





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








THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE




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TO MY WIFE



PREFACE

The World War, entering its thirty-fourth month, as these lines are written, has had three distinct phases, both on the military side and on the larger and more significant human side. The three military phases are supplied by the Marne campaign and its immediate consequences; the Russian campaign, with its Balkan episode and its Verdun ending; the Allied offensive in the west, which began at the Somme in July, 1916, and is still proceeding before Arras and along the old Aisne battlefield.

In the Marne campaign Germany sought a complete triumph by a swift and terrible thrust at France, the only one of her foes then in any sense prepared for war. Her thrust was parried at the Marne and permanently blocked at the Yser and at Ypres. Thereafter she had to turn east and restore the failing fortunes of Austria and protect her own imperilled marches.

In the Russian campaign Germany sought to dispose of Russia, as she had endeavoured to dispose of France in the Marne campaign. Immediate success escaped her in this field. Despite terrible defeats and long retreats, Russian resistance was not broken, although the Russian Revolution, now the main factor on the eastern front and unmistakably a consequence of Russian defeat,

gives to the German campaign of 1915 a value that was not perceived at the time. What the permanent value will be remains problematical. But as she had to turn east, with her western task incomplete in 1914, Germany had, after a brief and glorious campaign on behalf of her Turkish ally, to return west in February, 1916, and seek at Verdun what she had not attained on the Marne. Her failure there cost her the initiative and condemned her to the defensive.

The campaign which opened at the Somme is still proceeding. Since they began their attack on July 1, 1916, the Allies have steadily, if only slowly, pushed the Germans back and the recent victory of Arras demonstrates that the British army has at last reached a high state of efficiency, while there are signs, far from conclusive to be sure, of a decline in German morale. At all events, the Germans remain on the defensive and the end of this third phase has not come.

Looking now to the broader horizon, it will be perceived that here, too, there are three aspects. In its inception, in the first months of battle, the conflict still seemed to men, not alone of neutral nations but of involved nations, one more war, greater and more terrible than all past wars, but a war comparable to them in origin and purpose.

But as the struggle progressed, it brought more and more clearly to the eyes of men of all nations, save those of Central Europe, the truth that the German attack was something more than a bid for world power; comparable with that of France under Napoleon or Louis XIV, of Spain under Charles V. It became clear that Germany was not attacking armies or nations alone, but also the whole fabric of our common civilization and all the precepts and doctrines of humanity, which represent the slow progress up-

ward from barbarism.

The invasion of Belgium shocked the whole world. The crimes committed by German soldiers in Belgium and northern France, crimes not belonging to the order of excesses incident to war, but crimes ordered by commanding officers for the deliberate purpose of terrifying a helpless population and disarming men by the brutality practised upon women and children, these slowly but surely inclined the balance of neutral opinion against Germany. At first these brutal and bestial crimes only gave new heart and new determination to the nations directly assailed, but in the end they earned for Germany the condemnation of neutral nations the world over.

In its third phase there came, together with the growing anger and detestation of German violence and the clearer perception of the danger of Germanism to all civilization, the recognition that the war was, after all, one more stand of autocracy against democracy, that in its essence the German thing, already become abominable in the sight of all the non-German world, was the final expression of militarism, which had its origin in caste and Crown; that the "Superman" was only the old tyrant in a new disguise.

In this stage we have seen the Russian Revolution and the entrance of our own country into the war. The clearest definition of the war, as it is now seen everywhere save in the Central Empires, has been supplied by the President of the United States in that document which determined in fact, if not tech-

nically, American enlistment.

In succeeding volumes I shall endeavour to set forth the development of this world verdict upon German purposes and German methods. In the present volume, I have sought merely to outline the events preceding the war and the first campaigns in the struggle. Not until the first phase was completed had the real character of German menace been established, save in the minds of the French and Belgians on whose soil German armies had written their history of shame. Not until the war had entered its second phase was there apparent that spirit which was to dominate the councils and arm the spirit of the nations allied against Germany. Not until that hour was it to take on, consciously, in the minds of millions, the character of a crusade, a concerted defence of civilization against a new barbarism, which combined the science of the head with barbarism of the heart, the weapons of the Twentieth Century with the spirit of Attila.

And, conversely, when the war did take on this new character it became something different from all wars of which we have trustworthy record—a war fought not for territorial gain or battlefield success, but a war fought between two ideas, two conceptions of life, of civilization, of humanity; two faiths, of which there can be room for but one in this world, since each is utterly destructive of the other.

Tardily, perhaps, but completely in the end, we in America, far removed as we are from the European world, have perceived the issues of the war. Instinc-



tively the mass of men and women, the plain people of the United States, like those of Britain and France, have prevailed over the wisdom of politicians and the doubts of statesmen. Late, but not too late, the nation which had Lexington and Concord in its own history, recognized that neutrality was impossible when a new battle for democracy was going forward. And almost at the same moment there has been heard, broken as yet and uncertainly, a new voice in Germany, repeating something of the words that now fill the world outside of the Central

Empires Whatever be the outcome of the war, at least it is certain now that even German things will never be again what they were when Prussian militarism crushed Belgium under an iron heel and German necessity thrust its bayonet through international good faith and common humanity.

My acknowledgments are due both to the French and to the British Governments and General Staffs for the courtesy which permitted me to visit their armies and their battlefields, among others the Marne, Nancy, Champagne, and the Somme, escorted by officers who explained the actions, and for the kindness and frankness with which they supplied all information at their disposal. To the interest of the President of France I owe my opportunity to visit Verdun and to meet General Petain during the great battle, and to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig I am indebted for the chance to see the British army and to meet its Commander-in-Chief just before the battle of Arras and to look eastward from Mont St. Eloi at Vimy Ridge, soon to fall to Canadian valour. Nor should I fail to acknowledge here my gratitude to General Dubois, Governor of Verdun, who twice welcomed me to his ruined city and permitted me to visit Fort de Vaux, newly reconquered from the German Crown Prince.

On one other point I desire to make an explanation; the absence of any discussion of naval operations from my narrative is not due to any failure on my part to appreciate the greatness or the importance of the work performed by the fleets, and in an overwhelming majority of cases by the British fleet, but to the fact that it was agreed at the outset that the history of the naval operations of the war should be written for a later volume. The subject is of too great importance to be crowded in the space at my disposal in this volume.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Upper Montclair, New Jersey, May 1, 1917.



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
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INTRODUCTION

By ALBERT SHAW

The records of what we call "civilization" are largely devoted to a series of periods or historical epochs, marked by such intensity of action and such profound changes that the effects have a permanent bearing. Such effects in their turn become causes, and bring about still further events and changes. It is indeed true that in the more uneventful stretches of historic time there are silent forces and influences always at work, and that these are recognized by students of national life or of world history as things necessary to be understood. But such influences and forces often operate obscurely, and are not estimated at their full value until they have become revealed in the light of startling events in some new period of intense action.

Thus, in the background of the upheavals that produced the American and French revolutions, are to be found the new movements in navigation and trade due to the discovery and colonization of undeveloped parts of the world. And also, in the background, lies the breakdown of feudalism, with the spread of the new doctrines of human rights and of political liberty. The economic and political changes following that intense period at the end of the Eighteenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth century have been so extensive in their areas, and so vast in their statistical aggregates, that they almost

baffle analysis and computation.

Out of that intense period there emerged the typical representative democracy that was destined within a century or more to become the prevailing form of political association among men. There emerged from that period the modern ideals of local, national, and international life, as swayed by the intelligence of the masses. "Public opinion" became a recognized institution, so that its necessary instruments—the right of public assembly and the liberty of the press—were safeguarded in constitutions and laws. Invention and discovery also became recognized agents of social progress; and through these agents, within a century, the civilized nations had achieved an economic emancipation that was giving to the many what had been available to the privileged few alone in the Eighteenth Century.

It has been true, however, of all historical progress, that conflicting influences are always present and that forward movements must fight their way, sometimes suffering retardation and temporary defeat. The leading minds of the American and French revolutions had a conception not merely of the rights of man as related to the government and growth of separate nations, but

they also had in mind the establishment of universal peace through a federation of states or nations, and through a subjection of purely national ambitions to the larger and better aims of civilization as a whole. It was hoped and believed that these great conceptions might be realized through their strong appeal to the growing intelligence of mankind.

It was thought that the masses of men, acquiring enough education to read and think and take part in the government of communities and states, would firmly renounce so barbaric a thing as the use of force in the settlement of differences between nations. It was believed that those ideas and methods which had triumphed in the establishment of the United States would in due time have the effect of democratizing and unifying the peoples of Europe. Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and other Americans believed that the Western Hemisphere should, in so far as possible, keep aloof and develop the principles of democracy and confederation until Europe, influenced by American success, might also adopt full democratic methods in the government of states and nations, and might substitute some form of confederation for the military alliances and the "balance of power" principle that must inevitably lead to periodic wars.

Unfortunately, however, several great forces of human progress that were stimulated in that period of revolutions set forth upon their careers at unequal rates of movement. Universal education, as one of these forces, intensified devotion to the language, the history, the ideals, and the aspirations of particular nations. Thus national unity and progress became a passionate object of endeavour—in Germany, for instance, then in Italy, then in Russia, and in many of the smaller principalities and racial or political entities. Hungary had evolved an intense national consciousness, Poland had awakened, Bohemia had begun to demand a distinctive future, and the people of the Balkan regions in particular had experienced an almost unprecedented evolution of political and racial ambition.

This exaggerated nationalism could be ascribed above all else to the facts and the methods of universal education. The rapid forming of the reading and writing habit within a period of two or three generations was certain to promote nationalism and strengthen language barriers, and thus for a time at least to weaken the larger cause of unity and harmony among nations.

Furthermore, the great forces of invention and scientific discovery that were set at work were producing many consequences that could not have been foreseen. In some decades they encouraged vast migrations, while in others they produced conditions that checked the export of men and promoted the export of commodities. These discoveries abolished epidemics and resulted in the total increase of the population of civilized countries by from one hundred per cent. to two hundred per cent. in a very short period. The application of

science to industry had enabled this expanding population to produce vastly increased supplies of the necessities and luxuries of life.

In the industrialized nations which possessed or could secure supplies of iron and coal, and which could make and use machinery while having the technical ability to produce cloths of cotton, wool, silk, and linen on a large scale, the output of manufactured articles increased in something like a geometrical ratio. But, on the other hand, the production of articles of food necessary to sustain the industrial population went forward at an arithmetical rate, or even more slowly. The inevitable consequence of these two major facts in the conditions of Europe's economic production was an enormous growth of foreign trade. Regions that less than a hundred years ago had been almost wholly agricultural, except for the local and household industries that had supplied shelter, clothing, and the ordinary utensils and implements, had now become so transformed that more than three-quarters of the people were engaged in commerce and manufactures.

The products of their industry were sold throughout the world, and the question of markets had become vital. They were obliged to study the customs and the wants of Asia and Africa, as well as of North and South America and the various parts of Europe, and to awaken new wants and help form new habits and customs, for the sake of enlarged markets. They were obliged in return to import vast supplies of raw material to feed their factories, and increasing quantities of food materials from the temperate zones and the tropics, to provide the workers with bread and meat, fruits and spices, tea, coffee, and cocoa.

This had necessitated a correspondingly large increase in the tonnage of merchant shipping. It had transformed the new nationalism that had resulted from popular education into a nationalism of trade rivalry that extended to the remote parts of the earth. The growth of overseas commerce, and the increase in the number and importance of merchant ships, made the freedom of the ocean highways a matter of anxious concern to governments. The doctrine of naval expansion and power was proclaimed and justified on the ground of commercial necessity.

Let us take the growth of Germany as an illustration. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, what is now the German Empire had a population of less than 25,000,000. A hundred years later, at the outbreak of the Great War of 1914, this population had grown to nearly 70,000,000. As recently as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-'71, the German population was only a little more than 40,000,000. At that time German industry was not highly developed as compared with that of England or France. But it became the policy of the new German Empire to promote scientific and technical education and to stimulate the growth of German manufactures of all kinds. The success of this policy was so great that Germany became increasingly able to compete

everywhere with the manufactures of other countries. German migration to America practically ceased because there was ample employment in the home country. This meant, in simple terms, that besides an average increase in the standards of living and the conditions of German communities, which absorbed much of the new production of goods, there had come to be a population of many millions on German soil who were dependent in normal times upon trade with the outside world.

What was so true of Germany, was in greater or less measure true of other industrial nations. That is to say, an increasing percentage of their population was engaged in the production of articles which required international markets in contrast with domestic markets.

The period of discovery, in the Sixteenth Century and later, had been followed by the growth of commercial or trading empires, notably those of Spain, England, France, Portugal, and Holland. One of the aims of the revolutionary period of the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries had been to break up these empires and create a series of democracies. Thus the United States was created out of great strips of British, French, and Spanish commercial domain. The Latin-American republics in due time deprived Spain and Portugal of most of their acquisitions of the earlier period. Great Britain, as an island nation, and as the earliest of the countries to attain modern industrial development and large export trade, had been driven to the policy of naval supremacy. This unwavering devotion to the idea of a vastly superior navy, conjoined with Great Britain's acceptance of the principle of colonial self-government and democracy, had been effective in keeping the British Empire from falling apart, and in adding greatly to its extent when Africa came to be subdivided among the European powers.

Great Britain, after the American Revolution, gave up the old idea of the commercial or trading empire, which meant the exploiting of colonies to their own detriment and to the exclusion of the trade of other countries. England in due time gave to her own colonies full liberty of commerce and industry; and she also opened her home trade and the trade of her colonies to the competing trade of her European rivals. Nevertheless, the industries and commerce of England doubtless derived a certain measure of advantage from the political relations between the mother country and the outlying parts of the empire.

This position of the British Empire, viewed with just and temperate judgment, did not greatly menace the peace and harmony of the world, and it did not obstruct either the process of democratic evolution or that of the internationalization of trade and commerce. But it made the British Empire so ubiquitous, as it were—so omnipresent at every point of international rivalry or of local transition—that the danger of serious clash with other growing empires was illustrated by one incident after another. Thus, for a period of

years there was misunderstanding between England and Russia, because of Russia's vast territorial expansions in Central Asia that seemed to threaten England's control of India. There were differences between England and France, over respective spheres of influence in Africa.

 Π

Precisely as England's historic position had compelled her to adhere to the policy of naval supremacy, so Germany's historic position in the heart of Europe had led her to the maintenance of a policy of militarism. The conception of a nation which could at will turn all its energies and forces from the pursuits of peace to the achievement of victory in war has been entertained intelligently by a certain number of minds in many different countries. But Germany is the only modern country which has so ordered her affairs as to be the stronger for war by reason of every access of strength for the pursuits of peace. It would be useless for us to consider whether Germany originally adopted the military ideal through fear of powerful neighbours and the need of self-defence, or whether the German race is inherently militant and aggressive. It had usually been thought that the Germans were naturally peace-loving and contented, and the world had been disposed to praise them greatly for their educational and scientific progress and their many contributions to culture and civilization.

After the unification of Germany, following the war with France and the smaller wars of the Bismarckian period, there came the rapid growth of industry and commerce to which I have referred. Germany began to assume the rôle of the leading power within the European system. France strove for recuperation and formed an alliance with Russia. Germany secured Austria and Italy as allies, but relied mainly upon her own military prowess for protection against the Gallo-Slavic combination. In a country like England, military ideals were obsolete, and the army was considered as an emergency police force, somewhat necessary but an expensive adjunct of government. The island boundaries of the United Kingdom were fixed by Nature, and were not to be changed. The relations of the United Kingdom with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, were increasingly those of mutual helpfulness and voluntary cooperation. The future of India was to be determined by the developing capacity of the Indian peoples for mutual tolerance and for maintaining just and beneficent political institutions. Speaking generally, the British people conceived of their empire as a thing in harmony with world progress, and not as a thing that was blocking the rightful progress of any other nation or race.

But if the British Empire on its part was a finished affair, subject to peaceful decentralization through the growth of the oversea dominions, it was quite otherwise with the German Empire. The British army was a small, professionalized body of soldiers. "Tommy Atkins," the English private, was in no sense a civilian or an ordinary citizen. But the German army was in an almost complete sense the nation itself. There was an exception, however, which was fraught with a danger that even yet is not wholly understood. This exception lay in the great body of highly trained German officers. These army officers were soldiers and not civilians. Their training for every grade and rank of commissioned military service was serious, intense, extremely

intelligent.

This permanent military caste was imbued with the doctrine of sheer force for the advancement of a nation's ends; and the progress and dominance of the nation was for them the supreme ethical law. Comprised within this great body of permanent trained officers was a vast system or mechanism for training all the young men of the nation, as they reached the suitable age, to serve the country as soldiers. The system was carefully adjusted to promote rather than injure the industrial and commercial advancement of the nation. The well-educated young men could be returned to civil life within a year, while intensive training for two or three years made the country bumpkin or the village boy a more valuable civilian than he otherwise would have been. Thus while German militarism employed this twofold system, one for the development of the great body of professional officers, and the other for the disciplining of young civilians, there were also the specialized groups under the Army General Staff, such as the engineering and technical groups and those concerned with international military intelligence. Through these specialists all the progress of Germany and of other countries in mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering was so adapted as to be available for military purposes.

At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, the population of Germany and France was almost equal, being about 40,000,000 each. That of the United Kingdom was somewhat more than 30,000,000. In a period of forty years following that war, the population of France had remained almost unchanged, while the British Islands had surpassed France and contained about 45,000,000 inhabitants. Germany, on her part, had increased in numbers to a total somewhat less than 70,000,000. German industry, meanwhile, had made a far more rapid relative development than had the population, so that Germany was not only able to throw the nation quickly upon a war footing with 10,000,000 trained men under arms, but her great workshops could supply vast quantities of guns and munitions, while her chemical industries could provide new kinds of explosives and war materials, and her railroads, which had been built from the strategic as well as the commercial standpoint, were ready to serve ends and objects that had been carefully planned in advance.

France, Russia, Italy, and Austria were also on the basis of general military training and service; but in no other country were the collective resources of the nation so readily convertible into terms of immediate military efficiency as

in Germany. There were relatively few men in Europe, and still fewer in America, who could understand in advance what this convertibility of national power into terms of immediate military efficiency might mean in case of the sudden outbreak of a general war. It was not until the recent great war in Europe was nearly three years old that there came to be any wide understanding of the nature and extent of Germany's stupendous superiority at the outset in national efficiency for war.

This adaptability of the nation's resources of men and of industry to the purposes of war had been created, in the first instance, because of Germany's historical position amidst the conflicting tribes and races of Europe. Russia occupied vast territories, her population was soon to reach the 200,000,000 mark, she also had a system of general military service and a large body of professional officers, but her industrial resources were comparatively undeveloped. While Russia was dreaming her Pan-Slavic dream, Germany was looking forward to what she deemed her inevitable conflict with the Franco-Russian alliance. France also was highly militarized, but the Germans, weighing all military resources in the aggregate, regarded their own efficiency as at least twice as great as that of the French.

Thus as Germany grew in a sense of military primacy, her body of professional officers also grew in the conviction that a blow should be struck before Russian resources of science and industry should develop enough to enable Russia to maintain large armies over considerable periods of time. Furthermore, as Germany's foreign commerce increased, her ambitions expanded and she began to conceive of her destinies as something more than those of leadership within the continent of Europe. England, with 45,000,000 people in the home islands, controlled a vast empire in all continents and in all seas. Germany, with 70,000,000, was now outstripping England in quantity and variety of industrial products and was rapidly contesting England's primacy in merchant marine. Germany began to demand her "place in the sun." As her sense of military and commercial power increased, her national pride assumed aggressive and arrogant forms. Although Germany accused John Bull of a traditional arrogance, the facts show that in the main there was a surprising readiness on England's part to recognize Germany's progress and to admit German merchants everywhere on equal terms.

Fear, rather than arrogance, however, is at the root of much discord and conflict between nations as between individuals. Germany feared that the vast merchant fleet needful to carry her expanding commerce might at some critical time suffer unless protected by a great navy. England, on the other hand, feared lest Germany, already dominant on land by reason of her superior army, might at some juncture destroy the British Empire if to Germany's military machine there was also added the power of a German navy approaching that of England in extent. Thus Britain was led to lay aside all differences

with France and then with Russia, and to arrange for the combined use of the English and French fleets, while England also began to construct new warships and to revolutionize the world's navies in size and character.

III

Thus the modern world, as set upon its course by the mental and physical forces culminating in the American and French revolutions, had made vast progress in different kinds and degrees, and these different kinds of progress had been accelerated at very different rates of speed. The European masses had within a century been transformed from illiterate serfs and yokels to a body of more than four hundred millions of people who could read and write, take some part in government, and entertain with dangerous prejudices as well as with enthusiastic devotion those concepts making up what we call "patriotism." Several hundred million people who had never read at all were suddenly reading newspapers and bringing collective pressure to bear upon public policies. They were evolving great states like Germany and Italy out of fragmentary entities, and they were fusing populations into large, aspiring nationalities. They were doing all this within the circumscriptions of many different languages; and with mistaken ideas as to race origins and the historic background of European peoples. Thus the spirit of nationalism could but become excessive and therefore dangerous.

Furthermore, the population of the world within a brief period had increased from an estimated one thousand millions to an estimated one thousand five hundred millions, the relative increase being greatest in the highly civilized and industrialized countries, France being the only exception. Not only had population increased in the total, but it had shifted in its groupings from rural pursuits to those of industrialized towns and cities. The population movements had been accompanied by ever more intensified forms of industry, with an immense advancement in the earning power of the average man when expressed in terms of the comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life. And such altered conditions within national boundaries had of necessity been accompanied by almost incomprehensible increases in the volume and variety of international commerce, necessitating the multiplication of merchant ships. These changes—wrought within the period of a century—were the most stupendous, both in kind and in degree, that had come about during any century within the recorded history of the human race.

The growth of international commerce had created countless ties and relationships across the boundary lines of states. Science and education had found many ways to communicate and to coöperate. But whereas there had been developing a network of voluntary association and intercourse among the peoples of different nations, there had been a failure to secure the harmony and coöperation of governments, which was the one thing supremely needful. The powerful nations had intensified the danger arising from unregulated nationalism by entering belatedly upon an unwise policy of imperialism in rivalry with one another. If two great nations like the United States and Great Britain, possessing a common language and many other bonds of unity and agreement, had at times found it hard to avoid conflict and to reconcile differences arising from policies of expansion or empire or trade, how much harder must it have been for Russia and Austria-Hungary to avoid conflict and reconcile differences when, in addition to national separateness of languages and tradition, there were added the rivalries of imperial policy between two great governments each of which was seeking overlordship of the lands that had once constituted European Turkey.

The Turkish Empire at the time of its greatest extent had held in subjection various lands and nationalities of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. The forces of progress that became so accelerated with the revolutionary period at the end of the Eighteenth Century came to the aid of the western nations as against the decayed despotism of Turkey. Greece, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria emerged as European peoples and began to struggle for boundaries, for seaports, for future security, as their people became intelligent and infused with an intense spirit of national ambition.

Inevitably Turkish authority was superseded in Egypt and the Barbary States, through the commercial and colonizing energy of the western European powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary were increasingly convinced that in the further disintegration of the old Turkish Empire they must be recognized in an exceptional way and must be allowed by Russia, Great Britain, and France to acquire an undisputed influence from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Not only was Turkey collapsing, but Persia had become subject to the commercial energy and political influence of the European empires, Russia and England having substituted spheres of Persian influence for what at one time had seemed a dangerous competition. Germany's capacity, meanwhile, for taking a large part in the commercial and economic development of the world, was increasing more rapidly than that of any other European nation. With this growth of capacity, as I have already explained, came the increasing need of markets. German advance agents saw in the undeveloped regions of Asiatic Turkey, and beyond, a great opportunity for obtaining many products and materials needed in Germany, with the prospective opportunity of developing in those regions a large and permanent market for German wares. The Bagdad Railroad was projected as a part of a much larger scheme.

In furtherance of this larger ambition for an economic and political confederation extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, German diplomatic and military influence had for a long time been at work in Constantinople to gain a dominating place in the councils of the Turkish Government.

The alliance with Austria-Hungary was a necessary part of the great project. It was further needful for Germany that Austrian rather than Russian influences should guide the destinies of the smaller Balkan states which lay between

the Teutonic empires and the Turkish domains.

The importance of the Balkan and Turkish struggles of recent years, and of the bitter feud between Austria and Serbia over the annexation of Bosnia by the Vienna government, can only be understood when one has in mind the great projects upon which German policy was embarked. Austria had made a bitter enemy of Serbia when she had destroyed that dream of a "greater Serbia" which required Bosnia and a part of the Adriatic coast for its principal fulfillment. The assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne gave Austria her pretext for an attack that was expected to secure control of necessary river and rail routes to Turkey. Russia, on the other hand, saw her dream of control at Constantinople endangered, together with her plans for further "peaceful penetration" of Persia and of the Turkish provinces south of the Black Sea.

Germany was prepared to support Austria to the utmost, while Russia felt herself compelled to take the field on behalf of Serbia. It was fully realized by Germany that France must support Russia. It was not believed in Germany that Great Britain would be involved, and it was expected that Italy would remain neutral while perhaps rendering a certain amount of moral aid to her allies, Germany and Austria. The British on their part had not foreseen the danger, and were quite unprepared. The critical condition of the Irish question rendered it the more certain from Germany's standpoint that England could not bring military aid to France. Russia had entered upon large plans of military preparation, but these were not to culminate for two or three years. Germany, on the other hand, had immensely increased and strengthened her war machine several years before.

From the German standpoint, the fateful hour had arrived. Germany had full equipment for at least five times as large an army as Russia could at once supply with arms and munitions. Austria-Hungary might be regarded as almost, if not quite, able to cope with Russia, while Germany, moving swiftly against France, could bring the entire war to an end within a few weeks—prob-

ably by October and certainly before Christmas, 1914.

The boundary-line between Germany and France was barely two hundred miles long, extending from Belgium to Switzerland along the border of Alsace-Lorraine. This stretch of boundary was strongly fortified on both sides. The easiest way to France from the southern parts of Germany and from Austria was through the edge of Switzerland. The easiest way to France from central and northern Germany was across Belgium. But Belgium had, for the greater part of a century, been under the protection of a solemn guarantee of neutrality signed in successive treaties, Germany, France, and Great Britain being parties

to the agreement. France was not prepared for an attack by way of Belgium; and the German law of "military necessity" prescribed an attack upon your enemy by the path which your enemy has left unguarded, despite treaties.

In choosing this path, Germany failed to understand the Belgians themselves. It was expected that they would protest, but it was not expected that they could make war. Germany had expected to use Belgian railways and highways so swiftly as to make it certain that there could be no advance of the French forces to make formidable resistance until the German armies were moving upon Paris. Belgium was to be fully indemnified and rewarded for having suffered under duress the passage of the German forces.

An even greater mistake of calculation was Germany's confidence in the inability of the government and people of Great Britain to drop the Irish question and unite in supporting a declaration of war. Belgium's resistance had delayed the movement of the great German war machine, and had given the French time to save Paris while the Russians were invading East Prussia. The British, meanwhile, were coming resolutely to the aid of the French army; and what was to have been a short war was inevitably changed to a long one. What was to have been a single brilliant campaign, with peace terms based upon unqualified victory, had been of necessity transformed into a supreme struggle of years, destined to involve the whole world for reasons not so much of sheer material force as of moral conviction.

IV

In these introductory observations, I am not anticipating the great narrative that will be found so well related by Mr. Simonds in the chapters and volumes that are herewith presented. I am dealing, rather, with some of the underlying causes of the conflict and with some of the principles involved as bearing not only upon the conditions that I have already endeavoured to describe, but also upon the further progress of human society. It was not at first so clearly a war of principles. Opposing doctrines were not so sharply in conflict as to be clearly seen through all the complicated factors that had entered into the struggle in such fashion as to confuse the underlying issues. Gradually it was seen that this was a war to bring harmony into the world on principles of justice and freedom, and to create an organization of the world's public opinion that should be stronger for peace and order than any single empire or alliance could be for attaining its ends through military power.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had been harsh and peremptory beyond all modern precedents. Its principal objects and aims were unquestionably supported at Berlin, regardless of the details. The thing intended was to bring Serbia under the sway of the allied Teutonic powers. Not only must Austria's annexation of Bosnia no longer be questioned, but Serbia herself must become a vassal state, or ultimately a portion of a South-Slav member of

the Austro-Hungarian confederation. If the terms of the ultimatum had been accepted in full, Serbia would have yielded up certain attributes of independence and sovereignty that Austrian and German policy would never have allowed her to recover. Her answer had to be made very quickly by the terms of the ultimatum. She must yield without resistance, or she must make a stand for her own distinct future and for the rights of small nationalities.

If Serbia had yielded, the pretexts for an immediate war would have been removed; the projects of political and economic assimilation throughout the Balkans and Turkey would have been pressed forward by the Teutonic Empires and tremendous preparations would have been made on both sides for the great postponed European war, that should determine whether Russian or German influences were to become predominant in southeastern Europe and western Asia.

If under England's leadership the issues between Austria and Serbia could have been referred to the Hague Tribunal for settlement, the immediate peace might have been preserved. Furthermore, it was the hope of the friends of peace throughout the world that with every postponement of war the influences and forces that were trying to build up international methods for preventing conflict would gain strength, so that the truce maintained by the "balance of power" might by degrees become transformed into an assured and constructive peace based upon world organization.

This desired transition, however, was not destined to come about. Even the non-aggressive nations were reluctant to trust their destinies to an untried kind of world union for peace-keeping and common humanitarian ends. They were living in a world that had been transformed by modern science, industry, commerce, and education, while dangerously obsolete in its political structure.

Germany had not become formidable through her martial spirit and prowess alone, nor alone through her expansion of industry at home and of trade abroad. Her power had been developed through the marvellous union of these two things. With the growth of her power, her world ambition had become more far-reaching and more daring. And she had come to believe that she was being deprived by other ambitious nations and races of opportunities in the world justly commensurate with her extraordinary attainments in education, science, industry, and social order.

Nations and races that had believed they could make better use of lands, resources, and facilities, than others in possession, have in all recorded time persuaded themselves that they are justified in using power to attain their ends, believing that ultimate results will give historic vindication. Thus the European colonists dispossessed the aboriginal races of North and South America. And thus the European governments have partitioned Africa among themselves, while at times menacing the integrity of China and laying hands upon whatsoever portions of Asia they could secure by one means or another.

Germany's belated arrival as an aspirant for world empire was attended with the highest degree of moral and physical preparation for the unrestrained use of force in the attainment of objects that the world had known in recent times. Only two remedies for this condition were possible; and neither could be applied quickly or peaceably. One possible remedy lay within the German nation itself, and this could have come about only by a social revolution.

The vast military machine was not to be rendered meekly subordinate to a civilian society led by Social Democrats like Liebknecht. The army and navy—that is to say, the immense body of professional officers—had joined hands with the great captains of industry and of commerce to gain control of the German mind and to shape German policy. The older publicists of Germany were forgotten. The universities and technical schools were now controlled by the exponents of the new doctrines of German destiny and supremacy. German nationalism had grown into German imperialism; and the idea of leadership in central Europe had expanded to the principle of leadership throughout the world. There was no counteracting sentiment in Germany of sufficient strength to bring about a rejection of these views and policies.

The other remedy, outside of Germany, was almost equally impossible. Nationalism had also been assertive in other lands; and imperialism had infected national policy elsewhere than in Germany, even if in lesser degrees.

The doctrines and policies of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who believed profoundly in the value to backward regions of British regulation and British justice, have been discussed throughout His Majesty's realms with entire freedom and candour. It is enough to say that the South African War and the annexation of the two small Boer Republics, taken together with Mr. Chamberlain's plans for imperial federation involving preferential tariffs, had a great influence upon the German mind.

As a sequel to the Boer War, there came the Union of South Africa, with a constitution of the most liberal kind under which the Boers were given every opportunity for self-determined progress that reasonable men could desire. No finer tributes, whether in action or in word, have ever been paid by defeated leaders to their conquerors than those that the Boer generals Botha and Smuts have paid during the recent war period in which they have rendered such conspicuous service to the British cause.

Germany could not, or would not, understand. Through a long term of years, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman as Premier, then Mr. Asquith, and at length Mr. Lloyd-George himself, with Foreign Ministers like Sir Edward Grey, had represented an England that stood for democracy at home and abroad and that held out the olive branch to all nations—not the least to Germany—in the desire for a world of harmony along lines of justice, progress, and good understanding.

I might continue with further allusions to the growth in colonial empire

of the French Republic, so bitterly resented by Germany and so much contributing to that crystallization of German policy that I have already characterized. Within the volumes to which these observations of mine are introductory, will be found a chapter explaining the growth of the greater France in Asia and Africa and its status at the outbreak of the war of 1914. I might also allude to the process of Russification that had been sweeping over vast areas in central Asia, extending southward through Persia and Mesopotamia, and embracing Mongolia and much of Manchuria. A conspectus of the growth of the Russian Empire as it stood in 1914 will also be given for convenient reference in these volumes. It is enough for me to remark that Russia's power to acquire political control over Asiatic regions and to assimilate Asiatic peoples had aroused the attention of all intelligent observers, and had led Germany and Austria to look forward with no little anxiety to a time when Russia's ability to put twenty million or thirty million men in the field might be attended by a corresponding ability to equip such vast armies with the necessary arms and munitions, and to maintain them on southern and western fighting fronts.

The example of the United States in expelling Spain from Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, and in acquiring the Hawaiian Islands, had been used in Germany in a manner that wholly failed to recognize the motives, methods, and objects of the American people. Germany had regarded the United States as, like herself, one of the newer industrial nations, with an inevitable tendency toward economic and political expansion. Germany, on her own part, had desired to acquire the Philippines, and had looked forward to obtaining bases in the West Indies and colonies, perchance, on the mainland

of South America.

Democracy in America, like democracy in England, was fully able to check imperialism and to transform the doctrines of possession and exploitation into those of guardianship and tutelage. American sentiment had become almost too eager to cut the Philippines adrift. The efforts of the United States to create a system of education in the Philippines, to reform agriculture, to establish security and justice in the daily affairs of life, to train the people in local self-government, and to give them political institutions for permanent insular self-rule, had been remarkably successful.

But Germany could only see that the United States was attaining a position of larger influence and scope in the outer world, at a time when the southern and western parts of the American republic, together with Alaska, still afforded ample opportunity for the growth of population and the development of resources. Germany, with a greatly restricted home area, was second to the United States alone in the volume of her industry, and ahead of the United States in some forms of manufacture and commerce. Furthermore, Germany had seen the United States fortify as well as construct the

Panama Canal, acquiring dominant influence in Central America and the Caribbean Sea, while England had been constantly strengthening her naval and political authority along the Suez route, in the Red Sea, in Egypt, and in Persia.

V

Such was the world in which Germany felt it necessary to make her way. first by an unexampled training of her people and development of her industry and commerce, and second by devising a wholly unexampled convertibility of human and industrial resources into the instrumentalities of war. Democratic transformation from within was impossible under these conditions. possible, on the other hand, for the democracies of England, America, and France to have taken Germany so freely and generously into a partnership for developing the resources and trade of the world—while restricting land and sea armaments and organizing the nations for peace—as to have won the great victory for civilization? The essential factors of progress characterizing the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries had been international, and therefore indivisible by political boundaries. Could the rivalries of the nations have been modified, and the dangers of nationalism gradually reduced and removed, if America, Great Britain, and France had set more consistent examples? believe the records will show that each of these three great countries had actually endeavoured to do full justice to Germany in every respect.

Mighty as the economic progress of the world has been through the application of steam and electricity to industry, the discoveries of chemistry, and the use of railroads and steamships, by far the greater advancement has come about through intellectual and spiritual changes. Serfs have been made into freemen. Margins of leisure have been earned for countless millions by the increase of abundance and the gradual extinction of poverty. The press, based upon the universal practice of reading and writing and the growth of public opinion, has intensified the nationalistic sentiment because it has made of the local idiom or vernacular the chief agency of enlightenment and progress.

In such a period of awakened nationalism and race consciousness, the principal safeguard against dangerous and devastating conflicts lay in the application to actual life everywhere of the doctrines of liberty and democracy. When freedom and equality had been established among the inhabitants of a given locality, and among the peoples using a common tongue and inhabiting a national area, it became increasingly probable that a democracy thus grounded in the doctrine of human rights would not maintain a governmental policy that looked toward the permanent subjection of other races or peoples. Unfortunately, governmental autocracy had survived up to the outbreak of the war of 1914, to a far greater degree in some countries and empires than in others. In this obvious historical fact lies the answer to the question I have proposed.

The great conflict seemed inevitable, in order that its reactions might bring about a much larger development of democracy within certain countries, while hastening the revision of imperial policies as regards certain other countries that were already democratic in many essential aspects. Germany had been disappointed in the recent diplomacy that had helped to shape the course of things in Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to the Mediterranean. She had not been appeased by the political development, during the previous twenty years, of affairs in the Pacific and the South Seas, nor of affairs in the Western Hemisphere. The course of events in central Asia and in the Far East had not encouraged her to believe that as against Russia, Japan, England, and France she could very rapidly gain a position of superiority.

Thus she became forced by the logic of facts to encourage Russia's ambitions in the Far East, in order to divert Russian energy from southeastern Europe and Turkey. While continuing as rapidly as possible to build a fleet that might in some juncture enable her to try issues with Great Britain, Germany became more fully convinced that her immediate future must be devoted to strengthening her relations with her ally, Austria-Hungary, and to obtaining economic and political ascendancy throughout the Turkish Empire. Thus it became her immediate object to consolidate her power on inner lines, penetrating Asia by railways, and building up an empire that should not be

dependent for its maintenance upon the security of navigation.

The precipitation of world war through the attack upon Serbia might have produced a more profound shock everywhere if its success had not been delayed by the exertions of the Serbians themselves and the swift mobilization of Russia. If Germany had not become so completely the victim of her own doctrine of power and of success through any means to attain ends, she would not have tried to reach Paris by way of Belgium. If she had been faithful to her joint guarantees of Belgian neutrality, and had merely resisted French invasion along the Alsace-Lorraine boundary, while using her supreme initiative to help Austria against Serbia and Russia, the immediate course of history would have been greatly changed. It is at least possible that England may have entered the conflict too late. It would seem that Austrian policy must have prevailed in Serbia and the Balkans. Russia could not have stood out against Germany; Italy could not have become involved in the war; France could hardly have sustained such temporary advances as she might have made in Alsace-Lorraine.

But the major conflict would have been merely postponed. France, Russia, and England would have been obliged to make enlarged military and naval preparations. Italy would have been compelled to reconsider her associations, and would probably have severed her connection with the Teutonic Empires and joined the Anglo-French entente. Germany felt that her chances were better in 1914 than in a postponed world struggle. She knew the exact status

of every army and navy in the world. The only thing she did not understand was the spirit and temper of the small nations with their own intense nationalism, and of the large democracies with their determination to have a world of safety and peace.

VI

Germany's trampling upon the treaty that had guaranteed Belgium's immunity from war was destined to become the keynote of the world struggle. Those who saw deepest into the situation perceived at once that if the right of Belgium to live at peace and determine her own destiny were not supported successfully, there could remain no real security for any other nation, however large and wealthy, unless it should henceforth espouse militarism as completely as Germany had done.

Why, then, did not the whole world arise at once in stern protest on behalf of Belgium? Why did not all neutrals join in an ultimatum to Germany? The answer is not difficult. The situation seemed to be wholly European. America, the most powerful of neutrals, had always endeavoured to keep aloof from struggles relating to the balance of power in Europe. Furthermore, the processes as provided for in advance seemed to be sufficient for the crisis. Russia and France were already fighting Germany, and England, as the remaining guarantor of Belgium, had immediately entered the struggle. At a later period it became clear enough that all neutrals might well have made protest, and might indeed well have contributed of their men and their resources to help Belgium and to vindicate the rights of neutral states in time of war. But events had moved swiftly, and there was no voice of great authority in the neutral world that was raised in potent leadership. Russia, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, seemed surprisingly efficient, while the battle of the Marne was regarded in England and France, and throughout the neutral world, as unquestionably the decisive action of the war, which must culminate in Germany's humiliation and in the fixing of terms of peace in the near future.

There was, indeed, the growth of a strong opinion against Germany because of her methods. She had permitted, probably instigated, the attack upon Serbia. She had violated the rights of Belgium. Though not organized for united action or for common expression, there was such a thing as the public opinion of the civilized world. And the verdict of this public opinion was against Germany for her choice of the path through Belgium. Belgium might, indeed, have made formal protest, declining to match her puny strength against Germany's armed hosts; and she might have accepted the proffered payments for incidental damage. But such acceptance would have made her the permanent vassal of Germany in case the war had not ended in complete German defeat. And if Germany had been defeated Belgium would have become either

a vassal of France or an outpost of England, or both. Furthermore, if Belgium had merely protested and then yielded, the future of Holland, Switzer-

land, and Denmark would have been imperilled.

Belgium's heroic resistance was made for the liberties of all those smaller states that had through generations of national life vindicated their right to exist and to be treated with respect. Holland and Switzerland armed themselves for defense, but they, too, in the opening campaigns, regarded the strength of the great powers arrayed against Germany as sufficient, especially after Italy had entered the war; and so they remained neutral until at length their positions had become increasingly difficult and it had become too late for them to assume belligerency. Germany's disregard of neutral rights, as shown by her attack upon Belgium, had cost her the support of the world's enlightened sentiment.

She brought herself under further condemnation by her ruthless methods in warfare. The nature of her conquest and occupation of Belgium will form the subject of a chapter or two supplemental to Mr. Simonds's main narrative in these volumes. The progress of civilization had gradually evolved many rules of conduct and relationship affecting both times of peace and times of war, that had come to be embodied in what we call international law. Such rules had been sanctioned by faithful observance in many cases constituting established precedents; and they had also been further strengthened by being written into a great number of treaties and agreements accepted by all nations. To limit the ravages of war, rules had been made regarding the treatment of the inhabitants of occupied districts. Other rules had related to the care of the wounded and to the services of medical relief. There were rules for the protection of unfortified places and of non-combatant people against needless injury of persons and property.

VII

War could not be otherwise than terrible and ruthless; yet it was believed that civilized nations were ready to confine its worst direct ravages to combatants and fortifications. It was believed that prisoners of war, civilians in conquered areas, non-combatant persons on the highways of the sea, the agents of mercy relieving the wounded and maintaining ambulance and hospital services, would henceforth be treated with scrupulous regard for accepted international rules. Again Germany illustrated the danger to the modern world of an unrestricted appeal to force for the attainment of national ambition, by a disregard, in many instances, of the humane code which German publicists themselves in times past had helped to formulate.

It is not my purpose to speak in any detail of atrocities charged against Germany in her treatment of the populations of Belgium and northern France, nor of the vandalism proved against her as respects monuments of architecture

and the private property of civilized peoples. This subject also will be duly presented in these volumes. Nor is it my purpose here to make an indictment of Germany for her terrifying air raids upon peaceful places in England, or for her other shocking violations of international law in her methods of warfare. My object is to show that, quite regardless of the temptation or the provocation, the ruthlessness and frightfulness of Germany's warfare alarmed and aroused the entire civilized world. In degree at least this was proving itself to be wholly unlike any other war. Civilization was assaulted in the use of methods that all civilized nations had solemnly agreed not to employ.

These forbidden methods employed by Germany to wear out her opponents and turn a threatened defeat into a deadlock or a partial victory, found their climax not—as had at first been expected—in the use of the Zeppelin aircraft, but in the use of submarines against the world's merchant shipping. England had entered the war with a vast navy, but with a very small army. She had used her navy to drive German merchant shipping from the seas and to "bottle up" the German navy itself in the German harbours. Quickly gaining full control of the ocean highways of trade, England, with the consent and assistance of France, determined to make the largest possible use against Germany of the means at her command. Germany was carrying on a vast commerce in all the ports of the world. And her own ports were visited by thousands of neutral ships.

Though England was not prepared for war with large land forces, her navy was ready and it was decided by the British Government that Germany must derive no military benefit from imports by way of the high seas. as contraband articles were concerned, there was no question of Britain's right to interfere with neutral traffic for Germany's benefit. There arose, however, certain questions of construction as regards the application of the principles of contraband to food and materials alleged to be for civilian use. There also arose questions regarding the principles and methods of blockade. For a considerable time the United States Government, in diplomatic notes exchanged with Great Britain, took the ground that the Orders in Council went beyond the bounds of international law as previously recognized. Great Britain, however, held firmly and resolutely to her positions, and the United States took no steps beyond the filing of legal arguments which might have a certain bearing upon the subsequent settlement of claims. Fundamentally, Germany had adopted the methods of an outlaw on land and of a pirate at sea, and Great Britain made her appeal to the common opinion of mankind.

It is true that Germany's submarine policy purported to be one of reprisal. The sinking of the Lusitania, with hundreds of women and children on board, was one of the most abhorrent crimes in all the annals of warfare. Such an

act bore no relation to anything that could have been recognized in international law as within the sphere of retaliation. As a result of the diplomatic controversy that ensued, Germany changed her submarine methods, and the United States postponed belligerent action. But subsequent events indicated that Germany had temporarily modified her submarine policy chiefly because she had found that it was not sufficiently effective. In the first place, she did not wish America drawn into the war; and, in the second place, she desired to build a great many more submarines in order ultimately to make victorious use of that dastardly weapon. When subsequently she resumed her U-boat ravages on a great scale and with results that for a time were gravely menacing. the United States was compelled to enter the war. Furthermore, the perspectives had wholly changed. The magnitude of Germany's preparations had become more evident. It was seen that the neutrals also had been in real danger, and that the British navy had represented the principles of justice and security on the oceans. Under these conditions, the arguments regarding the earlier British Orders in Council as affecting the rights of neutrals lost their interest and importance as pertaining to the major facts of the war, and remained merely as a part of the historical record for students of maritime international law.

The Germans had counted upon a short war, and after two years they became intensely anxious for a negotiated peace that would have left them with their military strength intact and with some very substantial gains especially in the completeness of their domination over the Balkans and Turkey. The Allies were not willing to consider any such compromises, and an attempt on President Wilson's part to bring about an end of hostilities by mediation proved to be unavailing. It was plain that the opposing views could not be reconciled.

With a vastly increased fleet of standard-built and improved submarines, to which new boats were being added weekly, Germany decided to resume her unrestricted attack upon commerce, and declared a blockade zone around the British islands and the Mediterranean coasts of France and Italy. It was hoped in vain by Americans that Germany would modify this announced policy before putting it into effect. But our prompt breaking off of diplomatic relations, as a first step, led to no results. Germany did not believe that the United States, in the status of a belligerent, could render the Allies any greater aid than she was already rendering them in sending them munitions and supplies. Germany believed that if she could greatly check this flow of supplies to England and France, by a new submarine campaign of tenfold greater efficiency than the campaign of two years before, she might hope to frighten neutral ships away from the British coasts and to terrorize England into a willingness to enter a peace conference in the course of the summer of 1917.

This determination on Germany's part, interpreted logically, seemed to be

equivalent to the fixing of a status of belligerency as between Germany and the United States. President Willson so regarded it and declared himself to that effect in a message to Congress on April 2. Four days later America's

transition from neutrality to belligerency had been accomplished.

Meanwhile, the war itself had steadily progressed from its earlier character and objects, to a struggle in which the security and the future of all nations, in all parts of the world, were clearly concerned. Two or three years had not sufficed to transform equivalent numbers of people in other industrial countries into military organizations capable of withstanding the superb war machine of Germany. And while the Allied nations were trying to prepare themselves, Germany's previous preparation was shown to have put her enemies at a deadly disadvantage. If Germany could not win a clear and decided victory, neither could France and England, except by unspeakable sacrifices and with everincreasing aid and support from the rest of the world.

This situation had become intensified in its dangers, through the failure of Russia to meet the early expectations of France and Great Britain. Germany understood the Russian situation far better than did Russia's allies. There were dynastic and political influences in Russia relatively favorable to Germany, and in any case opposed to a prolonged war. At a time when Russia's vigorous action was most needed, on the east front, to support the predominance that France and England were gaining on the line extending across France from Flanders to Switzerland, Russia had virtually ceased to fight. Many causes that for a time will remain obscure were operating in Russia to bring about stupendous changes. Revolutionary movements that had been arrested after the war with Japan now began to assert themselves in new forms. The world was startled by the news that Petrograd was in the control of a revolution which the army had joined, that the Czar had been forced to abdicate, and that a provisional government was in temporary authority.

It was the paralysis of Russia for all immediate aid in the prosecution of the war against Germany, taken in conjunction with the submarine issue, that compelled the United States to enter the war. The history of the submarine issue was such as to lead the United States, on behalf of all neutrals, to take part in a war for the upholding of civilization. The failure of Russia to develop strength in what had been her own war against the Teutonic Powers was changing the issues, so that the world was entering upon a war for democratic freedom. Not to have supported France and the British Empire might have made possible a series of swift disasters by reason of which America would have become deeply involved in the near future. This would have meant extreme danger to the United States, with almost no military preparation to meet such danger, and with no strong friends capable of lending a helping hand.

America entered the war primarily to defend herself in a situation in which

her rights were involved and her future was becoming seriously endangered. She also entered it in support of the rights of neutrals, which had been increasingly menaced from the very beginnings of the conflict. In doing this she was the champion of all neutrals, and was without qualification entitled to their sympathy, and to such measure of their physical support as they were in position to render. The welfare of the world required prompt sacrifice upon the part of the United States, in the interest of all self-governing nations, and ultimately in the interest of Germany herself.

The nature and extent of the part that America was to play in the war could not be known at the moment when the fact of war was accepted. Great Britain and France had been making very large purchases of military and general supplies in the United States, and it was immediately arranged to furnish material aid in the form of large financial credits, thus making it possible to marshal American resources of food, steel, copper, and all sorts of prod-

ucts for the support of the armies that were already in the field.

The American Navy, though not as large as that of Germany and far smaller than that of Great Britain, was of the very best quality; and it was sent at once to support the Allies in the deadly struggle against the German submarines. Army enlargement by volunteer methods soon gave way to a draft system that ultimately registered—inclusive of those already enrolled as members of the army and navy—about twenty-five million names. Armies were organized and trained with surprising rapidity in great camps, and about three months after war was declared American troops began to arrive in Europe.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution, from which at first the Allies had hoped to derive military benefit, had degenerated into socialistic anarchy; and Germany had secured control of great areas formerly belonging to Russia, sweeping from Finland to the Black and Caspian seas and including also the conquest of Rumania. Great masses of German troops had been released from the eastern front for the culminating struggle in France. British and French losses through 1917 had been heavier than Americans had known; and the season had ended with a great reverse to the Italian army that had been fighting Austria. American forces were steadily accumulating in France, with a view to giving assistance when the campaign of 1918 should open.

An unprecedented attack upon the British lines in March and April, 1918, followed by a series of offensive movements, represented the high-water mark of German military power. The Channel Ports were threatened, and Paris was subjected to greater peril than at any time since the battle of the Marne in 1914. Under these circumstances the Government and people of the United States arose in a supreme effort to help meet the crisis. The Allies united their forces under the leadership of Marshal Foch; ships were chartered from

the ends of the earth, principally from the British merchant marine; American troops began to cross the sea through submarine-infested waters at the rate of 300,000 a month; Britain, France, and Italy took fresh courage as America supplied the needed reserves.

And so the tide was turned, and the culmination came with surprising rapidity. The surrender of Bulgaria was inevitably followed by the collapse and withdrawal of Turkey. Then came the disintegration of Austria and the acceptance of an armistice by the authorities of Austria-Hungary that gave the Allies every advantage for a flank attack upon Germany. Meanwhile, the British, French, and American armies had for several months been fighting a continuous battle—the greatest in world history—which ended in complete victory with the signing of the armistice of November 11, and the abdication of the German Emperor.

Not only had the aggressor who had staked everything on the assertion of force been humbled and subdued, but the larger principles at stake, involving the liberties of all peoples, had been fully vindicated. The peace that was assured by the signing of the armistice was avowedly conditioned upon a series of noble principles and specific aims that President Wilson had set forth, and that the Allied governments in conference at Versailles had made their own. It was agreed that the common efforts of the Allies and America were to result in the forming of a society of nations that would protect each self-governing people in the exercise of its rightful liberties, and would end, for this century at least, the menace of militarism and autocracy.

VIII

Thus our history of the war, of which Mr. Frank H. Simonds is the author—being supported by many other contributors who write upon various topics and episodes—recognizes the conflict as in many respects the greatest turning point in human history. Histories of this war will be written, we may believe, from time to time in the future, and men will be writing them a thousand years hence. Posterity will have its own perspectives and make its own estimates. But contemporaries may also make valuable surveys, of which posterity will gladly avail itself. Events have crowded one another with such bewildering and tumultuous speed that even now the best-informed minds require a careful and winnowed narrative in order to hold in mind the events of each half-year beginning with the last half of the year 1914.

Of the current writers upon the war as it progressed, no one in America had attained such eminence as Mr. Frank H. Simonds. Besides his constant newspaper interpretations of the military and political aspects of the war from day to day or from week to week, he had become even more widely known through his extended monthly installments of current war history which he contributed to the American Review of Reviews. He had not been content

with passing judgments upon military movements or events, based upon the limited information available at the time, but he insisted upon revising his own opinions as more complete knowledge could aid in forming truer estimates. He did not hesitate, at risk and hardship, to visit the scenes of war more than once, where he studied afresh the greatest battles which dwarf in magnitude those of former wars.

This history of the war, which is to be carried through a series of volumes of which the present is the opening one, is in no sense a re-publication or revision of any of Mr. Simonds's previous writings. It is, rather, a completely new presentation, upon a scale of its own, based upon fresh first-hand study, together with the official reports and the various writings of many experts and observers. He has had the advantage of intimate conversations with military leaders at the French and British fronts, as well as with governmental authorities at Paris, London, Washington, and elsewhere.

Through his lifetime Mr. Simonds has been a student of political and military history, with a remarkable aptitude for physical geography and for topographical conditions as affecting military campaigns. He had studied the Balkan wars by personal visitation, so that when the attack on Serbia was made in 1914 he was already possessed of exceptional knowledge of the complex conditions in southeastern Europe. He had long been a close student of the military history of the Civil War in the United States, as well as of the Napoleonic campaigns, and his acquaintance with the wars of the Bismarckian period and with Russo-Japanese military and political affairs, had all contributed to his preparation for an intense and continuous study of this greatest of wars, from its first movements in the summer of 1914. The intelligence and the brilliancy of his work were immediately recognized, and the public's confidence in it has steadily increased.

Thus I may express the assured belief that the history of the great war as presented in Mr. Simonds's graphic pages will prove not only a valuable aid to present-day readers, but will have a permanent place in the historical libraries, to be consulted for many decades to come. Mr. Simonds is not merely a military historian, but he has also a profound appreciation of the moral issues that are involved in the struggles between nations and in the political problems of empires and democracies. His plans for the full work, of which this is the initial volume, propose to carry the reader through the military campaigns to the broadening aspects of the struggle as it involved the world at large, until finally there had arrived the period of settlement and reconstruction.

Each volume will be supplemented by the briefer work of many special contributors, and will be embellished with numerous photographic illustrations. Already the inquiring reader must turn to books for an analysis and an interpretation, as well as for a narrative account of the earlier period of the war,

Since there is manifest need of such books, it is desirable that the reader should be able to secure the help and guidance of those students and writers who are the best trained and the most competent. By an almost unanimous consensus of opinion, such students and writers would accord Mr. Simonds not only an honoured place but the very first place among them all.



PART ONE HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR BY FRANK H. SIMONDS



CHAPTER ONE

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904

I THE FIRST YEARS

The full generation that lay between the signing of the Treaty of Frankfort and the crisis of Tangier was marked by no very clear and definite march of events. Between the Revolutions of 1848 and the close of the Franco-Prussian War, Europe had lived through a long series of wars, not comparable in magnitude or sacrifice to the Napoleonic and Revolutionary struggles, but sufficiently considerable to satiate the people of the various nations and reconcile the statesmen to pacific policies. Germany, during the years of Bismarck, pursued a moderate course. His greatest concern was to preserve and strengthen the great structure he had reared. If the swift rise of France from defeat led him to a minatory gesture in 1875, he heeded the warnings that came from London and Petrograd. Throughout his period of power he skilfully managed to keep the door to the Russian capital open, and while he detested the British, he never sought to challenge them upon the water.

To be sure, the Russo-Turkish War and the settlement of the Congress of Berlin led to an inevitable estrangement with Russia. Germany, having to choose between Russia and Austria, decided for the Hapsburg, and the Congress of Berlin, by destroying the Treaty of San Stefano, deprived Russia of the fruits of her Turkish triumph, and by putting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the road to Saloniki, thus made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. But in Bismarck's time this alliance was never a threat to German interests nor to German supremacy on the Continent, for Russia was in no mind to undertake the destruction of the Treaty of Frankfort to satisfy her French ally, while France was not willing to invite another invasion to replace the Crescent by the Cross at St. Sophia.

In 1881, Bismarck, by clever manipulation, thrust France into Tunis and effectively aided by Crispi, the inveterate foe of France, was able to harvest from Italian anger the entrance of the Italian Kingdom into the Austro-German Alliance, thus creating the Triple Alliance, which was too strong to be challenged by France and Russia, and, as a defensive alliance, served as the corner-stone of European peace until the middle of the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

Great Britain, moreover, inclined rather to the German than to the Franco-Russian group. Her foreign policy was still in the Beaconsfield era. She regarded Russia as her true enemy. She had joined Austria in vetoing the Treaty of San Stefano, as she had persuaded France to join her in the Crimea. Friction between Russia and Britain on the frontiers of the Indian Empire, with France all over the world where colonial enterprises were clashing, contributed to keep alive animosities born of the Crimean and Napoleonic wars. Thus, while nominally pursuing that policy, known in its day as "splendid isolation," Great Britain actually inclined toward the Germans and, while Germany under Bismarck pursued a clearly pacific course, British policy was markedly pro-German.

France, recovering materially from her terrible defeat with an alacrity that alarmed her conqueror, found herself for the time isolated in Europe. Slowly the hope of a reconquest of the "Lost Provinces" weakened in the eyes of the older generation while the newer generation found its attention and its energies consumed in the domestic strife between the Republic and its enemies, in the struggle with Boulangerism, in the battle with the Church, and in that grotesque episode which was the Dreyfus Case. It would not be fair to say that the memory of Alsace-Lorraine was banished from the French mind, but it is true that even Frenchmen believed it had disappeared in the mournful and ignoble years of the nineties. While German population increased by millions, that of France stood still, until France found herself distanced by her great rival and no longer able to match army corps with army corps on the open frontier of the Vosges. For France the years

between Frankfort and Tangier were years recalling the equally unhappy age of Louis XV. And in both periods there were not lacking those who foretold the disappearance of France as a great nation and spoke with ready conviction of the decadence of the French race, forgetting how frequently in past centuries the flame of French genius had grown dim, only to burst forth with new brilliance and dazzle the world with its radiance. And in this time not only did the desire for peace increase with each year in the hearts of the French people, but a too-eager acceptance of the illusions of pacifism and internationalism left the nation well nigh defenceless, when the crisis of Tangier brought France within two steps of war.

In the closing quarter of the Nineteenth Century, too, the Great Powers, with the exception of Germany and Austria, turned their eyes beyond Europe and laboured to construct great colonial empires. France spread her colours from Algiers to the Congo. Tunis, the Sahara, Senegal, the regions of the Upper Niger, the shores of Lake Chad, and the vast area between the Congo-Ubangi and the Atlantic were occupied. Madagascar was conquered. Indo-China was expanded into a colony greater than France in area.

Britain on her part kept pace with France in Africa, extended her Indian Empire, expanded her commercial and political influence in China, pushed France out of Egypt, and carried her conquests up the Nile until Cecil Rhodes' dream of a British "all-red route" from the Cape to Cairo was all but realized.

Russia on her side turned from the disappointments of the Dardanelles to the still unrestricted possibilities eastward to the Pacific and southward to warm water at Port Arthur. Siberia began to rival the American Far West in resources and opportunity and Russia seemed destined to achieve at the expense of the Chinese what she had missed in the estates of the Osmanli.

Even Italy, still struggling with the terrible problems of poverty and misery, also embarked upon the colonial enterprise, only to find disaster in Abyssinia and military disgrace at Adowa. Little Belgium, through the efforts of her able if unscrupulous monarch, acquired the vast empire of the Congo Free State and took rank with the Great Powers in possessions beyond the seas.

II. A NEW KAISER AND A NEW POLICY

In all this time Germany alone stood still. Great as Bismarck had been as the creator of the German Empire, he lacked the vision to grasp the new horizons. While he remained in power, he gave only contemptuous attention to the colonial ambitions within his own country. He welcomed the concentration of French energy upon colonial expansion because it promised the gradual extinction of the Alsace-Lorraine question. He skilfully turned every opportunity to account in bringing the French and the British into collision. Nor was he less contented to see Russia, forgetful of Constantinople and the Balkans, fixing her eyes upon Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

More than all else, perhaps, this failure of Bismarck contributed to the great catastrophe that he did not live to see. A new Germany was rising, a Germany he neither understood nor recognized. The whole fabric of German life was being made over and Germany was rapidly transforming herself into a great commercial nation, into a factory nation, into a nation whose organization, whose resources in minerals, made her a rival of Great Britain; whose merchant marine was growing by leaps and bounds and carrying the German flag into every sea and every port. This new Germany felt it unjust, immoral, that she, alone of the great nations, she, who had become in fact the most powerful nation on the European continent, should be without her colonies, without lands to which Germans could carry their language and their national faith, colonies which might serve as the markets for German manufactures and the plantations on which could be grown the raw materials needed by German industry.

And it was this Germany that William II represented when at last he came to the throne, speedily "dropped the pilot," and took from Bismarck's control the direction of the policies of an Empire which had been the Iron Chancellor's creation and for long years an instrument in his hands. In his anxiety to preserve what he had brought into being. Bismarck had withheld Germany from the world competition in colonial expansion, he had submitted to the naval supremacy of Britain, he had smiled upon the Russian adventures in the Far East, he had uttered no protest when Great Britain had added new empires to her vast realms. And the world upon which William II looked when power at last came to him, was a world already parcelled out, with but few and unattractive patches bearing the colour of the German Empire.

In the mind of the new Emperor it was clear from the outset that the real barrier to German development, to rightful German expansion, to the acquisition of that place in the sun that soon appeared in all German patriotic phrase, was Britain. It was Britain who held the fairest spots upon the face of the earth, so far as colonial considerations were concerned. It was British sea power that dominated the trade routes. Moreover, British arms protected the sinking power of Portugal, closed Morocco because it faced Gibraltar, was presently to join with France in an agreement that should bestow upon the Republic this rich and promising colonial field of Morocco, was to conquer the Boer Republics toward which German eyes had been turned, was to lend its support to an American admiral in Manila Bay, when German thoughts turned toward the expiring colonial empire of Spain.

Unless Germany possessed a great fleet, she must be contented to accept British dictation abroad. The dictation was not aggressive, the world had endured British supremacy at sea for nearly a century without too much protest or too great discomfort. But the cardinal doctrine of British policy for centuries had been that the British fleet should be supreme and there was no inclination in London, no matter what party ruled in Westminster, to permit an equal on the blue water.

The decision of the Kaiser, summed up in the famous phrase, "Our future lies upon the sea," involved an ultimate challenge to Britain. No one can read the pages of British history from the days of the Spanish Armada to the not-less-splendid moment of Trafalgar, without recognizing this fact. Indeed the development of steam transport and the change in the character of British industry had made it inevitable that Britain would starve, unless she were able at all times to keep

the seas open and insure the inward flow to her ports of the food for her dense population.

III. ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRAW NEAR

In the same fashion this challenge made it inevitable that in the end Britain should join the Franco-Russian group, as in her long history she had ever joined the weaker powers who made head against that Continental nation which at the moment crossed her path and challenged her supremacy.

Germany could believe, did believe up to the fatal moment in August, 1914, that Britain would be beguiled into staying out of that European war which was necessary to clear Germany's flanks, to dispose of a France still mindful of Alsace-Lorraine and certain to take advantage of German complications with other powers; the war that was necessary to send the Slav back behind the Niemen and the Bug, no longer a rival of Austria in the Balkans or a peril to Germany in East Prussia and Posen. But this was to mistake the genius which underlies the stupidity of the Anglo-Saxon in world affairs. For if Britain has always muddled her affairs in times of peace and in the opening hours of conflict, her instinct has saved her invariably.

In the early years of his reign William II seems to have cherished the notion that he could deal with France and Russia without war. Following the policy of Bismarck he encouraged the Russian to embark in the Japanese War. The earlier years of his reign are marked by a series of clumsy but no less sincere efforts to bridge the chasm that the Treaty of Frankfort had opened between France and Germany. But for this chasm there was but one bridge and this he could not take; Germany would not surrender Alsace-Lorraine, even at the behest of its young Kaiser, and no such idea ever entered the imperial mind.

Such hope as the Emperor may have entertained of winning France, of making her his ally against Britain, perished with the wholly unexpected termination of Anglo-French bickerings that followed Fashoda. When Kitchener, after his successful campaign to Khartum, and Colonel Marchand, after his memorable journey across Africa from the Congo

to the Nile, met at the miserable little village of Fashoda, two great imperial dreams came into collision. A century and a half before France and Britain had met on the Ohio, and the whole story of Nineteenth Century Anglo-French colonial enterprise is a marvellous repetition of the American episode. In Africa as in America, too, French explorers had out-distanced British.

There was a moment in 1898 when it seemed inevitable that France and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France bowed. The French Foreign Minister, Hanotaux, went into retirement, as his successor Delcassé was to go after Tangier, seven years later. Kitchener prevailed and Marchand retreated. When these two soldiers met again, they met as allies on the hills of Artois, Marchand wearing the stars of a French general and Kitchener the master of Britain's military establishment.

Oddly enough Fashoda left no permanent scar. France had to decide between England and Germany. She chose to remain faithful to Alsace-Lorraine. Britain on her part, having at last perceived the solid foundation of French colonial conception, already beginning to feel almost subconsciously the challenge of German sea power, held out a hand to France. More than all else, Edward VII, when he came to the throne, animated as he was by a real affection for the French, opened the way, by his skill and tact, for that Anglo-French Entente, which was to threaten the whole edifice of German hope.

Thus, when the momentary bitterness had passed away, France and Britain proceeded to the adjustment of all their world-wide quarrels. There was a wholesale liquidation of claims and counterclaims, culminating in the famous agreement of 1904 by which France recognized British supremacy in Egypt, and Britain withdrew her half-century-old veto to French expansion in Morocco. Not since the Hundred Years War had Anglo-French relations been placed on so friendly a basis and henceforth French and British policies were to converge until a friend-ship expanded into a virtual alliance and a virtual alliance into an actual union in the presence of a common foe.

All of this was not the work of a moment. When the Boer War came

there were not a few Frenchmen who openly expressed their hatred for Britain and their sympathy with the Africander Republics. To the very eve of the Great War there were influential Frenchmen who still nourished the ancient grudge against "perfidious Albion," as there were Britons who preserved the immemorial distrust of the "fickle Gaul." But, for all this, Fashoda was a landmark in European history, and the Anglo-French settlement that resulted carried with it the promise of the world conflict that followed the 1904 agreement by a short decade.

IV. THE CONVENTION OF 1904

The Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 was a heavy and well-nigh fatal blow to the policy of the German Emperor. With perfect accuracy he foresaw that it was the first step in the inevitable drawing together of France and Britain. Quite naturally he and the German nation as well saw in it the deliberate purpose of Britain to return to the old policy of balancing the Continental nations against one another and throwing her decisive influence on the side opposing her immediate rival. From this hour German teachers and German publicists were to speak with growing bitterness of the "iron ring" that was being forged about the Fatherland and the cult of hatred of Great Britain was to take on untold and unsuspected expansion.

In an Anglo-French understanding, limited as it was at the outset to a liquidation of lawsuits, to a settlement of wholly personal claims, Germany beheld the British nation taking its stand behind the French and giving its tremendous influence to encourage the French desire to destroy the Treaty of Frankfort and regain the "Lost Provinces."

And with this date there disappears the German policy of placating France which had long held sway in Berlin and had moved the Kaiser to innumerable gestures, which had been coldly rejected by the French or suffered to pass unnoticed. Out of this arrangement grew the German conviction that one more war with France was necessary and that there could be no realization of the dream of a German "place in the sun" until the ever-enduring French resentment was disposed of by a war, which should relegate France to the rank of a second-class nation

and leave her too weak ever to cross German purposes again. By force Germany was to try once more to separate France and Britain, without, in fact, arriving at war, but the failure of Tangier was to confirm the conviction born of the Anglo-French arrangement, and in it were the seeds of all that wrath which was to come.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON

I TANGIER, THE FIRST GESTURE

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 was the first clear warning of what was to come. It put forces squarely in opposition which were to meet again and again thereafter in similar conflict until there was no longer the smallest chance of preserving world peace. It was to open a new era in European history, the end of which no man can now see. It preceded the general conflict by less than ten years and it foreshadowed it with such clarity that those who come hereafter will marvel at the blindness that was subsequently displayed in many nations.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, while nominally a business arrangement between two nations, in fact undermined the whole structure of German policy. German challenge to British sea power was taking shape, but German policy contemplated the separation of Britain from the rest of Europe and gave its best effort to encouraging the bitterness between Paris and London and between Petrograd and London. A complete settlement between France and Britain foreshadowed a similar liquidation between Britain and Russia, which did come in due time, and beyond this it held out the menace of something more, of a possible alliance between these three Great Powers.

Was this in the minds of the British and French ministers who signed the treaty of 1904? Subliminally perhaps. Delcassé was a frank foe of Germany. British foreign policy was in Tory hands and the Government and the Crown alike felt the reality of the growing German challenge. More than any Englishman of his time Edward VII feared the German danger, and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. In the German mind, it was his policy that led to the Triple Entente. In the German mind, he con-

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES



Copyright, 1895, by Henry Graves & Co. From a painting by Stanley Berkeley
NAPOLEON'S CUIRASSIERS AT WATERLOO

Waterloo (June 18, 1815) marked the over throw of Napoleon's ambition to dominate Europe. Germany was the next nation to cherish the dream of world dominion

THE RISE OF GERMANY
BISMARCK



By permission of the Berlin Photographic Co.

THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

I. The Battle of Königgratz or Sadowa was an important step in the building of the German Empire. It was the decisive battle in the Seven Weeks' War (1866), where 220,000 Prussians defeated 205,000 Austrians. This victory assured to Prussia a leading position in the German political affairs



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THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

II. Napoleon Third's Capitulation at Sedan (1870) marked another important advance in the building of the German Empire. It was the first of the series of French surrenders in the Franco-Prussian War and cost the Emperor his throne. At once came the proclamation of the Third Republic in France. The Peace of Frankfort concluded the war five months later. Alsace-Lorraine was ceded by France to the German Empire, and Prussia in Germany became

Prince Bismarck is seated at the table facing the defeated French Generals. Von Moltke, the victorious Prussian general, stands with his hand on the table. He was the uncle of the Count Von Moltke who was the German Chief of Staff at the opening of the World War in 1914.



THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

III. William I, the present Kaiser's grandfather, was proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles a few weeks before the close of the Franco-Prussian War. This marked another step in the unification of Germany, under the leadership of Prussia. (It is of interest to note that the lesser German states have never acknowledged the Kings of Prussia as Emperors of Germany. They can be correctly spoken of only as German Emperors.) In the picture Eismarck stands, at the height of his success, close to the first step of the throne.



THE MAN WHO BUILT THE GERMAN EMPIRE

Prince Eismarck, the Germans' "Iron Chancellor," had a large part in the building of the German Empire and the creation of the Triple Alliance, in the days of the present Kaiser's father and grandfather. He did not realize the need for colonial expansion, otherwise Germany might have secured her "place in the Sun" while the other Powers were securing theirs. But Germany came into the colonial field too late to get her share peacefully. This was one deep-lying cause of the World War.



BISMARCK AS THE GREATEST STATESMAN IN EUROPE

The Congress of Berlin was convened in 1878 at the invitation of Pismarck to settle the affairs of the always troublesome Balkan States. Austria, France, Italy, England, Russia, Turkey and of course Germany—the chief contestants in the World War—were all represented. The most influential members of the conference were Prince Gortchakoff, Count Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, M. Waddington, Count Corti, and Caratheodori, some of whom will be recognized in the picture. Bismarck was chosen President and is shown welcoming the delegates.



"THE DEFENCE OF THE LONGBOYEAU GATE," DURING THE SIEGE OF PARIS, 1870-'71





FOUR GENERATIONS OF HOHENZOLLERNS

William I is seated; Frederick III, his son, who married a daughter of Queen Victoria, stands at his right; the present emperor, William II, Frederick's son, stands at his grandfather's left; the present Crown Prince, now active as a general in the field, is an infant in his great-grandfather's lap.

WILHELM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

This portrait was taken a year or two after his accession to the throne, which occurred in 1888, when he was twenty-nine years of age.

ceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany, to unite Britain with France and Russia, to keep Germany from the realization of her dreams. Many years may not solve this problem, and it seems inevitable that Germans will read history one way and the rest of the world another. It does seem clear, however, that Lord Lansdowne, who held the Foreign Office, was mindful of the German challenge; it does seem patent that Delcassé saw in an understanding with Britain the possibility of a concentration of French energies toward national regeneration and defence. But underneath all lies the solid fact that the original challenge had been delivered by Germany to British sea power. Germany was free to seek her future on the sea, but Britain was bound, in the nature of things, to meet such a challenge as she best could.

At the moment it was announced, the Anglo-French agreement made no great noise in Europe. Delcassé did not communicate it directly to the German Government, a fatal blunder, as it now seems, but he informed the German Ambassador at Paris, who notified his Government, and Berlin gave no sign of disapproval, even gave an apparent assent. The agreement itself, while insuring ultimate French political supremacy in the Shereefian Empire, guaranteed the "open door" for all, and thus for German quite as much as British trade.

But Germany was only waiting. For the first time since the Treaty of Frankfort an international agreement of great importance—concerning her but slightly, to be sure—had been made without regard to her. This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow that had been struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles.

In the opening weeks of 1905 Germany spoke. Russia had been defeated at Mukden, her prestige was gone and her military reputation had crumbled. France stood alone, notoriously ill-prepared for war. Not even with British help could she hope to make head against the German army, and there was yet no certainty that Britain would go to war to help France. Accordingly the Kaiser landed in Tangier and suddenly proclaimed the integrity of Morocco. He thrust a German sword

through the Anglo-French agreement and Europe came to the first

grave crisis of the century.

For days European peace seemed shattered. Germany demanded that the question of Morocco should be reopened, that it should be submitted to a council of nations. Delcassé refused. In the end France yielded, a weak and terrified ministry bowed. Delcassé went into exile, a council was summoned to meet at Algeciras, and Bülow, the German Chancellor, became a prince, in token of his sovereign's appreciation of this "shining triumph."

II. ALGECIRAS-A GERMAN DEFEAT

But if this incident was a "crowning humiliation" for France, and the going of Delcassé the greatest sorrow France had known since Sedan, Germany lost at Algeciras almost all she had hoped to win. In this conference Britain stood solidly behind the French. Russia was not less loyal to her ally, while Italy displayed a lack of sympathy with her German ally which roused bitterest recrimination in Berlin and was the first authentic sign of the crumbling of the edifice of Bismarck. Germany and Austria stood alone, the Moroccan question was dealt with in a fashion that insured new troubles, but in effect, the predominant influence of France in Morocco received the seal of approval of Europe and the door to German participation in Moroccan estates, which the Anglo-French agreement had closed, was not reopened.

Germany had humiliated France and angered Britain. She had thrust her sword into the balance against European peace, but it had not prevailed. She had not separated France from England. She had brought the two nations more closely together. Russia, already humiliated by defeats in the East, bore with ill-concealed resentment the effort of the Kaiser to take advantage of temporary weakness in Russian armies. Italy turned from Germany and Austria to France and Britain to make arrangements for the realization of her own Mediterranean ambitions.

All this the Germans clearly perceived, all this was gall and wormwood to the Kaiser. He had hoped to separate France from Britain but he had, in fact, brought them closer together. He had hoped to show a

mastery of a European council comparable to that of Bismarck in the Congress of Berlin but, save for Austria, he had been without friends in the council, a majority of which had been frankly hostile. It was Britain and not Germany that actually prevailed at Algeciras, and there was no mistaking the fact that Britain was even more willing than France to risk a deliberate rebuff to Germany, even if it should carry with it an appeal to arms.

Hence for Germany there was a new grievance against Britain, a new accentuation of Anglophobic sentiment, a new looking forward to "the day" which was becoming uppermost in German minds and hearts, the day when the British obstacle to German hope should be removed by a victory. But there were reasons why wise statesmanship should have perceived the facts that were now disclosed. Germany had feared that she would find herself faced by a triple alliance, she had made one gesture of war and all three were disclosed united against her. Unless she believed herself strong enough to face all three in arms, her course was marked out by Bismarck's successful policy of separating Austria and France and dealing with the former in 1866 and the latter in 1870. Instead, the German policy tended fatally to unite three possible foes and transform into allies, united against Germany, three nations widely separated up to the moment of Tangier.

For France, Tangier was a memorable incident. It marks the beginning of that new French spirit which was to blaze forth at the Marne and at Verdun and fill the world with the glory of French courage and patriotism. It was the beginning of the reconstruction of France, politically, spiritually, nationally. The French perceived the danger, the threat, the menace of German policy. They perceived that it had become a question of the future existence of France, and to such a threat France responded as she had to the menace of all Europe in the days of the Revolution.

III. AFTER TANGIER-THE NEW FRANCE

If French politicians still fettered French preparation, if French organization was still inferior to German, if France went to war in 1914

lacking in much, still there could be no comparison with 1905, when France must have fallen at the first blow. And what was all-important, the French mind was mobilized with the first call. France was saved by Tangier, although ten years were to pass before even the French would realize the fact of their deliverance.

The Tory ministry, which With the British it was far different. negotiated the Anglo-French convention, went out of power shortly. The Liberal Government that came into office turned the attention of the nation to domestic problems and in the bitterness of class war and Irish disputes the international situation passed from the minds of the British people. They forgot Germany, the Empire, the outside world; they devoted their energies and their attention to domestic differences, and they gave only impatient hearing to the few voices like that of Lord Roberts, which from time to time warned them of the danger that was Germany. Yet at the moment that they refused to recognize the outside peril the British ministers declined to renounce the policy from which flowed the danger. Faithful to the tradition of their race, they clung to the idea that Britain should be supreme at sea, and if, for a few years, they permitted British construction to fall perilously low by comparison with Germany, they changed their policy in time. And they accepted the legacy of friendship with France, they accepted the Moroccan commitment of Lansdowne, they remained steadily resolved to surrender nothing of British Empire or British influence to Germany, and only such a surrender could have conceivably appeared Germans.

In all this there was a fatal paradox. Pretending or even believing that Germany was friendly, the Liberal and Radical majority continued to follow a course which gave Germany no promise of a realization of her dreams. But against the danger that this policy brought they took no adequate step and members of the Government like Haldane continued to call Germany their "spiritual home" and make frequent visits to Berlin, after all real hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals.

And the people of Britain, lulled to sleep by their rulers, their passions stirred by home problems and domestic debates, gave no heed to European matters. Thus it was that when at last the whole fabric of the British Empire was in deadly peril, the British population was totally oblivious to the truth, and Liberal journals could tell their readers that the conflict which was breaking in the first days of August, 1914, was without importance for Britain.

IV. THE END OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

For France, for Russia, for Germany, for Italy, Tangier is a land-mark; its meaning was promptly made a part of the sum of human knowledge of millions in these countries, henceforth it gave shape to the policies and impulse to the purposes of the patriots of these nations. Frenchman, Russian, and German, alike, perceived in it the sign of an inevitable war, but the Briton saw nothing. From Tangier to the day when Belgium was invaded, British understanding of international conditions and British influence in the world declined until Germany could believe that the British had forgotten her challenge to British sea power and in July, 1914, could hope for a few brief hours that Britain would remain neutral at Armageddon.

Finally, and this is of prime importance, with the Algeciras Conference there expired the legend of a concert of Europe. Henceforth there were two groups of Great Powers and these groups naturally and inevitably tended to take opposite sides on every question of international importance that arose until their hostility paralyzed their influence and enabled the small Balkan States to unchain the tempest, by their attack upon Turkey in 1912.

After Tangier, too, it was plain that the understanding between France, Britain, and Russia marched steadily toward an alliance in fact if not in terms; an alliance which, by accident or design, found common ground in resistance to German policies. On the other hand, at Algeciras, Italy manifested patent weariness of the Triple Alliance, and her course thereafter was away from Berlin and Vienna and toward Paris and London. This course was to bring her into opposition with

Vienna over Tripoli and the Balkans and ultimately into alliance with the foes of the Central Powers.

The Tangier incident therefore early forecast a time when Italy would change sides, and this would leave Austria and Germany actually outnumbered and outweighed in European councils and abolish that real supremacy on the Continent which Bismarck had earned for Germany and preserved to the hour when he surrendered his office to the young Kaiser. With their larger ambitions wholly unrealized, Germans could foresee a time when they would be powerless to attain their visions of a Germany proportioned upon their own conception of her true stature.

And between Algeciras and Armageddon, Germany marched steadily from disappointment to disappointment, while the whole edifice of her power began to crack; not alone through the disaffection of Italy but through the perils which the rise of a Slav state in the Balkans, under Russian inspiration, brought to her one faithful ally, brought to Austria, half of whose population was Slav.

Thus, one may say accurately that the ten years that followed Tangier were but dominated by the consequences of this fatal episode. Henceforth the whole stream of European history flowed between circumscribed banks toward the inevitable cataract, which was the World War. Once it had entered these banks, the course was inescapable and the destination, however hidden from the view of those who sailed the stream, was ineluctable.

V. BOSNIA-THE SECOND GESTURE

Berlin had perceived with utter clarity that the entente between Britain and France would inevitably bring Russia and her ancient enemy into better relations. A Russian statesman had, indeed, remarked on the morrow of the Anglo-French convention, quoting from a Russian proverb: "The friends of my friend are my friends." Such a change would have the profoundest consequences in international relations, for the antagonism of Britain, which had again and again barred the Russian way to Constantinople, and British apprehensions

for the safety of the northern frontiers of India menaced by Russian advance, had been pivots on which German policy had turned for years.

And in 1907, Britain and Russia signed a document which in all respects recalled the Anglo-French compact of three years before. The questions that had divided the two nations, above all the question of Persia, were solved by a mutually satisfactory partition of Persia into zones. Britain and Russia, as it were, struck hands in compromise over half a century of differences, and behind the things agreed was the suggestion that, in due course, British opposition to Russian possession at Constantinople would vanish.

Again German answer was tardy, but unmistakable. This time Austria spoke, but the words were recognized as German. The Young Turk Revolution had now come to shake the crumbling foundations of Osmanli power. Europe stood amazed while a new and professedly Liberal Party seized the reins of power in Constantinople and first tied the hands of Abdul Hamid, and, when he plotted against it, threw him into prison, stripped him of his power, and put a Sultan of their own choosing in his place.

For the moment there was a promise of progress, of a renewed and reformed Turkey, and in that moment the various subject races of the Turk—the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Armenian—shared in the efforts of the Young Turks while even the faithful Albanians deserted their friend the deposed Sultan. But the Young Turk cherished grandiose dreams of a restoration, not of the Turkey that remained, by internal reform, but even more strongly the dream of a restoration of the Turkey of the past by the reconquest of the lost provinces of Bulgaria, of Serbia, of Bosnia, and Herzegovina which had passed to the protection of the Hapsburgs at the Congress of Berlin.

Seizing this pretext Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself Czar of Bulgaria, thenceforth beyond even the nominal sovereignty of the Turk. The results of this annexation were tremendous. Austria had many claims upon Bosnia, no colonial effort in European history had been more successful on the material side. She had brought civilization,

industrial development, railroads, and highways to one of the least advanced communities in the world. But by virtue of the mandate of the Congress of Berlin her rule was unquestioned and the fiction of an occupation had become only a fiction; to translate it into a legal as well as a nominal possession was to change nothing, but to bring instant difficulties.

The Turkish protest was of no moment. But Serbia, now become in fact the ward and protégé of Petrograd as she had been of Vienna in the days of the Obrenovitches, saw the extinction of her dream of a restored Serbia, which should include the 2,000,000 Serbs who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, moved by her Serbian interests, protested vehemently against the transformation of the agreement of the Congress of Berlin into a "scrap of paper." France and Britain supported Russia. Italy stirred uneasily, for she had no interest in seeing Austria advance southward along the Adriatic or toward Saloniki. In all this Austria was a rival, not an ally.

At the critical moment there came from Berlin another gesture like to that of the Kaiser at Tangier, but directed this time at Russia and not France. Once more Germany thrust her sword into the balance, and once more the governments of Paris, London, and Petrograd had to decide between war and surrender. And as France had been helpless in 1905, Russia, still suffering from her Japanese defeats, could not venture to risk a war with Germany. Nor did France or Britain at this moment manifest any strong enthusiasm for carrying their championship of Russia's protest to the firing line.

Russia therefore bowed, as France had bowed, but the time was to come when Petrograd would say, when the Czar himself was to be reported as saying: "We have stood this thing long enough." Russia accepted her humiliation in the spirit in which France had accepted hers. Henceforth the eyes of Russia turned toward Europe, toward the Balkans; the German gesture at Tangier had recalled France from Africa to Europe, the Bosnian affair recalled Slav thoughts from Asia to the Balkans.

Viewed at the moment, Bosnia was a shining success for German

diplomacy. But if for the moment the Triple Alliance seemed mighty and the Triple Entente a broken reed, Bosnia, like Tangier, had consequences which were unforeseen to the German statesmen who provoked the trial of strength, consequences which abolished the profits of the play. Above all, the blow did not permanently break the connection between Russia, Britain, and France, which alone could have counted for a clear success.

On the contrary, it did weaken still further Italian attachment to the Triple Alliance, as it stimulated Italian apprehension of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans and along the Albanian shore of the Adriatic. From this was presently to flow the Italian attack upon Turkey, while the expression of opinion in Rome, consequent upon the Bosnian incident, disclosed how rapidly the Triple Alliance was weakening, so far as the Italian partner was concerned.

VI. AGADIR-THE THIRD AND LAST TIME

Before Italy stirred, however, there was one more great crisis—the last before the coming of the general war—in which the two groups of powers were ranged against each other. After Algeciras, Moroccan affairs had gone from bad to worse; anarchy had spread and extended. This anarchy had brought French troops to preserve the lives and properties of Frenchmen in Casablanca and along the Algerian frontier. In 1909 there had been a separate treaty between France and Germany, which was accepted for the moment as eliminating the question of Morocco. But there had been subsequent delay on the French part in carrying out terms, that Germany had insisted upon, for joint commercial activity in German Kamerun and French Congo.

In 1911, accordingly, Germany reasserted her liberty; Morocco, as Prince Bülow had said after Algeciras, was a bell which Germany could strike whenever she desired to call anything to French attention. In 1911 French troops had gone to Fez, called there by the revolt of the Moroccans. The expedition may or may not have been necessary. The stay of the French troops may have been prolonged. These were but incidents. The fact was that Morocco was no longer capable of

saving itself, the integrity proclaimed by the Kaiser at Tangier and reasserted at Algerian had become an empty fiction.

In this situation and recognizing that French possession of Morocco was now become inevitable and that "Tunisification" would shortly close the Shereefian Empire to German desires unless Germany acted, the Kaiser suddenly sent the notorious *Panther* to Agadir, thus serving notice upon France and upon Europe that he purposed to share in the division of the Moroccan estate. At the same moment Berlin journals were filled with the promise of "West Marokko deutsch," and colored maps appeared assigning to the Kaiser the Moroccan provinces from the mouth of the Sebu to the Wady Dra.

Once more a European war seemed inevitable. Conversations between French and German ministers made no progress. The "sword-rattling" at Berlin was ominous. Presently the fact began to leak out that Germany was demanding from France "compensation" for French possession in Morocco, compensation amounting to most if not all of French colonial estates in Central Africa. Meantime British influence and British official actions tended more and more to take the form of solid support of France.

The situation was made the graver because suddenly a new spirit manifested itself in France. The Caillaux Ministry had given evidence of bowing before Germany, as the earlier ministry had sacrificed Delcassé in 1905. But now the French people suddenly spoke. There was a swift and unmistakable reassertion of the old spirit of France, a firm determination to make no further surrender, even though the alternative should be war. Caillaux fell. A ministry made up of all the greater men of France, headed by Raymond Poincaré and containing Delcassé, came into power. France in 1911 had marched far from the days of 1905.

Then in London, Lloyd George, speaking for the Liberal Government at a public banquet, uttered words that could not be mistaken, and were not. He gave the assurance to the world that the Liberal and Radical Government controlling British destinies did not purpose to permit British interests to be sacrificed or to allow Britain to be ignored. The words were of little consequence, the effect of the words was amaz-

ing. After a slight pause Germany changed her course, the Moroccan dispute was settled by the mutual cessions of territory in Central Africa by France and Germany. By the exchange France lost a hundred thousand square miles of Congo territory, but she acquired title to Morocco and placed her title beyond the reach of further German dispute.

VII. A GERMAN DISASTER

Agadir was, then, a defeat for Germany that approximated a disaster. Here was no superficial success as at Tangier, here was no temporary accession of prestige as after Bosnia. Germany had laid claim to a share in Morocco, having in 1905 bestowed her protection upon the Sultan. Her people had come to believe that there was in Morocco a chance for German colonial development and a new "place in the sun." But German power had yielded to British threat and French firmness all that had been won at Algeciras, so far as Morocco was concerned, and all that had been acquired in prestige through the Bosnian episode. Germany had now acquired a few thousand square miles of Congo swamps; France, "decadent" France, had annexed an empire, and her possession had been insured by British interference. Agadir was to the Germans as complete a disaster and national humiliation as Tangier had been to the French.

To the Kaiser was ascribed the surrender to Britain. Never in his reign had he known such unpopular hours, and even his son joined the ranks of his critics. There persists a legend that, at the critical moment, he summoned the financiers of Germany and asked if they were ready. Their negative response inclined his decision to peace, so the story runs. But if this be only legend, there is solid fact enough to show that his whole nation blamed him for his course. Looking to the future it was plain that never again could William II safely run the risk of thwarting the will of his countrymen, even to preserve European peace, and the aftermath of Agadir was in many minds, when the crisis of late July, 1914, placed in William's hands the destinies of Europe.

After Agadir the real hope of European peace vanished; Germany turned feverishly to prepare. France presently returned to the three-

year law, to meet new German levies, and Germany responded with a levée en masse, not to raise recruits but to raise money to meet the needs of a war chest. Neither in France nor Russia was the future misread. After Tangier many Frenchmen and some Russians may still have preserved the hope of avoiding war. After Agadir there was no hope. Only Britain again misread the truth and lapsed back into her domestic quarrels, having by her brief intervention brought humiliation to the proudest sovereign and disappointment to the most ambitious people on the surface of the earth.

For Berlin, for Petrograd, for Paris, the question now became—"When?" Men looked to the future wonderingly, conscious that a storm was soon to break, and seeking to discover in the passing clouds some sure sign of the approach of the whirlwind. Read the French Yellow Book, published after the war began, and this state of mind is disclosed beyond all cavil—disclosed as the state of mind of those directing the fortunes of France, of Russia, and of Germany. So fixed was this belief that when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was uttered in July, 1914, men of all three nations simply said: "So it has come at last!"

The Agadir crisis was followed promptly by the Italian attack upon Turkey. Italy had found, in German activity on the west coast of Morocco, a hint that there might be a subsequent voyage of the *Panther* to the Tripolitan coast. She had found, in the German demand for "compensation" from France for French expansion in Morocco, a warrant for demanding a compensation to match Austrian annexation of Bosnia. She had found in the disorder created by the Young Turk régime, in the disarray of Turkish military force, that opportunity to which she had long looked forward. Finally, her consent to French and British bargains in the Mediterranean had been purchased by their assent to her own plan.

But the attack upon Turkey was an attack upon a nation which in Berlin was looked upon as an ally. Austrian sensibilities were instantly provoked by Italian naval operations in the Adriatic and, in fact, Italy was charged in Vienna and Berlin with being faithless to her allies and having attacked the solidarity of the alliance of the Central Powers, to which, in fact, if not in theory, Turkey adhered. Bernhardi could write in this very year that Germany ought to have attacked Italy, when Italy assailed the Turk and the complete collapse of the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed. Here was a new blow to the edifice of German influence.

After the Tripolitan War had dragged on for many more months without bringing much of glory to Italian arms, although Italian troops slowly occupied the towns of the African coast, Turkey suddenly surrendered, and the Treaty of Lausanne gave Tripoli to Italy. Turkish surrender was due to the coming of a new storm, which was in its turn to add still more to the anxiety of Austro-German statesmen, and a new peril to Austro-German—and above all to German—policy.

VIII. THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

Turkish difficulties and defeats had now raised other hopes. The Balkan States, long looking forward to the liberation of their Christian brothers beyond their own frontiers and properly alarmed by the programme of the Young Turks, seized the moment to unite in an alliance against a common foe. To the amazement of Europe, the Greek and the Bulgar put aside a hatred of a thousand years, the Bulgar and the Serb compromised their Macedonian rivalries, and all three turned to attack the Osmanli.

Until the discord between the two great groups of powers had paralyzed Europe, such an alliance would have been powerless before the mandate of the Concert of Europe. But there was no concert, and neither group cared to invite the hostility of this new alliance, so closely balanced were the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One group, influenced by Russia, who had helped to form the Balkan Alliance, hoped for its success; the other, stirred by their own ambitions in the Balkans, hoped and expected Turkish victory.

But the Turk was swiftly and decisively beaten. The Bulgars defeated the main Turkish army at Lule Burgas, invested Adrianople, and reached the base of the peninsula on which Constantinople stands.

rry College Library Miami, Florida The Serb avenged Kosovo at Kumanova, took Uskup, completed his victory before Monastir, and flowed down the Vardar Valley toward Saloniki, upon which Greek and Bulgarian troops were converging. Greece, wiping out the disgrace of the earlier Turkish War, defeated the Turkish armies before her and seized Saloniki, the prize of the Near East, and at the same time sent her troops into Albania and conquered all northern Epirus, investing Janina as the Bulgars had invested Adrianople. Here then was an end of Turkish empire in Europe. The real contest was over in as brief a time as that in which Germany had vanquished France in 1870. The prize had been won and the only question was the division of it. Now at last Europe interfered. Repulsed at the Chatalia, the outward lines of Constantinople, the Bulgar was served with notice that he would not be permitted to hold the city, even if he took it. Then Serb, Bulgar, and Greek were bidden to come to London and put their case before the Concert of Europe at last reëstablished. To this conference the small States came, and it was to prove their ruin. Only Greece refused to discontinue her military operations, while Bulgaria declined to permit the revictualing of Adrianople.

IX. THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON

At this conference the aims of the Central Powers were at last disclosed. The Balkan Alliance had been a blow to their whole purpose. If it lasted it would bar the way to Austro-German expansion toward the East; it would erect a strong Serbia on the flank of Austria, a Serbia responsive to Russian influence and ambitious to reclaim the millions of southern Slavs remaining under Hapsburg rule. Italy looked with frank disapprobation upon Greek progress northward to Avlona and the Skumbi, and Italy and Austria agreed in opposing Slav expansion southward from the Montenegrin boundary to the new Greek frontier.

Wherefore Austria served notice that there must be a free Albania. On the surface the claim was fair. Albanians inhabited all the region from the environs of Janina to Scutari, and there was patent desire on the part of the Albanians to be free, not to be the subjects of a Greek or Slavic sovereign. But the true Austrian purpose had no concern with the

wishes of the Albanians. Her desire was to break up the Balkan League. If Serbia were denied the right to reach the sea, through northern Albania, then it was inevitable that Serbia would seek compensation in the Vardar Valley. Such compensation would be at the expense of Bulgaria, for although Bulgaria and Serbia had signed a treaty partitioning Macedonia before they went to war, Serbia and not Bulgaria had conquered and held all of Macedonia and could remunerate herself as she saw fit.

The comedy of Albania long occupied the representatives of the Great Powers of Europe. Germany cleverly made Sir Edward Grey the "honest broker" of the conference and used his ignorance of the Near Eastern situation to destroy the Balkan League. He was permitted to accommodate the differences between Austria and Russia over the future boundaries between the Serb and the Albanian. There were mutual concessions made with great show of good will, although it was of more than passing consequence that the peace of Europe hung on the disposition of Ipek and Jakova, wretched Albanian villages unknown to most of the millions who would have been called to arms had the Conference of London ended in war.

Without regard to the mandate of Europe, Bulgaria burst impetuously from the conference and returned to her work, which was the capture of Adrianople. This done, she bowed to the decision of London and agreed to accept the frontier drawn from Midia to the Gulf of Enos, while Greece consented to give up northern Epirus, and Serbia and Montenegro resigned Scutari and Durazzo. But now it was necessary to settle the division of conquered territory between the three victors. Serbia and Greece had agreed. But deprived of northern Albania, through Sir Edward Grey's Albanian operation, Serbia insisted that she be permitted to hold Macedonia west of the Vardar, while Greece insisted upon keeping Saloniki, although agreeing to surrender Kavala and northern Epirus.

X. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Bulgaria, driven by Austrian influence, declined all compromise, insisted that she should have all that her treaty with Serbia had assured

her, and maintained troops in Saloniki as a sign of her determination to possess this city also. To all appeals of Russia she remained deaf. To all dictates of caution imposed by the alliance of Serbia and Greece she turned a deaf ear. Even Roumanian warnings, combined with the demand for "compensation" about Silistria, left her obdurate. Her heart was set upon Macedonia and she refused to barter.

Finally in the closing days of June, 1913, a great Bulgarian army in Macedonia attacked the Serbs, standing behind the Bregalnitza, won a temporary advantage, but was presently forced to retreat, while a Greek advance from Saloniki and a Hellenic success at Kilkis compelled the rapid retirement of the Bulgars from all Macedonia. A Roumanian army now entered northern Bulgaria, while the Turk reoccupied Thrace and regained Adrianople. Bulgaria's ruin was complete. She had heeded Austrian advice and Austria shared in her misfortune. Austrian purpose to destroy the Balkan League had prevailed, thanks to Sir Edward Grey, but it had raised up a dangerous Serbia, it had enhanced not weakened Russian influence in the Balkans, and it had shaken the ties that had bound the Roumanian to the Austrian for a generation. The Roumanian troops which had invaded Bulgaria had openly proclaimed that they were following through Bulgaria the road which led to Transylvania and Bukowina.

The Treaty of Bukharest confirmed the Bulgarian defeat. Serbia acquired all of Macedonia and emerged from her trials a state equal in area and importance to that Sardinia which had with French help driven the Austrian out of Italy. Greece acquired all of the coast from her ancient frontier to the Mesta, including both Kavala and Saloniki. Roumania took a province from Bulgaria, and the Turk made good his claim to his Thracian districts. After two bloody wars and terrible sacrifices, Bulgaria was able to show only a small strip of land between the Rhodopians and the Ægean; Macedonia was lost, and the dream of the hegemony of the Balkans had gone temporarily to dust and ashes.

But the worst aspect of the Balkan settlement was the menace that it carried to European peace, through the inevitable rivalries of Austria and Serbia. Ever since the change of dynasties had given Petrograd

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES



KAISER GREETS KAISER

Germany and Austria, the two faithful members of the Triple Alliance, salute each other in the persons of their sovereigns, Wilhelm and Franz Joseph.

THE TWO KAISERS
DROPPING THE PILOT
GROWTH OF THE ENTENTE
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO



DROPPING THE PILOT—TENNIEL'S FAMOUS CARTOON

A clash was inevitable between two such masterful natures as those of William II and Bismarck. The ideas of the old man had been principally confined to building and buttressing the strength, first of Prussia, then of Germany, within her own borders. The young man, of broader vision, looked beyond the seas and sought in other lands for Germany's place in the sun. Bismarck was retired in 1890, two years after William's accession



M. DELCASSÉ, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN 1904

He and Lord Lansdown negotiated the extremely important Anglo-French Agreement without consulting Germany. "This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles."

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Lord Lansdowne was the British Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1904, and he is called "the father of the Anglo-French Agreement." On Black Sunday, during the faceful Twelve Days in August, 1914, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith, declaring in no uncertain terms that "France must not be deserted".



TWO STAUNCH FRIENDS AND PROMOTERS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

President Fallieres of France, and King Edward VII of England—father of the present King and uncle of the Kaiser. "More than any man of his time Edward VII feared the German danger and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. Many Germans believed he conceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany"





GENERAL LITCHINER AND COLONEL MARCHANG—THE PRINCIPMS IN THE FASHODA INCIDENT

Six years before the Anglo-French Agreement, Bransh and French plans for colonial expansion confliction when Killians and Barrian Barr



Photograph by Paul Thompson

CZAR NICHOLAS AND PRESIDENT POINCARE

This picture is evidence of a political friendship warmly cherished between the Powers to the east and west of Germany. Even while the diplomatic interchanges of the Twelve Days (in August, 1914) were in progress, President Poincare of France was returning from a visit to the Russian Czar.



THE KAISER WITH A FORMER FRIEND-ALBERT OF BELGIUM

The Kaiser in former years took such delight in visiting other monarchs that he was sometimes criticized at home as a gad-about and received the nickname of *Der Reise Kaiser*—the traveling Kaiser. He has justified his wanderings in the following terms. "On my travels I design not only to make myself acquainted with foreign countries and institutions, and to foster friendly relations with neighboring rulers, but these journeys, which have often been misinterpreted, have high value in enabling me to observe home affairs from a distance and submit them to a quiet examination".





LORD ROBERTS AND LORD HALDANE

One vainly urged preparedness, the other minimized the danger and called Germany his "spiritual home," even after all hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. "The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals."



Photograph by Brown Brothers

Photograph by International News Service

ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND (HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE)— WITH HIS MORGANATIC WIFE

Both were killed by an assassin's bomb at Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914



THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN

Austria asserted that his act was inspired by the Pan-Slavic propaganda in Serbia and declared war. Russia stood behind Serbia. Germany stood behind Austria. Then came Armageddon.

and not Vienna control at Belgrad, the relations between Serbia and Austria had been bad. Time and again Austria had bullied and mistreated her small neighbour. The annexation of Bosnia had been as heavy a blow to the Serb as the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany had been to the Frenchman. By refusing to permit Serbia to gain a window on the sea, Austria had renewed all Serbian resentment.

XI. BUKHAREST AND AFTER

Now, from Bukharest, Serbia emerged a considerable state; in the eyes of her own soldiers and citizens she was a real military power and the easy victories of her armies over Turk and Bulgar were taken as a promise of future success over the Austrian. Beyond the Drina and the Save were four million Serbs and two million Croats, toward whom Serbians now looked as the Italians of the Sardinian Kingdom had looked toward their brethren of the Milanese and the Kingdom of Naples. Nor was there any mistaking the similar stirring of race sympathy within the Hapsburg domains.

Worst of all, it was plain that Russia would henceforth regard Serbia as a ward, and never, unless under threat of war, permit Austria to strike the little Slav state. The growth and glory of a free Serbia might shake the very foundations of the Hapsburg empire with its millions of Slavs, uneasily bearing the German and Magyar yokes, but backed by Russia, Serbia was bound to endure as a menace to Austria as far as Austrian statesmen could see. Austria had challenged Russia in the Bosnia time; Russia had temporarily bowed, but the real answer came when Russia appeared at London, after the First Balkan War, to support the claims of the Serbs, and after Bukharest gave her protection to the new and strong Serbia, which not alone closed the Hapsburg pathway to the Ægean, but dreamed of extending the renaissance of the southern Slav to Fiume and to Triest, depriving German and Magyar alike of a window on the sea, from which they had excluded the Serb.

The Treaty of Bukharest placed Austria-Hungary in jeopardy. It had hardly been promulgated when Austria sought the permission of her Italian ally to attack Serbia. Italy, as Giolitti later confessed,

declined. But the Austrian suggestion leaves no doubt as to the Austrian purpose. The blow that was suspended in 1913 was to fall in 1914; it could no longer be permanently prevented, after Serbia had made good her place in the sun and Austrian diplomacy had proven bankrupt in the Balkan wars.

Unhappily the question between Austria and Russia over Serbia could no longer be regarded as one concerning them alone. Tangier, Agadir, and the intervening Bosnian episode had transformed Europe into two camps. A dispute between two nations, each belonging to a different group, became instantly the cause for difference between the two groups. Germany had twice challenged France and Britain, and her challenge had contributed to binding them still more closely together. The Anglo-French friendship had expanded to include Russia, the ally of France. And this relation between Russia, France, and Britain had barred the road to German colonial expansion at Tangier and Agadir, it had endeavoured to thwart Austrian purpose in the Balkans in the Bosnian time, and it had, in fact, appeared as a potential force at the Conference at London, if it had never been forced to declare its solidarity, because no test question was pressed to an issue.

Such, in sum, was the transformation that Europe had undergone in less than ten years. Such had been the inexorable consequences of the Kaiser's determination to challenge British sea power and his subsequent determination to prevent Britain from drawing close to Russia and to France. Britain had met his challenge on the water. She had drawn close to France and to Russia until a war was to show that she stood with them absolutely. The play of ten years had all turned against the German. His influence in Europe had been undermined; the safety of his Austrian partner had been compromised; the loyalty of his Italian ally had been weakened and, as it turned out, destroyed; and all this had happened to a Germany, every year growing stronger in all that makes a nation strong and possessing an army unequalled in Europe, unexcelled in history. In the minds of every German the shadow of Britain had crossed the path of rightful Teutonic expansion, and a Germany that felt she could win her rightful place in the sun by

the sword felt also that, in the preceding ten years, she had not only failed to win it, but had actually lost it by reliance upon peaceful methods.

This was the Germany that spoke in July, 1914, less than a year later. The Treaty of Bukharest, in restoring peace in the Balkans, had doomed the peace of the world.

CHAPTER THREE THE TWELVE DAYS

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE

The Treaty of Bukharest was signed on August 10, 1913. Such reservations as to its provisions as may have been cherished in Petrograd, Vienna, and Rome, were abolished when the Kaiser—by a gesture, memorable thereafter—conveyed to his brother-in-law, the King of Greece, his recognition that the terms of this settlement were definitive. And for ten months Europe settled back after two years of the acutest apprehension. On the surface all was calm, although the subsequent admissions of Giolitti have informed us that the ink was not dry on the document of Bukharest when Vienna began to sound Rome on the possibility of an attack upon Serbia. Rome was unresponsive and this bad moment passed.

But on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife were assassinated in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crime was committed by a man of Serbian race, but a resident of Bosnia and a subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The deed was an abhorrent one and if no evidence that the world has yet been able to submit to any impartial jury has fixed upon the Serbian Crown or the Serbian Government any complicity in the murder, still the crime itself was manifestly the outgrowth of the agitation of the Pan-Serbs, who aimed at extending the domain of King Peter from the Drina to the Adriatic and from Cattaro to Fiume. It was a logical and unmistakable consequence of the Serbian propaganda for racial unity, which had been permitted in Belgrad and not unkindly observed from Petrograd.

There were some days when Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from Vienna. But no sign appeared and slowly, yet in the end completely, the crime slipped from the headlines of the newspapers and the minds of the public. On the surface, European politics seemed in the most tranquil state in the long and troubled decade that had passed. A British fleet visited Kiel; the French President set out for Petrograd; there was not a ripple on the surface of the diplomatic waters. This was, however, only the calm before the storm. On July 23d Austria sent to Serbia the most formidable ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to another.

The ultimatum itself—in addition to prescribing rules and regulations with reference to anti-Austrian propaganda and propagandists in Serbia; in addition to calling for the disbanding of patriotic societies with aims inimical to Austria and the punishment of their leaders, who were also servants of the Crown in the army and in the civil service—demanded that Austrian officials should be associated with the Serbian in the carrying out of the tasks that were set. To this ultimatum there was added a time-limit of forty-eight hours.

Here, then, on July 23d, was a new crisis, graver than the three that had preceded, because, instead of abstract questions of territory and commerce, there were now raised the concrete questions of national honour and dynastic interest which were involved in the crime of Serajevo. Ostensibly seeking to punish agitators, whose activities had led to the killing of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian thrones; ostensibly aiming to put an end to an agitation injurious to Austrian safety, the Government of Vienna had, in fact, challenged Russia, the avowed protector of Serbia.

If Russia did not now step forward to defend Serbia it was plain that the kingdom would fall under the weight of Austrian arms, or if it bowed to Austrian demands would pass actually, if not nominally, under the influence of Vienna. If Russia stood aside and permitted this to happen, then her own prestige in the Balkans and among the Slav peoples of Europe was gone. It was Bosnia over again, but Bosnia with a new and still-more-disturbing set of complexities, for in annexing Bosnia Austria had only transformed the name under which she exercised authority in Bosnia, but now she would transform the actual condition under which Serbia lived from independence to servitude.

And if Russia did step forward to protect Serbia, then she, by this act, asserted that she claimed the right to exercise an actual protection over Serbia; she claimed the right to speak for Serbia; she extended Russian influence and Russian power to the very shores of the Danube, and from Belgrad, as from the Galician frontier, threatened the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. If Austrian will prevailed, Serbia would become a Hapsburg appendage, but not less clear, once the issue was raised, was the fact that if Russia intervened and prevailed, Austrian safety was compromised and her prestige destroyed.

II. THE AUSTRIAN CASE

Stripped of all detail the fact was that Serbia, if not through direct governmental action at least by general popular agitation and with the benevolent blindness of the government, had plotted to undermine Austrian unity. To be sure the movement had its origin in the fact that Austria contained some million of Slavs, who were Serb by race, and perhaps desired to become subjects of King Peter. It was a situation on all fours with that which existed in Italy, before the Austrian war with France. But, whatever the moral title of a nation to its own territories and subjects, no nation can permit itself to be destroyed by outside intrigue and no nation will voluntarily surrender provinces and citizens.

When France undertook to assist in the liberation of northern Italy from Hapsburg rule, war resulted, as it was bound to result. If Russia now asserted on behalf of Serbia the same doctrine that Napoleon III had practised with regard to Sardinia, Austria would have to fight. The only difference was that Austria now raised the issue herself. She did not raise the issue until the heir to the Hapsburg throne had been murdered, although she had proposed to raise it ten months before the crime; but, having raised it, her own safety, her own integrity, her own existence as a Great Power were at stake.

And if one look squarely at the facts, there is little question that she was bound to raise the issue, because this Pan-Slav agitation was destroying the very foundations of her national existence. The right

of ten million Germans and as many Magyars to rule twenty-five million Slavs may be questioned on the moral side, but the legal and international right of a nation to preserve itself cannot be questioned, save on the basis of some law higher than that recognized by nations in their common intercourse.

Austrian treatment of the Slavs within her boundaries, and her treatment of the neighbouring Slav states, had been brutal and stupid. She had gained their hatred and she had deserved it. She had sought in the Balkan wars to thwart their growth and her policy had gone bankrupt. But if her mistakes had gained her deserved hatred, and her failures had enabled the very state that hated her most to menace her existence, it was not less true that she was bound to defend her existence and her unity.

In the minds of many, Serbia has come to share the glory of Belgium and to occupy the niche of a martyr quite as completely. But the idea is fallacious. Belgium threatened no one, plotted injury to no one of her neighbours, permitted no propaganda of sedition which menaced the security and order of either France or Germany, for example, to be conducted from within her boundaries. Serbia did all these things. She did them as Sardinia carried on the *risorgimento*; she did them in the name and in the fact of patriotism; she sought to liberate and unite the mass of her race, but this liberation was predicated on the collapse of Austria.

If there had been no crime at Serajevo, it was inevitable that Austria would presently take the sword against Serbia, because only by taking the sword could she defend herself. But it was equally inevitable that Russia, bound by race and religion to the Serbs, animated as she had always been by the keenest race sympathy for her fellow Slavs, would defend Serbia, who had become her soldier on the Danube, her ally against Austria's dreams of an advance to the Ægean. Actually Serbia was only a detail in the rivalry between Romanoff and Hapsburg, which was several centuries old.


Bismarck himself had hesitated in making an alliance with Austria, because he foresaw that this meant to inherit the rivalry between the

two nations in the Balkans. His influence at Vienna had sufficed to keep peace, but his support of Austria at the Congress of Berlin had made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. For the moment, for his own time, he had met this by expanding his alliance to include Italy, by keeping on friendly terms with Britain, and by executing a "treaty of reassurance" with Russia. But it had needed the skill of Bismarck to keep the balance true and the successors of Bismarck had neither his skill nor his resources. Italy and Austria were natural enemies and he had made them allies, Russia and Austria were natural rivals and he had kept them at peace with each other. But less than two decades after he laid down the reins, natural tendencies had overcome fortuitous circumstances.

The peril of the Balkan situation was no longer the peril of a war between Austria and Russia, or between Austria and Germany on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, with Italy a possible ally of the Central Powers. The challenge of the Kaiser to Britain had brought Britain back to the Continent. France herself would have hesitated in the early nineties to fight on the Serbian issue for her Russian ally. But the French spirit had undergone a new birth since Tangier and Agadir.

Since the war came, volumes have been published devoted simply to proving upon which of the several nations the responsibility for the conflict rests and to demonstrating that one or the other of the nations, during the fateful twelve days before the storm broke in its full fury, actually desired war, or served the cause of peace more loyally, than its neighbours.

Yet it seems probable that, in the long time hereafter, those details will be forgotten by the historian, who will perceive that the twelve days were of little meaning, that they marked a period after real hope of peace had expired, that the whole system under which Europe had lived for so long had been destroyed, and that the statesmen who laboured so frantically in the closing hours were actually as impotent as medicine men who hurl incantations and invoke charms to check the approach of a cyclone.



LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR

As the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had been almost silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. An old and broken man he had gone to France at the moment of the crisis, to cheer on his well-loved Indian troops. Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it



III. SIR EDWARD GREY

In the Albanian time Europe had permitted Sir Edward Grey to act as its agent. He had passed from one group to the other, persuading Russia to resign Scutari to the new Kingdom of Albania, wheedling Austria into consenting that Dibra should be Serbian. Austria and Italy for once were agreed, both seeking to preserve from Serb and Greek alike that Albania each hoped to inherit. Neither Russia nor Germany was in a state of readiness for war, and France was, as she continued through the critical days of 1914, willing to serve the cause of peace to her limit, provided it did not interfere with her duty as an ally of Russia.

When the Serbian crisis came, Sir Edward Grey—still under the influence of his success over Albania, still convinced that he had to deal with a question that could be adjusted as the Albanian had been—began that earnest and industrious campaign to preserve the peace of the world, which remains the admiration of the Briton—and the target of the German. From first to last he had, in this campaign, the support of the French and the Italian statesmen; he had the assent of Russia to all the propositions which he made; but never, to the closing hour, does he seem to have grasped the fact that he was in the presence of a question which could not be settled by discussion about the green table, since it involved the safety of Austria and the honour of Russia.

The whole burden of Sir Edward Grey's words, messages, explanations, discloses his conviction that to preserve the peace of Europe it was necessary to persuade Austria to withdraw her ultimatum, to suspend her action against Serbia, to consent to submit to the Concert of Europe the question between Serbia and herself, which was the question of her own integrity aggravated by the new problem raised by the murder of the Archduke.

In the very nature of things Russia was prepared to consent to any arrangement that spared Serbia, but any arrangement that spared Serbia and submitted the Austro-Serbian question to the Concert of Europe vindicated Russia's assertion of a right to protect Serbia and

was bound to constitute a moral victory for Russia and a new blow to Austrian safety. Nor could Austria, remembering the experience of Germany at Algerias, anticipate a victory in any new international gathering.

To Germany Sir Edward Grey continued to address appeals to intervene to restrain Austrian action. Conceivably it had been Germany who had moved Austria to action, to the despatch of the ultimatum, but of this there is as yet no sufficing proof. Unmistakably it lay within the power of the German Government by a word, by a gesture, to deprive Austria of the assurance German support gave. But this would have been in fact a desertion of her one faithful ally at the moment of deadly peril, and it would have foreshadowed the collapse of the Austro-German Alliance, if it had not been but the prelude to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, already shaken by Slav intrigue within and without.

Unless Russia abandoned her championship of Serbia, or Austria consented to recall her ultimatum and leave to Europe the task of disciplining her little neighbour—a task beyond the capacity of the fragile Concert—war was bound to follow. And there never was any chance that either Austria or Russia would surrender. When Sir Edward Grey asked Germany to restrain Austria, Germany with perfect justice retorted by asking Sir Edward Grey to restrain Russia. Always the British Minister seems to have been obsessed with the immediate present, always the action of Austria in issuing the ultimatum seems to arouse his indignation and awaken his protest, but to the fatal chain of events that had made Serbia a deadly peril to Austrian existence he gave no thought.

Actually he accomplished nothing for good or for evil, actually he sought peace by suggesting temporary devices that were of no value and could be of no avail in the presence of the storm that was rising. When the storm broke he found himself without a policy, so far as his own Government was concerned, but bound by honour, if not by treaty, to stand with France and with Russia. Nor was he alone bound by honour. He had failed beyond all forgiveness, together with his as-

sociates, in not warning the British people of the danger that had for ten years been growing, but he now saw with utmost clarity that a Germany victorious over France would be a Germany which Britain could not resist and could not expect would refrain from attack.

German invasion of Belgium saved Sir Edward Grey, it saved England, because it supplied a moral issue and a moral impulse which served to enlist British effort until the nation at last perceived the material interests, the national existence, that were at stake. But if the successor of Bismarck will hereafter have to answer to his own people and in history for having involved Germany in a war against three great nations at once, the successor of Pitt and Beaconsfield will be indicted for having brought Britain to the edge of Armageddon without permitting the British people to suspect that their life and their Empire were in jeopardy.

Having entered into an arrangement with France, by which the French fleet was to guard British interests in the Mediterranean while the British fleet concentrated against the German menace in the North Sea, Sir Edward Grey could not desert France at the opening of the war, even if there were no written alliance. But if the British people had not been aroused by the invasion of Belgium it may be questioned whether Sir Edward Grey could have persuaded his Government to make good its obligations or his fellow countrymen to honour their Government's commitments.

It is difficult to find any warrant in Sir Edward's course for the storm of abuse that Germans have directed at him as a monster of bad faith, but equally difficult is the task for one, writing with such facts as are now at hand, to escape the belief that he acted with a blindness and a fatuity almost passing human comprehension. His party associates had kept Britain blind to the truth of world affairs for a decade, and when the storm arrived there was lacking any national understanding which could give force to the decisions of a Minister, at last aware of the deadly peril of his country. He knew England must stand with France to save her own life, but until Germany invaded Belgium, he was destitute of any resource by which he could reveal to his fellow countrymen the imminence and the magnitude of their peril.

Those who saw Sir Edward in the closing hours, when the World War had become inescapable, think of him as one who revealed in every word and act the emotion of a man who had seen the hope and the work of a lifetime gone suddenly to dust and ashes. He had believed that a settlement with Germany, which would lay forever the peril of what was now to occur, was possible. In the Bosnia time, in the Agadir crisis, at the Conference of London, he had not only striven to avoid war, but had found cause for hope that, since war had been avoided on these three occasions, the cloud that had hung over Europe so long might be finally dissipated.

His optimism had led him far afield. It had persuaded him to sacrifice the Balkan Alliance at the Conference of London, when he accepted the Austro-German programme for Albania. It was to cost his own country dearly in the first years of the war, which found her unprepared, because a Liberal Government, under Sir Edward's influence, had turned a deaf ear to all the warnings of those who saw Europe as it was and not through the golden haze of lofty but insubstantial dreams of world peace. Yet complete as had been his failure, absolute as had been his misreading of the essential facts of his own time, when he occupied a post of honour and responsibility, no one could doubt the sincerity of his purposes or the tragedy, the personal tragedy, that came with the destruction of all his lifework.

IV. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

The Austrian ultimatum was despatched to Serbia on July 23d, and it carried a time-limit of forty-eight hours. When it was sent, the President of France, with the important members of the French Cabinet, were on the sea, returning from Russia. The Irish crisis in Britain seemed to be about to end in civil war. The Kaiser was in Norwegian waters. There was no Russian ambassador in Vienna. The Caillaux trial was dominating French attention and a French senator, speaking in his place, had just called attention to grave defects in French military organization.

In only one detail—but this a vitally important one—did chance

favour the Triple Entente. The British fleet had been mobilized for its annual manœuvres shortly before the crisis came and, on a hint from Italy, received in the third week of July, demobilization was postponed. Thus British sea power was on a war footing at the crucial moment. If Germany had ever planned a raid on British shores in the first days of an Anglo-German conflict, as British naval authorities believe—such a dash as the Japanese made at Port Arthur in the opening hours of the Russo-Japanese War—the scheme was frustrated by the accidental posture of British fleets and the timely Italian hint.

On Friday, July 24th, Austria informed Russia that she did not have any intention to annex Serbian territory, and Russia replied by asking an extension of the time-limit attached to the ultimatum to Serbia. This was refused by Austria on Saturday, the day on which Russia issued her first warning note, published in the Petrograd press, an official assurance that Russia would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, which, through its Crown Prince, now acting as Regent, had appealed to the Czar on the preceding day.

On this same day, Saturday, July 25th, just within the time-limit, Serbia sent a reply to Austria, which contained a surrender on most points and an agreement to submit the rest to arbitration. Austria forthwith declared the Serbian response to be unsatisfactory and withdrew her minister from Belgrad.

On Sunday, July 26th, Sir Edward Grey began his task of accommodating the world crisis. He suggested that the case between Russia and Austria be left to the mediation of the four Great Powers not directly concerned, acting through their ambassadors in Vienna and Petrograd. These nations were, of course, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Russia, having first suggested conversations directly between Vienna and Petrograd, a suggestion subsequently rejected by Austria, accepted Sir Edward's proposal but Germany rejected it on the next day.

On Monday, July 27th, when Germany had rejected his proposal, Sir Edward invited the German Government to present a formula of mediation of its own. This elicited no response from Berlin, because Germany had already on July 25th invited France and Great Britain to restrain Russia, that is, to urge Russia to stand aside and permit Austria to punish Serbia. This proposal, described by the Germans as "localization" of the disturbance, was rejected both by France and by Great Britain.

A collapse of all preliminary efforts of Sir Edward follows the declaration of war upon Serbia, by Austria, on Tuesday, July 28th, as fighting commenced forthwith. Meantime the Kaiser, having returned from Norway on Sunday night, now addressed his first message to the Czar urging him to permit Austria to discipline Serbia. To this the Czar responded the next day by urging that the whole matter be submitted to The Hague, a suggestion never answered by the Kaiser.

Meantime the question of mobilization had become acute. Austria had been partially mobilizing against Serbia, and as early as July 25th the Russian Council had considered partial mobilization against Austria, at the same time informing the German Government that there was no hostile meaning for Germany in the approaching mobilization.

Now on the 29th, Germany for the first time began to sound Great Britain on the possibility of British neutrality if war should come. Her proposals were promptly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

By Friday, July 30th, general Russian mobilization was proclaimed, but at the eleventh hour Sir Edward Grey suggested that the operations of Austria against Serbia should be recognized as a punitive expedition and that Austria, having reached a point within Serbian territory fixed by agreement, should permit her future course to be submitted to a conference of Powers. Austria assented to a portion of this suggestion and for the first time manifested a decided change in spirit. Russia agreed.

But on July 31st Germany addressed an ultimatum to Russia demanding that Russia desist from her mobilization within twelve hours. This was naturally ignored by Russia and on Saturday, August 1st, Germany declared war upon Russia. A general war now became inevitable and the only question that remained was as to the course of Britain and Italy.

V. BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Something less than a hundred hours separate the German declaration of war upon Russia from the British declaration despatched to Germany after midnight on August 4th. In this time the real drama concerns only Britain and Germany, for Italy in due course proclaimed her neutrality while France affirmed her fidelity to her Russian ally.

In these momentous hours the whole play of German diplomacy was to keep Britain out of the conflict, for reasons too obvious to need mention. And it should be remarked that not only did Germany have good reason to believe that she would succeed, but also that she came desperately near to accomplishing her purpose, as will be disclosed when the history of what took place in London on August 2d at last sees the light of day.

Sir Edward Grey's rôle in this period is also plain. He knew that, not because of Belgium, not because of sympathy for Albert's kingdom or responsibility for its integrity, not because of unwritten but potent claims of honour binding Britain to France, must his country enter the war. Now at last he perceived that it had become a matter of life or death for his own nation and that a German victory and the destruction of France would leave Germany an enemy greater than Napoleon had been, and more menacing than any foe England had known in her long history. Unmistakably his course was to find the cause on which his nation could enter, just as Germany sought to abolish all causes.

In this situation Sir Edward's position was excessively difficult. The Cabinet in which he sat was by no means resolved to fight. Some of its members were frankly opposed to standing with France; others were, to say the least, doubtful. Strong Liberal newspapers, on which the majority party relied for support, openly proclaimed that there was no reason for British participation. The country at large had no inkling of the actual European situation and, thanks to Liberal-Radical rule for nearly a decade, had been taught to regard all discussion of the German menace as without other warrant than domestic political exigency might supply. In the critical hour Britain was asleep and Sir Edward's

associates divided as to their duty and paralyzed by the lack of any popular emotion which might supply a warrant for Governmental action.

From this terrible dilemma Germany rescued Sir Edward by her decision to strike at France through Belgium. But no one can read the various documents without feeling that for him Belgium was a pretext rather than a policy. The right and the duty of Britain to defend Belgium were manifest, but it was always as essential to British interest and policy that France should be saved and only a sacrifice of British safety could have resulted, if Sir Edward, lacking the Belgian issue, had been unable to find some other on which he could bring his nation to the point of war. Nor is it less plain that the moment France was involved in the war, the commitments of the British Government in the matter of the fleets bound Britain to stand by the Republic, no matter what course Germany should take—short of guaranteeing to respect the integrity of France, her colonies and her coasts, and to refrain from attacking France.

This was clearly perceived by Lord Lansdowne, who had negotiated the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 and, on the "black Sunday," when British Liberalism stood aghast and shaken before the abyss, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith affirming the belief, which was the opinion of the whole Tory party, that France could not be deserted. Conceivably this was the decisive gesture. But it was not until the invasion of Belgium became a fact that there was the suggestion of a resolved policy disclosed in the words or the actions of Sir Edward or his associates.

It remains now, rapidly to summarize the events of the closing days from August 1st, the date of the German declaration of war upon Russia, until the expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum addressed to Berlin.

Meantime it should be recalled that Germany, in addition to declaring war upon Russia, had demanded of France information as to what the French attitude would be; had been informed that France would follow the course dictated by her own interests; and that in due

THE TWELVE DAYS (AUGUST 4-16, 1914)



KING PETER OF SERBIA

In the Twentieth Century, one does not expect to see a king, clad in velvet and ermine, riding through the streets of his capital on a snow-white steed, with his golden crown upon his head. But King Peter is quite the old-fashioned, fairy-book monarch. In December, 1914, when his troops were about to begin their successful effort to retake Belgrade, he rode along the front of his line and harangued them, even as their chiefs of remoter centuries were accustomed to do.

PORTRAITS OF PERSONS THEN PROMINENT



WILLIAM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

"The Soldier and the army," he said in 1891, "not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army." In 1900, he added, "If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword." And in 1906, "My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea."




THE LATE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA HUNGARY

When he came to the throne in 1848, more than one revolution was in progress in his dominions. During his reign his army was badly beaten by the Germans and there was much dissension among the many races over which he ruled. His domestic troubles were numerous and heartrending. They included the assassination of his wife and the suicide of his son. Yet he lived on through a record-breaking reign of almost seventy years, and died leaving his people engulfed in the greatest disaster of history.



THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Nicholas, once Czar of all the Russians (left), the only autocrat among the Allies, was a weak ruler, much under the influence of his German wife and of wonder-working priests. But when revolution threatened he is said to have indignantly repudiated the traitorous suggestion of one of his generals, to overcome "the canaille" by letting in the Germans. King George of England (right) is more fortunate. A sovereign in name only, he occupies a secure position in the hearts of his countrymen, as the focusing point and symbol of their patriotic but self-respecting loyalty.



THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE


M. Raymond Poincaré, President of France, hurried back to France from Petrograd during the fateful Twelve Days in 1914 and set to work on diplomatic correspondence with England. On July 30th, he made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris, and the following day addressed a letter directly to King George asking for an assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. England refused to commit herself till she was sure that Germany was to invade Belgium, and that the Belgians meant to resist.



MR. ASQUITH, BRITISH PREMIER AND SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER Sir Edward Grey never grasped the inevitability of the World War. Consequently he was driven to a temporizing policy as the great catastrophe drew near. In the clear light of retrospect it is evident his position demanded that he should have warned the British people of the danger which had for ten years been steadily increasing Mr. Asquith, like Sir Edward Grey, seems to have been simply bewildered in the crisis. They felt that they ought to stand by France, but the invasion of Belgium was needed to stir the British public to action. Only after that event

was a definite settled policy disclosed by the words and acts of the Members of the Government.





For nearly forty years—he was born in 1856—the German Chancellor has held public office. He is a Brand enburger, that is to say, a Prussian of the Prussians Before becoming Chancellor in 1909, he was the Prussian Minister of the Interior (1905), and Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior (1907). His was the hard task of confessing to the world on August 4, 1914, that Germany was in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore invaded Belgium.



COUNT BERCHTOLD, AUSTRIAN PREMIER, 1914

After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from Vienna. But no sign came and the crisis seemed to have passed when, nearly a month after the crime of Sarajevo, Count Berchtold sent to Servia the most formidable ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to another. To this ultimatum was added a time-limit of forty-eight hours. One wonders what was secretly going on during these weeks of apparent inaction.





M. SAZONOF

M. VIVIANI

DIPLOMATISTS OF THE TWELVE DAYS

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister who appealed to England to declare she would stand by France and Russia on the day after Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. Sir Edward Grey replied then that England was not ready to go to war on Serbia s account. But the violation of Belgium greatly changed England's attitude. Gottlieb Von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. His admission to the British Ambassador of Germany's invasion of Belgium at once provoked the British ultimatum. Renè Viviani, Premier of France during the Twelve Days; later, Minister of Justice, and in 1917, head of the Allies' War Commission to the United States.



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TO PROVIDE THE SINEWS OF WAR

The Finance Ministers of the Triple Entente meet to discuss ways and means. On the left is M. Bark, representing Russia; in the centre, M. Ribot, representing France—in 1917 he became French Premier; on the right, Lloyd-George, then England's Chancellor of the Excheduer and later, Prime Minister.

course she declared war upon the French Republic on August 3d, alleging certain acts by French aviators over German soil that were too ridiculous to obtain even passing credence.

VI. SIR EDWARD'S DILEMMA

On July 24th, following the Austrian ultimatum by twenty-four hours, Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked the British Ambassador in Petrograd to use his influence to have Britain declare that she would stand with France and Russia. The conviction of Russian officials, held consistently by Russian and French diplomacy alike, was that the sole hope for peace was to be found in the chance that Germany would not care to fight if she knew she would have Britain in the field. This view was steadily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, who on July 25th informed the British Ambassador at Petrograd that Great Britain could give no assurance as public sentiment would not warrant a decision to participate in a war over Serbia.

This attitude endured right down to the time of the German declaration of war upon Russia. On July 30th the President of the French Republic made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris and on July 31st he addressed a letter directly to King George, asking for an assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. But it is fair to say for Sir Edward that at the same time he spoke with far more explicitness to Germany, and as early as July 29th warned the German Ambassador in London that he must not mistake the pacific tone of British diplomacy for any assurance that Britain would stay out. This warning was totally ignored in Berlin, where the ruling statesmen pinned their faith to the weakness of British foreign policy and the division in the British Cabinet.

On this same day the German Government made a clear bid for British neutrality by offering to respect Dutch neutrality, to guarantee Belgian integrity and independence, provided Belgium did not stand out against Germany, and to give assurance not to annex French territory in Europe if the war turned in Germany's favour. But Germany thus tacitly declined to promise not to violate Belgian neutrality or to give

any pledge not to annex French colonies after the war. This was the "shameful" proposal to quote Sir Edward Grey, which was rejected upon July 30th.

On this same day, too, the French Ambassador in London reminded the British Government of letters exchanged by France and Britain in 1912, after the Agadir crisis, which provided that, if the peace of Europe should be endangered, the two nations should proceed to a discussion of what they proposed to do. Actually this meant a discussion of combined land and sea operations. Still Sir Edward remained unresponsive and King George, on Friday, July 31st, could give only the vaguest of reassuring words to the appeal made to him directly by the President of the French Republic.

And yet on this same day, the situation began to clear, for on this day Sir Edward Grey addressed to France and to Germany an identic note asking their purposes with regard to Belgian neutrality. By the Treaty of 1839, reaffirmed by that of 1870, Britain had declared her purpose to defend the neutrality of Belgium, an engagement made also by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. France promptly agreed to respect Belgian neutrality, but the British Ambassador at Berlin was unable to get any response. The next day the German Ambassador inquired in London whether a German pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium would insure British neutrality. Sir Edward Grey declined such a bargain at once.

But on August 1st a new problem arose. By virtue of an arrangement made long before 1914, and probably after Agadir, French fleets had taken over the British task in the Mediterranean that the British might concentrate their fleets in the North Sea. The French Atlantic coast was therefore undefended. Wherefore Sir Edward Grey was moved on this day to give to the French Ambassador a promise to ask the Cabinet, which met that afternoon, to agree that if the German fleet undertook to attack the coasts of France, the British fleet would intervene. This assurance was given by the British Cabinet and the French were informed of it on August 2d.

On August 3d Germany on her part agreed to refrain from an

attack upon France by sea, if Britain would remain neutral, but declined to give any commitment as to Belgium. This occasioned no surprise because on the previous day Germany had informed the Belgian Government of its intention, provoked by alleged French activities, to enter Belgian territory and to advance up the Meuse Valley to attack France.

On this same day Belgium addressed an appeal to Britain for diplomatic support and Sir Edward Grey told the Belgian Minister that a German invasion would mean war with Great Britain. France offered Belgium five army corps, which were declined. But the British assurance sent to Belgium arrived only on the morning of the 4th of August, when the German invasion of Belgium had begun.

VII. BELGIUM DECIDES TO FIGHT

On Monday, August 3d, Belgium reached its heroic decision to defend its own neutrality and responded to the brutal German ultimatum with a declaration of purpose, contained in moderate language, which will remain memorable. In declaring that she purposed to defend her soil against German violation she asserted that she had at all times been equally prepared to defend herself against France or Britain and thus demolished the whole German edifice of allegation, that France was planning to attack Germany through Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey was getting on firm ground now. An invasion of Belgium, unless Belgium were willing to defend herself, might still have left his Cabinet cold, but once Belgium had made up her mind to fight he was assured that there would be little more hanging back in England.

August 4th is the last day. King Albert, now in the presence of actual invasion, appealed to Great Britain, Russia, and France to help him defend his country. Great Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany, which expired at midnight, demanding that satisfactory assurances be furnished of German determination to respect Belgian neutrality.

Notable on this last day, also, was the speech of the German Chancellor in which he told his countrymen and the world that Germany was in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore invaded Belgium. It is in this speech, too, that he made the frank

admission that the invasion of Belgium was in violation of the rules of international law. He went further and openly conceded that what was being done was "a wrong that we will try to make good again as soon as our military ends have been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way through."

When the public indignation of the world had become manifest, the German Government endeavoured to find post-mortem warrant for its course in Belgium by the "discovery" of documents in Brussels alleged to disclose a conspiracy of Belgium with Britain and France. Such devices were as futile as the efforts to find excuse for a declaration of war upon France in imaginary aeroplane raids by French craft dropping bombs over German cities. Whatever effect they may have had upon German opinion, these fictions have long been dismissed by neutral publics, which have accepted as final the blunt, brutal, but at least honest words of the German Chancellor spoken at the moment when the decision had been made.

Not less memorable is the incident that marked the final interview between the British Ambassador and the German Chancellor. To Sir Edward Goschen, calling to take his leave of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg made his famous inquiry as to the purpose of Great Britain to make war upon Germany merely for the sake of "a scrap of paper." The "scrap of paper" was the British guarantee of the integrity of Belgium, contained in the Treaty of 1839 and reaffirmed in the document of 1870. The full extent of German surprise, apprehension, and anger, provoked by the decision of Great Britain, was revealed in this interview for the first time.

Meantime, as Von Jagow had already told the British Ambassador, the invasion of Belgium had become an accomplished fact and there could be no drawing back for Germany. Accordingly, with expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum at midnight on August 4th, Great Britain declared war upon Germany. Thus the triple Entente in the presence of the fact of war became a triple alliance at the precise moment when the Triple Alliance was facing the defection of Italy, who promptly

announced that the terms of her alliance with Austria and Germany, which were for action in a defensive war only, did not require her to participate in a war which she considered aggressive on their part, and that she therefore proclaimed her neutrality. This prompt declaration of Italian neutrality was of incalculable military advantage to France, since it automatically released for service on the German frontier several army corps stationed along the Alps.

August 4, 1914, therefore, marks the complete ruin of the whole edifice that Bismarck had erected; his alliance had collapsed; the union of all the rivals of Germany, which he had feared and in his life time prevented, had come to pass. All of this, too, German statesmen might have perceived would inevitably occur, had they been guided by British tradition rather than contemporary British policy. Such, across the centuries, had been the unfailing answer of Britain to a challenge to her supremacy at sea.

VIII. THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE

It remains now to summarize briefly the evidence in the case. This review, written seven years after the crisis which preceded the World War, itself, cannot seek in the brief space here allowed, to deal with that vast accumulation of evidence and that unlimited mass of conflicting testimony, which war and peace both have contributed. About these Twelve Days and the incidents which preceded them and directly influenced them a struggle has been in progress from August 1, 1914 onward, which will hardly end within the lifetime of any one who shared in or witnessed the events themselves.

Yet it is not less clear that even the brief time which has passed has served to dispose of all the German assertions that the war was provoked by the treachery of Great Britain or by the aggressions of France. Equally ridiculous now seems the allegation that Belgium invited her ruin by any overt act or by any covert bargain, which associated her with an attack upon her German neighbour, or offered her territories to the enemies of Germany as a boulevard leading to the vital and unprotected regions of the lower Rhine.

Reasonable Germans, Lichnowsky's testimony compelling, have discarded the old allegations that Sir Edward Grey was responsible for the war. They have been forced to abandon the assertion that France, either by air raids on Nuremberg or violations of the frontier of Germany, supplied a casus belli. Before the testimony—which cannot be controverted—that French forces retired ten kilometres behind the Franco-German frontier and there remained until Germany declared war upon France, all such charges have recoiled. Indeed, the fact has been established that even had France declined to stand with her Russian ally, she would have been called upon by Germany to surrender Verdun and Toul to German keeping as a guarantee of good behaviour.

So far as Belgium, France, and Great Britain are concerned, the German has shifted his attack from the specific to the general. He has fallen back upon the charge that the policies of his western neighbours before the war led to the conflict; that the "Encircling policy" of King Edward encouraged French chauvinism; that British dealings with Russia were a decisive aid to the war party at Petrograd. In sum, he now argues that the western nations desired the war and were therefore responsible; that they did not prevent it and therefore they were guilty. But this is to substitute for the specific charge of murder, susceptible of refutation, the general allegation that there existed in French and British hearts a hatred of Germany which went to the point of envisaging murder, and such a charge lies outside the field of any court and beyond the capacity of any jury to deal with.

As to Russia, the case is different. Russia did order a general mobilization on the night of July 29th and the Czar did seek to recall it the next day, but was deceived by his war minister who told him and told the German representative that the order had not been issued. The discovery of this mobilization led to the German ultimatum and the inevitable following declaration of war. Hence the charge that Russia is responsible for the war.

But again, the facts are against any such allegation. In the first place, Russian mobilization was only one consequence of the Austrian ultimatum sent to Serbia and in this action German policy supported Austria. The cause of the mobilization was not Russian but German and Austrian. Therefore, if the fact of mobilization produced the war, the responsibility, in the larger sense, must rest with those authors of the Austro-German policy, which set the match to the European powder magazine.

In truth, time has but confirmed the western view of the origin—or, more exactly, the occasion—of the outbreak of the war in 1914. The responsibility must be found in the acts of Austrian and German statesmen. The debate no longer properly concerns itself with this aspect of the case. Such discussion as remains must go to the deeper problem, must seek to resolve the ultimate question as to whether, in producing the crisis of July, Austrian or German statesmanship, or both, deliberately sought the end attained: namely, a war.

No one is clearer than Von Tirpitz on the point that Bethmann-Hollweg risked the war. Nothing is more transparent in all the German evidence available since the war ended than the fact that at the outset German and Austrian statesmen marched forward with express intent to force an issue, and from the solution of that crisis to bring back a shining diplomatic triumph, which should at once consolidate Austria's position in the Balkans and enhance Germany's position in the world.

In the final analysis it is to Kautsky one must go for the complete and the inescapable demonstration of the guilt of the rulers of Germany. There, assembled by a German, himself the dupe of the first manœuvres of the conspirators, are the conclusive proofs, which as the years pass must gain in credence the whole world over.

In his examination of German and Austrian documents Kautsky traces each step from the preliminary conference between the German Kaiser and the doomed Archduke at Knopischt, through the Potsdam council of July 5th, at which it was agreed that Austria should have free rein for her Serbian policy, straight down to the fatal hour when the German General Staff snatched the reins from the palsied hands of Bethmann-Hollweg and precipitated the deluge.

For the German people Kautsky enters a plea of innocence, which

might easily have appealed to world intelligence had Germany, the war over and the dynasty overthrown, consented to accept the evidence, given itself over to the examination of the evidence rather than passionately and furiously delivered itself to the empire of those lies, which had been proven lies either in the course of the conflict or in the general revelation which followed the downfall of the defeated.

The words of Kautsky sum up the whole evidence in the case. Thus he writes:—

"By lies and by perfidy the war had been prepared in the first days of July. By lies and by perfidy it had been begun in the first days of the month of August."

And again:—

"All the war policy of William and of his associates was based from the beginning on false premises. They had decided to share in the Serbian adventure, in the expectation that it would furnish the Central Powers with the opportunity for an easy success over Russia and also over France.

"These two nations, insufficiently prepared, would either have to submit passively to the affront which Austria would inflict upon Russian prestige in the Balkans, or, if they allowed themselves to be dragged into war, would be conquered easily, since Italy and Rumania would support Germany and England would remain neutral. As a result, Germany would in any event gain glory and power. If from the clash war came, territorial acquisitions were also in the perspective."

That the Kaiser willed the war which actually did result, his severest critics are the first to deny. The war he "willed"—the war which his advisers associated with Austrian statesmen foresaw and did not recoil before their vision—was something far different. The war which William II "willed" was an Austrian disciplinary excursion into Serbia. The war which William II conceived possible was the Franco-Russian War, which might result from the decision of Russia to support Serbia.

On July 29th the Kaiser, the German statesmen, all responsible men in Germany outside of the Army, saw that quite another war was in prospect, a war in which it would be Italy and Rumania who would remain neutral and Britain who would enter, as a foe and not as an ally. But in that critical hour Austria remained deaf to the frantic words coming from Berlin and the German Great General Staff, perceiving mobilizations beginning all over Europe, intervened, leaving to diplomacy and statesmanship no other duty than that of finding justification for military action.

Kautsky, Lichnowsky, Muehlon, Eisner, Foerster, a score of other witnesses, German and Austrian, will suffice the student seeking to fix the responsibility for the greatest tragedy in all human history. Red, White, Yellow, Gray, books of all shades and colours, the official explanations of all nations serve only to accentuate the impression. The World War was "made in Germany." What does it signify that the architects planned a wholly different structure? What does it matter that in their stupidity they so wrought that their structure, planned to cover a world empire, served only to crush the builders themselves? If there was more of stupidity than of wickedness in the conception, there was still no lack of wickedness.

In truth, the method and the morals were those of Frederick the Great, when he attacked Maria Theresa and won Silesia; of Bismarck when he made war upon Denmark, upon Austria, and finally upon France. But William II was not Frederick the Great and unlike his illustrious grandfather, he had not a Bismarck, but only a Bethmann. Thus, though the conception was Prussian, the execution dishonoured the Hohenzollern tradition, which had customarily joined genius to treachery.

In weak hands this tradition had once led to Jena; in equally incapable control it was now to lead to Rethondes.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONDITIONS OF BATTLE

I THE GERMAN ESTIMATE

In the ten years which immediately preceded the outbreak of the World War, German statesmen and soldiers alike had, with increasing unanimity, arrived at the following conclusions: (1) A European war is not only inevitable but necessary to preserve Germany's position in the world: (2) In this war Germany is sure to have as opponents France and Russia; (3) British intervention on the Franco-Russian side is probable, the real element of doubt is discoverable only in the question as to whether British entrance will be immediate or eventual; (4) Despite the fact that Italy, like Austria, is bound to Germany by the Triple Alliance, Austro-Italian differences insure the neutrality of Italy, and Italian desire for Trieste and the Trentino may lead to Italian intervention on the enemy side, should the war be prolonged; (5) By contrast, Germany can count upon the immediate support of Austria-Hungary and the eventual enlistment of Turkey and Bulgaria, but against this she must set the probability of Serbian and Rumanian appearance among the number of her foes.

In sum, the Germans reckoned that the war which they foresaw would mean immediate conflict with France and Russia and might mean ultimate hostilities with Britain and Italy if the decision were postponed. As against this formidable coalition, assured and probable, Germany could muster only her own and Austrian military strength, although Turkish and Bulgarian assistance might arrive presently.

Still the German soldier did not shrink from this prospect. On the contrary, Bernhardi asserted that Germany might expect victory provided she was able to eliminate one of her opponents before all were engaged at their maximum strength. Appealing to history German

writers pointed out that Napoleon, by breaking Austrian military power at Austerlitz, Prussian at Jena, and defeating Russia at Friedland, was able, despite continuing British hostility, to establish his mastery of Europe at Tilsit. His success was due to the failure of his enemies to act together. By contrast, when in 1813 he undertook to fight Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain at one time, the result was Leipsic, followed by the first abdication at Fontainebleau.

Still more emphatic were the lessons furnished by German history in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century. In 1866 Bismarck had attacked Austria, and complete victory in a campaign of seven weeks had assured to Prussia the prize for which she contended before Napoleon III could intervene. Four years later an equally swift assault upon France had ended briefly, Sedan taking the place of Sadowa. Once more no time had been allowed the surprised spectator nations to intervene.

Reasoning by analogy, the Germans might conclude that while their next war would involve them in hostilities with both France and Russia, another swift victory over one of these two enemies would abolish all danger of Italian intervention and compel Britain to halt in the presence of the accomplished fact as Napoleon III had hesitated after Sadowa.

Facing the facts as they were, the German reasoned that the war to which he now looked forward would be a struggle in which the inexorable condition of ultimate triumph must be the destruction of the military power of one of his two immediate enemies in as brief a time as had seen the decisive stages of the campaigns of 1866 and of 1870, and for that matter of the campaign of 1815, which had removed the great Napoleon. But provided these conditions were fulfilled, he could afford to neglect both the British and the Italian circumstances.

Having disposed of one foe, he would hold the other at his mercy, and, master of the fleets of his enemies, whose armies he had broken, he could confront the British with a challenge to a struggle recalling that of Rome with Carthage. Conceivably a brief truce, like that of Amiens, might precede the final conflict, but as the defeat of Austria and France had been essential to the achievement of Bismarck's purposes, the crushing of the Franco-Russian combination and the defeat of Britain

were equally important circumstances in the new conception. As Bismarck had defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, German leaders now planned that the first blow should be delivered against France and Russia, the second against Britain. If Britain intervened in the first instance, the struggle would be fiercer, but if the military events of 1866 and 1870 were repeated, the results would be the same, as the first stage in the Napoleonic drama demonstrated.

II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Having arrived at the obvious conclusion that they must seek victory by a swift attack upon one of their several potential foes and achieve the approximate annihilation of the military strength of the enemy attacked within a time so brief as to preclude the possibility of effective intervention by the others, the first decision the German military leaders had to make was as to which of their foes they should attack. And since only two nations need be reckoned as certainly hostile, the choice was actually between Russia and France.

But in reality there was no problem presented here. By reason of the immensity of Russia it was not only possible but assured that the Russian armies would be mobilized and concentrated far within Russian territory behind the Niemen and Bug rivers and the Pripet Marshes. In case of a German attack upon Russia, the Czar's covering troops would destroy the few railway lines leading into the vast Russian plain and the Russian masses themselves could retire if they chose more and more deeply within their own frontiers without risking the loss of the war by this surrender of national territory.

In a word, the unquestioned power of Russian armies to retire at will, avoiding decisive engagement, drawing German and Austrian armies after them into a country practically destitute of communications, of itself abolished all possibility of a swift victory. And while Russian armies were thus retiring, French armies would be striking at the eastern frontier, and the British, if they entered the war, would be allowed time to call in their garrisons scattered over the world, to send their available forces to the Continent, and to begin creating national armies.

Swift and decisive victory, therefore, was in the nature of things to be had only on the French side. The absolute accuracy of this final German conclusion was disclosed during the war when the long series of Eastern victories resulted in inconclusive invasions of Russia and Russian resistance was prolonged in the face of the main effort of the Germans as well as the Austrians, up to the summer of 1917. It was, moreover, on a field of victory that Russian resistance collapsed not as a consequence of military defeat but of domestic revolution.

Attacking the French problem, however, German military men were again confronted by certain disturbing conditions. To attack France across the Franco-German frontier meant to engage battle on a front of less than 200 miles, that is, the distance between the neutralized territories of Luxemburg and Switzerland, half of which was covered by the Vosges mountains and was therefore unsuitable for military operations. Actually, an attack on France could only be made through the narrow gap between the Vosges and Switzerland, or the much more extensive gap between the Vosges and the frontier of Luxemburg.

This meant the concentration of Germany's vast numbers on two fronts whose combined extent did not pass 100 miles. But of itself this single fact would deprive Germany of all advantage due to those superior numbers which were in turn the consequence of her larger population. In reality, the Germans could engage only a small portion of their mobilized strength at one time on so narrow a front and the French could match these numbers over a long period of time.

And this was only one circumstance. Across their frontier from Switzerland to the Vosges and from the Vosges to Luxemburg the French in the years following 1871 had flung a Chinese Wall of fortifications. Four entrenched camps with many outriding detached forts had been constructed. The great camp of Belfort closed the gap between the Vosges and Switzerland, that of Épinal watched the central passes of the Vosges while on the natural rampart, separating the Meuse from the Moselle and extending from Verdun to Toul, the French had built a series of fortifications anchored at either end by the entrenched camps of Verdun and Toul.

Therefore there were left open to the Germans only two avenues of entrance into France not actually barred by fixed fortifications: a fifteenmile stretch between the forts of Épinal and of Toul, the famous Gap of



WHY THE GERMANS WENT THROUGH BELGIUM

A wall of steel, with but one gap, southwest of Nancy, opposed itself to German advance across the whole extent of the Franco-German frontier

Charmes; and an unfortified stretch between the northern forts of Verdun and the Luxemburg boundary, the equally renowned Gap of Stenay.

Reading the lessons of the Manchurian campaign and reading them correctly, the German recognized that while heavy artillery had obtained an ascendency over fixed fortifications of which those at Port Arthur were an example, the developments of trench warfare had been such as to give fixed fortifications a new value when they were covered by field

armies which had systematically dug themselves in. It had been possible in Manchuria to force the Russians out of their lines at Mukden only because it was possible to turn the flanks; all frontal attack had been futile. But resting their flanks upon Switzerland and Luxemburg and in fact upon the Vosges and Luxemburg, the French would be open only to frontal attacks.

Thus, occupying positions which were topographically advantageous, backed by innumerable permanent fortifications and served with a network of railroads and canals, the French might be expected to offer so obstinate a resistance as to abolish all chance of a swift victory.

Moreover, if the Germans carried their masses against the French, they could leave only relatively small forces to cover their Russian frontier and within a period estimated by the German High Command to be not longer than six weeks Russian armies would begin the invasion of East Prussia. If French resistance had not been broken in these six weeks, Germany, with her western campaign undecided, would have to move great masses of troops from the Moselle to the Vistula; and this would mean absolute failure and the loss of the war, since Germany would not have disposed of France before Russia had been able to intervene. Thereafter Germany would be outnumbered on both fronts and if the British entered the war, the weight against her in the west would steadily increase while British sea power would complete the encirclement of Germany and the war would take on the character of a gigantic siege, and the end of the siege could be inexorably forecast.

Impracticable as was the French frontier, given the German necessities in time and space, the attack upon France remained the only conceivable avenue of escape for the Germans from the limitations imposed upon them by the eventual superiority of their foes. Victory was attainable solely by the immediate use of their momentary advantage in numbers and in preparation against the French, and use which led to decisive, annihilating success within the delay of six weeks, the period of grace assured by the established slowness of Russian mobilization and concentration. But this victory was manifestly not to be had on the front marked by the common frontier, traced at Frankfort and

bounded by the neutral territories of Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The Germans could not go through; could they go around?

Obviously, from the military side it was possible to go around, either by violating the neutrality of Switzerland or that of Belgium. To penetrate through Luxemburg alone would be of little value, since it would not materially extend the front. Laying aside for the moment the political considerations involved, it is possible to simplify the problem again, by indicating why the Swiss route was impracticable.

In the first place, Switzerland could mobilize immediately 200,000 well-trained troops, whose value to the enemy would be almost decisive, given the relative strength of the two forces. Moreover, it could be calculated that Switzerland would mobilize and resist to the utmost. In the second place, the advance through Switzerland would encounter immediate and dangerous obstacles, since the French frontier was mainly covered by the Jura Mountains, while the railway lines available were neither in number, character, nor condition suitable for any such grandiose operation.

Entering France by the Swiss route, moreover, the Germans would be far from Paris, exposed to attack by superior numbers concentrated upon interior lines, with their rear and communications menaced by the Swiss army. For these and other reasons, equally sufficient, the Swiss avenue was eliminated. Later in the war, in 1917, the possibility of such an invasion momentarily disturbed the French, as Americans who were with General March at Valdehon, in the pathway of such an invasion, will recall vividly, but in the plans for the campaign which actually opened in 1914 the Germans excluded the Swiss approach to France.

There was left, then, only the Belgian boulevard, which, in the nature of things, included the Luxemburg territory as well. In considering the Belgian possibility the Germans had to reckon with two factors, the military and the political. An attack through Belgium would almost inevitably insure Belgian resistance, it would probably involve British intervention. In the event of British hesitation, the approach of a German army to the Straits of Dover would almost certainly decide the debate and insure the eventual intervention of a British army on the

BELGIUM "THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE" IN PICTURES



ALBERT OF BELGIUM (BORN 1875, ACCEDED TO THRONE, 1909

The fighting king of "the Cockpit of Europe" is so old-fashioned that he led his army in person and asked no better fate than to share the hardships and dangers of his soldiers. His democratic attitude toward his soldiers he himself has attributed in part to his observation of the late James J. Hill's attitude toward his railroad employees—for King Albert, before his accession to the throne, paid a long visit to the United States, spending a large part of the time studying American railroading as Mr. Hill's guest.



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BELGIAN CAVALRY



Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE SHOT FROM A GERMAN 42-CENTIMETRE GUN PUT THIS BELGIAN FORT OUT OF COMMISSION

Students of German strategy assert that the Germans long ago decided to strike quickly at France through Belgium when "The Day" should come. The French frontier was strongly fortified. Switzerland was a difficult country and defended. There remained—Belgium, cangerously peaceful and prosperous, like the United States Her little army and her forts were easily reducible by the terrible German guns.



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BELGIAN BATTERY ON THE MARCH



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WAR ENTHUSIASTS IN BRUSSELS

Shouting, flag-waving crowds in the cities of Belgium enthusiastically voiced their approval of the Government's decision to resist the violation of Belgian territory. And the little Belgian army, in full realization that the day of fairy-tales was past, set itself to play the rôle of Jack, against the German Giant.



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BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT REST DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING

Germans under Emmich arrived before Liége on August 5, 1914. For two days of almost incessant fighting General Leman with the third Division of the Belgian army maintained his defence of the city. Then fresh masses of German troops arrived and to save his exhausted soldiers Leman retired upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. The Germans occupied the city on the 7th, but the nearby forts held out against them for several days.



Copyright by the International News Service
A typical Belgian soldier



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood General Leman, defender of Liége




Awaiting the Uhlans

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THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, EPITOMIZED IN PICTURES

The German hordes invaded the land which was open, flat, sea-girt, seeming to invite the invader. The little Belgian army stood its ground as long as possible, resisting to the limit of its strength.

But it was all of no avail and the Germans marched into Brussels, the capital city, on August 20th, seventeen days after crossing the border.



RUINED TOWN HALL AT YPRES

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About the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres for more than a month raged one of the most intricate, confured, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of the war; fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.



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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

I. General Von Bissing, military governor of Belgium, is here shown in consultation with his staff. He is the man with the heavy moustache who stands with the knuckles of both hands resting on the map, upon which the attention of all is concentrated. (He died at his post in Belgium in March, 1917).



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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

Even the civil governors of Belgium, here shown, have a decidedly military appearance. Nearly all are in uniform, hooted and spurred. The Excellency Von Sandt, head of the Commission, is at the end of the table leaning slightly forward, with eves cast down. 11.

Continent and the immediate operation of the British fleet, which meant blockade, the consequent destruction of German commerce, and the isolation of Germany.

On the moral side there stood the treaty, signed by Prussia in 1839, together with France and Britain, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgian soil. Since Belgium would not, in any event, attack Germany, the invasion of Belgium would constitute a violation of a sacred obligation, a defiance of international principle and practice, an offense against the rights of a small nation, and a disregard for the ideals of all nations. It would instantly take rank as an act of violence far surpassing Napoleon's violation of the territory of Baden in the case of the Duc d'Enghien, which had aroused Europe a century before.

On the political and moral side the obstacles were patent then. The resistance of Belgium, whose field army of nearly 100,000 men would be added to the strength of the western enemies; the intervention of Britain, by her fleet at once, by her army ultimately; and the certain disapproval of all civilized nations who while neutral in the conflict were bound to be a factor in the problem of the future; all these elements had to be considered. True the German could calculate that the Belgians might not resist, that the British might hesitate until the decisive hour had passed, that the neutrals might lose their keen edge of moral indignation when they saw the violation of Belgian territory followed by the occupation of Paris and the capitulation of France; but these were only possibilities. It was the costs that were likely, not the immunities which were possible, that had to be reckoned with.

Nevertheless, the dominant necessity, the primal condition of success, remained the same. France must be crushed in six weeks, else the war could not be won and—Bernhardi had said it—would in all human probability be lost, thus insuring the downfall of Germany. Therefore the single question which could be weighed was: Can Germany, by using the Belgian boulevard, crush France in the allotted time? To this the German military men answered unhesitatingly in the affirmative. Accepting Belgian resistance, conceding British intervention with army and navy, the German High Command affirmed that if it were per-

mitted to send its massses through Belgium, it could reach Paris and destroy French military power before Russia could intervene effectively in the east. Thus and only thus was the German victory attainable. The decision was made years before 1914, to strike through Belgium.

III. MARSHAL VON SCHLIEFFEN

We have then reviewed all the successive elements in the German problem which led to the decision to seek through Belgium the victory not otherwise obtainable, the victory which alone could insure German success in the war Germany had decided was necessary to her prosperity and national existence. The conditions Germany accepted for herself, conditions which are to be discovered in all German military writings, were expressed in the formula: "France destroyed in six weeks." And the General Staff, the military leaders of Germany, had set themselves to the task of organizing this victory, in advance—at the long hand.

The author of that strategy which Germany employed was Marshal von Schlieffen, a pupil of the elder Moltke, who died before the outbreak of the World War. At the bottom of his conception was the victory of Hannibal over the Romans at Cannae, and the essential detail of that victory was the attack of the victorious general on both flanks of the Romans, a complete envelopment and destruction of the army. whose centre, momentarily successful, found itself presently involved in the wreck of both its flanks, its line of retreat cut and its ruin inescapable. Schlieffen conceived that Germany, mobilizing approximately 1,750,000 men, should throw 1,500,000 into France, where they would encounter not many more than 1,000,000 French, aided, if at all, by less than 100,000 British. Of his vast host one-third would operate between Luxemburg and Switzerland, two-thirds through Belgium and Luxemburg. Thus the larger fraction would turn the French barrier fortresses and, passing through Belgium, arrive in the open plains of northern France, behind the French barrier and along the roads which. unprotected by fortresses, lead to Paris.

The essence of the Schlieffen scheme is disclosed in the obvious French concentration. The French, uncertain of German plans, ignorant of the numbers to be used in Belgium, ignorant of the western extension of the movement of the German armies, would concentrate their masses in front of the eastern barrier fortresses between Switzerland and Belgium. From these fortifications they would launch an offensive against the German troops facing them. This offensive would be broken on fixed German fortifications between the two great fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg. Following this decisive defeat the German troops in Alsace-Lorraine would pass to the offensive, drive the French troops in upon and then beyond the barrier fortresses, which, given their rout, they would not be able to defend.

Meantime, the opening of the offensive of the French against the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine would be the signal for the German masses in Belgium and Luxemburg to begin their sweeping and irresistible advance through Belgium, extending to the coast and then, turning south and east, sweeping the fragments of French and British resistance away from Paris and toward the upper valley of the Seine, precisely at the moment the German armies from the east were driving their enemies westward. By the fourth week of the war the French armies would all have suffered decisive preliminary defeats, would be threatened on the east and on the west by wide-swinging flanking attacks, would be retreating in upon each other, approaching the fate of the Romans at Cannae, when Hannibal's flanking attacks had joined in their rear. And (in the view of Hanotaux) the vicinity of Troyes on the Aube was fixed as the scene of the final act, the Sedan that was to surpass all Sedans, all military successes of human history.

By the first week of September only fragments of French troops, which, like a single division at Sedan in 1870, had escaped capture, would remain in existence; Paris would lie open to the siege which would repeat the history of 1870-71, but, given German heavy artillery, could only offer brief resistance. France would be at the mercy of her foe. German masses could be transported to Russia. France would pay the costs of the contest and be out of the reckoning forever as a military power when the peace terms had taken from her all her eastern fortresses.

But recall once for all the essential detail of the Schlieffen concep-

tion, the double envelopment. Stand up straight, extend your arms to their widest stretch, and then draw your doubled fists together. The fists represent the flanks of the Schlieffen operation. When your fists meet, your arms will surround any object you have sought to encircle. This is the strategy of Cannae. If it succeeds, what follows is not the defeat but the destruction of the enemy; it is annihilation, nothing less. But if it fails, if the enemy evades the fatal embrace, if he prevents the closing of the circle, then it is total defeat, for the element of time is decisive, before another attempt can be made the Russian will be at the German's back. And the situation will be materially worse if the Russian is able to shorten the time consumed in his preparations.

Now grasping the underlying theory of this Schlieffen strategy it is essential to recognize that it has obvious dangers. A million men are to be launched across hostile territory in a mad drive which will cover more than two hundred miles in less than two weeks. Necessarily the armies which compose this vast horde will have different experiences, encounter varying degrees of resistance. In a word, given the magnitude of the operation, it is impossible to assume complete and continued harmony between the elements. Moreover, granted that the enemy is surprised at the outset, as he will be, unless the first encounter is decisive, unless he loses the power to construct an answering strategic conception, the situation will change rapidly.

Schlieffen foresees this and writes clearly that if the first real encounter does not bring victory, then the total failure of the strategy is assured. No local victory, however great, which leaves the enemy free to retire, capable of applying his own strategical remedies, will avail. Worst of all, any considerable failure, however restricted, will doom the whole enterprise. A moment will arrive when the forces are in presence, when the whole conception will be applied; the enemy is surprised, he is taken unawares, he faces deadly peril. He may fall. But if he does not, if somehow he manages to escape the deadly embrace, he will not be surprised again by it. He will have seen the whole of the opposing strategy, he will proceed to fashion his own strategy, which cannot be foreseen. He may have surprises in store at the next encounter. Meantime, for

the assailant no change of plan can add to his strength, his chances; he has staked all on the single thrust. Mere loss of time is fatal to the larger scheme, an authentic check is ruin.

Let us say at once, then, that this German operation is the most gigantic gamble in military history. It eliminates the enemy from all calculation. It assumes that if German troops fulfil the time schedule of the master, victory is mechanically assured. It makes such preparation as to assure the observation of the time schedule infallibly, to its own mind. At a certain moment the French will be beaten. Being beaten they can do nothing; the defeat will paralyze their will, their energies; thenceforth it is only the march to victory, the exploitation to annihilation of the tactical triumph.

The strategy of the thunderbolt, this Schlieffen method—and in truth it is the German method, for we shall see Ludendorff organizing a similar operation four years hence. But after all there are lightning rods and it is conceivable that the bolt will be deflected. What then? More than this, there is an obvious danger that, having planned the destruction of the enemy at a time and place, having staked all on the assumption that he will be there and then destroyed, might it not arrive that his destruction would be more apparent than real? Might not a species of auto-intoxication set in, leading to the rash assumption that the enemy, actually preparing a deadly stroke, is out of the reckoning?

The point is capital because it underlies all known explanations of the actual events of the latter phases of the Marne campaign. Ludendorff tells us over and over again in his memoirs that in the last analysis everything in war becomes a matter of chance. It is with these words that he dismisses his mighty machine launched against the British on March 21, 1918. But Foch had taught for years that Moltke, the elder and great Moltke, had invited and deserved ruin at Metz in 1870 by launching his army into space on the totally erroneous assumption that Bazaine had quit that fortress. Had Foch or Joffre been in Bazaine's place, how different might have been the outcome of the war!

Analyzing this stupendous German conception one seems to detach the same characteristics discoverable in all German operations, notably that of Ludendorff in 1918. Despite its grandiose dimensions the German machine has something of the nature of the mechanical toy. Once it is wound up and released it is beyond the direct control of the hand that released it. Thereafter all depends upon the character of the surface over which it travels; if the surface be smooth, it runs well, if it be rough, it may upset. In any event, it will presently run down, its moment of greatest speed is the instant of release, all the energy it is going to have has been imparted in advance.

Moreover, in every case a primary miscalculation as to the capacity of the German machine discloses itself. Invariably the thing runs down at the precise moment when the decision is to be expected. It is the same at the Marne in 1914, at Verdun in 1916, in Picardy in 1918. Lay aside all figures of speech and the simple fact is plain that French strategy, however mistaken at the outset, ultimately operates from a correct appreciation of things as they are at the decisive moment; German, from an incorrect estimate of what they will be at a moment for which preparations are made. Joffre is ignorant of what Moltke means to do; he undertakes to do certain things himself. He fails at them and discovers in a terrible moment what Moltke is doing. But thereafter he deals in facts while Moltke, having played the part of the god, arranging the future, continues to act in the conviction that what he has foreordained will infallibly arrive.

The Schlieffen strategy, operated by Moltke, foresees that, as a result of the setting in motion of a million and a half of men on a day certain, two-thirds of them sent through Belgium, that is around the French defenses, a situation will be produced one week later, a hundred miles away, in which all the French armies—a million of men, perhaps reinforced by British and aided by Belgians—will be forced to do certain things, against which due preparation has been made—to do these things and none other; and, as a result, a few days later the French armies will be gathered up in the "genial" embrace (the words are German) while the last phase of the modern Cannae will take place in the valley of the Seine.

The order of events in the Schlieffen calendar are thus arranged.

In the latter part of the third week of the war the French offensive will be broken and the resistance of the French half destroyed. Less than a week later, the full force of the unforeseen German manœuvre having been launched, the balance of French resisting power will be crushed in the second and truly decisive encounter. Thereafter will follow the swift and terrible pursuit terminating in the final act when the two fists, the extreme flanks of the armies coming from Belgium and from Alsace, meet behind the doomed enemy. This last incident must take place not later than six weeks after the declaration of war. Since Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1st, the end must come not later than September 11th. And, one may note, September 9th was the day which saw the virtual termination of the Battle of the Marne.

The drama will then be complete within the period allotted to it by Schlieffen; it will, moreover, unroll in the manner he foresaw. The futile French offensive will merge into the astonishing and successful German offensive, the two constituting in French accounts the Battle of the Frontiers. Following these events will come something which will seem to correspond to the approach to the last phase, relentless pursuit and hopeless flight, but finally comes not Cannae, but the return to Africa—the triumph of the strategy of Fabius over that of Hannibal. Examining the facts we shall see that as early as the second phase, the first shock provoked by the German offensive, the Schlieffen strategy had failed—was in fact, but not visibly to German eyes, superseded by the Joffre strategy on and after August 25th in the evening, but continued to seem to German eyes measurably successful until the bandage fell from Kluck's eyes on the afternoon of September 5th.

IV. FRENCH STRATEGY

Last of all, then, we may examine the French conception. The first French principle is necessarily the antithesis of the primary German condition. Since Germany plans to destroy France in six weeks, the chief preoccupation of France must be to live, to live in the sense of preserving the military establishment intact and capable of continuing, when Russia has compelled the Germans to turn their masses eastward.

Given German superiority in numbers, it lies with the German to select the time and place of attack, subject only to such disturbances as the French may be able to cause in the German schedule. Joffre expects an attack through Belgium, but since he does not meditate a preventive offensive into central Belgium, he can only mobilize his armies at the frontier facing Germany. Since mobilization cannot wait upon the disclosure of German plans, given its vastness and its necessary machinery, it will have to be based upon the assumption of attack from German soil across the common frontier. Only as the German plans disclose themselves can the concentration be modified to meet new conditions.

Assembled upon the German frontier, French troops will attack, since there is no other real defense in war. They will attack into Alsace-Lorraine with the design of breaking through to the Rhine, penetrating between Metz and Strasbourg, and through the Gap of Belfort; they will strike north of Metz toward Thionville. Success, decisive success, will isolate Metz, carry the French troops to the Rhine Valley, threaten the rear and communications of the German armies in central Belgium, if there be a German offensive in Belgium.

Still, in event of the unforeseen, that is, an enormous expansion of the Belgian operation, French troops can be pushed north to cover the country south and east of the Sambre. That any considerable German troops will operate west and north of the Sambre is not held likely or even possible by the French High Command, an essential miscalculation fraught with very grave consequences. Such forces as Germany may send will be attended to by the French, Belgian, and the British armies immediately available, attended to until the success of the French in Alsace-Lorraine exercises a restraining influence in Belgium.

French concentration will be completed by the tenth day after war is declared. Then the advance can begin: advance into Lorraine from Nancy; into Alsace from Belfort; and finally, north of Metz, into the Belgian Ardennes, if the Germans decide to come that way. Joffre contemplates attacking immediately with his right and centre toward Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes; he will manœuvre his left north-

ward in *liaison* with the British and seeking junction with the Belgians. It will presently appear west of Namur, in the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse, names forever memorable in French military history.

So far French strategy falls in with German. Joffre is going to attack where Schlieffen foresaw; he is going to underestimate the extent of the German thrust through Belgium, he is going to dismiss the possibility of the appearance of German masses between the Sambre and the sea. Comparing the two conceptions we can see that the French offensive will encounter the Germans waiting on fixed positions and in all reasonable probability will fail. We can see that the Anglo-French army in the Sambre-et-Meuse district will presently find itself in the presence of overwhelming numbers and under the threat of destruction.

But we have now to consider one other circumstance. Joffre has concentrated his men in the east; he will be outnumbered decisively in the west; but, unless his eastern armies are completely beaten, he will have behind him adequate railway lines to bring troops from the east to the west and, if he chooses to retreat in the north—if he avoids destruction in the first battle—he can begin to mass forces brought from the east to the west, and a day can arrive when he will be able to oppose something approaching equal numbers along the whole front and particularly on the flank nearest Paris.

He must do three things: (1) hold the eastern barrier, thus breaking one arm of the Schlieffen thrust; (2) abandon his battle in the north before it is too late and thus elude the other arm of the menace; (3) he must rearrange his forces by bringing masses from French Lorraine to the Ile-de-France and Champagne. But all these things are possible provided only there is the vision and the will. They are not only possible but conform to the ultimate objective of French strategy, to remain alive for the fixed time during which Russian help cannot be expected, although conceivably will come sooner than the German calculates.

In sum, then, French strategy, while coinciding with German calculations up to a point, breaks absolutely with them at the decisive moment. The French commander is going to seek victory by his own offensive, taking what he considers due precautions against an attack through Belgium. But he conceives that his plans may fail and he envisages prompt, far-reaching retreat the very moment he feels that his armies are in real danger. He is not going to fight it out at the frontiers, on the Sambre, on the Aisne, on the Marne for that matter, unless he sees victory assured—sees, at the least, the preponderance of chances in his own favour. Napoleon III's generals lost a war beyond redemption, sacrificed the field armies of France because they were afraid to evacuate territory, but Joffre is a commander who will evacuate Paris to preserve his army intact—does think of doing it for some days in late August; and it is the French army that Germany must destroy.

Above and beyond all else it is necessary to perceive at the outset that the campaign of 1914 in the west is the collision between two systems. The fog which surrounded the operations at the time, the confused and confusing reports which were then published, the misapprehensions of the Germans in the beginning and the activities of their propaganda at the end, have served to prevent the general appreciation of the fact that, from August 25th to the Marne, French operations were dominated by a single and clearly defined objective. Seeking to preserve his army from immediate destruction, threatened by German violation of Belgian neutrality and success in secretly mobilizing unforeseen numbers, Joffre breaks off his battles and undertakes his great retreat, but the retreat itself will be marked by a series of successful counterattacks, and behind this screen French armies will be reconcentrated for that return to the offensive which will be the Battle of the Marne.

The retreat is the single conceivable answer to the Schlieffen strategy, it is the only contingency which that strategy did not foresee, and it is to the success of the retreat—that is, to the realization of the objective sought by the retreat—that it is essential to look, and not to the fact of retreat, which suggested and continues in some minds to suggest defeat, whereas in truth it was the foreseen prelude to victory carefully and exactly calculated.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIÉGE

Ι

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1914

In examining the history of the campaign of 1914 it is natural and necessary to concentrate attention first upon the western and then upon the eastern operations; that is, to discuss the French and Russian campaigns as if each were a wholly separate affair. This is by no means the fact. On the contrary, action in each field is influenced by events in the other. The victory at the Marne is in some measure due to Russian sacrifice at Tannenberg, and yet, keeping in mind the need to recognize the interdependence of the two fields, there is no other way to appreciate the development of either of the two stupendous struggles than to view them independently; that is, to study first the French and thereafter the Russian operation until each reaches its climax, the one at the Yser, the other at the crests of the Carpathians.

As to the western campaign, it has five well-defined phases, each marked by conspicuous military events. These phases, identified by the chief military circumstances of each, are as follows: Liége, the Battle of the Frontiers, the Battle of the Marne, the Battle of the Aisne, and the Battle of the Yser. In reality, the first phase is actually occupied by the mobilization and concentration of the opposing forces. The brusque attack upon Liége, like the French dash to Mulhouse, is a detail, but since the detail was the final demonstration of the Belgian decision to resist, which had incalculable consequences, on the moral even more than the military side, it may fairly be reckoned the most impressive incident in the first fortnight of the war.

On the calendar, these five phases occupy unequal periods, the first three, accepting the date of the German declaration of war upon France as the opening of the campaign, each covers two weeks, and collectively fill the six weeks in which the Germans undertook to obtain a decision in the west. The fourth extends for six weeks, between the end of the Marne and the beginning of the Yser and is, in fact, characterized by the effort of the Germans to escape from the consequences of their Marne defeat and deliver one more colossal blow which should bring victory without the delays of a long war. The last phase fills rather more than a fortnight and sees the supreme German effort broken and the western campaign descend to that deadlock which marks the shipwreck of all German hopes and demonstrates the failure of all their strategic conceptions. Moreover—accepting August 3rd, the date of the declaration of war upon France, as the opening of the western campaign and November 11th, the day of the decisive repulse of the Prussian Guard before Ypres, as its close—the operations occupy exactly that period of a hundred days which saw the landing of Napoleon in France and the second abdication, following Waterloo.

In reality, however, the first six weeks are the decisive period. In them the German is defeated, the blow at the Marne is like a mortal wound inflicted upon a wild beast, which does not immediately kill, which leaves the animal strength for furious and violent rushes, but in the end brings him to earth. And in these six weeks the three phases are unmistakable: preparation, the first shock, and the final engagement. Of the three acts the first is accomplished behind the screen of the censor; the second unrolls with rapidly mounting fury, as the German purpose and power disclose themselves in Belgium and northern France; while the third, the French counter-manœuvre, hidden until the decisive moment, suddenly transforms the whole situation and by its very suddenness gives to one of the most carefully and scientifically devised military combinations of history the superficial appearance of an accident.

To understand the military operations, as they unfold, it is essential to grasp and keep hold of the military method underlying the superficial chaos, to see what were objectives of each high command, to measure the result by the necessities of each strategy, to lay aside many of the misconceptions born at the hour and nourished by German propaganda;

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thereafter, above all, to see what the German himself believed, not what he would have both the German and Allied peoples believe, about the Battle of the Marne. For while the war lasted, the German High Command denied the fact of the Marne, but once the war had terminated, testified freely that in this encounter the war was lost.

Seen in its true unity, the Marne campaign is one of the simplest as it is undeniably the grandest of all military history. Not impossibly, too, it was the last of the conflicts fought with traditions of the past dominating strategy and tactics alike—the final brilliant and supreme revelation before armies took to trenches and the struggle became a test between machines—a struggle of material, a butchery by gas and high explosives unrelieved by the charge and countercharge, unredeemed by the splendour of human achievement—a war without colour, romance, glory—a contest of attrition devouring nations, not merely armies.

II. JOFFRE

We have now to examine, first, the commanders; second, the armies as they mobilized; and third, the first serious engagements of the war, those about Liége and Mulhouse. Of the two soldiers called to command armies of a magnitude hitherto unparalleled in history—Moltke and Joffre—only the latter is a significant figure for the future, since the former fought behind the veil of censorship impersonally and the fruits of his labours were early defeat, prompt retirement, and a premature death which charitably intervened to cover one of the most colossal failures in all military history.

Joseph Jacques César Joffre, to give the French commander his full name, was, like Foch his most brilliant subordinate and greatest successor, a southerner. He was born at Rivesaltes, six miles from Perpignan in the eastern Pyrenees close to the Spanish frontier, of humble stock, and his ancestors had dwelt and traded in wine in this small town time out of mind. A year younger than Foch, Joffre was born on January 12, 1852.

At sixteen, having completed his studies in the local schools, the future marshal comes to Paris to prepare for the École Polytechnique

which he enters at seventeen. A year later the Franco-Prussian War breaks out and Joffre serves as a sub-lieutenant, the story of his first campaign promptly forgotten in the whirlpool of great and mournful events. The war over, he goes to Fontainebleau whence he is graduated second in the branch of his class occupied with military engineering. His first task allows him to contribute a minor share in the reconstruction of the defenses of Paris. Hanotaux and all other historians recall the circumstances of the first promotion of the victor of the Marne. Still a lieutenant, he serves as guide to President MacMahon when the old marshal inspects the fortifications of the French capital.

"I congratulate you, Capitain," the hero of Sebastopol exclaimed to the soldier who would one day succeed where he failed. Thus Joffre is a captain at twenty-four, but soon thereafter, impelled by some circumstance of private misfortune, he leaves France and disappears in that outer darkness wherein so many great men labour to create in Africa a colonial empire which shall regain for France her old position and prestige in the world.

In 1885, Admiral Courbet, by decorating him, briefly recalls Joffre to notice. For a decade thereafter his work is that of an engineer rather than a soldier, and in the Senegal he constructs the first great colonial railway of French West Africa, the line which joins the Niger to the Senegal and will one day cover the distance between the Atlantic at Dakar and the French Niger. Recalling that from the very outset the World War will be a contest in which railway transport will play the decisive part, one can appreciate the importance of this preparation.

In 1894, Bonnier reaches Timbuctoo, but the French flag briefly planted in this "mysterious" city, which has been the objective of so many explorers, is promptly lowered as a consequence of a native uprising in which Bonnier and his slender force all perished. Then at last Joffre really emerges, makes a rapid dash to Timbuctoo, restores the situation, and once for all establishes French rule at the great bend of the Niger. By this achievement, and by his later service in organizing his conquests, Joffre earned a place for himself among the great men who bestowed upon France her second colonial empire.

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Become a colonel he appears in Madagascar, conquered by his comrade, General Galliéni, who will one day share with Joffre (become his commander) the glory of the Marne. Finally after twenty years and more of colonial service, Joffre returns to France, passes briefly through the routine of garrison appointments, and in 1910 enters the War Council. A year later Millerand—at that moment occupying with distinction that post of War Minister which he will resume in the dark days of August, 1914—names Joffre Chief of Staff of the French army, the post that will make him Commander-in-Chief when the war breaks three years later.

Such, briefly, is the history of Joffre—a history, on the whole, arid so far as anecdote and incident dear to the public are concerned. Following his victory, patient biographers have failed to supply any circumstances which illuminate the portrait of the man whom they seek to describe. One must conclude—and all later events confirm the conclusion—that through all his long apprenticeship Joffre was a silent, reserved, even inarticulate man—a tireless worker but an architect of colonial empire, who, unlike so many of his conspicuous co-workers, neither by the written nor the spoken word contributed to the exposition of the common task.

Yet two things are worthy of note: First, while in the Franco-Prussian War French generals who had won distinction in colonial campaigns proved unequal to the tests of a European conflict, in the World War the fact was just the contrary. In addition to Joffre, Galliéni, Mangin, Gouraud, Marchand are among the most brilliant names emerging from the conflict. Moreover, the result of the African training, with its necessary development of self-confidence and calm, its emphasis laid upon organization and engineering, is displayed in all of Joffre's achievements!

Contrasted with Foch or even with Petain, the personality of Joffre seems blurred and indistinct. There is nothing to suggest that before the war he had been a student and a thinker as was Foch. He had neither talked nor taught; when he became chief of staff his name was little known in France, and the writers of daily comment in the newspapers of foreign countries searched in vain for illuminating details of his personal life or public career.

Measured by the two great years in which he directed the fortune of the French army, Joffre recalls measurably our own Grant. In the greatest moment of his career between the loss of the Battle of the Frontiers and the victory of the Marne the overpowering impression communicated by the future marshal was one of serene confidence. Like Grant, he carried on even broader shoulders and without complaint or faltering, an incredible burden of responsibility. In defeat he neither lost hope nor the capacity for clear thinking. He recognized his original failure before the failure became fatal. He abandoned his initial plans when obstinacy would have meant ruin. His first conception shattered, he set to work—calmly, coolly, without haste or agitation—to construct a new strategical conception.

The realization of this conception one moment postponed, he clung to it, rearranged his plans to fight at the Seine instead of the Aisne; but when Galliéni's message informed him that the Germans had committed a capital error, he modified his plans again, passed to the offensive, reanimated his armies by a terse appeal which will remain immortal, and at the moment of joining battle—of joining that battle in which the fate of France would be decided—reported to his government, in tones of confidence and utmost serenity, which remain a final evidence of the character of the man.

Through all the orders of Joffre there runs the same clarity, the same proof of calm and logical thinking. All the initial mistakes of 1870 seem to have been committed in 1914 and with the same preliminary results. The same initial blunders and weaknesses alike in preparation and in action lead to the same tragic disappointments. But, of a sudden, the whole course of events changes. Out of chaos order develops; slowly, surely, the situation is restored; easy victories followed by headlong pursuits lead the Germans from blunder to blunder until decisive defeat wrecks their whole strategy, transforms their whole fortune.

Less fortunate in his later campaigns; a victim finally to the impatience of a public too easily impressed with specious promises of swift victory; responsible, in part, by his own miscalculations, Joffre appears at the end of the war with something of his greatness of 1914 eliminated

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Yet it is not impossible that the future will in part repair the injury. As the immediate memories of the last days of the contest grow dim, the importance of the First Marne cannot fail to obtain a higher appraisal. And, despite all controversies, the First Marne was the contribution of Joffre; he made it possible. If Galliéni saw the opportunity and the hour to strike, on September 4th, Joffre had foreseen the essential preliminary steps and prepared for them in his order of August 25th.

If one cannot claim for Joffre admission to that narrow circle of supreme soldiers, which includes Cæsar, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, and will probably include Foch, it is not less true that no victory of any one of these masters was more important in its world consequences, more stupendous in its mere extent of battleground involved than that of the Marne, or save for Foch's final conflict even comparably as grandiose. Nor can one compare the resources of Joffre with those of Foch, the least of whose assets was that supreme and unified command always denied to Joffre.

Again, if it was Petain who saved Verdun and Foch who won the war, it was Joffre who selected both, and in no field does Joffre's judgment reveal itself more unmistakably than in his selection of subordinates. The men he honoured with his confidence were the men who performed the great tasks when he had retired; the men who failed were removed relentlessly, for if as "Père Joffre" the French commander was a figure of benevolence and consideration promptly become legendary the real Joffre was as little tolerant of incapacity as he was astonishingly acute in the recognition and reward of ability.

For two years the massive figure of Joffre dominated Allied military affairs to the exclusion of all others and then, made Marshal of France, in a natural and just succession to the famous title of the Napoleonic age, the victor of the Marne becomes a memory.

"You will see one day that it will be said that I was the only man who had nothing to do with the victory of the Marne," he once said, a little sadly. Yet already the perspective is becoming more just and the world is learning to recognize in the very confessions of the Germans themselves what was the real significance for the whole war of the

first great western triumph and what, in the achievement of that success, was the share of Joffre.

For the rest it is essential now merely to perceive that, at the moment when France was forced to defend herself against a blow which had been preparing for nearly half a century—against a military machine unequalled in mechanical and material appointments and commanded by men who were themselves decorated with that halo of invincibility bequeathed to them by immediate predecessors who had made Germany the first military power in the world—she could place her armies in the hands of a soldier possessing every quality lacking in the generals who had gone to deserved defeat in 1870, who would join inexpugnable faith to complete clarity of judgment, who would know when and how to retire from a field of defeat in order to attack victoriously, once he had reordered his shaken forces.

Remembering, too, that the whole German strategy was comprehended in the delivery of one colossal blow, which to succeed must fall swiftly and destroy completely, it will be appreciated exactly what was the value of the character and qualities of Joffre in the supreme crisis of August and September, 1914. Exact appraisal of this character and these qualities, too, supplies by far the best single circumstance in the explanation of what actually occurred and the most illuminating revelation of why it did occur.

By contrast with the figure of Joffre, long conspicuous on the stage of the war and forever memorable for the Marne victory, that of his first opponent, Count von Moltke, is fugitive and of only passing value. Nephew of the victor of Sadowa and Sedan; inheritor, thereby, of the prestige of a great name; the younger, the lesser Moltke beyond question profited by this circumstance and owed to it something of his success in reaching the supreme post in the German army. Yet his contemporaries, even after his defeat, do him the justice of praising his ability.

The strategy which he employed was not his own; he was but the administrator of a system which dated from the War of Liberation and the plans which he sought to execute were those of Schlieffen. Unmistakably he was chained by the tradition of the German General Staff

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and a co-victim with his subordinates of the legend of invincibility. In part, his friends trace his downfall to the insubordination of Kluck at the critical hour, yet even before Kluck adventured south of the Marne the Schlieffen plan had failed.

In any event, Moltke disappears on September 14th, on the morrow following the defeat of the Marne, leaving to his successor, the Kaiser's favourite, Falkenhayn, the heavy task of restoring a situation fatally compromised, the impossible labour of regaining the advantage possessed at the moment of the first shock and never reacquired in four years of conflict. Ill-health covers the retirement, concealed from the German people for many months. Death soon removes the beaten general. After his death there is a silence in German quarters not yet fully broken. But since the plans Moltke employed are known and the progress of the German operations fully recorded, this is of little significance.

The first German commander-in-chief bore a famous name, was reckoned in the German army its ablest soldier; the army which he commanded was the most formidable and the best armed and equipped the
world had ever seen. Yet in six weeks that host was decisively beaten,
its general was removed, and death took him at no long time thereafter.
This, after all, is the essential history of the lesser Moltke. In reality,
it was not Moltke but the German military system, the whole German
military conception, which was defeated at the Marne. Petain administered the second defeat at Verdun, which eliminated Falkenhayn,
while Foch, in the campaign of 1918, not only defeated but destroyed
both the system and its army, commanded by Ludendorff, who was a far
abler soldier than either Moltke or Falkenhayn, but succumbed in the
end as a consequence of precisely the same mistakes.

One may perhaps dismiss Moltke with the fugitive comment supplied by Ludendorff who talked with him on September 14th, the day on which he was retired. In the conversation, Moltke furnished Ludendorff with a brief account of "sudden change" on the western front. To Ludendorff Moltke seemed "deeply moved by the state of affairs in the west." Ludendorff continues in his memoirs with the following:

"This was my last official conversation with this remarkable man. He had a keen grip on military affairs and could handle a great plan of campaign with extraordinary mastery. But he lacked vigour and his inclinations were more pacifistic than warlike."

III. GERMAN MOBILIZATION

The German plan for the opening campaign of the war was, as we have seen, conceived by General Count von Schlieffen, whom Ludendorff as late as 1919 still describes as "one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived." Since the main feature of this plan was the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, it was inevitable that the mobilization and concentration of the German armies on the western front should in themselves disclose the direction of German assault, and it is from this angle that the gathering of the German hosts must be viewed.

To deliver the knock-out blow against France, Germany concentrated seven armies between the Vosges and the Dutch frontier. Since the main thrust was to be made through Belgium, five of these seven armies were assembled between the Dutch frontier and the Metz-Thionville fortified area, while the other two covered the gap between the southern forts of Metz and the Vosges west of Strasbourg. In addition, a smaller covering detachment watched the Gap of Belfort between the Vosges and the Swiss frontier.

In the examination of the Marne campaign, the simplest and the easiest method of exposition is to deal with both the German and Allied masses as constituting two armies, each composed of the conventional three elements: the two flanks and the centre. Thus the German army may be divided into a right flank, composed of three armies, those of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen; a centre, made up of two armies, those of the Grand Duke of Würtemberg and the German Crown Prince; and a left flank including two armies and the detachment facing Belfort commanded respectively by the Crown Prince of Bavaria, Heeringen, and Deimling.

Since the right wing was charged with the most difficult mission, the colossal and far-swinging dash through Belgium and northern France, LIÉGE 1115

it was naturally provided with the greatest numbers and the most perfect equipment, while the men who commanded the three armies were chosen without regard to anything but military qualities. Thus we see Kluck a commoner commanding one army; Bülow, a representative of the Prussian caste, the second; and Hausen, a Saxon, the third.

By contrast, the mission of the centre is far less difficult. Its success or failure will be determined by the fortunes of the two flanks. If the great double envelopment of the Schlieffen plan is attained, then the centre may deliver the final blow, but this will be predicated upon events on its right and left. As a consequence, the centre is the weakest of the three army groups, but the presence of the German Crown Prince as commander of one of the two armies discloses regard for dynastic conditions and an effort to provide for the Kaiser's heir a brilliant opportunity to harvest glory, actually belonging, if the plan shall succeed, to the general commanding the army group of the flanks.

The two armies and the detachment constituting the German left, and having for their mission the double task of breaking the first French offensive and thereafter pursuing the defeated French troops through the Gap of Charmes, will, like the army group of the right, include some of the best German commanders, and one of the armies will be assigned to the Crown Prince of Bavaria out of regard for the susceptibilities of the second German state. But it is worthy of note that this same Bavarian crown prince seems on the whole to be the single representative of royalty in the German army who displays at least a moderate degree of military ability.

It remains now to tabulate this strength and the places of concentration of the respective armies. The First Army, commanded by Kluck, four active and two reserve army corps, rather more than 260,000 men of all arms, is concentrated about Aix-la-Chapelle. It is to cross the Meuse north of Liége and make the wide-swinging raid through Belgium into northern France. It is the marching flank of the whole German host—is, in reality, the right arm in the Schlieffen "embrace."

The Second Army, commanded by Bülow, also numbers 260,000 strong. It concentrates on the Belgian frontier about Malmédy. It

is to cross the Meuse at Huy, take Namur, and join hands with Kluck's First Army when that force shall have made its great south turn west of Brussels. Kluck's is the army the British will encounter at Mons; Bülow's, the force with which the French Fifth Army, under Lanzerac, will battle at Charleroi. In Bülow's army is the Prussian Guard together with three active and two reserve corps. In the two armies are the best units of the whole German host.

The German Third Army, commanded by Hausen, himself a Saxon, contains two active and one reserve corps, all Saxon. It will assemble on the Belgian frontier about the town of St. Vith; it will have for its objective the crossing of the Meuse south of Namur. Its appearance at Dinant will give Joffre the first clue as to German purposes in Belgium and its passage of the Meuse will compromise Lanzerac's Battle of Charleroi. But the real mission of the Saxon army will be to preserve the contact between the marching flank and the centre and its failure to accomplish this task will be one of the causes of later disaster.

The German Fourth Army—which, with the Fifth, constitutes the centre—includes three active and two reserve corps. It will assemble on the Luxemburg frontier and will be directed through the Ardennes upon Sedan. It will encounter the French Fourth Army and defeat it along the Semois in the Battle of the Ardennes. It numbers 200,000 strong.

The German Fifth Army, that of the German Crown Prince, also includes five army corps—three active and two reserve—with a strength of 200,000 men. It is concentrated about Treves, will advance through Luxemburg, and cross the Meuse at Stenay. On its advance it will encounter the French Third Army.

The German Sixth Army, commanded by the Bavarian Crown Prince, is composed of the four Bavarian army corps—three active and one reserve—200,000 strong. It concentrates in German Lorraine southeast of Metz covering the routes leading by the Sarre Valley into the Rhineland. It will meet the French Second Army at Morhange.

The German Seventh Army, that of Heeringen, consists of three corps—two active and one reserve. It will concentrate west of Strasbourg,

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and its mission will be, in close conjunction with the army of the Bavarian Crown Prince, to break the French offensive, and then, penetrating the Gap of Charmes, constitute the left arm of the Schlieffen "embrace." It contains 120,000 men and will face the French First Army in the battle south of Sarrebourg which in reality is a part of Morhange. Operating with the German Seventh Army is the detachment covering the Gap of Belfort, containing a single army corps amounting to 40,000 men, which will meet the French about Mulhouse.

Summarizing, then, the German right consists of three armies having a total strength of 640,000 men and composed of eleven active and five reserve corps. The centre consists of two armies with a combined strength of 400,000 men—seven active and three reserve corps. The left consists of two armies plus one detachment, 360,000 men-seven active and one reserve corps. On August 18th, when the German advance begins, 1,400,000 men are thus directed against France: twenty-five active and nine reserve corps. But to the left wing must be added something like another 100,000, constituting the garrisons of the Metz-Thionville area and employed in part in various operations in the first phase of the campaign. The figures cited are those of Hanotaux, the most documented of French historians on this period of the war. Colonel Réquin, working from French General Staff sources, places German strength at the outset at 194 divisions, which would amount to 1,400,000 approximately, a total which rises to 99 divisions on the western front by the first week of September, that is at the moment of the Battle of the Marne, and would mean a strength of 1,500,000. It is fair to assume then that in the Marne campaign Germany employed against the French, the British, and the Belgians, 1,500,000 men, and of this number more than a million were used in the attack through Belgium and Luxemburg.

IV. FRENCH PREPARATION

Like German mobilization and concentration, the French are based upon the strategic conception which is to direct the first operations. This conception, as we have seen, while keeping in clear view the variants necessary as German purpose discloses itself, is dominated by the idea of a brusque offensive into Lorraine, between Metz and Strasbourg, made by the French right, with a coördinated enveloping movement by the centre north of Metz, provided the German strategy refrains from violation of Belgian and Luxemburg soil. In case Luxemburg is invaded, together with eastern Belgium, the French centre is to seek the invading armies in the Ardennes and defeat them by a brusque attack, corresponding to that of the right in the region of annexed Lorraine.

We shall expect, then, to see the French right and centre powerfully constituted in accordance with its difficult mission. But there remains the problem of the left. This can only be organized as German purpose discloses itself. Joffre must "wait and see" what Moltke is going to do; he must hold his forces until he discovers (1) whether Germany will send her main masses through Belgium at all; (2) whether she will make her Belgian irruption, if at all, east of the Meuse; or (3) transport large forces west of the Meuse, either above or below Namur. Joffre can only guess on all three vital questions, therefore he can only make provisional arrangements as to his left, which will be transformed into actual decision only as late as August 15th, when the attack at Dinant at last sheds the first light on German intention, which is recognized at once as looking westward of the Meuse.

At the termination of the mobilization period France will have in the field five armies. The First and Second armies constituting the French right, will be commanded by Dubail and Castelnau respectively. The First, together with a detachment covering the Belfort Gap and commanded by Pau, will extend from the Swiss frontier to Lunéville, watching the Vosges through which it will presently attack. It will consist of five active corps reënforced by certain reserve divisions, 280,000 strong.

The Second Army, covering Nancy, will rest on the entrenched camp of Toul and cover the Gap of Charmes; with the First, its mission is to make the great dash into the "lost provinces." It will contain three active corps, the cavalry corps and certain reserve formations, in all 180,000



MARSHAL FOCH

This is the man whose tremendous thrust routed the Prussian Guard at the Battle of the Marne. Launched at exactly the right moment it went through the Guard "as a knife goes through cheese," routed the whole army of Hausen, and earned for Foch, Joffre's verbal decoration as "the first strategist in Europe." A few weeks later, through his generalship and the help of the flower of the British Army, Foch's troops won the terrible struggle that we call Ypres. There is a legend that this time he won commendation from Lord Roberts who, after studying his plans, is said to have remarked to officers of his staff, "You have a great general." His appointment as Generalissimo of the Allied forces marked the beginning of their final forward drive to victory.



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men. The French right, then, numbering 460,000 men in the armies of Castelnau and Dubail, confronts the German left, consisting of the armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria and Heeringen, which are 360,000 strong.

At the moment of concentration the French centre was made up of the Third and Fifth armies while the Fourth Army assembled in reserve at the Camp of Châlons, but almost immediately indications of German purpose in Belgium led Joffre to push the Fifth Army northward and to send the Fourth into line between the Third and Fifth. Thus before the actual campaign began the French centre was constituted by the Third and Fourth armies. The Third Army was commanded by Ruffey who was soon succeeded by Sarrail, later commander of the Salonica army. It included four active corps and certain reserve divisions; it took position east of the Meuse and north of Verdun covering the railroads entering France from Luxemburg and the Metz-Thionville fortified area. Ruffey had under his command 200,000 men.

The Fourth Army, commanded by De Langle de Cary, contained four active corps counting 160,000 strong and assembled on a front between Sedan and Montmédy, facing the exits from the Ardennes Forest into which it would presently make its unhappy venture. The two armies which constituted the French centre had a combined strength of 360,000 men as compared with 400,000 for the armies of the German Crown Prince and the Grand Duke of Würtemberg, facing them.

As to the French left, theoretically it was to consist of the French Fifth Army, commanded by Lanzerac; the British Expeditionary Army, led by Sir John French; and the Belgian Field Army, headed by the King himself—always provided that Belgium were involved in the struggle. Had the three forces been able to unite, and had the British Expeditionary Army joined up in full strength, the situation would have been this: the Lanzerac army contained five active corps and certain reserve formations having a total strength of 240,000 men; the British Expeditionary Army was reckoned on paper at 140,000, and the Belgian Field Army counted six divisions whose effective strength was slightly in excess of 90,000. This would have given Joffre a left wing containing

slightly under half a million men composed of three armies which as the campaign developed would have had to face the three German armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, which were 640,000 strong. At best, then, there would have been a strong disparity between the two opposing forces. This disparity would have been further aggravated by the absence of all unity of command, since French, British, and Belgian armies were each subject to the orders of its own chief.

But in fact, no junction between the Belgian and Anglo-French forces was realized until after the end of the Marne campaign and at the opening of the German movement toward Calais in October. The British were unable to get more than 70,000 men to the Continent in time to meet Kluck at Mons, and the Anglo-French armies, those of Sir John French and Lanzerac, could oppose only 310,000 men to the 640,000 included in the three armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, which were, to be sure, diminished by the detachment of two corps to watch the Belgian army, when it had retired behind the defenses of Antwerp after the great German advance began.

In sum, the French mobilized a field army consisting of twenty-one active corps, with a cavalry corps and certain reserve divisions, which had a total strength of 1,060,000 as against 1,400,000, the German strength. The French situation was in part redressed by the presence of 90,000 Belgians and 70,000 British, bringing the Allied field strength in the west up to 1,220,000, to which were added 30,000 British before the Battle of Cambrai on August 26th and 20,000 more before the Marne, at which point the British engaged 120,000. But this assistance, precious as it was, lost in actual value because the Belgian and British troops operated independently of the French Commander-in-Chief with evil consequences for his own strategical purposes.

V. A GENERAL SURVEY

Looking over the whole western from the Swiss frontier to the southern boundary of Holland, we can see that on August 13th, when French mobilization is complete, a situation is developing in which the military and numerical circumstances are as follows: Two French LIEGE 123

armies are about to attack two German armies across the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. The French number 460,000, the Germans 360,000. This is to be the first French blow and it will be delivered between Metz and the Vosges; it is an advance by the right flank for the French.

North of the Metz-Thionville fortified area two more French armies will presently throw themselves against two German armies, one emerging from Luxemburg and the other awaiting French attack in the Belgian Ardennes. This will be the main French attack delivered by the centre, and the French are here outnumbered, 360,000 against 400,000, but the difference is not decisive.

Finally, in the region back of Liége, already occupied by the German advance guards, the Belgian field army has assembled six divisions strong, numbering 90,000. Behind the French centre and to the west of it, Lanzerac's Fifth Army, 240,000 strong, is beginning to glide northward, toward the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse, where it will presently fight at Charleroi, and the first detachments of the British army are landing in France and being moved northward toward Mons toward a junction with the Lanzerac army.

Against these three scattered armies, which will count only a total strength of 400,000 at the decisive hour, 640,000 men, organized in three armies and containing the best-trained and equipped elements in the whole German army, are preparing to advance. Moreover, between Metz and the Dutch frontier the Germans have concentrated 1,140,000 men, who are presently to engage 760,000 French, Belgian, and British troops. Clear as are these facts to-day, they are at the moment hidden from Joffre who will receive his first warning through an attack upon Dinant on August 15th, which will foreshadow German purpose to cross the Meuse below Givet and he will not be completely enlightened until the battles of Charleroi and Mons, a week later, reveal the extent of German numbers in Belgium.

But great as is the German advantage thus disclosed, it must be appreciated that between German and Allied numbers, in the aggregate, there is no decisive disparity: 1,250,000 British, French, and Belgians against 1,400,000 Germans; and events in the east will presently practi-

cally abolish all German advantage by calling two corps—80,000 men—to East Prussia, at the moment when the arrival of the final British detachment gives Joffre a further 30,000.

German strategy, as disclosed by the examination of the size of the several German armies, aims at concentrating secretly overwhelming numbers on that Belgian boulevard which leads across the unprotected section of the French frontier into the open plains of northern France, and, ascending the Meuse and the Sambre and descending the Oise, reaches Paris. This purpose has been revealed in advance by the strategic railways and terminals constructed, years before the war, along the Belgian boundary, constituting a solid confutation of all German explanations of the occasion of the invasion of Belgium. It is further disclosed in that siege train, including the famous 42-centimetre guns, which will—with the assistance of aeroplanes (now used for the first time as the eyes of the artillery)—reduce the forts of Liége and Namur and open the way for the infantry, for Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen.

German mobilization and concentration have, as was foreseen by Schlieffen and directed by the lesser Moltke, provided the German right flank with an enormous preliminary numerical advantage. But what now follows will depend upon the use made of this advantage which at best is transitory. Supreme success depends upon the snatching of decisive victory from the first encounter, the primary shock, which will be the Battle of the Frontiers. Mere victory—local battlefield triumph which leaves the defeated armies free to retreat, the enemy commander able to repair his initial mistakes—this can only be the prelude to later defeat.

The conditions of triumph have been fixed in advance and they are immutable. The German has accepted them and tabulated them. All French capacity for resistance must be destroyed within three weeks after that August 18th, on which he sets his marching right flank in motion through Belgium. Anything short of complete victory is defeat, failure in the main field of operations which can only be followed by a transfer of effort to a subsidiary field in which no sacrifice can be crowned by the victory necessary to win the war.

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VI. THE ATTACK ON LIÉGE

Foreshadowed by the exchanges which preceded the final rupture of all diplomatic relations, the German purpose to lay hands upon Liége was promptly translated into action. Knowing as we do now the whole German plan, the explanation of that adventure is simple. Two vast German armies, the marching flank of the whole host, were to cross the Meuse and manœuvre in the Belgian plain, where they would begin their dash into France. Since time was so important an element in German calculation it was of utmost importance that this advance should not be held up by any delay in passing the Meuse, as such delay might be considerable and even fatal, if the Belgians decided to resist and defended Liége energetically.

It was, then, essential to take this fortified city, which commanded so many of the Meuse crossings, as soon as possible, in any event in advance of that hour when the main German masses, the armies of Kluck and Bülow, finally concentrated, were ready to begin their enormous operation. Hence the Germans schemed to seize Liége by a brusque offensive, by something amounting to a colossal raid, recalling the Japanese destruction of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in the first hours of the Manchurian War. This brusque offensive, if it was successful, would simultaneously remove the obstacle to the passage of the Meuse and give the Germans control of the great trunk railway coming from the Rhine at Cologne, which at Liége divides, one branch proceeding to Brussels, the other to Paris, through Namur and Maubeuge. And this railway line, could it be seized intact, would be of infinite value to the armies, which would follow it all the way to the French capital.

Liége was surrounded by twelve isolated forts, the work of the celebrated Brialmont. It had ranked in its day as one of the finest of European fortresses, but it had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and no effort had been made, as in the case of the French fortresses of Verdun and Belfort, to strengthen its works as the improvement in heavy artillery became pronounced. These forts were isolated, and they were neither connected by any field works nor had there been any care

taken to keep their field of fire free by forbidding the construction of buildings.

The forts had permanent garrisons of trained artillerymen, but the city itself was without any sufficient garrison and it had been calculated that it would take 75,000 men to defend its wide circle. Still it was the general expectation of Europe that Liége, however insufficient as a permanent barrier to German advance, would delay that advance sufficiently to permit the arrival of French and British troops to the west of the town and their junction with the Belgian field army. This army, actually in process of reconstruction, had been organized and trained with the idea that it would take its position west of Liége, behind the Geete River, its right resting on Namur, its left upon the Diemer at Diest. Here it was expected that it would be able, thanks to the resistance of Liége, to hold a solid front and prevent the overflow of German masses into the plain east of Louvain until aid came.

Belgian mobilization was ordered on August 1st; it was completed by August 6th. Something less than one hundred thousand men, the field army of the nation, were then concentrated behind the Geete. The King took command, establishing his headquarters at Louvain.

Meantime, there had been very striking developments. On August 4th, twelve regiments of German cavalry had crossed the frontier from the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle; moved rapidly west to the Meuse, which they reached at Visé, just south of the Dutch frontier and north of Liége; forced the crossing of the river, driving in a weak Belgian force, which recoiled upon Liége; and thus gained the west bank of the Meuse.

On August 5th the X German Army Corps under Emmich reached the front of the eastern forts of Liége, demanded permission to pass unopposed and, this permission being refused, undertook to take the town by assault, seeking to penetrate between the forts.

At this time the whole 3rd Division of the Belgian field army, and two brigades of the 4th, occupied the ground between the forts and, supported by their fire, successfully repulsed the German attacks through the days of August 5th and 6th. On this latter day, however, the arrival of masses of German troops, which began to cross the river

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above and below, threatened to cut off the retreat of the field forces and General Leman, the commander of Liége, ordered these to retire upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. This retreat was successfully conducted.

On August 7th the German infantry penetrated between the forts, occupied the city and the citadel, but were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire until German and Austrian heavy guns were brought up, but under this attack they crumbled almost instantaneously. The last fort fell, accepting the Belgian official report, on August 16th, but the German reports placed it much earlier. Actually, as an obstacle to German advance, Liége lost its importance by August 10th and the city itself was in German hands on the 7th.

As a coup de main the attack upon Liége was a failure. Hanotaux estimates at 40,000 the German losses in the early assaults. Ludendorff, who participated quite accidentally, rallying broken troops and actually making the raid into the city itself, gives a vivid picture of the initial disorder in the German ranks and testifies to the severity of German losses. The German General Staff later felt it necessary to deny that the losses had been heavy—itself a significant circumstance. Moreover, the operation showed a startling lack of foresight, due to the totally unwarranted assumption that the Belgians either would not or could not resist. Only on the arrival of the siege train were the forts actually reduced. The lives wasted in the futile attempt to take by assault a fortress still intact, defended by infantry in no sense shaken, were the first sacrifice to German arrogance and rash contempt for the enemy, which would claim so many sacrifices in the following weeks.

At the moment the fact of resistance and the proof the resistance presently disclosed of German failure to achieve swift success awakened hopes in Paris, London, and Brussels, which were promptly turned to ashes, when German siege guns methodically wrecked the forts—themselves powerless to reach their enemy as a result of the inferior range of their guns and of the absence of airplanes to discover enemy batteries. But, on the other hand, the moral value of Liége was permanent, while the circumstances of the German operation disclosed a fundamental

weakness in the German High Command which would have fatal con-

sequences just one month later.

Still, well in advance of the hour when the armies of Kluck and Bülow, constituting the German right wing, were to begin their real advance, the Liége obstacle was out of the way and before its forts had succumbed, German cavalry had passed the Meuse to the north and were sweeping the Belgian plain between the Meuse and the Geete. For a week Liége filled the world; thereafter it was forgotten in the midst of the far more momentous events which succeeded. It was at most but an incident, but a glorious incident, memorable for ever as the first clear answer to German militarism.

VII. MULHOUSE

Exactly as the first German undertaking, that before Liége, disclosed inherent weaknesses in the German system, the first French effort, the dash for Mulhouse, revealed defects which soon after cost the French dearly and led to a series of heavy defeats. Like the German raid on the Belgian fortresses, the French dash into Alsace was made by the first troops to be available—the units whose mission it was to garrison the great circle of forts which, between the Vosges and Switzerland in a wide circle about Belfort, defend the Gap of Belfort, the Gate of Burgundy, the opening between the Vosges and the Jura through which passes that road from the Rhine to the Rhone, followed by so many invasions in ancient times.

The purpose of the French operation was far less serious than that of the Germans before Liége. A certain number of troops were promptly available, and there was in southern Alsace no artificial obstacle to invasion, while the large industrial city of Mulhouse, consistently loyal to its old French masters, lay almost within sight of the frontiers. A successful advance to Mulhouse would reassert the French claim to Alsace-Lorraine, rouse French enthusiasm, and correspondingly depress German spirits.


Accordingly, on August 7th, the day on which the German penetrated the city of Liége, detachments from the Belfort garrison, under General

NOVEL PHASES OF MODERN WARFARE SHOWN IN PICTURES



A HIDDEN AND DEFENDED MACHINE GUN

Except for the noise, which resembles a pneumatic rivetting machine, this gun gives the enemy no indication of its whereabouts. It fires through a painted net curtain.



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THE "AGENT DE LIAISON"

This French soldier's official designation is as sinister as his appearance. He is an agent de liaison. It is a relief to know that this means simply telephone operator. He wears his mask as a protection against poison-gas bombs. A hand grenade is in the pouch suspended from his belt.





Photograph by Paul Thompson

"POISON GAS" IN THE WAR

The upper picture shows the cylindrical containers from which the poison gas emanates. The Austrians left them behind when the Russians drove them from this position. Trenches have to be dug sometimes when gas-bombs and shells are exploding close at hand. These British "Tommies" are wearing respirators as a protection against poisonous fumes.



MACHINE-GUN POSITION IN THE OPEN

Where guns and men are protected only by small dugouts and shell-craters—conditions which obtain during an advance



PERISCOPE AND METAL HELMET

The French soldiers soon bowed to grim necessity and gave up the blue tunics and red trousers endeared to them by a romantic and glorious tradition. These entrenched poilus are sensibly making themselves as safe and comfortable as they can. Clad in serviceable and inconspicuous "horizon" blue uniforms with metal helmets, one man is trying a pot-shot with his rifle, which is equipped with a periscope so that he need expose himself no more than is necessary, while his comrade is solacing himself with a glance at his favorite Paris newspaper.



THIS IS THE RESULT WHEN A FOREST BECOMES A BATTLEFIELD



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BUCKLER, HAND-GRENADE, AND HELM

History repeats itself in war as in other human relationships. In 1913 the world thought the day of warriors with steel helmets and shields had passed forever. But here is one very much alive. He is a grenadier, too, in the original sense of the term, for he stands ready to throw a hand-grenade in the face of his enemy.





Photograph by the International News Service BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

Barbed wire has been used in the World War on an unprecedented scale. These troops (upper picture) are advancing upon an abandoned fort by the side of a formidable entanglement which has been firmly anchored by stout posts. The French have invented a gun (lower picture) which fires into the midst of the wire entanglement a hook attached to a cable. The hook is then hauled back, supposedly bringing with it large masses of the wire.








THE GASOLINE ENGINE

The gasoline engine has greatly increased the mobility of modern troops. The lower picture shows a little British fortress that can be moved at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, wherever there is a decent road. The upper and middle pictures show one method the Germans have adopted for increasing the mobility of their artillery. The armoured car affords protection to the gun-crew while in transit to the point at which they are needed. Arrived on the ground the car's armour is removed (as shown in the rentre picture and the gun cleared for action in two or three minutes.



WORK AND PLAY AT THE FRONT

These French gunners (upper picture) are working to excellent purpose in a dugout carefully concealed from the

This seems a strange place for a candy-shop, yet it is doing a big business. The Young Men's Christian Association maintains many little booths like this, just back of the firing line. The soldier's small change is apt to burn a hole in his pocket, and he highly appreciates such opportunities to get rid of it in exchange for sweets and other little luxuries.

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Bonneau, crossed the frontier, pushed on without serious resistance until they reached Altkirch, where they encountered and routed a German brigade. The next day Mulhouse welcomed the liberators with an enthusiasm which proved costly a few hours later. All France rejoiced at the swift and inexpensive success, but joy was turned to grief on August 11th when a German counter-attack pushed the French out of Mulhouse and back into French territory.

The defeat was totally unnecessary, the retreat precipitate, the whole operation ill conceived and badly executed. A few days later a new French movement, directed by General Pau—one of the surviving heroes of the Franco-Prussian War, who had preceded Joffre as chief of staff and more than once been welcomed at German manœuvres by the Kaiser—returned to the charge, retook Mulhouse, approached Colmar, drew near to the Rhine. But the success was without value, for events in other fields promptly necessitated the dislocation of Pau's force and the transfer to the very doors of Paris of the corps which had fought at Mulhouse. More than four years were to pass before Mulhouse would see another French army, this time led by one of her own sons, General Hirschauer. But this army would come to stay. Until that hour French troops from the Vosges summits about Thann would have to content themselves with the view of the roofs of Mulhouse and the far more distant glimpse of the Rhine.

Thus at either end of the great battle line, within sight of Holland and of Switzerland, the first considerable operations of the World War developed, filling the press for the two weeks following the first declaration of war. Meantime, behind the silence which covered the preparations on the whole front between these two cities of Liége and Mulhouse, the hosts of two nations were assembling. Indeed when Pau won the transient success before Mulhouse which gave him the city, 1,200 prisoners, and 24 guns—that is on August 18th—all the French and German armies were in motion and the second stage, the Battle of the Frontiers, had already been reached, while for this initial shock nearly 3,000,000 men between Liége and Mulhouse stood to arms.

CHAPTER SIX

THE BATTLE OF THE FRONTIERS

T

THE FIRST SHOCK

The Battle of the Frontiers, the first shock of the World War, extends in time over ten days, from August 19th onward, and in space over more than two hundred miles from the Sarre to the Sambre. It is, in reality, not one battle but many, fought not by two armies but by at least a dozen. Several of these battles, too, in numbers engaged and in losses sustained, challenge comparison with the greatest conflicts of the Franco-Prussian War and surpass all those of the American Civil War.

Yet beneath the superficial confusion there are both unity and clarity. Actually one must see the opposing hosts as two armies and follow the progress of the encounter with clear comprehension of the purposes of the two commanders-in-chief. Here, as everywhere, war is a collision between two wills, precipitated by two purposes. What is of importance is to appreciate the purposes and thereafter to view the successive actions in relation to the purposes which produced them.

The two fundamental strategic conceptions have been explained, but it is well to emphasize the fact that although the Schlieffen envelopment is now generally accepted as underlying the whole German plan, as a consequence of the studies of Hanotaux, and Tirpitz in his diary testifies that throughout the Marne campaign German High Command was obsessed with the vision of a new "Cannæ," not only were there variant proposals on the German side, but, as Maurice well points out, the German General Staff did not commit itself to an immutable programme, in fact, as the orders received by Kluck and quoted in his own defense indicate, there was a great modification in detail, after the Battle of Charleroi on August 23rd and particularly after the Battle of Guise, on August 29th, which itself coincided with the check of the eastern armies before the Gap of Charmes.

As early as 1911 Bernhardi in his "War of To-day" had suggested an offensive through Belgium, even touching Dutch territory, which should seek to transfer the battlefield to the north of France and thence to the environs of Paris. But the essential circumstance in Bernhardi's significant proposal, too little considered by French soldiers, was the recommendation that while this irruption through Belgium and Luxemburg was being made by the main masses of German troops, the left flank should retire, out of Alsace-Lorraine, behind the Rhine and even the Main, if necessary.

Bernhardi's thesis was based upon the assumption that the Germans would use for the first shock only active formations, twenty-four army corps. It was, itself, an answer to the proposal of Falkenhausen, following Schlieffen, that Germany should embody reserve formations with the active army and thus obtain the requisite number of troops to maintain the eastern frontier and at the same time to execute the double envelopment. Bernhardi opposed the use of reserve formations as likely to weaken the efficiency of the active units. In point of fact not less than fourteen reserve corps were employed in the west, and this constituted the chief surprise to the French, who had assumed that the German army would follow the Bernhardi view and that, as a consequence, they would either be unable to extend their front west of the Meuse, or, extending it, would so thin their line as to invite precisely the counter-thrust which Joffre attempted into the Ardennes.

But if it be accepted that the Germans in the first instance undertook the double envelopment, seeking to advance with their right wing on the coast, Kluck reveals the fact that the western extension was at once abandoned, so far as the Channel was concerned, while by August 30th even the effort to reach the Seine west of Paris was discarded in favour of the movement to the Marne, to cut the French armies off from Paris, which culminated in the Battle of the Marne. This manœuvre still left open the possibility of the double envelopment, provided the German armies in Lorraine could penetrate the Gap of Charmes, but in point of fact they had already been decisively checked.

Ludendorff, in his book, makes it clear that Marshal von Schlieffen

had envisaged the possible check in Lorraine and prescribed the immediate transfer of troops from east to west, from the Nancy front to that of Paris, to correspond with the deplacements Joffre actually made, and angrily criticizes the handling of the Lorraine troops, but at the same moment ascribes the final failure to the inadequate strength of the right flank, hopelessly crippled by the transfer of two corps to the east in advance of the decisive shock.

To load a narrative such as this with technical details is obviously unnecessary, but it is clear from the foregoing facts that it was possible, should the Schlieffen double envelopment fail on the Lorraine side, to continue in northern France executing precisely that envelopment of one flank which Bernhardi had foreseen and, relying upon the armies in Lorraine, to fix the masses of the French forces on their front and prevent the transfer of large numbers from Nancy to Paris. Or, if such transfers were made in too great masses, to exploit the resulting weakness and resume the process of double envelopment. Moreover, it is clear that neither the double nor single envelopment was possible, unless the Germans should incorporate reserve with active corps. This is what they did, but Joffre's assumption that such incorporation would not be attempted constitutes his chief miscalculation and explains all his consequent mistakes about the Sambre and the Meuse.

To return now to the actual narrative: Moltke is going to wait for Joffre in Lorraine and the Belgian Ardennes. Joffre, attacking in Lorraine and eastern Belgium, is going to wait for Moltke on the frontier between France and Belgium west of the Meuse. Thus the first shock will result from the advance of the armies which constitute the French right and centre and their encounter with the armies comprising the German left and centre. It will take place on the fields selected by Moltke, but the offensive determination of Joffre will precipitate it. Since both Joffre and Moltke will hold back their opposing flanks in the west—Joffre, to await illumination as to Moltke's purpose; Moltke, to see the French masses committed to an offensive in Lorraine and the Ardennes which he purposes to break—the shock between the French left and the German right will come somewhat later.

But it is essential to mark the difference between the course of Joffre in the case of his left and of Moltke in that of his right. Moltke has resolved upon the defensive in Lorraine and the Ardennes. Therefore he proceeds systematically to the fortification of the positions on which he means to stand. This entrenching is done with utmost care, and the fruits of this labour will be disclosed a few days later when Castelnau and Dubail attack at Morhange and Sarrebourg.

Joffre, by contrast, has obviously had two minds about his left. His hesitation grows out of an obvious inability to decide in advance how many troops will come through Belgium and cross the Meuse. He underestimates them, his military intelligence department fails him, and these are important circumstances; but worst of all, he listens to political pressure and presently embarks upon an offensive into Belgium, which results in a collision with the Germans on the Sambre, before his armies are even properly concentrated.

Out of this series of blunders and miscalculations grows the subsequent crisis and the considerable professional criticism which is directed against the French commander-in-chief by French soldiers. The gravamen of the charge, hardly to be traversed, is that Joffre risked a doubtful offensive with his centre and right, while taking no proper precautions for his left. Moltke, on his side, with the same offensive operation in view, built his operations on the impregnable foundation of his eastern entrenchments.

Joffre's purpose in attacking in Alsace-Lorraine is to break through between Metz and Strasbourg with his right, reconquering Alsace, opening the Sarre route to the Middle Rhine, and enveloping Metz from the east. He also believes with every other soldier, that offense is the best defense and that success in Alsace and Lorraine will compel the German to diminish or even to abandon his contemplated offensive in Belgium, west of the Meuse.

For his centre attack, Joffre foresees two possible gains. To break the German centre will compromise the German offensive by the right flank, across the Meuse, which is still only a hypothesis so far as the French commander is concerned. It will also threaten Metz with envelopment from the west, and this threat will coincide with a similar threat from the east if Castelnau is also successful on the Sarre. To put the thing simply: Joffre is going to try, by two headlong attacks in Lorraine and in the Ardennes, to upset the whole German offensive before it gets started. He is going to attempt this by employing his own right and centre, while Moltke, satisfied that the attempt will fail, is going to await the moment when Joffre has committed his main masses to an offensive, destined to fail, before setting his own hosts in motion.

French mobilization and concentration, accomplished with admirable regularity in striking contrast to 1870, are complete on August 13th. On the next day the First and Second armies, those of Dubail and Castelnau, constituting the French right wing, move eastward, the former army following the Nancy-Strasbourg railway line in the direction of the important junction of Sarrbourg, but sending detachments across the Vosges into the Bruche Valley which opens eastward toward Strasbourg. Pau's detachment, renewing the French operation against Mulhouse, will act in strict conformity with Dubail.

Castelnau's army will aim for Morhange and the Metz-Strasbourg railway just beyond this town, his right flank in close touch with Dubail's left. Thus on August 19th, after a swift advance, encountering only rear guards of the German forces of the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Heeringen, Dubail will reach Sarrebourg; Castelnau will approach Morhange; and Pau will dispose of the forces barring his entrance into Mulhouse, which he will occupy the next day. Except about Mulhouse and in the Bruche Valley the fighting has not been severe, and the French success has been uninterrupted.

On the morning of August 20th the two French armies are ranged in semicircle from the heights east of Nancy to the Donon Peak of the Vosges, while to the south they hold a portion of the Bruche Valley and most of the Vosges passes to the south, together with Mulhouse and much of southern Alsace. In the main, between the Vosges and Nancy, they stand on the actual language frontier between French and German, marked by the Donon, Sarrebourg, and Morhange. They have, moreover, reached the front on which Moltke has prepared in advance to break Joffre's Lorraine thrust.

II. THE BATTLE OF METZ

This German position rests on the west upon the forts of Metz; it extends eastward along the high ground of which the Côte de Delme is the most conspicuous landmark. Thence it tends southeastward, along the hills on the east bank of the Sarre to the Vosges. The region is thinly populated, largely given over to woodland and, in the region where the armies of Dubail and Castelnau make junction, filled with small lakes. It is admirably suited to a defensive battle, both by reason of the character of the country and the relation of the heights to the German lines. In reality, the French have thrust their head into an ambush and any disaster in front will be attended with utmost peril for their rear, instantly threatened with attack from the forts of Metz.

In addition, the Germans have faithfully studied and applied the lessons of the Manchurian Campaign, of the Boer War. They have perceived the enormous advantage acquired by the defense, as a consequence of the developments in rapid-fire guns and in heavy artillery. Thus they have constructed elaborate trenches, covered by intricate barbed-wire entanglements, and furnished with innumerable machine guns. In a word, they have already foreseen many of the circumstances which will be familiar for four years in the warfare of trenches, in the war of positions.

Behind these entrenchments, facing ground carefully studied by their own artillery, hidden from the enemy, clad in the field gray which is well-nigh invisible, they are awaiting that impetuous attack of French infantry, still wearing the red trousers of the Third Empire and thus targets beyond compare. Equal in numbers, since Joffre has already begun to borrow divisions from the east; superior in all that can contribute mechanically to victory, the armies of Heeringen and the Bavarian Crown Prince now stand ready.

And in the larger view, Moltke's purpose now becomes manifest. He will first break the force of the French attack on this selected front. He will not only parry the blow but inflict such losses as to destroy the coherence and will power of his foe. Then he will pass to the offensive,

pursue the beaten French armies, seek to envelop them by a thrust from the Metz forts, transform defeat into rout, and, on the heels of the routed armies, push through the Gap of Charmes to that rendezvous at Troyes which is to be the last circumstance in the Schlieffen conception.

Now on the days of August 19th and 20th most of the German expectations are realized. The French, taking both Morhange and Sarrebourg, displaying characteristic dash and courage, are nevertheless slaughtered mercilessly by heavy artillery, without support from their own guns. They are thrown against prepared entrenchments without the smallest thought for their own protection, and in two days the offensive value of the two armies is broken. What happened to Burnside's army at Fredericksburg, to Grant's at Cold Harbour, happens to the armies of Dubail and Castelnau in a country equally advantageous for defense.

Then, on August 20th, in strict conformity with the preconceived plan, the German armies pass to the offensive, particularly on the flanks of both French armies, seeking to envelop them. Not only is French retreat instantly necessary, but the retreat has in places the character of a rout, and it needs all the skill and courage of Foch, who now appears as commander of the famous Twentieth Army Corps, to cover the retirement and protect the northern flank of Castelnau's army. Dubail's army is less heavily beaten but the question is merely one of degree. In two days the main French offensive has been transformed into a precipitate retreat and the German left flank begins its advance, the advance which is designed to follow the beaten French through the Gap of Charmes and join hands with the armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, coming south through Belgium and northern France.

Meantime, on August 21st, the world, which had hitherto relied for its news upon Allied bulletins of the successful defense of Liége and the progress of French invasion in Alsace and Lorraine, a progress which on August 20th had brought the French back into Mulhouse, suddenly learns from German announcements that the French armies of the east are in full retreat after a disastrous defeat which has cost them 10,000 prisoners, a number of flags, and many cannon. German semi-official



HINDENBURG, VICTOR OF TANNENBERG



reports compare the battle in magnitude and importance to the opening struggles of the Franco-Prussian War. Nor can French statements deny the essential fact, that the French offensive in Lorraine has failed and two French armies are retiring from the field on which they have suffered very heavy defeat. The hope of immediate reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine is now at an end. What remains to be disclosed is whether France can defend her new frontiers.

Examination of the causes of the defeat leads clearly to the discovery that all the sad circumstances of 1870 have reappeared. Once more the Germans are better armed and better led. The French soldiers have been thrown recklessly against unseen troops fighting in trenches and supported by heavy artillery which massacres the French troops, who can derive no support from their own artillery.

The French soldier has fought gallantly, but his gallantry has gone for nothing and his officers have sacrificed him without reason. His morale has been shaken by this terrible slaughter inflicted by an invisible enemy. To be sure the German losses have been severe, heavier than was suspected at the moment, but far less than the French. The Napoleonic tactics of mass attack have been employed against an enemy furnished with those weapons about which Napoleon could not even dream; and the result has been fatal.

On August 21st, then, the French right wing, the armies of Dubail and Castelnau, are streaming back across the French frontier, repassing the frontier posts so joyously overturned a few days before. They cannot stand, even at the frontier. A new invasion of France has begun and Lunéville is the first considerable French town to know the grief of a German occupation, while along the whole eastern frontier the memories of 1870 are vividly and poignantly awakened.

III. THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES

The French centre has engaged on the same days as the right. Here, as in Lorraine, Joffre has taken the offensive, throwing the armies of Ruffey and De Langle de Cary, the French Third and Fourth armies, northeastward, against the armies of the German Crown Prince and the

Grand Duke of Würtemberg. If the offensive succeeds Ruffey will threaten Metz from the west, De Langle will menace the flank of any German army beyond the Meuse. So sure are the French of success that for several days French officers hail the rumours of German advance beyond the Meuse as the promise of victory.

But on August 19th and 20th, the days of the Battle of Metz, the French centre encounters its foes in the difficult region of the Belgian Ardennes, a country even more favourable than that south of Metz for the sort of defense the German has organized. And in this country the French confront prepared positions exactly like those at Morhange and Sarrebourg. The new battle rages all the way from Givet on the Meuse eastward to the outskirts of the fortified area of Metz and Thionville. It is particularly bitter on the Semois. Neufchâteau, Bouillon, Virton are names memorable hereafter in the French army for gallant deeds but not less of mournful significance. In brief, what happened in Lorraine happens in the Ardennes: the same mistakes, the same weaknesses on the French side, the same skilful preparation on the German.

The result is inevitable. At the foreseen moment the Germans pass to the offensive; the armies of Ruffey and De Langle abandon their own attacks and flow backward behind the Meuse, the Chiers, and upon the fortifications of Verdun. A gallant little thrust by Maunoury, commanding a detachment whose task (never to be fulfilled) was to join in the siege of Metz, pushes back the flank of the army of the German Crown Prince; but the success is without future, for immediately Maunoury is called away and will appear presently before Paris, commanding the army which will fight at the Ourcq. Foch and Maunoury, these are the names which emerge from the disheartening records of these initial failures.

Still it is necessary to recognize that, on the whole, the two French armies of the centre have suffered less and retired in better order than the armies of the right. The defeats in the Ardennes have not been quite so heavy as those in German Lorraine, although Ruffey will be removed on the field of battle, to make way for Sarrail, henceforward commander of the Verdun army, until he goes to Salonica.

Immediately on the heels of the German bulletin announcing success on the Lorraine front there now comes an even more glowing statement of the victory in the Ardennes, a statement decorated for dynastic purposes, since a portion of the victory is attributable to the troops led by the German Crown Prince. By August 22nd the world, Allied and enemy, knows that the French offensive has been broken, that the main masses of the French army are in retreat. It can gather from the German reports that the defeats have not merely been heavy but decisive. From French communiqués it learns little beyond the fact of the loss of battles disclosed in the confession of retreat. In Lorraine and across the frontier from Sedan to Longwy German armies are now coming on; invasion is beginning on the Meuse and on the Moselle at the same moment and under the same circumstances.

IV. CHARLEROI

Joffre's defeats on his right and centre have been due to German superiority in machines rather than in numbers. He has employed equal if not slightly superior numbers in his offensive; and his offensive has failed because the Germans, far more successfully than the French, have read the lessons of recent wars. But since his whole offensive was confined to his centre and right, his failure on these fronts automatically disposes of his original conception.

Still, in the days when he was going to defeat in Lorraine and the Ardennes, Joffre was slowly building up a plan on his left. German action at the outset of the war, the attack upon Liége and subsequent events as well, clearly forecast an attack through Belgium. Joffre not only recognized this, but, by throwing his centre into the Belgian Ardennes, sought there to meet and defeat German armies coming toward France across Belgium and Luxemburg.

Nor was Joffre deceived as to the possibility of an advance across the Meuse, south of Namur, or for that matter about Namur. He had to await the disclosure of such a purpose, however, because up to the last moment Moltke was free to attack either with all his armies north of Metz, between Verdun and Givet, that is east of the Meuse, or he could divide his forces and send half across the Meuse to the westward.

It was only on August 15th, when Hausen's advance guards made a serious attack at the crossings of the Meuse at Dinant, that Joffre was able to foresee a considerable German effort west of the Meuse. This German attack, which was repulsed, is memorable further, because the failure of Hausen was the direct consequence of the skill of a French colonel, who will be a general at the Marne a few days later and, in the future, a Marshal of France, for it is at Dinant on August 15th that Petain emerges.

After August 15th, Joffre, whose cavalry and air observers have failed him and continue to fail him, gives attention to Belgian appeals and earnest requests of the French Government and begins to move his Fifth Army northward into the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse, famous fighting ground in the wars of the French Revolution. He plans that the British shall march with this Lanzerac army. He believes that the German thrust by the right flank will come mainly south of Namur and he will undertake to build up on the right flank of this attack a force which can assail it a few days hence. This purpose to create an enveloping flank will underlie all Joffre's combinations up to the Marne.

But now Joffre is going to pay the price of two colossal blunders. He has rashly ventured into his own offensive without taking the necessary precautions to protect his own left flank. He has, moreover, totally misconceived the extent of the German thrust through Belgium. He has assumed that the Germans could employ only 700,000 troops west of Metz; they have mobilized and concentrated more than a million. He has reckoned that Moltke will have not more than 300,000 troops to use west of the Meuse; Moltke now has 640,000.

Instead of following the method of Moltke in Lorraine and directing the armies of his left flank to entrench and await attack upon selected ground, Joffre, in part moved by political pressure, has pushed Lanzerac with 240,000 troops and Sir John French with 70,000 up into Belgium—too late to join hands with the Belgians, too late to entrench themselves.

And this Allied force, approximately 300,000 strong, is now going to have an affair with three German armies, numbering, after two corps have been detached to observe the Belgians in Antwerp, upward of 540,000. This vast force—including an army, that of Kluck, which will drop from the clouds so far as Joffre's reckoning goes—will, moreover, encounter



THE FIRST BATTLES, AUGUST 15TH-23RD, 1914

A-Belgians C-Lanzerac E-Ruffey G-Dubail
B-British D-De Langle de Cary F-Castelnau H-Pau

Allied armies imperfectly concentrated, engaged in an unfinished manœuvre into Belgium, still aiming at an offensive. Thus one must say quite frankly that, in taking the offensive with his right and centre while leaving his left in the air, Joffre not only blundered but came near to losing the war.

Moltke's three western armies were set in motion about August 18th, and the next day swept the Belgian field army out of their way, behind the Dyle, covering Brussels for one day and on the next behind the permanent defenses of Antwerp. On August 20th Kluck's army passed through Brussels. Richard Harding Davis saw the "march past" and described it in terms which made Allied flesh creep for a week thereafter.

At this moment, while Lanzerac and the British are still struggling up toward Charleroi and Mons, three German armies are converging upon them, Kluck seeking their left, Bülow their centre, and Hausen reaching for their right and rear across the Meuse, by Dinant, where he will not find Petain this time. Lanzerac has now a suspicion of what is ahead of him, but not Joffre, who remains obstinately wedded to his own estimates.

It is only on August 21st that Lanzerac begins to get in line on the Sambre, having waited several days for the British, who even now are not quite ready. At this moment Sir John French's little army has concentrated at Maubeuge and is moving toward Mons, whither Kluck, executing his famous half turn, will now tend. Joffre had hoped that the British would encounter the Germans on the field of Waterloo, but, in fact, they will not get beyond the canal at Mons. He had hoped for a junction with the Belgians, but they have finally retired northward instead of southward—away from, not toward, their allies—strategically a capital blunder, but a blunder inevitable, given their concern for their own territory and the plans of their general staff.

August 21st Bülow attacks Namur, Lanzerac's army begins to be engaged on the Sambre in the prelude to the Battle of Charleroi. The Germans successfully pass the Sambre the next day, reduce Namur, from which the garrisons must flee the next morning, while the British at last get into line about Mons. Meantime, Lanzerac, fully awake to the peril in which he is involved owing to the miscalculation as to German numbers, strives unsuccessfully to awaken Joffre to the real situation. But Joffre still insists that Lanzerac attack.

On August 22nd, then, Lanzerac does attack, and there takes place

one of the most furious battles in the long history of Franco-German combats, more furious and more deadly than any of the battles of 1870. But the battle can have no decision for, unfavourable to the French in its major circumstances, it is broken off by Lanzerac, on the discovery that Hausen's army is threatening his rear across the bridges of the Meuse, notably at Dinant where they were repulsed on August 15th. The details of this Battle of Charleroi would be worthy of recitation under any other circumstances. There is memorable fighting between African troops and the Prussian Guard, terrific street combat in Charleroi, the French weaknesses already disclosed before Metz and in the Ardennes conspicuous again; but the main fact is too important to warrant delay with the subordinate details.

Four days after the defeats of the centre and of the right, then, the left is thus conditioned: The Belgian army has retired out of line into Antwerp; the French Fifth Army has been beaten and, following the fall of Namur, is retiring into France, its right flank threatened by Hausen. its centre striving to hold back the masses of the victorious army of Bülow, and its left menaced by a deadly peril coming from the west. The defeat at Charleroi has locally been due to the lack of cohesion. rash adventuring of certain corps commanders, premature engagement without awaiting proper concentration—a heavy punishment for an illconceived advance into Belgium. Still the defeat of the Fifth Army is, on the whole, far less severe than that of the armies of the centre and right, and it has dealt heavier blows. Joffre thinks the battle broken off too soon and does not forgive Lanzerac, with whom Sir John French presently quarrels. As a consequence, Lanzerac disappears soon. was reckoned the best commander in the French army at the outset, but he will not reappear.

One other name is worthy of mention. Just before Namur fell a French regiment arrives, too late to help defend the town but in time to faid in the escape of the Belgian garrison. It is commanded by Mangin, after a fashion the Ney of this new war, and for Foch, four years later, a lieutenant with the temperament and qualities of Sheridan.

v. MONS

Of the British participation in the first campaign of the war it is necessary to say at once that it has been and will remain the occasion of innumerable controversies, sterile in themselves, controversies between Sir John French and Lanzerac; between French and his own lieutenants, notably Smith-Dorrien and Maurice; recriminations filling books and stimulating bitterness, but having their origin in circumstances which remain clear to all eyes.

For a campaign on the Continent in a war such as had arrived and with the participation of Britain assumed, the French and the British General Staffs had, as early as the Agadir Crisis, laid plans—prepared for coöperation in order that, if emergency arrived, it would not be necessary to perform all the intricate staff work in the heat of actual operations. The plans did not rest upon an alliance, since British action was not assured in advance, but to the British and the French there seemed so real a prospect of war and of British participation that both saw the need of preliminary arrangements.

Against such an eventuality Britain had created a field army, with a paper strength of some 140,000—seven divisions and a cavalry corps. This expeditionary army was organized with the express idea of service on the Continent and it was, in theory, fixed at a strength adequate to cover the disparity between German and French numbers and ensure a balance on what would be the western front.

But in point of fact, in August, 1914, the British were not able to put 140,000 men immediately on the Continent. For the first shock they were able to provide only four divisions of infantry. The fifth only joined up after Mons and on the eve of Le Cateau; the sixth did not arrive until the retreat was over and the Marne beginning; the seventh only came with the transfer of activities to Flanders in October and at the opening of the Yser conflict. And in addition, the first four divisions were so much behind their schedule that Lanzerac was delayed for several days in his projected push north, with evil consequences.

Britain was the last nation to enter the struggle, and her declaration

"ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND!"

FRANCE AND ENGLAND STAND TOGETHER



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood BRITISH HIGHLANDERS LANDING AT BOULOGNE

"VIVE LA RÉPUBLIQUE!"



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GENERAL JOFFRE

GENERAL GALLIENI

General Joffre commanded the French during the first seventeen months of the war, was then retired as Marshal of France, and in April, 1917, came to America as a member of the French War Commission. He was the idol of the soldiers who spoke of him affectionately as "Grand-papa" and "Our Joffre." His ringing message to the army before the Battle of the Marne will long be remembered: "Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come; let each man die in his place, rather than fall back."

General Gallieni was the defender of Paris. On the evening of September 3d, he learned from his observers that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast toward Meaux and the Marne. He

telephoned this news to Joffre and the next day the plan for the Battle of the Marne was arranged.



THREE FRENCH GENERALS

Photograph by Paul Thompson

These generals were all active during the first year of the war. "Grand-papa Joffre" stands in a characteristic attitude with field-glasses "mobilized." At Joffre's right and left are Castelnau and Pau. All three are good-naturedly quizzing the orderly who stands at attention while the man at the extreme left enjoys seeing his comrade "on the carpet"




LORD KITCHENER AND SIR JOHN FRENCH

There were persistent rumors of differences between Lord Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War, and Sir John French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Army. General French was relieved of his command six months

before Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea, June 5, 1916.

The British believed for some time that their help enabled the French to win the Battle of the Marne. But to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. When Joffre asked for instant action, Field Marshal French replied that he needed forty-eight hours in which to get ready. He failed to rise to the greatest opportunity of the War, either because he did not perceive it or because he lacked the necessary energy and initiative. That is the verdict of French criticism and British students of the war are being driven to the same conclusion.



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GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN

Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French in command of the British forces in France. He is a more active man than his predecessor and nearly ten years younger, having been born in 1861. Throughout his military career he has been concerned chiefly with cavalry, and he possesses all the cavalryman's traditional fire and dash.

General Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second Corps of the British Army during the terrible days of the retreat

which preceded the Marne.





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FRENCH ARMY JOINS BELGIANS

The advance guard of the French Army on their way to join the Belgians. French marines welcomed by the residents of Ghent.



British Artillery in a Rearguard Action in Belgium.



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood When the British Marines disembarked at Ostend they received a rousing welcome from the Belgians.



BRITISH ARTILLERY IN ACTION

When the average British soldier actually gets to work he is happy. Even life in the trenches then becomes "a little bit of all right," as he expresses it.



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THE PRINCE OF WALES WITH HIS REGIMENT

The Prince has seen service abroad and many anecdotes are current illustrative of his good-humor and democratic ways



Photograph by Paul Thom;
ON THE CHAMPAGNE FRONT

These men are constructing a series of caves—called "Robinson Crusoes" in military slang.



Photograph by the International News Service

FRENCH DRAGOONS WITH CAPTIVE UHLANS

This is what happened to some of the German Uhlans, who figured so prominently in newspaper headlines during the first days of the War. They were captured by French dragoons who have seized their caps to send off as souvenirs to French wives and sweethearts. General Joffre afterwards forbade this practise by an explicit command couched in very severe terms.



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THE ADVANCE OF FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS AND RIFLEMEN

Some types of machine guns may be carried by one man. Others are carried piecemeal by two or more. In this case the second man has the gun itself on his shoulder while the third man follows with the tripod.



Copyright by Lavoy

A BIG FRENCH GUN ON THE RAILROAD AT VERDUN

The big German 42-centimetre guns seemed in the early days of the War to be irresistible and incomparable. But with the appearance of such creations as this the French artillery regained its traditional superiority.



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TWO REMARKABLE AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE FRENCH FRONT

(Above). The devastated city of Clermont, in the Argonne region. It was burned by one Germans at the Battle of the Marne. Roofless ruined walls are all that remain in the foreground. Up the road toward the top of the picture a cluster of buildings is seen which must have been just beyond the zone of fire.

(Below.) The French aviation camp near Verdun. One can plainly see the hangars with the insect-like war-planes in front of them. Behind the hangars motor trucks are parked, and behind these are tents, the living quarters of the

aviators.

did not become effective until August 5th. Moreover, there was, for a time, short or long, a question as to whether the British army should be sent to the Continent, a debate terminated by Kitchener's wise decision—which had such value—to engage the whole Expeditionary Army on the French front. Still the tardiness of the declaration of war and the momentary hesitation as to the use of the Expeditionary Army combined to prevent the Allies from realizing the greatest profit which might have accrued from British participation in the period before the Battle of the Marne.

Still another detail is of utmost importance. Sir John French, in taking his army to the Continent, received orders to cooperate with the French commander-in-chief loyally, but he was expressly enjoined not to surrender his freedom of action and to regard his first duty as that of preserving his own army, which was the sole reservoir for the future for the training and officering of the new British armies that would now have to be raised. Obedience to this order had grave consequences throughout the Marne Campaign; it led to several acute crises and it unquestionably reduced the extent of the victory at the Marne. Thus early in the war, then, the evil of a divided command-already disclosed in the Belgian case by the retirement of King Albert's force upon Antwerp, rather than upon the Allied armies—revealed itself a second time and would continue to exercise unfortunate influence right up to the moment when Ludendorff's initial success in March, 1918, at last drove the British to accept a French commander and abolished the handicap of divided counsels, themselves growing out of divergent interests.

Nor can one fail to recognize also that Sir John French proved himself a failure in his responsible position, a fact established by his ultimate recall after many unhappy events, all of which had the same general character and similarly contributed to the ruin of the larger strategic combinations in which they were an important circumstance. From the outset the British army disclosed a defective staff, which was inevitable, given the character of the British military establishment; revealed an unfamiliarity with the facts of modern war and of large

operations, wholly analogous to the American situation three years later. Like the Americans, the British concentrated their whole attention upon their own immediate field of operations and too completely ignored the larger aspects of the situation.

Yet for French's first mistakes there was justification in the circumstances in which he suddenly found himself. Concentrated about Maubeuge at the close of the third week of August, the British army moved up to Mons, which it reached on August 22nd and about which, behind the canal, it deployed in battle line, while its cavalry pushed north and fought a smart engagement with Uhlans on the field of Waterloo itself. Such information as reached the British marshal led him to the conclusion that on the next day he would encounter not more than two German corps, 80,000 strong, and he had 70,000 men in line, well posted and partially entrenched.

Under such circumstances the British began the Battle of Mons on August 23rd and throughout the day held their lines—despite certain minor retirements, all foreseen—inflicting very heavy losses upon the Germans, who undertook to throw masses against the British infantry in trenches. This was exactly what the British had done in the Boer War and the Germans suffered terribly as a consequence of British training in just this sort of fighting. All through the day the fighting was sharp, but the British losses were not heavy, and Sir John might well believe that he was repeating the achievement of Wellington at Waterloo, with infinitely less cost.

But late in the afternoon the Field Marshal suddenly received a message from Joffre announcing that, instead of being supported on either flank by French armies, as the English commander had assumed, and having only two German corps to deal with, he was in fact in the air, since the Lanzerac army was retiring on his right from the lost battle at Charleroi and the French forces on his left had not been able to cover this flank against Kluck's advance. Thus French was involved not with two but with five German corps—two in front, two reaching for his left flank, by way of Tournai and Valenciennes, and a fifth pushing between the British and the French Fifth Army.

There was left nothing for Marshal French to do but to get out as fast as he could. He acted a little slowly, as always, but with manifest skill, drawing his armies back successfully, first toward Maubeuge and then—rejecting the lure of this fortified camp, which held the peril for him that Metz had held for Bazaine in 1870—southward in the direction of St. Quentin. Once clear of Maubeuge the retreat was badly directed, the two corps became widely separated with evil consequences for Smith-Dorrien, while Haig's corps invaded the roads reserved for the retreat of Lanzerac's army. French's main consideration, however, was to save his army and, given the deadly peril of August 23rd, his success was notable.

But the real evil of the surprise of August 23rd was its effect upon the British commander. He had gone into action confident of French support on either flank; he had suddenly discovered himself in the air. To be sure Joffre had been as completely surprised by Kluck's farswinging move around Brussels and, once aroused, had set out to aid his British ally with all energy and promptitude. But French's confidence was destroyed; his original orders to save his army, in a crisis, took on a new value, and from the moment of Mons onward Sir John declines to engage again until he was assured of flanks solidly covered by French armies.

Moreover, as we shall see in a moment, if the British army succeeded in escaping from Mons and Maubeuge easily, the real crisis arrived on August 26th at Le Cateau, and the left corps, Smith-Dorrien's little force, was for hours on the edge of complete ruin. This agony, the Battle of Le Cateau, finally brought the British army to a condition in which Sir John held it incapable of immediate fighting and therefore persisted in retreating without regard to Joffre's plans, a course which ruined the French commander's conception of a new offensive on the line of the Somme.

Continued persistence in this retreat; the reports of Sir John, which disclose complete loss of confidence in French command; finally, at the critical moment the frank consideration of a plan to withdraw the British army to the coast, bring Kitchener to France at the ago-

nized request of the French Government and lead to a sharp passage between the War Minister and the Field Marshal, who insists upon his freedom of decision and upon the wisdom of his policy of retreat. But if Kitchener ultimately withdraws any semblance of orders, it is still plain that his intervention had its effect, for Sir John presently volunteers to stand at the Marne and does actually fall in with Joffre's supreme appeal made "in the name of France" a few days later, on the eve of the decisive struggle.

Nevertheless, at the Marne, at the Aisne, and at the Yser, too, French still discloses a vivid and unfortunate recollection of his first experience, revealed in suspicion, exaggerated caution, and incredible sluggishness. Whatever criticism one may direct at French, however, it is plain that he was the unintentional victim of Joffre's greatest blunder—that the British army came within an ace of destruction as a consequence of this; and, given his primary duty to his government, that of saving his army, Sir John French's course was not without explanation and even justification. In judging the man, too, it is essential to recognize that it was as a general not as a soldier that he was at fault, since he was as hard a fighter as any of his veterans and, in the end, led his Expeditionary Army not merely to terrible losses, but to something approaching annihilation.

VI. AUGUST 25TH

On August 24th, then, the first shock was at an end. In three successive days the French right centre and left had been defeated in the Battles of Metz, the Ardennes, and Charleroi. On the fourth, the British army had been forced to break off the Battle of Mons, still indecisive, and begin the long and difficult effort to escape from envelopment and capture. Thus early the French offensive had been broken, while the German initiative had just disclosed itself in its full strength between the Meuse and the Scheldt.

To the French commander-in-chief there now arrives the crisis in which a momentous decision must be made. He has to settle immediately the question of the next move. His own initial plan has gone to ruin. He is in the presence of the whole German manœuvre fully revealed. Shall he now seek to meet this manœuvre on the positions to which his beaten armies are still in the act of retiring?—or shall he break off the engagement altogether and seek, while retiring, to organize a new stroke of his own?

The answer comes on the next day in the General Order of August 25th, in the minds of Hanotaux and all other French writers—probably in the view of all military historians of the future, German included—the cornerstone of the subsequent victory of the Marne. Joffre will break off the battle, telling his lieutenants frankly that his plans have failed. His armies will now retire, covering their retreat by swift, short counterblows, while, behind this screen, the commander repairs the situation, moves corps from east to west, creates a new army in the centre to cover that of Hausen; continues to organize an army, already in construction, to the west of the British to cover their imperilled flank.

In his plan, Joffre sees three necessary details. His right—the armies of Dubail and Castelnau—must hold fast before Nancy, covering the Gap of Charmes and thus breaking the left arm of the Schlieffen embrace. His centre—the armies of Sarrail (who succeeds Ruffey) and De Langle must slowly swing back, behind the Meuse, behind the Aisne, fighting as they go. Between the armies of De Langle and Lanzerac a new army will presently operate, commanded by Foch, called from Lorraine, where he has done wonders in covering the retreat from Morhange. But until August 29th, when that army will be organized, De Langle must check Hausen as well as the Grand Duke of Würtemberg, thus preserving his connection with Lanzerac.

In the west Joffre will create another new army. It will be the Sixth, as Foch's will be called originally the Seventh and later the Ninth. Maunoury, who has just acquired distinction by a heavy blow against the German Crown Prince northwest of Metz, is despatched from Lorraine to command it and it will concentrate about Amiens. It will thus take position on the British left, which has been gravely menaced by Kluck. All told, Joffre is going to move 150,000 troops from right to left, from Lorraine to Picardy and Champagne; for the right

flank, while defending the Gap of Charmes, must in addition surrender many divisions—must serve as a strategic reserve.

Back of these details lies a major purpose. Joffre means to bring the French armies back on a front from Verdun to the Oise, behind the Aisne, resting on the Craonne Plateau, upon Laon and La Fère, covering Verdun, Rheims, Laon, and St. Quentin. West of St. Quentin, astride the Somme, he is going to place Maunoury's army, on the British left, but facing east, while the other armies of the centre face north. This accomplished, he is going to pass to the offensive again, assailing the Germans both in front and in flank, Maunoury's army performing the mission originally assigned to the British and Lanzerac in the first conception, which was broken at the Battle of Charleroi.

The order of August 25th, then, foresees a retreat, to escape from the immediate circumstances of the lost battles; a reorganization and a swift return to the offensive on the front foreshadowed, which will be, in the main, the front of four years of trench warfare, when the Marne is over. But the conception rests upon the assumption that Maunoury's army can be constituted in time in the west and that Castelnau and Dubail can hold the Gap of Charmes and break the left arm of the German envelopment. This return to the offensive will take place on or about August 28th.

Now it is essential to recognize the relation of Joffre's second plan to the German purpose. Underlying all else in Moltke's strategy was the necessity to break the French resistance in the first shock. This shock has taken place and all French armies have been beaten. But this is not enough; the dictum of Schlieffen is unconditional; unless rupture or envelopment is absolute, the whole manœuvre is a failure after the first shock. The enemy will retire, will rearrange his armies, and react. Schlieffen has written this in all discussions of his great manœuvre.

Therefore the crisis of the whole campaign arrives at the moment when, following the first shock, Joffre undertakes to do what Schlieffen foresaw the enemy commander would do, namely, retire and reorganize. Provided the French commander can do this, the whole German strategy will now collapse exactly as that of Joffre collapsed in the first phase of

this same Battle of the Frontiers. For the Germans it is now a question whether they can transform their original successes into complete and shattering victory or see their enemy escape.

VII. THE SECOND PHASE

The Second Phase of the Battle of the Frontiers lasts from August 26th to August 29th, although it was preparing, through the initiative of Joffre's subordinates, for several days before. In this phase the Germans seek to transform initial victories into absolute success, the French to escape immediate perils and react in a new offensive. The engagements which take place are, in reality, considerable battles, but can only be enumerated here.

Starting again from right to left, as the French stand, the armies of Castelnau and Dubail, Joffre's right, beginning on August 24th and engaging to the utmost from August 26th to 29th, do fulfil their whole mission. By the latter date the Germans are recoiling from their advanced positions before the Gap of Charmes, after desperate efforts and colossal losses. Assuming that Castelnau's army is out of action they have offered an open flank to him and he has seized the chance, passed to the offensive, and repaid the debt of Morhange. Moreover, since he had foreseen the check at Morhange and ordered the fortification of positions in his rear, Castelnau is able to give the Germans exactly what they gave him at Morhange. By August 28th Joffre knows that his right is secure; he has a pivot about which his centre and left will swing.

Nor are the developments in the centre less favourable. On the Othain and the Meuse the armies of Sarrail and De Langle have checked the forces of the German Crown Prince and the Grand Duke of Würtemberg—not only checked them, but administered very heavy blows, which begin to shake confidence of German officers and men alike. Thus the Battle of the Meuse confirms the events of the Battle of the Gap of Charmes. The French right and centre have not merely survived the defeats of the first shock but have demonstrated by successful counter-offensives that they are intact. Finally, a detachment of De Langle's army has held up Hausen, who is beginning to drift away from

the German right and act with the centre. Thus De Langle temporarily stops the gap in the French armies which will soon be filled by Foch. This last achievement is the Battle of Signy-l'Abbaye.

Westward, still, on August 28th, Lanzerac, primarily to save the British, has taken the offensive with four corps and on the next day thrown Bülow back, driven the Prussian Guard into the Oise, and won a brilliant success. This is the Battle of Guise, which reveals the French Fifth Army in as good form as the other four to the eastward; discloses, in truth, the capital fact that all the French armies, which staggered under the first shock, have recovered; establishes beyond question the all-essential fact that the Schlieffen strategy, the main German conception, has failed.

Nevertheless, despite all these heartening successes, Joffre will not be able to realize his larger purpose. The onrush of Kluck has been so rapid that Maunoury cannot get into action in time about Amiens. Sir John French's army, plunged in headlong retreat, has become divided and Smith-Dorrien's corps, forced on August 26th to fight at Le Cateau, contrary to Sir John's orders, has suffered terribly. Thanks to its own efforts and the support of French cavalry and territorials, Smith-Dorrien has escaped; the British have made good the line of the Oise, but on this line Sir John declines to stand. In fact, at the moment of Guise, he retires out of line leaving a wide gap between the Lanzerac army and that of Maunoury.

Joffre's manœuvre, prescribed in the order of August 25th, has in fact succeeded, in so far as it has reëstablished his armies. Even the gap left by the British retirement will be filled when the British are willing to stand. Apart from the British who, because of Joffre's initial mistake, have been exposed to terrible punishment, all his armies are intact and the recent engagements have given them a sense of superiority, have restored their morale. On August 29th it is with totally different conditions from those of four days earlier confronting him that Joffre can postpone the battle which he hoped to deliver between Amiens and Verdun. Preserving the strategy, he will merely select another field.

The Battle of the Frontiers closes on August 29th. It is deliberately broken off by Joffre, who orders a resumption of the general retreat, the limits of which he will presently prescribe as the Seine, the Aube, and the Ornain. At the same time the two armies in Lorraine will be called upon to continue to stand fast and hold the eastern gateway, that is, to break the thrust through the Gap of Charmes, which constitutes one arm of the Schlieffen "embrace."

The retreat, which follows, bringing the Germans close to Paris in ten days after the initial defeats, as contrasted with forty-two in the Franco-Prussian War, is the inescapable consequence of the strategy which risked an offensive in Lorraine and the Ardennes, without any real preparation for meeting a German thrust through Belgium—that is to say, any preparations adequate to the unmistakable possibilities. As General Le Gros caustically observes, the Germans did not risk their masses in Belgium without organizing a solid defensive on their left, between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Vosges, and "thanks to this wise precaution, the French plan, erected on the sands, crumbled like a house of cards."


VIII. GERMAN BLUNDERS

If the initial mistakes were French and were both colossal and beyond excuse, France was now to be saved by compensating German blunders. We have seen that Schlieffen had always maintained that the strategic conception which bore his name must be decisively successful in the first shock or it would lose its larger possibilities; would, in fact, fail completely. Hanotaux reports that experiments with the plan in the German manœuvres in peace time had resulted in developments differing but little from those of August, 1914.

In peace, as in war trial, the Schlieffen manœuvre had led to the decisive check of the German left, represented in 1914 by the armies seeking to pass through the Gap of Charmes. But following the peace trial Moltke had asserted, in a written comment on the operations, that the sole solution of the situation created by the failure of the left was the abandonment of operations on the right and the transfer of the

masses there operating to the left, which in 1914 would have meant withdrawing from western Belgium and concentrating in Alsace-Lorraine.

But in August, 1914, the German commander, plainly misled by the amazing succession of initial triumphs, concluded that collectively these



THE SITUATION OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES ON AUGUST 30, 1914

Between August 20th, the date of Morhange, and August 30th, Joffre had rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use

had broken the French capacity for resistance, and on this assumption acted. Thus, the Russians having been unexpectedly victorious at Gumbinnen and having thereafter swept far into East Prussia, Moltke, possibly under pressure from the Kaiser, detached three army corps from the west front for service in the east, two of which were actually sent and

the third, although recalled, could not participate in the Marne conflict. The two corps enabled Hindenburg to win his great victory of Tannenburg, but their absence was one of the factors in the loss of the western battle.

Moreover, by August 29th, when Joffre broke off the Battle of the Frontiers, the situation was changing, even in the eyes of the German High Command. The check in Lorraine, where Castelnau and Dubail had made good their hold on the Gap of Charmes, the successful counter-offensives from the Meuse to the Oise, had disclosed the fact that no French army had yet been put completely out of action. Only Kluck, after his success against Smith-Dorrien on August 26th, could believe that the original hopes were still realizable, while Kluck himself, long after the event, to be sure, asserts that he perceived at once that another battle would be necessary, and that the first shock had failed.

Under the spell of the first successes, however, Moltke, drunk with victory, disregards the advice of the sober Moltke of the peace manœuvres. He slowly modifies his plan of action in France, but he does not resort to the heroic remedy which he had prescribed, namely, a return to the Lorraine front. Further than this, disagreement and consequent lack of coöperation develop between the several German army commanders, leading to grave consequences a few days later.

Moltke continues to believe that, although the first shock has not produced the envelopment hoped for, it has won a victory sufficiently complete to insure final success in the next encounter. In this conviction he continues blindly to pursue an enemy, whose condition he holds desperate, when in fact that enemy is fully master of his own movements, is reënforcing his stricken divisions, reordering his armies, making new concentrations. Meantime, the Germans are moving away from their bases, their heavy artillery is falling behind, their ammunition is beginning to fail, their troops are visibly disclosing the effects of their terrible marches and their lack of food and sleep. If they are still sustained by the sense of victory and by the expectation of prompt entry into Paris, their morale is enfeebled and will yield to the first disillusionment.

IX. WHY IT FAILED

On August 30th, when Joffre's armies begin to carry out his orders for a further retreat, we are, in fact, on the threshold of the Battle of the Marne, which will remain the decisive battle of the World War. We are on the edge of the greatest military failure since Napoleon set out for Moscow. Moreover, all the causes of the approaching defeat are in full view and must be appreciated to understand that reverse itself. More than this, they must be exactly appraised to understand all the German failures of the future. The blind folly which drags Moltke south of the Marne will draw his successor, Falkenhayn, to persist in the terrible butchery of Verdun, after February 26th, when the chance of larger success is gone—will push Ludendorff into his fatal gamble at the Marne in July, 1918, when only obstinacy could conceal the fact that his chance, like those of Moltke and Falkenhayn, has gone glimmering.

On all three occasions the world is called upon to marvel at the meticulous and amazing German preparation. Always the German begins with unchallenged supremacy on the mechanical and material sides. He surprises his opponents alike by his weapons, his methods, and his numbers. Before the Marne, before Verdun, before the Second Marne, there is the same overpowering revelation of perfection in preparation, supreme art in calculation. Yet, as Ludendorff himself says in his memoirs, not one of all the great German efforts leads to anything decisive. Even in Russia the larger hopes are not realized on the battlefield.

What is the explanation? It is the explanation of the Marne. It is the explanation found in the events which separate the opening shock, which we have described as the first phase of the Battle of the Frontiers, from the second. In that campaign, in all campaigns, the moment arrives when it is demanded that a clear vision shall correctly appraise the situation then existing, discover how it differs from the conditions expected. At this moment in the Battle of the Frontiers Moltke seems victorious, but never was it more essential for a man, bearing such tre-

mendous responsibilities, to distinguish between the apparent and the real.

And at this crisis all German commanders convict themselves of exactly the same blunder, reveal themselves chained to their original conception. Each has willed the destruction of his opponent, each has prepared an incredibly formidable machine, which has realized the first hopes by its blows. Indeed the German comes so near to supreme success on each major occasion that the notion is propagated that, with a little more of luck, one different circumstance, he might, in fact, have triumphed. Yet, analyzing each occasion, one discovers a series of events as regular as the symptoms which mark the onset of a fully charted disease.

Kluck has a glimpse of the truth, years after the war, when he says to an interviewer, come to seek an explanation of the lost Battle of the Marne:

"The decisive element at the Marne was the sudden resurgence of the French soldier. That he would fight bravely we knew, but that, after days of retreat, after defeat, he would suddenly face about and attack, that is a thing which we have never counted with. That is a circumstance of which we had never taken any count in our war colleges. We have made a bad mistake, let us concede it, and I have not been the only one to make it. Those who came after me have made the same blunder. We have been perhaps a little bit too wise."

The truth is all there, if one expand the application to include not merely the French soldier, but Joffre, Petain, Foch. All will face about suddenly and attack, and all will attack an enemy already convinced that the battle is won. And as one passes now from the Battle of the Frontiers to that of the Marne, it is essential to perceive that all Germany—Kaiser, Moltke, generals, soldiers, civilians—are on August 25th, when Joffre takes firm hold of the facts, convinced the battle is won. Colonel Feyler, an eminent Swiss military critic, analyzes the whole phenomenon admirably. Stegmann, a German critic, confesses—"We were all drunk with the first victories." Only this faith could explain the bulletins—official, semi-official, and inspired—which flowed from Berlin in that hour. The merest hesitation or doubt, the smallest question of the extent of victory, would have imposed a degree of moderation.

Nothing but absolute and limitless success in the following weeks could fail to produce depression in Germany, given the promises of the statements of the last half of August.

But of moderation there was not the slightest. In fact, as Tirpitz angrily remarks in his diary, the exultation continued after the Battle of the Marne was lost, and the German people, still ignorant of the truth, which their generals did not dare acknowledge, were madly rejoicing at the moment when German conditions on the western front were little short of desperate.

In point of fact, the Schlieffen manœuvre failed in the Battle of the Frontiers because the conception was out of proportion to the resources of Germany. Its conception was based upon an estimate of France, of Belgium, of Britain, totally erroneous. It might have succeeded against Bazaine but the manœuvre of the elder Moltke before Metz would quite as certainly have collapsed before Joffre, Petain, or Foch, before Gouraud, Mangin, or Castelnau. When the Schlieffen manœuvre had failed in the Battle of the Frontiers, Moltke was so blind to the fact that he consented to send away three army corps, losing the advantage of numbers obtained by his secretly expanded mobilization and, when his eyes began to be opened, very tardily, he lacked the courage to follow his own advice and retire from a lost battle, as Joffre had retired from his opening defeat.

Ludendorff would do the same thing after July 18, 1918, and this obstinacy would lead to eventual ruin. Falkenhayn would display the same obstinacy before Verdun and the result would be the sterile sacrifice of much of the best human material of Germany at a moment of real danger, only averted by the collapse of Russia in the following campaign. In all three instances the German High Command would be the victim of its own delusion of invincibility. Following the Marne, Falkenhayn would risk ruin to avoid a confession of defeat, inevitable if the retreat continued. After the Second Marne, Ludendorff would run the same risks, this time, too, receiving the punishment Falkenhayn just escaped.

But it is imperative to understand this underlying truth about

German High Command, about the German military mind, as the first circumstance in understanding the Battle of the Marne.

Had Moltke faced the fact any time before September 4th, he could have checked his advance; extended his line to the coast, taking Calais and Boulogne, controlling the Paris-Calais railway and the Nancy-Paris line, which were the life lines of French armies in the east and north; made good his possession of northern France, with the control of the Channel ports, practically prohibiting the reinforcement and supplying of British armies in France, establishing positions close to Paris from which a later advance might have been conducted.

In all human probability this strategy would have won the war, although the "Six-weeks-to-Paris" time-table would have been scrapped. But this was the maximum of possibility, of reasonable possibility, after Joffre's army, as Schlieffen had feared, had successfully escaped the destruction of the first shock. It required nothing like the sacrifice demanded of Joffre, when, on August 25th and again on August 29th, he ordered the terrible retreats which gave over so much of France to the enemy. But it did call for the same clairvoyance. And what was demanded of Moltke in the first days of September was required of Ludendorff in July, four years later. To this test both succumbed.

If one insists upon these circumstances, now, it is because the whole history of the war is disclosed in the First Marne Campaign. The more one studies the German machine, the more it compels admiration. To travel behind the German line soon after the Armistice was to acquire new respect for the marvellous gift of organization, of foresight. The concrete emplacements, the dugouts, the system which was the Hindenburg Line, all the large factors and all of the most minute, revealed the same gift for taking thought. The shoes the German soldiers wore, the weapons they carried, the food with which they were provided, the colour of their uniforms, every detail revealed a capacity for thinking out unrivalled elsewhere.

Yet the more one analyzes the actual use made by the Germans of their machine, the achievements of the several commanders, the more one is overpowered by the completeness of the failure. "An express locomotive in the hands of a bus driver," Foch somewhere says. But the thing goes deeper; never at any moment does the German High Command, or for that matter any general big or little, have in time the smallest inkling of the mind of the man opposing him. Kluck's assertion is at once confession and condemnation, not merely of himself but, as he grimly notes, of those who came after him and repeated his blunders. Small wonder, the battle over, the German denied the reality of any conflict at the Marne, for, in truth, the whole explanation of his later defeats, the causes which would lose him the struggle, were therein disclosed unmistakably. And the battle itself is no longer a mystery or a miracle when the German fact is duly appraised in advance.

X. "ATROCITIES"

There remains a single other circumstance, most shameful of all incidents of the war, which serves to shed light upon the German mind. From the moment the first German detachments crossed the Belgian and French frontiers to that hour when Kluck turned back from the Ourcq, German operations were accompanied by a series of organized murders, devastations, deeds of terrorism, unequalled in the history of any campaign from the period of the French Revolution onward.

The subject of German atrocities has been studied with utmost care during and since the war. About it has raged a controversy which may never be ended. Yet the truth is not to be concealed. In their preparations for war the German General Staff had envisaged a method of dealing with the populations of invaded nations which was designed to strike terror to these populations, produce confusion and panic in the front of its own advancing hosts, and shake the resolution of the nations with whom they were at war.

There was in this nothing of the excesses which have in all times marked the progress of victorious armies, of the sack and slaughter accompanying the capture of besieged cities. It did not represent the deeds done in hot blood by soldiers escaping from discipline. No; the German atrocities were the product of a deliberate, cold, passionless estimate of the results which were to be attained by the use of terror as

a policy. Moreover, and the fact is capital, when the German offensive was broken at the Marne, the policy was abandoned. Harsh, cruel, brutal the Germans were consistently thereafter, but the methods which preceded the Marne were not again employed. They were thus disclosed to have been a detail in the German effort to seek swift decision, and, in seeking this decision, to use every means available, however inhuman, however base, relying upon the conviction that victory, assured in the German mind, would sweep away all consequences of the crimes.

From the moment when Belgium was invaded, then, there began the application of this policy of terror. Wherever German troops met with the enemy and were engaged, the villages, towns, human habitations in the vicinity were fired and razed. Civil populations were slaughtered without the smallest provocation. Mayors, local officials, men of prominence were sent before firing squads and interred in ditches. Women and children were abused. Exactly the same tactics were disclosed in French Lorraine and in Belgium. Again and again the same pretext covered the operations. Invariably French and Belgian populations were accused of having fired upon German soldiers, and this pretext, as false in the vast majority of instances as the allegation that French airplanes had bombed Nuremberg before the declaration of war, was relied upon to meet criticisms coming from neutral nations, and inquiries belatedly arriving from Germany, when the public sentiment of the civilized world was at last aroused to the facts.

In Belgium the devastation and killing took on vast proportions before the Germans had even passed the Meuse. Visé was the first town to suffer; its fate was due to the fact that regular Belgian forces had destroyed the bridges across the Meuse and temporarily checked the German advance. Aerschot, Dinant, a score of other cities and towns were similarly treated. Finally, on August 25th, following the sortie of the Belgian troops from Antwerp and hard upon the heels of the exchange of shots between two excited German battalions, there took place the ever-memorable destruction of Louvain.

In magnitude alone this crime surpassed all previous German achievements in slaughter and destruction directed against a civil

population. For some hours German troops destroyed and murdered at the command of their officers. Women and children shared with the peaceful male civilians the consequences of ordered assault. Much of the city was destroyed by flame and dynamite. Scores of civilians were murdered; scenes recalling the fury of the sack of a city in the Middle Ages were enacted.

Louvain was, however, only the far-shining example of the German method. The same thing happened in Gerbéviller, in Sermaize, in a score of French towns many miles removed from Belgium. Collectively, these shocking crimes represented the German conviction that the methods which were thus used would not alone send the civil populations fleeing before the invaders, spreading confusion and terror in the ranks of enemy armies, but would contribute to destroying the will of the nation itself to face the German foe. They expressed a deliberate and terrible effort to break the will, to conquer the spirit of the foe, to produce a collapse behind the lines in advance of battle.

Only a mind incapable of the smallest accurate estimate of the soul and of the intellect of the opposing nations could have been guilty of such a preposterous blunder. Decades before, the Chinese had sought victory over their first European foes by placing in front of their own lines imitation dragons, by uttering wild cries, and provoking an infernal din. But this terrible fracas had failed to shake the aim of the riflemen and gunners who faced them, and the first volleys had disposed of the childish devices.

To imagine that French, British, or even Belgian soldiers could be conquered by a campaign of terror was to imagine a vain thing. Actually, the atrocities which preceded the Marne contributed much to increasing the energy and determination of the French soldiers, who won the conflict. Horror there was in France at a sudden eruption of ancient barbarism into the peaceful villages and towns of the border departments. But the horror only added to the determination to conquer; it strengthened, it did not unnerve.

Moreover, such a method could alone be employed by an army certain of victory, for defeat would mean a punishment beyond the limits of any previous national experience. The mere fact that the German risked the use of such tactics discloses the supreme confidence with which he rushed down into France in August, 1914. The Marne lost, he abandoned the methods, but the evil consequences of the brief employment followed him throughout the war and after the war. Reprisal was swift and terrible. World condemnation carried with it a moral as well as a military isolation of Germany which explained the events which followed the Armistice and the spirit which was written into the Treaty of Versailles.

The very worst things done by the enemies of Germany during the war found adequate warrant in the circumstances of the first weeks of the conflict. The hunger blockade, which gripped the nation and brought agony and death to the helpless, found justification in the fact that it was a reprisal, provoked by crimes which could not be defended and had shocked the conscience of mankind. The gas attack of Ypres in 1915, the unrestrained submarine operations of a later time, might find some defense as the acts of a nation fighting for existence and encircled by deadly enemies, but for the Belgian and French atrocities of August and September, 1914, no such palliation could be found.

It was this campaign of terror that gave to the war the character which it thereafter maintained to the end. Peace without victory with an enemy guilty of such crimes was, in reality, impossible, despite the various futile attempts. Between the German and the world at war with him a gulf opened, totally unlike that separating nations in other wars. After the war had ended he suddenly discovered the extent of the gulf. While he stood in arms, unbeaten, the German seemed the personification of all the violence of the barbarians of old; when at last his sword was dashed from his hand his methods had lost for him the pity which belongs to the vanquished foe who has fought bravely and cleanly.

The resurrection of France at the Marne was, in part at least, the direct consequence of the German campaign of violence against the civil populations of the invaded district. The character of the war after the Marne campaign was equally the inevitable consequence of the

German acts. The condition in which Germany found herself at the end of the war and the world-wide silence in the face of miseries which must otherwise have aroused sympathy among neutrals and pity even from belligerents must be traced to deeds of terror of which Louvain will remain an undying symbol—deeds which thenceforth earned for the Germans throughout the enemy world the appellations of Hun and Boche.

Laying aside all moral considerations, the resort by Germans to the methods of Attila and Ghenghis Khan was one of the supreme blunders of history. In truth, even victory could not have availed to abolish the evil consequences, while defeat left the German not only defenseless but, for a time at least, beyond the pale. But what it is essential to perceive at this moment is that the war received its distinctive and dreadful character in the opening days, the character which was to make it more awful as it was at once more tremendous, than any other struggle in all human history.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

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THE GENESIS OF THE COMBAT

Like Gettysburg, in our own Civil War, the Battle of the Marne was precipitated by a wholly accidental collision. The battle was expected by both commanders, but from the outset it took directions unforeseen by either. On September 4th all the French armies are retiring in a semicircle resting on Paris in the west and Verdun in the east, save for the two eastern forces which continue always covering the Gap of Charmes. On the same day all the German armies west of Metz are beginning to dip down into this semicircle. As Hanotaux emphasizes, they are no longer pursuing Joffre, as they imagine, but following him toward a battle, which he has planned.

But on this same day Galliéni perceives that Kluck has done the precise thing which for two days Paris observers have suspected: he has marched by Paris and taken the mass of his troops south of the Marne. As a result of this "swerve" if Maunoury's Sixth Army is now thrust east out of Paris, it can threaten the flank and rear of Kluck and thus of the whole German line from Paris to Verdun. Actually, then, the Germans are now entering a position such as they sought to create for the French; they are open to a double envelopment, a reverse Schlieffen movement, coming from Paris and from Verdun.

Joffre is still preparing his battle for September 8th, behind the Seine, with a thrust east from Paris between the Seine and the Marne, when Galliéni begins to telephone him of the new situation and to urge an immediate attack to profit by Kluck's blunder. Joffre is not at once convinced; it takes three conversations, separated by the time necessary to visit Sir John French and obtain his agreement to participate; not an easy thing to get, as the circumstances indicate.

But late in the afternoon Joffre gets back to his new headquarters at Châtillon-Sur-Seine; he has just been forced to quit Vitry-le-François by the approach of the enemy. He has obtained the consent of French; he has manœuvred his foes into a position in which their flanks are threatened; he has concentrated superior numbers at the point of danger, the western and now the Paris flank, where Moltke surprised him at Charleroi. Therefore, at sunset, he announces to his staff, still debating the problem—"Well, gentlemen, we will fight at the Marne!"


The controversy between the partisans of Joffre and of Galliéni over the respective shares of the two soldiers in the victory need not detain us here. On the German side there will be a similar dispute as to who deserves the most blame. It is enough to recognize that France was fortunate at this crisis in having a great soldier in Paris as well as at General Headquarters. As General Mangin writes later, the glory of Joffre is not lessened by just praise due to Galliéni? That Galliéni was a great man is undeniable. His career had been brilliant from the moment when he fought at Bazeilles, in the Franco-Prussian War, defending the house of "Les dernières cartouches"—an incident immortalized by a painting known to most Frenchmen and Germans alike.

In West Africa he had been the successor of Faidherbe in the tradition of French colonial effort. He had conquered and pacified Madagascar. A Corsican, with more than a little of the Napoleonic "touch," he was called to the capital in the supreme crisis, when Joffre at last consented to defend Paris. If Paris was to be defended, of all men Galliéni was the fittest for the task; and—thanks to the pressure of a new cabinet, called into being on the morrow of the opening disasters and representing all French political groups, representing the "sacred union" of Frenchmen in defense of the country—Paris would be defended.

Arriving in Paris Galliéni found everything to be done. His first encounter with the new Minister of War, Millerand, was decisive: two strong men met and agreed to hold Paris at all costs, even to the ruin of the city. Clemenceau expressed the same decision nearly four years later in the immortal declaration:

"I will fight before Paris, in Paris, behind Paris!"

Out of the conference there emerges Galliéni's first pledge to the people of Paris: the promise to defend the city to "the last ditch,"



THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE MARNE

I-Kluck
II-Hausen
IV-Würtemberg
VI-The Bavarians

placarded on the walls of the city and remaining there for four long years. Then the government, following the example of 1870, went south, to Bordeaux. Paris was left alone—defenseless, so far as its antiquated forts were concerned—to be saved, if at all, by the scattered oddments of troops which were now coming to Galliéni's hands from the units that

had been in action west of the main battles and the few regular formations belonging to Maunoury's army, which had reached the Somme too late.

But Galliéni has something close to genius—never was the right man more conspicuously in the right place—and he will imbue these oddments with his spirit. He will create an army out of fragments, and Maunoury, whom Joffre has assigned to command this army, is a man, too. Meantime, Galliéni watches Joffre with anxiety and open disapproval, he says; and many eminent French soldiers, Bonnal among them, later confirm his opinion that if Joffre goes behind the Seine he will never recross the stream.

In the midst of all this terrific energy and desperate labour Galliéni also observes Kluck, marks the great turn southward, sees its full bearing, and succeeds in imparting his vision to Joffre, to Sir John French, to everyone about him. All this would have been useless if Joffre had not saved his army, preserved its power to strike back; but since Joffre has done all of this, Galliéni's proposal supplements Joffre's general strategy perfectly. As a result of Galliéni's intervention the battle will be delivered at the Marne and not the Seine, on September 6th instead of September 8th. The decisive blow will be north of the Marne instead of south, as Joffre had planned, but for the rest the two conceptions nowhere clash.

In the night of September 4th Joffre's orders issue. They prescribe flank attacks: by the British and Maunoury striking eastward from the Paris area; by Sarrail striking westward from the Verdun and Meuse forts. To these flank attacks will be joined frontal assaults by the armies of D'Esperey (who succeeds Lanzerac), of Foch, and of De Langle. Joffre is going to attack everywhere and with all the force that is left him, "without limit to conquer victory" is his own statement to his government.

In addition to the orders to his generals, Joffre also issues his appeal to his soldiers, the appeal which will live as long as the memory of the deeds it inspired:

"At the moment of beginning that battle on which depends the safety of the country everyone must remember that the time for looking backward has passed

"Every effort must be exerted to attack and push back the enemy.

"Troops which cannot advance farther must hold the ground gained whatever the cost, and die rather than retreat.

"In the present crisis no weakness can be tolerated."

More than a million French soldiers, still preserving hope and faith in France, despite the opening defeats and the subsequent retreats, will hear this order in the hours which just precede the opening of the conflict; and their response will be the "miracle of the Marne."

To the Government at Bordeaux, watching from afar and with grave anxiety, Joffre's last word is:

"The conflict which is just about to begin can have results which will be decisive, but in case of defeat the consequences for the country may be most serious. I have decided to engage my troops to the utmost."

At the supreme hour, the faith of the general is inexpugnable—he sees all, but the worst that may arrive cannot shake him—he has done his best. The duty now passes to his generals, to his soldiers, but the serenity of the Commander-in-Chief will be transmitted to the least of his subordinates. All France speaks through Joffre.

II. KLUCK'S MANŒUVRE

It remains now to examine the sequence of events on the German side: what was the explanation of the circumstances which led to the change of direction by Kluck, to the march past the eastern edge of the fortified area of Paris, to the presentation of an open flank to the enemy?—which was the major circumstance in all that followed, as it was the immediate occasion of the Battle of the Marne.

After seven years, confusion remains as to the whole story. Moltke died and left behind him no formal statement of the circumstances leading to his defeat and retirement, which certainly caused his premature death. Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen quarrelled and wrote books setting forth their conflicting versions of the circumstances, each attaching to the others' course the responsibility for defeat. The controversy has grown and extended beyond the limits of the immediate actors until it divides the German military world, but still there is no satis-

factory narrative of the decisive days that permits clear judgment. Like Waterloo on the French side, the Marne on the German promises to be an eternal conflict, with Kluck playing something of the part of Grouchy.

Yet certain facts there are set forth in Kluck's own account which suffice for the purposes of a general view of the situation. His army was concentrated about Aix-la-Chapelle; it began its advance about August 13th, the date when French mobilization and concentration became complete. On August 17th, the day when the great forward drive through Belgium was to begin, Kluck's army was passed under the command of Bülow, who thus became the directing force in the two armies which constituted the marching flank, the western arm of the Schlieffen operation.


Kluck, as we have seen, was in Brussels on August 20th. Two days later, Bülow, engaged at Charleroi, orders Kluck to move in and support the Second Army, an order which draws forth violent criticism from Kluck, whose view it was, at the time and after, that the German operation should have extended to the westward, to the coast. August 23rd sees the Battle of Mons, the first shock for Kluck, August 26th the Battle of Le Cateau, called Cambrai in contemporary reports, in which Smith-Dorrien is nearly destroyed. On August 27th the Kaiser congratulates Kluck on his two victories, Mons and Le Cateau; obviously Kaiser and High Command alike believe that the British have been eliminated.

But now we are drawing close to the decisive moment. On this same day, August 27th, in the afternoon, Kluck receives orders from Moltke; his army is to march on the lower Seine, which it will strike west of Paris, between Paris and Rouen; Bülow's army is to march on Paris itself. But, and the condition is all-important, if the enemy resistance on the Oise and later on at the Marne develops sufficiently, the two commanders may incline to the southeast; that is, strike east of the Oise. Meantime, a change in the relations of the two army commanders has arrived. On August 26th, the day of Le Cateau, Kluck regains his freedom, his subordination to Bülow ends.

As late as August 27th, in the afternoon, then, the German High Command still contemplates an attack upon Paris, while its great enveloping movement is to extend west of the French capital, but already it considers the possibility of restricting the extension to the east side of Paris. Now, on August 29th, Lanzerac attacks Bülow at Guise. The battle which follows is desperately contested, but ends, as we have seen, after unmistakable French successes, locally, in further French retreat.

This Battle of Guise seems to Bülow a complete triumph. In the afternoon of August 30th, he informs Kluck by wireless that the enemy has been decisively defeated and is retiring in disorder. An hour later he urgently requests Kluck to make the change in direction, foreseen in the instructions of August 27th, and moving eastward, assist in the exploitation of Bülow's great victory.

Kluck complies, announcing to Moltke on the evening of August 30th, by wireless, that the First Army has changed its direction, that it will march by Compiègne and Noyon to exploit the success of the Second Army. August 30th, in the evening, then, the famous Kluck manœuvre



KLUCK'S CIRCLE

About Sept. 1st, at Senlis, Kluck began to move eastward away from Paris. On Sept. 5th the van of his army was south of the Marne beyond Coulommiers. At that time his rear and flank guard just north of Meaux was attacked by Maunoury coming from Paris. Kluck then drew back the mass of his troops in a complete circle north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq. On Sept. 9th, following the reverse of Hausen, he began his retreat upon Soissons

begins, but on the invitation of Bülow. The next day Moltke informs Kluck that this change conforms to the wishes of the High Command. By this time one flank of the First Army is on the lower Aisne, the other on the Oise about Noyon.

Kluck is now essaying a final effort to dispose of the British, but, as we have seen, the British have already escaped him and are retiring behind the Marne. On September 2nd, Moltke informs Kluck that the general purpose of the German strategy, now, is to drive the French southeastward, interposing between them and Paris. In this message appears the formal statement that the First Army is to follow the Second, to cover its flank, the western flank of all the German armies.

But at this point Kluck openly revolts. His army is a day's march ahead of Bülow's. As to the presence of any French troops in Paris, or to the possibility of such a force attacking from Paris, German High Command obviously does not yet consider the one nor the other hypothesis. Wherefore Kluck asserts that it must be for the First and not the Second Army to deliver the decisive blow. To take position en échelon behind the Second Army as Moltke directs is to halt for two days, to lose all the profit of the headlong pursuit from Mons, and give the enemy time to get his breath. To attack Paris with the enemy armies in being—utter folly.

September 5th, the day when the French army receives Joffre's order to attack on the next morning, Kluck, still without news from Moltke and still convinced that the enemy is retreating south of the Marne in utter disorder, leaves his Fourth Reserve Corps in front of Paris, on the heights above the Ourcq, and orders the rest of his army to push south of the Marne. But during the morning there arrives the formal order of Moltke; the First and Second armies will remain facing the eastern side of Paris, Kluck's between Oise and the Marne, Bülow's between the Marne and the Seine, their point of junction at Château-Thierry on the Marne, a town which will presently earn undying fame in an America still neutral. At this moment Kluck's headquarters are at La Ferté-Milon, north of the Marne and in the Ourcq Valley, but his advance guards have reached the Petit Morin, are approaching the Seine toward Provins.

Again Kluck balks, despatches to Moltke a new protest, sent at ten o'clock in the morning, two hours before Maunoury's troops, already flowing eastward toward the Ourcq, encounter Kluck's Fourth Reserve Corps above Meaux; Kluck accompanies this protest with the final declaration of insubordination: "I propose to pursue the enemy up to the Seine and only after that to begin the investment of Paris." All day, then, the mass of the First Army continues southward, marching toward the armies of D'Esperey and Sir John French, which have already halted, are turning round and returning to meet the enemy.

Kluck's purpose is manifest; he is acting still, with the Schlieffen operation in mind. He still seeks "a super-Cannæ," says Henri Carré, reviewing Kluck's Apologia. Kluck is convinced, Hanotaux insists upon the point, that there is before him and between Paris and the flank of D'Esperey a gap; that the British are out of action, and that in this gap he will find the exposed flank of D'Esperey and roll it up, eastward, away from Paris. Then Bülow and Hausen can complete the work

Up to this moment Kluck believed, no report to the contrary having reached him, that all German armies were as successfully advancing as was his. No information had come to him from Moltke leading him to have any suspicion that Joffre had concentrated an army in Paris. No suspicion of this seems to have been awakened in Luxemburg, where Moltke followed events, followed them with difficulty, for it seems beyond question that communication between Headquarters and the German First Army was practically non-existent in the decisive hour of the campaign.

It is not until the afternoon of September 5th, then, with the Battle of the Marne actually beginning, that Kluck's eyes are opened. But the evil tidings, when they come, rush in upon him like a tidal wave. From Gronau, commanding the Fourth Reserve Corps, he learns that a French army has come out of Paris and attacked on the heights west of the Ourcq. From Moltke he learns that Joffre has transported masses from east to west, from Alsace and Lorraine to the environs of Paris. From a staff officer, sent by Moltke, he learns that the German operations in Lorraine have resulted in defeat after victory, that the Crown

Prince of Bavaria and General von Heeringen are held up definitively before the eastern barrier, on the German side of the Gap of Charmes. Finally, Bülow, naturally irritated and alarmed at the sudden rush of Kluck southward, in utter disregard of the whole strategic conception, sends sharp messages also reporting the irruption from Paris.

Kluck has disobeyed orders, he has disregarded Moltke's instructions, he has rushed past Paris toward the Seine, seeking the gap between Paris and the French armies and thus exposing his flank to any Allied armies in Paris. His defense, that Moltke had failed to keep him informed of the general situation, does not much improve his case, although it certainly reveals a state of confusion and lack of coördination in German Headquarters hardly to be believed otherwise. His manœuvre has been detected promptly by Galliéni, who has taken the necessary steps to prepare an answer, to profit by the blunder. But Kluck has been led into the blunder by the failure of Moltke to keep him informed—by the failure of the German Intelligence service, which only on September 4th begins to suspect the presence of Maunoury's army in Paris although Kluck encountered its first elements on the Somme a week earlier, and not until the next day, when it is much too late, reports the transfer of French corps from east to west, which had begun on September 2nd.

"Kluck's army wanted the victory for themselves and hadn't sufficiently considered the whole," Tirpitz reports from German Headquarters a few days later. Kluck, himself, was promptly passed under Bülow's orders and at no distant time retired, further proof of the initial view of the German military world as to the responsibility of the commander of the First Army for the defeat. Yet Kluck found defenders, Falkenhayn among them, and even Tirpitz subsequently reports: "We had everything in our hands once, but evidently Moltke was wrongly advised"; and ten days after the Marne adds: "Owing to collapse here (G. H. Q.) the frightful sacrifices have been in vain." The next day he adds: "The French are splendidly led, which is unfortunately not the case with us. Physically, Moltke is a wreck." And, finally, "the reins are trailing on the ground."

In sum, the famous change of direction by Kluck was in itself fore-seen under certain circumstances by Moltke; undertaken by Kluck, on the request of Bülow, who manifestly misunderstood the nature of the Battle of Guise, which in itself produced the change of direction. It was undertaken to exploit Bülow's victory—the extent of which was exaggerated by Bülow—and was subsequently approved by Moltke. But on August 31st and the succeeding days, Kluck, instead of conforming to the orders received or of coördinating his advance with Bülow's, quickens his pace. The fact that he had been freed from Bülow's command at this critical hour and congratulated by the Kaiser for his successes at Mons and Le Cateau, obviously, as Commandant Carré insists, stimulated his zeal. It was as the Blücher of the new war that Kluck saw himself.

It is not until the night of September 2nd-3rd that G.H.Q. sends Kluck general instructions, and at hat moment his situation is far different from what Moltke conceives. Kluck is already so far forward that to conform to orders means to halt and let the enemy, terribly pursued since Mons, regain his breath. It is not until September 5th, in the morning, that Kluck is ordered formally to take position between the Marne and the Oise and by this time all but one of his corps are south of the Marne and pushing toward the Seine. To obey now is not merely to halt, but to retreat, to march away from the enemy, still believed to be in extremis, but capable of swift recovery—if ignored. Accordingly, it is not until Maunoury attacks and Kluck learns of the actual situation on his front and flank and elsewhere on the whole front, that he at last submits to orders, which have become emphasized by enemy action.

Whatever may be said of Kluck's insubordination, then, and it was a decisive element in the campaign, it is not less clear that at the moment when the Germans are going into the battle for which they have been preparing for more than forty years, their High Command has broken down; not only are separate army commanders quarrelling, but at least one is operating in absolute contradiction of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. German Headquarters is only just aware of the fact, as contrasted with the assumption, with respect of the Allied condition.

German armies themselves are well-nigh exhausted by the rapidity of a pursuit, which has drawn them into a strategically faulty situation at the precise moment when they believe that their enemy is finally collapsing.

And, in sum, two different strategical conceptions operate in German quarters. Moltke plans an attack upon Paris by Kluck between the Oise and Marne by at least a portion of Bülow's army between the Marne and the Seine. At the same time Hausen is to break the Allied centre, Bülow's left assisting, Wurtemburg's right also extending a hand—the rupture to take place on Foch's front. After the event Kluck writes and talks very scornfully of this insistence that he assail Paris.

But in this Moltke conception Hausen should be in advance of Bülow and Bülow a day ahead of Kluck, whereas in fact exactly the reverse order exists. Moreover, so far from assaulting Paris, all of Kluck's forces are marching away from it. Moltke is seeking to pierce the French centre east of the Plateau of Sézanne and roll up the right and centre upon Switzerland. By contrast Kluck is trying to interpose between the French left and Paris. Neglecting Paris for the time being, he aims to roll up the French left upon Hausen and Bülow, while the Lorraine armies, which he believes ever victorious, roll the right back upon the centre, achieving Cannæ.

The resulting confusion is obvious: Kluck should be last and he is first; Hausen first, and he is last. The opening German blow should be delivered west of Fère Champenoise, and Kluck is just on the point of launching it west of Esternay when Joffre strikes his blow north of Meaux. Thus in Hanotaux's vivid phrase—while the Germans are trying to run two hares at once, Joffre is going to kill two birds with one stone.

III. THE MOMENT OF THE MARNE

And at the final moment before the battle, that is at noon on September 5th, what is the situation? Between Paris and Verdun the French armies, together with that of Sir John French, six in all, are manœuvring on a semicircular front. At the same moment, too, French and British troops alike are far from feeling themselves beaten. On the contrary, after Guise, after the combats on the Meuse and the Aisne, all French

GLIMPSES OF THE SQUADRONS OF THE AIR



AMERICANS WHO FLEW FOR FRANCE

This picture shows some of the members of the Escadrille Lafayette, an organization made up of American aviators. From left to right: Lieutenant de Laage de Mieux (the French instructor), Johnson, Rumsey, McConnell, Thaw, Lufbery, Rockwell, Masson, Prince, and Hall. Within a short time after this photograph was taken, McConnell, Rockwell, and Prince, had been killed in action.




THE DREADNOUGHT OF THE AIR

The huge Brequet air cruiser, used for bombardment purposes and carrying machine guns as well as racks for launching bombs.



THE BATTLE CRUISER OF THE AIR

The new model Nieuport fighting machine mounts at great speed, rising to 7,000 feet in six minutes, and flies as high as 20,000 feet. The machine gun is mounted on the hood and shoots through the rapidly revolving propeller.



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
THE WAR IN THE AIR

This giant Zeppelin was brought down in the suburbs of London by anti-aircraft guns. The envelope burned up but the gondola was barely scorched. The whole incident afforded the British an excellent opportunity for studying the secrets of German Zeppelin construction. The upper picture shows a German dirigible intact.





WOMEN VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FRENCH AËRIAL SERVICE



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This picture reminds one of the photographs of the crater-pitted face of the moon. But in reality it is an aviator's photograph of a modern battlefield. The numerous spots are the craters made by shell-explosions. The heavy lines drawn with mathematical precision are fortifications; and the lighter lines, more or less wavering, are the trenches.



A PAIR OF ABLE-BODIED ZOUAVES FROM THE GOLD COAST OF AFRICA

Decent Europeans at the front were often hard put to it, to explain the horrors of war to half-civilized men like these, who were familiar with such scenes among savage men and beasts in the African jungles. But as missionaries had assured them that such behaviour was abhorred by civilized men, they were much puzzled by the "frightfulness" rampant in France and Belgium.



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TURCOS

In this war of many nations, men and costumes of all sorts were to be met with. This picture shows a group of French Turcos from Algeria, solicitous as to the manner of preparation of their midday coffee.




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CANADIAN TROOPS

A large proportion of the sparse population of Canada crossed the sea to fight for the mother country. With them went many Americans. After a period of training in England the Canadians and the Americans stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches in France.





A TRUE WORLD WAR

From all quarters of the globe men come together to resist aggression by the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg. Never before in the history of the world—not even in the Crusades—were men of such diverse and wide-scattered races banded together in a common cause. Here are Cossacks from Russia, Sikhs from India, and English Colonials from New South Wales.



A SENEGALESE INFANTRYMAN

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ANNAMESE SOLDIERS



MEN OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Few realize that there were troops of Mongolian race on the battlegrounds of Europe. The Japanese have taken a hand only upon the sea and at Kiao Chau. But here (upper picture) is a column of soldiery from French Cochin-China marching to their camp near Versailles. The lower picture shows a French Senegalese battalion going forward into action in the great Somme offensive.


armies have a consciousness of victories won and fields abandoned after success. The retreat has puzzled, angered them—the order to face about and attack corresponds to their own conceptions. This circumstance, disclosed in all the records of the time of all the armies, is enormously significant—explains what Kluck calls the decisive, the imponderable factor, the resurrection of the beaten armies, beaten only in German estimates—conscious themselves of the capacity to conquer.

As yet none of the armies is in its appointed position, but all are hastening to obey Joffre's order, issued the night before, which ended the retreat. These armies, from west to east, are commanded by: Maunoury, Sir John French, D'Esperey, Foch, De Langle, and Sarrail. Farther east, Castelnau, now as always, watches the Gap of Charmes in close coöperation with Dubail.

In the same order, the armies stand about as follows: Maunoury's is coming out of the fortified area of Paris moving due east into the angle between the Ourcq and the Marne. Sir John French's army is getting into line to move northeastward, away from the Paris area in the angle between the Marne and the Seine. D'Esperey's force is moving northwestward, toward Montmirail. Foch's newly organized command is on either side of the Marshes of St. Gond, trying to retrace its steps and get hold of the northern exits of the marsh before the Germans arrive. It faces north and its right flank stretches eastward to Fère-Champenoise in the plain, which will give its name to this phase of the battle. Still to the eastward, De Langle's army is in line behind the Saulx, covering Vitry-le-François while Sarrail's army faces west and stretches from Revigny to Verdun, covering Bar-le-Duc and the Heights of the Meuse.

All told, in the six armies Joffre has at least 800,000 men and will muster fully 850,000 when reinforcements, still on the road, arrive. In a word, he has now 150,000 more troops west of Verdun than he had when the Battle of the Frontiers opened, and he will have 200,000 before the battle reaches the decisive stage. He has achieved this result by moving troops from Lorraine and Alsace to Champagne and Ile-de-France and through the arrival of an additional 50,000 British.

Now, against this Allied mass the Germans are throwing five armies, whose aggregate strength does not much pass 750,000. Two weeks ago, at the first shock, the Germans used 1,000,000 between Metzand Brussels between the Moselle and the Scheldt. But in these two weeks they have been compelled to detach two corps to East Prussia, two to watch the Belgians; a fifth is besieging Maubeuge, which is only now about to fall; a division is held up at Givet; and yet another corps, marked for East Prussia, is still out of line and will not engage. In point of fact, the




BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPTEMBER 5TH

A-Maunoury D-Foch B-British E-De Langle de Cary II-Bülow C-Franchet d'Esperey F-Sarrail III-Hausen IV-Würtemberg V-Crown Prince


Note—The small black and white square above Meaux represents the Fourth Reserve Corps left by Kluck to cover his flank

German numbers are further reduced by the terrible losses of the recent battles, for while Joffre has been able to fill gaps, Moltke has been less fortunate, by reason of the swift advance of his armies. Between Paris and Verdun, then, Joffre will have during the Battle of the Marne an advantage of numbers amounting to 100,000 at the least. This advantage, as we shall see, is at the decisive point, too. Here, finally, then, one sees the fruit of all the manœuvre of the French commander from August 25th to September 5th.



BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPTEMBER 8TH

Armies distinguished by same symbols as on previous map. The small square north of the British represents the cavalry corps



BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPTEMBER 9TH

Armies distinguished as above. The arrow shows attack by Foch's Forty-second Division which won the Battle of La Fère-Champenoise

Of the five German armies, Kluck's—save for a flank guard facing Maunoury—is in the angle of the Seine and Marne, about Coulommiers and Esternay, heading generally for Provins, looking for the "open" flank of the D'Esperey army. Bülow's troops are south of the Marne, below Château-Thierry, moving toward Sézanne and the Marshes of St. Gond, but a full day behind Kluck. Hausen has two corps moving toward Fère-Champenoise, but still far away. The Grand Duke of Würtemberg is north of the Saulx, still back of his battlefield, while the German Crown Prince is watching Sarrail from the Argonne.

It follows, then, that Kluck will fight with Maunoury, Sir John French, and a portion of D'Esperey's force; Bülow with the balance of D'Esperey's army and a portion of Foch's; Hausen with Foch; the Grand Duke of Bavaria with De Langle; and the Crown Prince with Sarrail. But, as we shall see, the battles between Kluck and Maunoury at the Ourcg, and between Bülow and Hausen on the one hand and Foch at the other, about Fère-Champenoise, will be the decisive engagements, because, at the Ourcq, the Germans encounter the thrust from Paris, which is the chief element in Joffre's envelopment, while at Fère-Champenoise and the Marshes of St. Gond Foch will meet the final German manœuvre, which is the attempt to smash through the · French centre and separate the armies about Paris from those in the east. Moreover, what happens east of Foch will not have major importance either for the French or for the Germans, and the change in the situation there will come only when the decision in the other fields begins to have its effect in the east. The same is true of the concomitant conflict about Nancy, which is one of the most desperate battles in the whole series, but does not influence the situation elsewhere, could only influence it if the French defense failed.

IV. THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

At 12.30 o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, September 5th, some German artillerymen, occupying the Heights of Monthyon—looking out over the plain toward Paris rather less than twenty miles away and not more than five miles northwest of Meaux in the valley of the Marne below—discovered French troops moving about the little village of Iverny, their presence revealed by the fatal red trousers which cost so many French lives in the first months of the war. Immediately German guns opened fire, killing Charles Péguy, one of the younger French writers of note, with the first volley.

The French troops thus discovered belonged to Maunoury's army, which was moving eastward from Paris toward the bridges of the Ourcq at Lizy, to be ready to cross that stream and start for Château-Thierry the next morning, in conformity with Joffre's orders. General Harbord's marines will take this road to Belleau Wood less than four years later with memorable consequences. The Germans were of the IV Reserve Corps, General von Gronau commanding, and they were marching southeastward to take up position covering Paris between the Marne and the Seine and thus cover Kluck's thrust at D'Esperey's flank.

The collision was totally unexpected on both sides and precipitated a general engagement eighteen hours earlier than Joffre had planned the clash. Immediately the French troops deployed on a front extending from the Paris-Meaux highway northward to the woods, west of St. Soupplets, and began an attack upon these woods and upon the two hills of Monthyon and Penchard. The Germans, on their side, clung desperately to these ridges and, losing St. Soupplets permanently, first lost and then regained Monthyon and Penchard.

Meantime, Kluck, adventuring south of the Marne with his main force, four corps strong, suddenly hears from Gronau, from Bülow, and from Moltke the astounding news that a French army is advancing out of Paris and has attacked his flank corps between the Ourcq and the Marne. He perceives instantly that unless this thrust is parried there may be no limit to the subsequent disaster, because the line of retreat of all his forces can be cut, and thereafter the situation of Bülow's army also compromised.

At this moment Kluck's four corps are arranged in a square about the Grand Morin, two of them, the II and IV Active, to be distinguished from the IV Reserve in action to the north, are on the edge of the Forest of Crécy, two more, the III and IX, are eastward toward Esternay. The whole British army is getting into line behind the Forest of Crécy for attack the next morning, an attack which would strike the II and IV Active Corps. But Kluck has no inkling of this fact. As for his other two corps, they are menaced with attack by three corps belonging to D'Esperey's army, which has faced about and is now coming on, carrying out Joffre's directions.

In this crisis Kluck's first necessity is to save his flank and rear. Grim necessity now at last compels him to obey Moltke's command and cover Paris between the Oise and the Marne provided always that he still can. He must reënforce the IV Reserve Corps on the Ourcq. To do this he moves off the II and IV Active Corps, the former starting at 3:30 A. M. on September 6th, the latter some hours later. But the consequence of this operation is that when the British begin to advance at six o'clock of the same morning, instead of encountering two corps they meet only the rear guards. A day later the III and IX will follow, despite Bülow's protests.

Kluck has, then, "robbed Peter to pay Paul"; he has reënforced his right flank, but he has opened a gap on his left and there is nothing before Sir John French's army, 120,000 strong, but a screen of cavalry, not more than 12,000 at most. Moreover, there will be nothing but cavalry in front of the British until they reach the Aisne, more than a week later. Kluck's first miscalculation exposed his flank to the Paris thrust, for his advance south of the Marne was based upon the belief that there were no forces in Paris capable of taking the offensive. But, faced with the obvious fact of his mistake, he seeks to remedy it by measures to be taken only if the British army does not exist; and it does exist.

Kluck is going to escape from the consequences of his first blunder and block Joffre's major thrust, but from his second blunder there is no escape and a week later Tirpitz will write:

"Thus the gap arose into which the British with great skill wedged themselves, and up to now there has been no closing of the gap successfully."

Henceforth, very slowly at first but with ever-increasing speed, as

Sir John at last perceives the truth, the British will come north between Kluck on the Ourcq, and Bülow's left, operating to the south of Montmirail. What the effect of this advance will be we shall presently note, but it is essential to perceive that on the morning of September 6th, when according to Joffre's orders the battle should have begun, the first fighting had taken place and already there had been certain vitally important developments.

Returning now to the Battle of the Ourcq, the situation at daybreak on September 6th is this: The Germans quit the hills of Monthyon and Penchard and retire to the plateaux, which run from northeast to southwest on the right banks of the Ourcq and the Marne. On these hills, with their backs to the two rivers, the Germans dig in, bringing up their heavy artillery. Their line is indicated by the towns near the western rim of the plateaux: Betz, Acy, Étrépilly, and Chambry; German heavy artillery is in the folds of the plateaux about Trocy; the advanced posts are in Barcy, Marcilly, Bouillancy.

On this day all of Maunoury's army, upward of six divisions, some 75,000 strong, is in action against the two divisions of the IV Reserve, which fight alone until late in the afternoon, when the first detachments of the II Corps, coming from south of the Marne, begin to appear. The day is prosperous for the French, who take Chambry, Barcy, Marcilly, and begin to approach Betz. But they do not reach the Ourcq, much less do they begin the advance beyond the Ourcq, which is the main detail in Joffre's strategy. On the contrary, short advances bring heavy losses; German heavy artillery begins to intervene with deadly effect.

On the next day the advances are even less considerable for two more German corps have arrived from the Marne and six French divisions, "scratch" units for the most part, encounter ten German, eight of the first line, provided with heavy artillery almost totally lacking to the French. By September 8th the III and IX Corps also come up and threaten to envelop Maunoury's left flank, bent back toward Paris. Kluck has thus completely parried Joffre's thrust from Paris, parried it in a manner which will continue to command Joffre's personal admiration long after the battle.

Still Kluck's position on the Ourcq becomes hourly more difficult. Three of his corps are facing westward, their backs to that stream. By September 9th the British have crossed the Marne and are moving due north on the east bank of the Ourcq; that is, straight across Kluck's rear. His troops are in a pocket, formed between Maunoury and the British, and the position of the troops in the bottom of the pocket nearest Meaux is becoming more dangerous each moment.

As a consequence, all through this day the Germans on the southern flank of the Ourcq battle begin to draw out of the pocket and move northward. Meantime, Kluck, calling to him some reserve units which have followed him south at a distance, attacks the northern flank of the Maunoury army in the afternoon and threatens to turn that flank. Maunoury's line bends back at a right angle. His troops are exhausted. Galliéni, who has sent his last reserves from Paris to feed the battle—hurried them out in taxicabs—now asks his lieutenants what is left. "Only the sergents de ville, the police," is the answer. "We may have to send them," Galliéni comments, grimly. Maunoury asks for a line of retreat in case of disaster. "There is none," responds Galliéni, sadly.

Maunoury must hold, then; his exhausted soldiers are rallied by a supreme appeal; they will attack at daylight. But daylight come, Kluck is gone. The flank operation of the previous afternoon was no more than a clever trick to occupy the French while he extricated his army. Henceforth, the British menace was no more to be ignored, only retreat could prevent the isolation of Kluck and Bülow. Thus the retreat to the Aisne begins, Kluck drawing back not toward the north but toward the northeast, toward Soissons, toward the hills behind the Aisne, along which runs the Chemin des Dames of enduring memory.

In his book Kluck gives us his own view of this Battle of the Ourcq. It was still progressing favourably, he insists, when, about noon on September 9th, Colonel Hentsch arrives from Moltke, does not see Kluck but communicates his message to Kluck's staff, puts it in writing on request. Hentsch is clothed with full powers and categorically commands Kluck to break off the battle and retreat. Hentsch's statement, thus written down for Kluck's staff, shows exactly how the Battle of

the Marne appears to the German High Command on the morning of September 9th, the final day. It reads as follows:

The situation is not favourable. The Fifth Army is held up before Verdun and the Sixth and Seventh armies on the Nancy-Épinal front. The retreat of the Second (Bülow) Army behind the Marne must be continued because its right wing, the Seventh Corps, is not retiring voluntarily but is being forced back. The First Army must, therefore, also retire in the direction of Soissons-Fère-en-Tardenois and, in extreme circumstances perhaps, farther, even to the line Laon-La Fère.

Kluck's first orders issued at 2 P. M. At 8.15 P. M. he addressed to his army the following order:

The situation of the Second Army has necessitated its withdrawal behind the Marne on both sides of Épernay. By order of the Supreme Command the First Army is to be withdrawn in the general direction of Soissons, to cover the flank of the armies. A new German army is being assembled at St. Quentin. The movement of the First Army will begin to-day.

Kluck's order places the responsibility for the retreat upon Bülow first, upon the Supreme Command next. He insists henceforth that he might have won the Battle of the Ourcq had he been allowed to continue, but the next day he is returned to Bülow's command and presently, after a decent delay, is retired definitively. Moltke vanishes on September 14th, five days after the issue of the order to retreat, although the fact is not published until late autumn.

In his memoirs Ludendorff remarks significantly:

The order to retreat from the Marne was issued, whether on good grounds or not I have never been able to ascertain.

V. THE BRITISH AT THE MARNE

From the operations at the Ourcq we turn naturally to those to the southeastward, where the British army is again in line. The mission of the British army in Joffre's plan is unmistakable. Maunoury is to assail Kluck's flank above the Ourcq, six divisions against two. Sir John French, abandoning his retreat to the Seine, in conformity with Joffre's previous orders, is to face about and advance northeast, away from Paris; he, too, has six divisions. After many hesitations, conferences with Joffre, Galliéni, Maunoury; finally, after a stirring appeal by

Joffre "in the name of France," he has at last resolved to join his army to the French in the forthcoming battle and after having begun retirement on the morning of September 5th, his army at last receives the definite command to face about and change direction.

This conversion, if performed promptly, will bring Sir John's army into collision with Kluck's western corps, the II and IV, both active. He should encounter them at daybreak on the morning of September 6th, north of the Forest of Crécy, behind which he has been changing front. If he succeeds in engaging them, Maunoury will have little trouble in disposing of the IV Reserve above the Ourcq. But before French attacks upon the morning of September 6th the II Corps makes its escape, begins its whirlwind rush to the Ourcq, to succour the IV Reserve Corps, already reeling back from Monthyon and Penchard.

Sir John's army does encounter the IV Active Corps, already under orders to follow the II Corps northward, and engages it briefly, but not sufficiently to anchor it. In turn, it withdraws northward, goes to add its weight to that of the II and IV Reserve Corps. Thus Joffre's larger conception, the envelopment of the German right, is already out of the question in the early morning hours of September 6th, the first day. On the contrary, Maunoury is going to have a desperate time maintaining himself on the field of the Ourcq, and, as we have seen, the later arrival of the III and IX will further aggravate the situation.

With the controversy arising over this failure on the part of the British to act promptly and decisively, it is unnecessary to deal at length. The same faults charged against Sir John French in the Marne campaign were disclosed later, at Neuve Chapelle, finally at Loos, which led to his retirement. His own book makes it clear that he was slow, terribly slow in realizing that the enemy before him were retiring. Lord Ernest Hamilton, in his history of the first seven British divisions—an admirable account—emphasizes the hesitations of the first hours of the Marne.

Like McClellan all through his career, French at the Marne is always convinced that the enemy in his front outnumber his forces. He is still profoundly affected by his experience at Mons and therefore sus-

picious as to his French supports on either side. He has, from noon on September 6th onward, nothing before him but a cavalry screen. This screen covers the gap which Kluck has opened between himself and Bülow, by his back somersault to the Ourcq. But into this gap Sir John presses only with great deliberation.

Still he does get forward with ever-increasing speed, as the truth slowly dawns upon him that the enemy has retreated. He forces the passage of both Morins; he gets across the Marne with his whole force on September 9th, interposing between Kluck and Bülow and threatening the troops of the former standing between the army of Maunoury and his own.

Contrasted with the terrific fighting of Maunoury's army and of Foch's, compared even with the bitter passages at arms of D'Esperey's troops, the British are hardly engaged, their casualties are small, and the enemy, except on the north bank of the Marne, about La Ferté, steadily retreats, conducts a retiring operation, confines his efforts solely to retarding the British advance as much as possible, seeking to give Kluck time to obtain a decision on the Ourcq and Bülow and Hausen about Fère-Champenoise. But as the decision cannot be had in either place in the time allowed, therefore in the end the British intervention will be decisive.

If the British failed to achieve what Joffre hoped of them and as a consequence the envelopment he aimed at was not obtained, it is not less evident that their presence in the battle line and at the point where the gap occurred in the German lines, as a consequence of Kluck's withdrawal of his four corps, did determine the issue of the actual battle. The victory was necessarily limited in its scope, fell far short of Joffre's hopes, but it did result in the dislocation of all German plans, the utter shipwreck of the German bid for supreme success in the first six weeks of the war.

Considering the extent of the defeat of the British in the opening days of the fighting—itself the consequence of French miscalculations—the strain of their great retreat, the loss of men, material, and the disorganization of machinery incident to this retreat, the swiftness with

which Sir John's army found its cohesion and passed to the offensive remains a landmark in military history and serves as a fitting prelude to the great achievement at Ypres, where the Expeditionary Army, the "Old Contemptibles," were to win a far-shining victory at the price of proximate annihilation.

Such, then, is the Battle of the Ourcq, fought between Kluck and the armies of Maunoury and French acting in more or less close coöperation: begun by Maunoury's attempt to envelop Kluck; continued by the swift response of Kluck, drawing his troops from before the British and first checking then rolling back Maunoury; but decided by the slow but sure advance of the British into the gap opened by Kluck in his own line, by the withdrawal of troops from the Morins to the Ourcq. In French military parlance, the Maunoury thrust is the coup de ventouse, the application of the leech which draws, begins by drawing Kluck from Esternay to Lizy, will continue to draw, pulling Bülow toward Kluck, at the moment when Hausen is seeking to crush Foch and thus pulling Bülow southward, and the double pull will decide the battles of Montmirail and of Fère-Champenoise, to which we now turn.

VI. MONTMIRAIL

Moltke's purpose, the final conception of German strategy, taking form in the last days of August, after the Battle of Guise, set forth in the order to Kluck of September 5th, has been to invest Paris from the east and north, between the Oise and the Seine, while Hausen ruptures the French centre. In this combination Kluck should have attacked Paris and left it to Bülow and Hausen to sever French communication with the capital. But Kluck, as we have seen, declined to wait; on the contrary, rushed on south of the Marne, a day ahead of Bülow, instead of a day behind. It followed that on September 6th, in the morning, his left corps were near Esternay and exactly on the ground that German High Command had foreseen Bülow would reach later in the day.

And about Esternay, early on September 6th, these two left corps of Kluck—driven thither by Kluck's mad rush to interpose between Joffre and Paris and now left in the air by Kluck's equally precipitate with-

drawal toward the Ourcq with his two centre corps—are suddenly, wholly unexpectedly assailed by the left flank of Franchet d'Esperey's army, advancing to battle, complying with Joffre's order, published the preceding day. These are the soldiers who fought at Charleroi, made the retreat from Belgium, and engaged Bülow at Guise, but their commander, Lanzerac, has turned them over to a successor, who will one day be the victor in the decisive battle in the Near East.

All this day, September 6th, the battle rages about Esternay, the Kluck corps holding on grimly against the arrival of Bülow, to whose command they will now pass. And as the day advances Bülow's troops do get up and encounter D'Esperey's army, all the way from Courtacon southwest of Montmirail to the Plateau of Sézanne, D'Esperey's front more or less accurately marked by these two limiting towns of Courtacon and Sézanne, the former still in German hands. East of Sézanne is the front of Foch, covering the Marshes of St. Gond, but not yet the scene of serious engagement.

On the next day D'Esperey resumes. Kluck recalls his two corps, the III and IX. Bülow seeks a way out of the mess Kluck has left him. The British are advancing into the gap between the Ourcq and Colommiers, have nothing before them but cavalry, cannot be checked by any reserves available either in Kluck's army or Bülow's. The best to be hoped for is that they can be delayed. Meantime, Bülow will swing his right flank, his own VII and X Corps Actives backward, northward to the Marne, reaching for junction with Kluck, protecting his own flank from the British menace, above all seeking to gain time for Kluck and Hausen to win their battles.

Coincident with this backward movement of his own right Bülow will throw his centre against D'Esperey and his left against Foch in coöperation with Hausen. If he is successful, then Moltke's purpose will still be realized and Bülow's left and Hausen's army will pierce the French centre, separate Foch from D'Esperey, and Foch and all the French armies to the eastward from Paris. Already Kluck has checked the French envelopment from the Ourcq; Marwitz and the cavalry are slowing down British advance, not yet become dangerous. All can yet

be attained, if Foch's army is broken, if Bülow can get the Plateau of Sézanne, where the armies of D'Esperey and Foch make junction.

But this is to reckon without D'Esperey. The Germans have failed to foresee the concentration of Maunoury's army in Paris and its subsequent sortie from Paris; they have considered the British army out of action as a result of its defeats at Mons and Le Cateau; Bülow has reported Lanzerac's army, now D'Esperey's, as finished at Guise, which Lanzerac and his army regarded as a victory. And now this defeated army is returning to the charge with unexampled fury.

So far from smashing D'Esperey, then, Bülow is first checked, then turned backward; September 7th the French are across the Grand Morin to the eastward, keeping pace with the British to the west. They have taken Esternay and are approaching Montmirail. September 8th they take Montmirail and on this day win victories all along the line, marked by names forever linked with the last Napoleonic successes: Vauchamps, Montmirail, and Champaubert. September 9th, the last day at the Ourcq, is the last day for Bülow's right and centre, which begin to retire north of the Marne.

It is essential now to perceive the rhythm of the whole battle. On this day, September 9th, Kluck, on the Ourcq, is threatened by the advance of the British who have crossed the Marne in his rear, between his army and that of Bülow, while the army of Maunoury, terribly stricken, still stands firm before him. At the same moment Bülow's right and centre are streaming northward, only his left, in coöperation with Hausen, is still continuing the original effort, to break the French line, to interpose between Paris and the mass of the French armies. Nor is Bülow's retreat merely voluntary; Hentsch's memorandum in Kluck's headquarters, written on this morning, concedes this.

Since Bülow's enforced retreat is drawing him away from Hausen, it follows, inevitably, that that fraction of his forces, his left flank, which preserves his union with Hausen, is being stretched like a rubber band—is, in fact, submitting to a double tension, for, while Bülow's main masses are pulling northward, Hausen is still pulling southward. This situation cannot last. Inevitably a gap will presently occur between Bülow and

Hausen, such as now separates Bülow from Kluck; and if Hausen has not, in coöperation with Bülow's left, broken Foch, the whole German purpose will fail.

Thus from the Battle of Montmirail we turn to that of Fère-Champenoise. But it is worth noting in passing that later accounts of the Battle of the Marne ascribe far greater importance to the contribution of D'Esperey's army than the first reports, which were filled with the more spectacular circumstances of the Ourcq and Fère-Champenoise. After a century the new victory at Montmirail was a fitting continuation of the traditions of 1814 and it was, happily for France, the beginning, not the end of an immortal chapter.

VII. FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE

In passing from Montmirail to Fère-Champenoise, too, we pass not merely to the field on which the last German bid for victory will be made, but to the battle in which there emerges the greatest single figure of the World War—the soldier who will one day dictate to a defeated Germany those terms of surrender which avenge Sedan and Metz. For if the skill of Ferdinand Foch, as a corps commander, had been disclosed in the retreat from Morhange; if his eminence as a teacher and a military thinker was already known to French and even to British and German soldiers, it is at Fère-Champenoise that he discloses that genius for war which subsequently earns him a place among the supreme soldiers of all history.

Foch's army, it will be recalled, was created by Joffre, following the disasters of the battles of the Frontiers, with the specific mission to fill the gap between the armies of Lanzerac and De Langle. It had been assembled during retreat, under circumstances trying beyond description, and its commander had been called from command of a corps before Nancy to lead an army, against which Joffre already divined enormous pressure was soon to be directed. And in our examination of the progress of the Battle of the Marne on the fields to the westward of Foch, we have already seen that the events of the first days made it patent both to Joffre and to Moltke that the success or failure

of the effort to break the French line at Fère-Champenoise would decide the issue of the whole conflict.

On September 6th, when the Marne opens, Foch's army has passed the Marshes of St. Gond, has mounted the Plateau of Sézanne, is retiring behind the Aube, in conformity with Joffre's instructions. Receiving the orders to turn about, Foch obeys with characteristic alacrity and seeks to make good the exits of the Marshes of St. Gond to the northward. In this he is not wholly successful, encountering the advance guards of Bülow's left and two corps of Hausen. September 7th sees local fighting; but Hausen, as always, moves sluggishly—will presently be removed for his failure here, and to the north in the Charleroi time, when he failed to roll up Lanzerac's flank.

It is only on September 8th that the real battle begins for Foch—the fourth day for Maunoury, the third for Sir John French and D'Esperey. And the latter are already pushing north irresistibly. But as yet there is no benefit to Foch in the western operations and his "scratch" army, heavily outnumbered, is driven back everywhere; instead of facing north at the end of the day he faces east, has lost Fère-Champenoise, the Plateau of Euvy. His right is back in the Camp de Mailly and there is a yawning gap between that flank and De Langle's army. Finally, his army begins to show unmistakable signs of disintegration. Unmistakably the next day, September 9th, is going to be the decisive day for him, and, as we have seen, it is the decisive day of the battle, for Kluck's orders to retire have already been issued and Bülow, under pressure, must continue his retreat north of the Marne. If Hausen, with Bülow's left, cannot break Foch's army, pierce the French line, he will have to retire by the end of the day; but if he succeeds, triumph is still to be achieved.

All of which Foch perceives. He has arrived at one of the great moments of his career, one of three, he tells a friend, afterward. The others are at the Yser a few weeks hence and at the Somme, on March 26, 1918, moments when a "clear vision is given to a man, at an historic moment." To his staff he explains that intensification of the effort on his front is the final proof of the fact that things must be going very

MEN AND GUNS OF THE TWO KAISERS



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THE IMPERIAL GUARD PASSES IN REVIEW BEFORE EMPEROR WILLIAM

At the left of the Kaiser is General Lowenfeldt, and at the extreme right General

Von Bülow.



GENERAL VON MOLTKE

GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN



GENERAL VON HEERINGEN

CROWN PRINCE RUPERT OF BAVARIA

General Von Moltke, nephew of the great Moltke of Bismarck's day was Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the World War. Because of his failure to seize and hold the French and Belgian seacoast when opportunity offered and because of rumored mistakes in the Battle of the Marne, Moltke lost his position and turned over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

The armies of General Von Heeringen and Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria met the French after they had penetrated German territory some fifteen or twenty miles, about a fortnight after the War began. The battle was an undoubted German victory. The French "75's" were outranged by the heavy German field artillery, and in three days the French were driven back across the border and the invasion of Lorraine was at an end.

A fortnight later, while the Battle of the Marne was on these same generals fought another engagement on this same front—"the Second Battle of Nancy." They were opposed, as before, by the French general Castelnau. Their aim was to cut through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Epinal and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies. Though fighting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself they were repulsed with great slaughter—else the Battle of the Marne might have ended very differently.



Photograph by Paul Thompson GENERAL MACKENSEN

GENERAL LUDENDORFF



THE KAISER IN WARTIME

GENERAL VON KLUCK

General Mackensen, conqueror of the Russians under Dmitrieff at the Dunajec, in the spring of 1915. The trapped Roumanian army surrendered to him in December, 1916.

General Ludendorff, close associate of Hindenburg. He has been called "the brains of Hindenburg," and even the "real German dictator." His mastiff-like visage recalls the bull-dog countenance of Hindenburg and even more the resolute mask of the old "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck.

The Kaiser's wartime photographs betray the fact that he has aged greatly during the conflict. This shows him in his field uniform, with helmet covered so as to offer no glittering mark to sniping aviators. For all the dozens of gaudy uniforms in which he used to take so much delight, he has never been indiscreet enough to lead an army in person—except at manœuvres. He is said, however, to have waited "in shining armour" to take part in one or two triumphal entries which failed to come off.

General Von Kluck, about August 23d, made a desperate effort to "run around the end" of the Allied line, interposed between it and Paris and produce another Sedan. He did not quite succeed, and immediately found himself in a very dangerous position during the Battle of the Marne. Thanks to Sir John French's failure to rise to the occasion, Kluck was able by dint of desperate fighting against the gallant Maunoury to make good his retreat to the Aisne.



Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE OF HINDENBURG'S THRUSTS AT WARSAW There is plenty of room on this broad road for ammunition and supply trains to advance along with the infantry.




AN INCIDENT DURING THE GERMAN EFFORT TO DRIVE THE RUSSIANS HOME FROM GALICIA
The German soldiers are coming out of the garrison church at Przemysl, after attending Sunday morning service.
Few civilians are in the street and the shop-windows are tightly shuttered.



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EFFECT OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF PRZEMYSL



Photograph by Paul Thompson

GENERAL VON AUFFENBERG (Right)

The unlucky Austrian general from whom the Russians captured a quarter of a million prisoners at the Battle of Lemberg, one of the great disasters of military history which brought the Austrian war establishment to the verge of ruin.

TYPICAL AUSTRIAN INFANTRYMEN

As is shown in another part of this book the Austrian makes a good and courageous soldier. Men of many diverse races fight under the colours of the Dual Monarchy yet no dissension has appeared.



PARCELS FROM FRIENDS AT HOME ARRIVE TO CHEER GERMAN ARTILLERY OFFICERS BEFORE WARSAW



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THE AUSTRIANS

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It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France. But Austria was unable to carry out her part of the program, and when she had been defeated by the Serbians at the Jedar and by the Russians at Lemberg, Germany was compelled to draw troops from the western front to send to her rescue and thus lost her own chance for a quick victory over France.

The upper picture shows some of the celebrated Rangers Corps guarding a road; the lower one, a group of officers

seated before one of the guns used in bombarding Antwerp.



ONE OF THE SKODA HOWITZERS THAT REDUCED LIEGE

On August 7th, the German infantry penetrated between the forts before Liége and occupied the city and the citadel; but they were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire till German and Austrian heavy guns were brought forward. Under this attack the forts crumbled almost instantly. They were the work of the famous Brialmont, and supposed to be very strong. But they had been allowed to fall into disrepair and their reduction proved to be child's play to the mighty new engines of destruction.

badly for the Germans elsewhere. Thus he informs Joffre, in a message forever memorable: "My centre is retiring, my left is broken, impossible to manœuvre; situation is excellent, I shall attack." And he does attempt to attack on the morning of the 9th. But his attacks are smothered; and the Germans, mounting the slopes of the hills overlooking the Marshes of St. Gond, take the Château de Mondement, the key to the Plateau of Sézanne.

Obviously the decisive hour has arrived. But now D'Esperey lends Foch a corps, become available because of the retirement of Bülow's right and centre corps northward. Assured as to his left, by this aid, Foch draws out his 42nd Division, commanded by Grossetti, a Corsican like Galliéni and also of the Napoleonic school. Foch is going to throw Grossetti against Bülow's left corps, because his sharp eye has discerned that, as a consequence of the double pull to the north and to the south, the Prussian Guard has thinned its line to the breaking point.

Grossetti was to attack at two o'clock, but he cannot arrive until five. Meantime, as his artillery moves, it pauses about Mondement, lends its aid to General Humbert, who is seeking to recover the lost position. Thanks to this aid the position is recovered, thus reëstablishing Foch's centre. This same Humbert will command one of the armies which close the gap opened by Ludendorff's attack of March 21, 1918, and will become one of the great figures of the last campaign.

Finally, at five o'clock Grossetti does attack, aiming at Fère-Champenoise, and the attack is the "event" of the battle. This "event" Napoleon thus defines in words that Foch has been fond of quoting to his students in the École de Guerre:

"Toward the end of the day, when I see that the enemy is tired and has drawn upon the greater part of his resources, I gather together all my reserves. Thanks to the fall of this mass upon an enemy who did not foresee it, I cause an event; and by this means victory is almost always won."

It is won at Fère-Champenoise. The enemy has no more reserves. He has made his last effort to rupture the French centre, and, with this effort still uncrowned by success, the French have delivered a

new thrust, which has heavy local consequences. Thereupon Moltke breaks off his battle; abandons his last plan, Bülow's left and Hausen's whole army begin to retreat in the night of September 9th-10th. Foch will be in Fère-Champenoise the next morning, pushing toward Châlons.

This is the first great triumph of Foch; it will earn for him Joffre's praise as "the greatest strategist in Europe." He will follow it by the achievement at the Yser and, three years later, holding a position far greater than Joffre, he will win the final victory. Petain and Mangin, who will also go far, fight with distinction in D'Esperey's adjoining army, Humbert, henceforth "the hero of Mendement," also emerges, with Grossetti will do great things in the Yser presently.

And now, on the night of September 9th-10th, the situation becomes clear: three German armies, those of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, are in headlong retreat toward the north, followed closely by victorious but weary French and British armies. Moltke's final effort, the blow at the centre, has failed. If Joffre's flanking thrust has been parried, it has had consequences which, if less complete than the commander foresaw. have been decisive. The Germans have lost their great battle.

VIII. THE END OF THE CONFLICT

It remains to summarize the events on the other fields, but with the clear appreciation of the fact that the decision has been had in the west. On the Saulx, the encounter between De Langle and the Grand Duke of Würtemberg is exceedingly severe. The French are driven back gradually south of the Saulx, across the line of the Paris-Nancy railway. The fighting grows more and more desperate, but gradually De Langle, reënforced by Joffre, makes head and checks the German advance.

In this situation the retreat of Hausen to the west uncovers the flank of Würtemberg's army and he has no choice but to retire—his army still unbeaten, but unmistakably checked. The ruined villages from Sermaize and Revigny, the graves along the railway, long bear accurate testimony to the severity of the fighting, but on neither side can there be any claim of actual victory, although De Langle's resistance has assured Joffre's battle to the westward.

Nor is the case different in the battle between the German Crown Prince and Sarrail. Here the fighting is less intense, although for a moment Sarrail's rear is threatened by a German attack coming out of Metz and assailing the forts covering the Meuse. But the attack is contained. Still, by taking Revigny the Crown Prince momentarily inserts a wedge between the armies of Sarrail and De Langle and extends a hand to the German armies assailing Nancy, but the gap is promptly closed and the danger thus exorcised. Joffre's conception of an offensive by Sarrail, corresponding to the Maunoury movement from Paris and constituting the right arm of the enveloping operation, of the reverse Schlieffen, is not even attempted, since the Germans are too strong.

But the retreat of Würtemberg, produced by the retirement of Hausen, uncovers the flank of the Crown Prince, and presently he has to get up and go back, covering his retreat by a very sharp action at Beauzée and then tending northward toward those very fields on which American troops will presently fight between the Meuse and the Argonne. Actually the Crown Prince's army has been less heavily engaged than any other, has accomplished less, and has apparently aimed at accomplishing little more than covering the flank toward Verdun, as Moltke hoped Kluck would cover the flank toward Paris.

Looking still eastward, it must be realized that all through the critical period at the Marne the Germans are making a final effort to break through on the eastern barrier, where they had been checked in the Battle of the Gap of Charmes in the last week of August. The battle-field is slightly different, the possession of the city of Nancy is the immediate objective, but behind this lies the dream of the larger Cannæ and the more limited possibility of joining hands with the Crown Prince and thus enveloping all the French barrier positions and the defending armies north of Toul.

Joffre's battle at the Marne is predicated upon a successful maintenance of the eastern front, which in military phrase is the pivot of his battle, the success of De Castelnau and Dubail in holding their positions is, then, as essential a circumstance in the victory of the Marne as the performances of any other armies actually engaged between Paris and Verdun.

As to the fighting itself, it centres about the Grand Couronné, the wooded hill or hills which extend along the east bank of the Meurthe and Moselle from Pont-à-Mousson southward to the latitude of Nancy. In their first effort the Germans seek to come south astride the Moselle and turn the French out of the northern end of the Grand Couronné about the village of St. Geneviève. Failing here, after desperate fighting, they turn south and endeavour to hack their way along the Nancy-Château Salins national highway to Nancy itself. The key to the French position is the Plateau d'Amance, overlooking the Forest of Champenoux and commanding the highway.

Under the eyes of the Kaiser, waiting at Eply for a triumphal entry into Nancy, as he would wait in Flanders, a few weeks hence, for a similar entrance into Calais, the Germans pushed through the Forest of Champenoux and reached the foot of the Plateau d'Amance. But there they are checked, thrown back into the woods, where the fighting is, if anything, more intense than anywhere on the Marne battlefield.

There is a moment when Castelnau thinks of retiring upon Toul, but Dubail and Joffre prevent the retreat. Then, as the situation in the west worsens for the Germans, they begin tardily to imitate Joffre and draw off troops for the western flank. So the battle dies down, and presently a push by Castelnau and Dubail forces the enemy back to the frontier and the Nancy sector stabilizes on lines which will be maintained until the end of the war, will become familiar to many American troops as a training area three years hence.

The victory of Nancy was won by armies which had been reduced to almost insignificant numbers by the transport of corps to the westward. The German attack itself, aside from its larger purposes, was obviously designed to prevent such a transfer, but was begun too late and totally failed in this object. The German losses in the battle were colossal, the German troops outnumbered the French decisively, and a large fraction of the French force was composed of reserve units.

The victory at the Marne would have lost most of its value if Nancy had fallen and the eastern barrier been penetrated. German failure before Nancy, in combination with the defeat at the Marne, compelled the withdrawal of the Germans north of the line Verdun-Rheims and thus automatically released the all-important French lines of communication with the Lorraine front from Verdun to the Vosges. After Nancy, De Castelnau appears in the north, commanding an army in the "Race to the Sea" and thereafter joins Joffre at Chantilly and remains his faithful second until Joffre retires. When the war ends De Castelnau is again on the Lorraine front, commanding the group of armies defending the frontier from the Moselle to Switzerland.

IX. SUMMARY

Such, briefly, is the Battle of the Marne, begun at noon on September 5th, terminated for the western armies by the morning of September 10th, when the troops of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen were all in full retreat, prolonged by the action of the armies of Würtemberg and the Crown Prince, which lingered several days upon their positions before the effect of the dislocation to the west and the failure of the German efforts about Nancy forced them to conform to the general retirement.

Over the circumstances of the battle controversies began while the German retreat was still in progress and continue to rage in all camps with the promise that they will endure at least as long as those which for a century have confused and wearied the student of the Waterloo Campaign. With these controversies the general reader can have little concern, the ultimate result of the great battle, the greatest in all history to September, 1914, alone interests him.

Yet there is one observation which is perhaps permissible. In all contemporary accounts doubt is left as to whether the Allied victory was due to the Maunoury thrust, the Foch counter-stroke, or, as the British allege, to the intervention of the British army. On the whole, the first historians chiefly French were inclined to give the chief glory to Foch, while British writers, notably Maurice, incomparably the most reliable, still support the British thesis.

The publication of German accounts, notably Kluck's, gives the lie to the Foch claim, however, for Bülow affirms that he formally ordered to retreat on the morning of September 9th, while Foch's thrust did

not come off until five o'clock in that afternoon. As to the British claim, while it is clear that the interposition of the British in the gap created by Kluck's backward rush to the Ourcq was the decisive factor, this was, in turn, the consequence of Maunoury's thrust and the British merely reaped where Maunoury had sown. Moreover, in the same order of reasoning, the gap into which Foch thrust Grossetti was only another consequence of the general dislocation of German forces produced by the Maunoury attack.

What seems to emerge from the full statements made available by the coming of peace and the rush of soldiers to explain is the fact that the determining factor in the Battle of the Marne, as a whole, was the prompt appreciation and exploitation by the French High Command of the situation created by Kluck's rash and insubordinate adventuring south of the Marne.

Maunoury's advance on September 5th precipitates a premature collision about St. Soupplets a day in advance of Joffre's plan. This collision leads directly to the dislocation of Kluck's army, begun by the transfer of his two corps northward on September 6th. This transfer opens the gap for the British and as they begin to penetrate it, the dislocation communicates itself on September 7th and 8th to Bülow's army, itself heavily punished by the attack of D'Esperey.

It is only on September 9th that the dislocation extends to the German troops facing Foch, but it does inevitably arrive and creates the gap near Linthes, into which Foch throws Grossetti and thus enforces the retreat of the Hausen army. Thereafter, the advance of Foch uncovers the flank of Würtemberg, who leaves an incomplete battle with De Langle to execute the retreat now become necessary and his retirement communicates the general dislocation to the Crown Prince, who feels it last and thus is the last to quit the battlefield of the Marne.

The maximum profit of the Maunoury thrust and the Joffre strategy would have been the envelopment of Kluck and the consequent expulsion of the German armies from France and not impossibly the infliction of one of the greatest defeats in all military history. This profit was no longer to be attained when Kluck rushing north succeeded,

first in checking and then in rolling up Maunoury's army. But Kluck only succeeded in warding off the major evil by inviting the lesser, instead of immediate disaster on the Ourcq his manœuvre invited ultimate defeat at the Marne.

The defeat at the Marne was thus, in its immediate circumstances, only strategic, that is to say, the German armies escaped from rout and destruction, but the German purpose, Moltke's strategic combinations were all wrecked. Certainly if there had been no British army in the battle line, indubitably if Foch had succumbed to the onslaught, finally, if Dubail and De Castelnau had failed to hold the eastern gateway, the Maunoury stroke could have had no decisive influence. But given a satisfactory situation with respect to all three of these essential circumstances, it did result in the general dislocation of the whole enemy front and the ultimate wide-swinging retreat to the Aisne.

To the present writer it seems that the more one studies the history of the Marne in the light of fuller evidence the clearer becomes the fact that, as the German writers now generally concede, the victory was strategic and the fruit of Joffre's conception influenced manifestly by Galliéni's swift detection and prompt appreciation of Kluck's blunder. It was the logical consequence of the resolutions taken in the order issued on the morrow of the defeat in the Battle of the Frontiers. It was the final success of a purpose, disclosed in the decision to react at the Aisne, momentarily adjourned to the Seine, finally expressed at the Marne.

Kluck bluntly asserts, with the Cannæ obsession still uppermost in his mind, that it was the strategy of Hannibal, the guiding spirit of the Schlieffen manœuvre, unsuccessfully employed by Moltke, which Joffre turned to account at the Marne. And it seems to me that in the end it will be Joffre and not any subordinate, not the brilliant or fatal stroke of any army, which will explain the victory of the Marne. In a word, the victory goes beyond the limits of any single circumstance and is the unmistakable consequence of the genius, the vision, above all the calm judgment of a great soldier—of a thoroughly matured purpose revealed in all which happens from August 25th to September 10th.

It was Joffre who saw all the field of action and saw it whole, not

Maunoury, nor Foch, nor French. It was Joffre who transported westward the troops whose presence supplied the necessary weight; it was Joffre who constructed the battle from the hills above the Ourcq to the Vosges, who watched it, fed it, sustained it. And the battle itself is a logical whole into which all details fit, not a series of brilliant but unconnected accidents. It was Joffre who foresaw the battle, two weeks before it was joined, not where it was fought, but as it was fought. It was Joffre who created Maunoury's army and Foch's and selected Maunoury and Foch to command these armies, at least an equal claim to eternal praise. It was Joffre who at last persuaded Sir John French to join in a battle in which his presence was indispensable. It was Joffre who fixed De Castelnau before Nancy, when even that gallant soldier for a moment considered a retirement, which must have been fraught with most evil consequences. Above all, for as Napoleon said, the moral is to all else as three to one, it was Joffre who endured ill fortune with unshaken spirit, survived defeat to construct victory, to overthrow the enemy and save his country, when the world held France lost.

Contemporary mankind promptly described the victory of the Marne as a miracle. Those who come hereafter will easily demolish this and all related legends, finding in human causes sufficient explanations for all circumstances. But in lightly brushing aside the legend, they will also dismiss the emotion out of which the legend sprung. Yet who of these who lived through it can write of the Marne without recalling that immense and world-wide despair when for a whole week western civilization awaited the arrival of German hosts in the French capital and the German machine seemed the ultimate expression of the invincible and destructive? The emotion was like to nothing since Rome awaited the arrival of the conquering barbarians and all seemed lost.

Small wonder, then, when suddenly, from out the clouds, the news of deliverance, the irrefutable evidence of escape from supreme tragedy emerged, the world acclaimed a new miracle. In the perspective of the moment nothing but a miracle could explain the transformation. From one end of the western world to the other the news spread bringing re-

joicing, but month followed month and even years passed before the fact became clear that what had seemed a miracle was indeed the consequence of clear vision, calm judgment, and supreme self-sacrifice, a combination of human intelligence with human self-abnegation.

The Germans would approach Paris again and once more pass the Marne exciting new apprehensions, but the hour which preceded the victory of the Marne would remain, for the Allies, the darkest in the war and for the Germans the most hopeful.

The Battle of the Marne was the most important conflict since Waterloo and not impossibly will rank in history with the victories over Attila at the Catalaunian Fields and over the Saracens at Poitiers, which twice before on French soil rescued western civilization from the menace of complete annihilation.

Like these two former conflicts, the first of which was fought on fields which witnessed Joffre's success, the Marne was a battle of arrest: not—like Waterloo or Jena—a struggle in which an absolute decision of the whole war was had.

Yet Falkenhayn, who was called to succeed Moltke on September 14th, testifies to the fact that days passed, after he took command, before it became clear that the Germans would be able to make good their stand on the Aisne. All evidence, French and German alike, confirms the belief that, with a little more of luck—and, perhaps, of energy—in certain quarters, the French and British might have forced the enemy back to the frontiers and thus have prevented the long occupation of the industrial regions of northern France and of the Belgian coast, which had such grave consequences for the Allied cause.

The truth is unmistakable, however, that, in the moment of victory, the French army was hardly less exhausted than the German. Its ammunition, like that of the enemy, had been practically exhausted, while its cavalry, become the essential arm in pursuit, had been substantially used up by its enormous relatively fruitless efforts.

Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying the essential fact that at the Marne Germany lost the war. Not even in 1918 did Ludendorff have as good cards as were in the hands of Moltke at the outset of the cam-

paign of 1914: and victory, such victory as was conceivable in 1918, would have left Germany exhausted.

Strategically, the whole German conception was broken at the Marne. The effort to renew the offensive at the Yser just two months later failed absolutely and, despite the Verdun venture of 1916, Germany was never able to make material progress until the collapse of Russia opened the way for the final campaign in 1918, which, in turn, failed even more dismally than the First Marne operations.

When Kluck dug in behind the Aisne at the close of the second week of September, 1914, the situation had arrived which all German soldiers had foreseen must follow the failure of the bid for swift and supreme triumph in the attack upon France. Actually the siege of Germany began on that day and was never effectively interrupted until the rupture of the Hindenburg Line four years later led directly to the surrender of Rethondes.

On the morrow of the Marne, Germany found herself involved in a long war, with the odds heavily against her. Ludendorff in his narrative recounts his bitter reflections when the news reached him. Bernstorff asserts that he recognized victory thereafter impossible. Tirpitz in his diary records even deeper pessimism. Germany's superior capacity for organization and her better preparation for war gave her certain initial advantages which enabled her to protract the struggle for four years, to destroy Russia, and, in 1918, to menace France and Britain once more. Yet these circumstances were, in the end, ruinous. Germany emerged from the struggle in a condition recalling that of France at the close of the long succession of wars waged by Louis XIV, while, unlike the France of the Grand Monarch, Germany was unable to preserve her integrity or maintain her prestige.

Following the defeats of 1918, the German military leaders were able to claim that the nation had collapsed behind an army which was still unbeaten, and this inveracity achieved no little credence in Germany. But no such defense can be pleaded for the defeat of the Marne. On the contrary, it must be recognized that German High Command, at the outset of this campaign, had every advantage known to war: supe-

rior numbers, better weapons, finer equipment, the element of surprise, procured mainly by the violation of Belgian neutrality and enhanced by all the secret preparations of forty years, the superiority of members gained by the unexpected employment of reserve with active units which alone permitted the extension of the front west of the Meuse.

And yet it failed completely—lost the war irrevocably within six weeks of the date when the campaign opened; and, in its effort to conceal the truth and escape the consequences, persisted in the struggle until that hour when nation and army collapsed together, the dynasty fell and fled, and the proudest nation the modern world has seen entered upon a period of humiliation and degradation unparalleled in human history.

Time can only add to the grandeur of Joffre's victory, which was in reality the victory of the French people, fighting in the presence of a peril terrible beyond description, facing an enemy who had willed the annihilation of France and had spread ruin and devastation from Flanders to the Vosges. For the fourth time in human history—at the Marne as at the Catalaunian Fields, before Poitiers, and at Valmy—France saved western civilization from impending ruin. And if the glory belongs to France, the gain was once more shared by all mankind.

X. TANNENBERG

To complete the story of the Marne, it is necessary to recount now the disaster that overtook the Russian army, which had invaded East Prussia from Warsaw. In the general Franco-Russian plan it was agreed that Russia should promptly invade East Prussia if Germany sent her masses through Belgium and against France. It was believed that such an operation would mean that Germany would have to leave her eastern front insecurely guarded and that a Russian invasion would promptly force her to withdraw troops from France in advance of the decisive engagement.

Accordingly two Russian armies were at once sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Both won immediate and considerable successes, and the Germans on the day they reached Brussels learned that Russian armies were carrying

the whole eastern frontier and advancing after victories at Gumbinnen and Insterburg, toward Königsberg and toward the east bank of the Vistula north of Thorn. Refugees were fleeing into Berlin at the precise moment that French and Belgian exiles were reaching Paris.



FIRST RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA, CHECKED BY HINDENBURG AT TANNENBERG, AUGUST 31, 1914

Two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Hindenburg defeated the Warsaw army decisively at Tannenberg and the other army then drew back

A—Rennenkampf B—Samsonoff

So far the Allied plan had worked amazingly well and the promptness of Russian invasion had taken the Germans by surprise.

Now, however, the Emperor summoned Hindenburg from retirement and gave him command in the region which he had made a life study. Hindenburg acted promptly. Leaving only a screen of troops

in front of the Russian army advancing from the east, he concentrated his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the difficult swamp region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims, he massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost more than 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, celebrated on Sedan Day by all Germany as a deliverance from deadly peril.

After Tannenberg, the other Russian army drew back safely and Hindenburg still lacked the numbers to press it hard, but he was able to clear German territory, and the mass of German armies in France were permitted to go forward to their decisive battle without fear for this eastern front. Half the Franco-Russian strategic conception had been wrecked. After the Marne the Germans would not be forced to face immediate peril in the east as well as the west. They could still concentrate their energies on retrieving the situation at the Aisne.

The French victory at the Marne and the great Russian triumph at Lemberg obscured the Allied mind and the mind of the neutral world as to the value of Tannenberg. It has not even now, outside of Germany, received its just appraisal. Yet, to judge it rightly, it is only necessary to consider what would have been the German situation if, at the moment the Marne had been lost, Russian troops had occupied all of Prussia east of the Vistula. This would have happened but for Tannenberg; it would have happened infallibly if the action of the two Russian armies had been properly coördinated, for their combined strength was far greater than Hindenburg's.

For this disaster Lemberg was no counterweight, because Germany and not Austria was the true enemy and German disaster might have ended the war. Had the Germans been driven behind the Lower Vistula all their later and successful campaigns would have been impossible and, taken with the collapse of Austria at Lemberg and the defeat of the Marne, the Central Powers would have found themselves at the close of the second month of war in a situation difficult in the extreme.

All this was avoided by Hindenburg's amazing victory, one of the most complete in history and rivalling any Napoleonic combination in

skill and effectiveness. More than all else this German victory at the other end of Europe robbed the Marne of its greatest possible fruits and condemned northern France to a German occupation which still persists. The victory on the eastern front enabled Germany to go forward to the Marne without hesitation; it did not enable her to win this battle, but after the retreat to the Aisne it permitted her to concentrate her energies and her resources in new attacks upon the west which did not terminate until the Battle of Flanders in mid-November.

Therefore, just as the Marne deprived Germany of any chance to get a quick decision on her main front, the disaster of Tannenberg deprived the Allies of any similar chance for a prompt victory. Later historians will certainly do fuller justice to the importance and service of Tannenberg to Germany. It was not the greatest German victory of the war, but certainly it was the most useful, and as such it can rank only second to the Marne in the first two years of the contest. It is hardly too much to say that it saved Germany almost as unmistakably as the Marne saved France.

As Foch emerges from the Battle of Fère Champenoise, Ludendorff attracts attention by the victory at Tannenberg, the first of the many which he will win, in the closest coöperation with Hindenburg. In his memoirs, Ludendorff gives a dramatic account of the fashion in which he was recalled from the western front at the moment when the Battle of Charleroi was beginning to share in the salvation of the eastern frontier. Henceforward he would grow in stature until he became in all military circles the recognized brain of Hindenburg, who remained for the masses a legendary figure. Three years after his transfer to the east, almost on the anniversary of Tannenberg, he in turn would come west, to seek victory where Moltke and Falkenhayn had failed and to encounter at the Marne the defeat which proved as fatal to his purposes as Moltke's had to German strategy four years earlier.

And to add a final ironical detail, the victory of Tannenberg was won by the strategy of Cannæ. Thus the Schlieffen application of the method of Hannibal saved Germany in the east and for the moment, at the hour when it was turned against Germany in France.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

I MOLTKE COLLAPSES

On the morning of September 10th and from his headquarters at Luxemburg Moltke issued an order for the retreat of the German army, for the withdrawal of all the armies between Verdun and Paris, which terminated the Battle of the Marne. On the next day, in the face of the general retreat of the enemy, Joffre could refer to the "incontestable" fact of the Allied victory.

In issuing the orders for the withdrawal, orders which were henceforth to be criticized by all German writers with ever-increasing bitterness, Moltke acted under precisely the impulsion which similar events had exerted upon Joffre three weeks before, when on August 25th he had ordered the Allied retirement. The strategic situations were strangely alike, and the purpose of Moltke in September was exactly that of Joffre in August.

In August Joffre found that his own offensives had been wrecked in the Battle of the Frontiers and that Moltke secretly and successfully had concentrated overwhelming numbers on the Allied left; that is, on the Paris flank. To stand meant to risk envelopment and destruction. Before any hope of a new offensive could be warranted, Allied armies must be withdrawn until such time as reënforcements brought from Alsace and Lorraine could be put in on the menaced flank.

In September Moltke faced the fact that during the Allied retreat Joffre had moved corps from east to west, created Maunoury's Sixth Army about Paris and thrown that army upon the unsuspecting Kluck. The result of this attack had been to recall Kluck from the vicinity of the Seine to the Ourcq. Kluck in rushing north had opened a gap between his own and Bülow's army and into this gap the British had penetrated

and on September 9th, having forced the passage of the Marne, threatened to envelop, isolate, and destroy Kluck, who was fighting prosperously but not yet decisively west of the Ourcq.


As early as September 8th Moltke had sent to the front a certain Colonel Hentsch, authorized to act for him. Hentsch had visited Hausen on this day and found his situation difficult but not without promise. But the next morning, in conference with Bülow, he learned of the passage of the Marne by the British, of the existence of a fifteen-mile gap between the armies of Bülow and Kluck, and accordingly decided that both Bülow and Kluck must retreat, the directions of their withdrawals tending to converge, thus partially closing the gap between them.

But the real closing of the gap would have to be the work of the German Seventh Army, composed of troops coming from Lorraine or released by the fall of Maubeuge, and if these troops failed to arrive in time, the consequences could be fatal. Pending the arrival of these troops, moreover, the Germans would have to retreat, as Joffre had retired from the Sambre to the Marne while he was transferring troops from east to west. In Hentsch's plan the German retreat was to extend to the Aisne, behind which Kluck and Bülow, reënforced by Heeringen's new Seventh Army, might be expected to stand.

We have already seen that later, on September 9th, Hentsch reached Kluck's headquarters, imposed the views of Bülow and himself upon Kluck's staff, and as a result procured the issue by Kluck of the orders which broke off the Battle of the Ourcq in the afternoon, when the French case seemed desperate and Kluck not unreasonably hoped for such a success as might throw the beaten Maunoury army back upon the permanent fortifications of Paris.

By the night of September 9th Bülow and Kluck were both on the road. So also was Hausen, his retreat enforced by the withdrawal of Bülow, which uncovered his flank, and his pace quickened by the brilliant thrust of Foch in the late afternoon near the Marshes of St. Gond. This thrust quite transformed Hausen's situation which had seemed to Hentsch hopeful on September 8th and had been so reported by him to Moltke.

PICTURES OF TRENCH WARFARE



GERMAN SHELTERS OF SANDBAGS, IN THE DUNES ALONG
THE BELGIAN COAST



THE ELABORATION OF TRENCH WARFARE

A typical trench on the western front, braced to prevent caving in, with the usual boardwalk and the numerous telephone and telegraph lines needed in a modern communication system. The shell case, hanging from the cross beam, is struck when a gas attack is discovered, as a warning to all within hearing to put on masks. The inset shows an underground telephone exchange which is part of the system of communication between the front lines and headquarters in the rear.




AN OBSERVATION STATION

These are placed in buildings, trees, shell craters, etc.—wherever the observer can see the effect of his batteries' fire. Telephone communication back to the gun is arranged and the observer then reports as to the range, the movements of his own and the enemy's infantry, etc.



'AN UNDERGROUND PASSAGE DUG BY THE AUSTRIANS AT DUBNO, RUSSIA, WITH AN OUTLET IN A CHURCH



Copyright by Brown & Dawson

WINTER QUARTERS

These German soldiers have made themselves very snug just behind the front in the Argonne region. The hut in the foreground is a field post office. The "corduroy" paths are reminiscent of pioneer days in America.



ANOTHER ASPECT OF LIFE IN THE TRENCHES

These Frenchmen are in the front line of trenches during a brisk bombardment. The shell-hole shows the Germans have got the range. The less venturesome of the pair finds his pipe useful in helping to preserve his sang-froid.



A LIGHT GUN ELABORATELY ENTRENCHED

Note the curtains which are closely drawn when there is danger of aërial observation. These guns are used to cut wire entanglements, destroy parapets, silence enemy artillery, and for barrage fire either with or without gas shells.



BELGIANS ENTRENCHED OUTSIDE ANTWERP

In this final stand of Belgian patriotism against the German invaders there is a strong appeal to American admiration. For a nation whose own history begins at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defense of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of all that men hold dear, is a moving spectacle.






UNDERGROUND WITH THE BRITISH

(Above) King George inspects a trench won from the Germans.
(Below) These British Red Cross Officers have "dug themselves in" very comfortably and are just sitting down to dinner. Cave life is not always incompatible with good cheer.

Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SHELTERS IN THE ALPS

It would seem, and all the narratives of German generals after the war emphasize this point, that Moltke was too far removed from the front and both his orders and the reports of his generals travelled with fatal slowness. Thus on September 5th he issued orders on the assump-



THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE AISNE, SEPTEMBER IOTH-I5TH, 1914

The purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France, reëstablish contact between the various armies, and then seek, in a new contest, to win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne

tion that his armies were in places totally different from those in which they actually stood. All through the decisive phase of the following battle he seems to have been out of touch. Finally, it is only on September 9th that he is placed in possession of the actual facts and by this time the battle has been lost, his right wing, the armies destined to deliver the principal blow, are all in forced retreat; the question raised is simply whether the retreat can be checked at the Aisne or at the Meuse.

In the presence of this terrible crisis, carrying with it the unmistakable proof of the failure of the whole German plan, the supreme gamble for a swift victory, there can be no question that Moltke collapsed. Under circumstances every bit as agonizing, Joffre rose to the emergency with supreme courage, but Moltke was not of the same material. For four days more he wrestled with the problem, growing more and more uncertain, "the reins trailing on the ground," as Tirpitz reports. Then abruptly he disappears and Falkenhayn arrives, the world remaining ignorant of the change for many months.

II. THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

On the night of September 14th, as we have seen, Falkenhayn—favourite of the Emperor, Minister of War, a shining rather than solid figure in the German military hierarchy—took over the command of the beaten imperial armies. The first problem which confronted him was to make good the position behind the Aisne to which the armies of Kluck and Bülow were retiring, to fill the gaps between the several armies and thus to prepare the way for eventual counter-offensive. In his own narrative, Falkenhayn thus describes the situation:

"The retiring movements which were connected with the Battle of the Marne had at any rate come to an end. The German western army faced the enemy again. Yet the front between the Oise and Rheims was only maintained with difficulty against the assaults of the oncoming enemy. In the Champagne, too, the German lines were not yet consolidated."

By the third week in September the whole front from the Oise to Verdun had become stationary. The Allied advance had been checked. German counter-offensives had been improvised, and as Falkenhayn correctly states, while these counter-thrusts failed to produce any large result they did suffice to compel the French and the English to assume a defensive posture from the Oise to the Moselle and "their mistake in assuming the events after the Battle of the Marne to mean the collapse of Germany was hammered into them."

But these German counter-attacks were designed to accomplish a far larger purpose. Already Joffre was beginning to move masses of troops up the valley of the Oise around the right flank of the whole German front from the Oise to Verdun. The campaign was entering a new phase. Unless Falkenhayn could compel Joffre to reënforce his centre and thus to abandon the movement of troops around the German right flank, Falkenhayn would be obliged to push troops to meet this enveloping movement and all hope of resuming the battle toward Paris would have to be foregone. In a word, these German counter-thrusts were designed to regain the initiative won by the Germans at the Battle of the Frontiers and lost at the Marne.

Falkenhayn failed to attain this larger purpose and the result was the transfer of the conflict to other fields, was, in fact, that "race to the sea" which in turn led to the Battle of the Yser. But before turning to this new phase it is necessary to note the progress of events between the Oise and the Vosges which culminated in the creation of that western front which from September, 1914, to the early days of October, 1918, endured with only one considerable change.

By the opening of the third week in September Kluck's army had made good its position north of the Aisne from the heights south of Noyon to the Craonne Plateau. The gap between Kluck and Bülow had been closed by the arrival of the German Seventh Corps released by the fall of Maubeuge and by troops brought from Lorraine constituting the Seventh Army. Maunoury, Sir John French, and Franchet d'Esperey had been checked south of the Craonne Plateau crowned by that Chemin des Dames which was to be the objective of so many desperate battles during the next four years. British and French armies alike had forced crossings along the Aisne from west of Soissons to Berry-au-Bac, but the exhaustion of the armies, of their ammunition, the arrival of German heavy artillery, and the superiority of the Germans in machine guns had brought them to a dead halt.

Thus the German liquidated the Marne at the Aisne so far as his western flank was concerned. South of the Aisne and about Rheims he did better. Having retired through Rheims, Bülow turned and at-

tacked Foch, retook Fort Brimont on the hills to the north of the city, and made good that position from which for four long years German guns shelled the French city. And at this moment began the bombardment of Rheims Cathedral which would impress the whole world, neutral and belligerent alike, and lose the German one more battle in his campaign to gain the sympathy of the neutral world at the precise moment when his campaign for swift and decisive military triumph had failed.

From the hills and forts above Rheims the German line stretched eastward over the barren and monotonous plains of Champagne to the Argonne. This front was held by the armies of Hausen—now commanded by Einem, for the general vanquished at Fère Champenoise disappeared in prompt disgrace—and Würtemberg. Between the Argonne and the Woëvre plain east of Verdun the army of the German Crown Prince halted after its retreat from Ornain. Having retired north of the Verdun-Châlons railroad, the Crown Prince undertakes by a vigorous counter-offensive to regain this vital line of communications. He advances several miles, retakes Varennes, where Louis XVI's tragic flight had terminated, but gets no farther. American soldiers will find him about Montfaucon in substantially the same position from the Argonne to the Meuse when they begin, just four years later.

At the same moment far to the south a German corps comes out of Metz, crosses the Woëvre plain, penetrates the barrier of the heights of the Meuse, takes St. Mihiel and with it Fort Camp des Romains. For a moment it seems possible that this thrust in conjunction with that of the Crown Prince may envelop Verdun. But the French react; the Germans are first thrown back and then held. Still they retain St. Mihiel.

They will continue to hold it until September 12, 1918, when an American army entering its first European battle, the greatest struggle in American history up to that moment, will abolish the too-famous St. Mihiel salient forever. Meantime, the success of the two thrusts north and south of Verdun, although only partial, suffice measurably to isolate the fortress and to cut its two available lines of communication. Hence-

forth Verdun is compromised, becomes a shining mark, which will presently attract German High Command.

Eastward of St. Mihiel and the Moselle the respective armies after the Battle of Nancy dig in close to the frontier from Pont-à-Mousson to Switzerland, and the Armistice of November 11, 1918, will find them substantially where they stood in the closing days of September, 1914. And along all the front from St. Mihiel to Belfort American divisions will find training camps in quiet sectors when their turn comes.

All these complex and confusing operations may properly be described as a single battle with its decisive phase on the Aisne front. Roughly speaking, it occupied two weeks. In these two weeks Falkenhayn strove to make good his position and then to regain the offensive. Joffre endeavoured by relentless pursuit after the Marne victory to prevent the Germans from taking root in France. His dominating purpose was to transform his victory on the battlefield into a decision which would expel the enemy from France. The measurable failure of both the German and French purposes resulted in the deadlock between the Oise and Switzerland which marked the close of the Battle of the Aisne.

One further circumstance compels attention. On September 3rd the German official statement announced the approach of German armies to Paris after decisive victories everywhere. Thereafter came silence. Berlin waited with feverish excitement for the fall of the French capital. For ten days German High Command gave no sign. Presently Allied reports of the victory at the Marne filled the press of the world. Then, when the German retreat to the Aisne had been accomplished, there emerged a sweeping denial of the fact of the Marne. A few days later, when Falkenhayn's counter-offensive began, Berlin became vociferous. It was the *real* battle which was now opening; decision had been postponed but was at hand.

But the counter-offensives fail; the French turning movement west of the Oise develops. The field of combat shifts from the Aisne to the Somme, from the Somme to the Scarpe. It approaches Belgium. Insensibly German attention is diverted from Paris to Calais. In a word, the Battle of the Marne is abolished for the German public. Ger-

man High Command denies the fact, will continue to deny it for four years. The substitution of Falkenhayn for Moltke will be concealed for many months to aid in the greater deception. To confess defeat is to destroy the prestige of that invincible general staff on which the legend of the superman rests. And in all history there is no more amazing circumstance than this successful suppression from a whole nation of the fact of a supremely great battle and of a defeat which sealed the fate of the vanquished.

III. BY THE LEFT FLANK

At the close of the third week in September the Battle of the Aisne, having led to a substantial check for both Falkenhayn and Joffre, begins to merge into that manœuvre which is picturesquely described as "the race to the sea." The Germans had made good the front from the Oise to the Meuse. Frontal attacks had been checked and pushed back; trench warfare was setting in. A war of movement was only possible in the area between the Oise and the Channel.

In this area and around the western front of the German Joffre, as early as September 15th, began a turning movement. The operation which followed may be fairly compared to Grant's movement from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour in the campaign of 1864. Then Grant sought, advancing by his left flank, to intervene between Lee and Richmond, severing his enemy's communications with the Confederate capital. Fifty years later Joffre, also moving by the left flank, similarly aimed at Falkenhayn's communications with Belgium.

In his memoirs Falkenhayn sets forth the value of these communications as follows:

"The only line of supply of any use to the greater part of the western half of the German army was the railway connection leading from Belgium into the St. Quentin district. This was almost wholly unprotected against enemy attacks. Any, even if only temporary, gain there on the part of the enemy would be bound to lead to incalculable consequences."

Falkenhayn, as we have seen, endeavoured to prevent Joffre from striking at these communications by counter-thrusts of his own be-

tween the Oise and the Moselle. Failing in these, he had no other choice than "to carry out, with the greatest speed, movements behind the German front corresponding to the enemy's movement, with the object of not only meeting the enemy's efforts at envelopment but of countering them also, so far as the circumstances permitted, by means of an enveloping movement by the Germans."

Condemned thus to conform to Joffre's strategy, to march to the music of the Allied commander, Falkenhayn still looks forward to an eventual reconquest of the offensive; but his effort in this direction must wait upon the arrival of reënforcements, and not until the very last days of October can he expect such reënforcements. Then five corps, called to training at the outbreak of the war, will become available. With them Falkenhayn—brushing aside agonizing pleas coming to him from Hindenburg in East Prussia, from the stricken Austrians in Galicia—will make one more bid for decision in the west; and this will be the German "Battle for Calais." But against the coming of the new formations he can do no more than parry Joffre's thrusts and seek to abolish the Belgian threat in his rear at Antwerp.

As the Battle of the Aisne merges into the "Race to the Sea" in September, the "Race to the Sea" will merge almost indistinguishably into the "Battle for Calais" in October. As the final phase begins there will appear in the north the figure of Foch. To his genius will be due the final check of Falkenhayn, and as he travels northward to meet the coming storm he will pause for a brief, characteristic interview with De Maud'huy in the little town hall of Doullens. In this *Mairie* less than four years later a conference of the statesmen of all the Allies will summon Foch to perform one more miracle, and in April, 1918, he will bridle the German flood about Amiens as he had already turned it from Calais in October, 1914.

It is now time to examine in detail the operations of late September and early October, keeping clearly in mind that the object of Joffre is to outflank the German right, interpose between it and Belgium, severing the vital railway communications on which it depends. Falkenhayn's purpose is to prevent this development, cover his communications

tions, await the arrival of the new corps which will enable him to take the offensive.

Joffre's first thrust aims at St. Quentin by the valley of the Oise and through Noyon, but this is checked by German troops arriving from Lorraine. So confident were the French of the success of their thrust that at this time Millerand, French Minister of War, one day to be President of the Republic, forecasts the immediate retirement of the Germans from France, and London has a rumour that Kluck has surrendered. Old Tirpitz, at German Headquarters, now established at Charleville, records in his diary the gloomy apprehensions of that hour.


This French thrust is, however, parried. The Germans begin to answer the French flanking operations by bringing troops of their own from their main front and putting them in west of the Oise. These troops retake Péronne, Roye, Lassigny, and win an action at Bapaume, establishing in this sector that front which will endure up to the hour of the great Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916. And on this same ground will be fought the decisive phases of the final campaign of 1918.

IV. THE RACE TO THE SEA

But Joffre sticks to his plan. He has brought De Castelnau from Lorraine with much of the army which had defended Nancy. Oddly enough the army of De Castelnau, which has long faced the army of Rupprecht of Bavaria east of the Moselle, arrives west of the Oise just in time to meet the same German army. A general dislocation of French and German armies is going forward, General Maud'huy, brought from the Aisne and put in command of a new army, encounters Bülow, brought over from before Rheims. Finally the Grand Duke of Würtemberg arrives from the Argonne and faces Foch, but recently commanding the army which had reconquered Rheims.

And with this general dislocation the German hope of resuming the offensive between the Oise and the Moselle expires. The campaign enters the second phase. The front from Noyon to Nancy becomes relatively unimportant and the deadlock of trench war along this line becomes absolute. Now the field of operations is between the Oise

and the sea and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure. Joffre puts De Castelnau in about Roye and he encounters



THE RACE TO THE SEA

Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea, and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure

Rupprecht of Bavaria. He puts Maud'huy in and he meets Bülow east of Arras. He puts Foch in and Foch encounters, not merely Würtemberg, come from the Argonne, but Besseler, striking south, when the Antwerp episode is completed. Even Field Marshal French, quitting his trenches near Soissons, will presently arrive at Ypres.

The French strategy begins to reveal itself. As the French line mounts to the north it points first toward Lille, lost in the first hours of the invasion and subsequently retaken, then toward Antwerp, where the Belgian army still stands, with a line of retreat open to the south, on the west bank of the Scheldt.

What this means the German High Command at last perceives. It can no longer continue its effort to advance between the Oise and the Meuse, it has been compelled to draw off troops in Lorraine and Champagne to meet the new thrust in Picardy and Artois. Already the active front has mounted into Flanders. Unless a change comes promptly the French line will extend until it reaches Belgium, joins with the Belgian front behind the Scheldt, and not only will there ensue a trench deadlock from Holland to Switzerland, but the Germans will be permanently excluded from the Belgian seacoast. If such a deadlock ensues, then there is an end to all hope—and already this hope is becoming remote—of a quick decision over France, and a short war.

There remains in late September only a gap forty miles wide between the French lines in position from Lille southward and the Channel. Unless German troops can penetrate this gap and come south, sweeping behind the Channel ports of Calais and Boulogne, the whole western campaign will have ended in a stalemate and the French, British, and Belgians will hold an unbroken line from Antwerp to Belfort.

Hence in the latter half of September begins the new and final German concentration. German strategy has now three purposes: to take Antwerp and capture the Belgian army, thus preventing a junction of the Belgians with their allies; to move south through the gap between Lille and the Channel, taking the Channel ports, and finally, if possible, thus regaining the initiative; to reopen the decision of the Marne and win a real victory north of Amiens. Even if this last object is not realized the Germans can hope to shorten their front by establishing their western flank on the sea near the mouth of the Somme and at the same time complete the occupation of northern France and that seacoast which would be the logical base for operations against Britain.

And for the German people this last phase is summed up by the word "Calais," as the earlier drive was comprehended in the magic term "Paris."

For clarity and convenience we may regard the Battle of the Aisne as covering all the operations between Soissons and St. Mihiel in the time in which the Germans endeavoured to regain the initiative and advance over the ground they had covered on the road to the Marne. We may regard the "Race to the Sea" as describing the complicated operations following the effort of the French to outflank the Germans between the Oise and the Channel, which resulted in extending the deadlock of trench warfare at right angles to the old front nearly as far north as the city of Lille.

Then comes the German effort to destroy the Belgian army in Antwerp and drive south through the open gap between Lille and the sea, which results in the capture of Antwerp and the advance south as far as the Yser and Ypres, the occupation of most of the Belgian seacoast, and finally the bloody defeats at the Yser and Ypres, where the French and British close the last gap in the line from the sea to Switzerland and thus checkmate German strategy.

In capturing Antwerp the Germans won a moral not a military victory, since the Belgian army escaped. But the occupation of the Belgian seacoast was a considerable material advantage and it was due primarily to the fatal interposition of Winston Churchill, who made his celebrated entrance into Antwerp after King Albert and the French General Staff had agreed upon an evacuation, inevitable by reason of German progress through the Belgian defenses. Yielding to the importunities of Churchill, King Albert delayed his evacuation for two days. When he did leave he lost a whole division, crowded into Dutch territory by the Germans; his army was disorganized by its pressed retreat; it was no longer possible to hold the line of the Scheldt; and the Germans were not only able to take Ostend and the Belgian seacoast, but also to seize Lille, the greatest manufacturing city of northern France, which they still hold after two years and a half.

Only by a narrow margin did the intervention of Churchill miss caus-

ing the capture of King Albert's whole army and a great Allied disaster. Never was there a better example of the folly of political interference with military operations; no single blunder in the whole opening days of the war was more costly to the Allies than this grotesque venture of a British cabinet minister into the realms of higher strategy.

V. ANTWERP

It was the Siege of Antwerp which supplied the single unmistakable circumstance of the October fighting and on the human side the only dramatic incident in a war which had now become a bewildering tangle of operations obscure to the contemporary observer and without immediately apparent result. From the attack on Liége to the Battle of the Aisne the world had looked eagerly for a Sedan or a Waterloo. But in October it was plain that the time for Sedans and Waterloos was passing.

Thus it was that the first shots of the German cannon before Antwerp on September 29th instantly drew the attention of the world to an action which was easily comprehensible and already promised to be promptly decisive. More than this, there was in the final stand of Belgian patriotism an appeal to American admiration, lacking in all else in a war between rival cultures, ambitions, races. For a nation whose own history began at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defense of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of life, of all that men could hold dear, was a moving spectacle. For Americans there was bound to be in the final tragedy of the Belgians a claim on sympathy. Already to the neutral eyes beyond the Atlantic the Belgian resistance had taken on the character of that of Holland to Spain, of the Greeks to the Persians.

On the military side the German attack upon Antwerp was easily explicable. German attempts to force a short road into northern France by taking Verdun had failed. West of the Oise and the Scheldt the Allied advance was pushing north toward Antwerp. If the Belgians and their allies should join hands, German hold on Belgium would be precarious, for Antwerp was now like the citadel of a captured fortress,

which still held out. But far more serious was the fact that such a junction would close the last open gap on the western front and rob Germany of her only remaining chance not merely to reverse the decision of the Marne, but also to reach the Channel and the North Sea, facing the British coast.

From the outset Belgian resistance had seriously impeded German plans. In the days when every German soldier was needed in France, an army corps had to be kept in Belgium to protect the German lines of communication and contain the Belgian field army in Antwerp. At the moment of the Battle of Charleroi the Belgian army had made a sortie, in the course of which it had almost reached Louvain. The destruction of this city followed this fighting and was an act of reprisal by the Germans, who ruthlessly executed many men and women. This deed promptly filled the civilized world with horror and awakened protest in all lands. Again, at the Battle of the Marne, a second Belgian sortie had detained troops which were starting south and held them until the critical days of the retreat to the Aisne were passed.

To rid themselves of this annoyance, to clear their flanks, to prepare the way for a final attack to the south, the Germans now resolved to have done with King Albert and his gallant little army. The closing days of September, therefore, saw Belgium approaching her final agony.

In all military history of the future the capture of Antwerp must necessarily be a landmark. Here, briefly, terribly, the superiority of the gun over the fort, of the mechanic over the engineer, was demonstrated. Aside from Paris, there was no city believed to be as strongly fortified as Antwerp, and the fate of Antwerp gave a new value to the French for the recent deliverance of Paris. Unlike Paris, however, its position on the neutralized Scheldt and near the Dutch frontier prevented complete investment. Along its southern front, ten miles distant, the Nèthe flowed through deep marshes, forming a natural moat, strengthened by forts once held to be impregnable.

Before these forts, in trenches long ago prepared, stood the whole Belgian field army, reënforced in its last days by British marines. All that the art of the engineer, all that the courage of brave men fighting with their backs to the wall could contribute to making a fortress impregnable, was to be found in the ancient Flemish city.

Yet before the German artillery Antwerp's defenses crumbled with incredible rapidity. What the 42-centimetre gun and the Austrian "305" had accomplished at Liége, at Namur, at Maubeuge, but hitherto behind a veil, they now did in the full sight of the whole world. In less than a week these forts which had been pronounced impregnable were heaps of dust and ashes, and German troops had forced the river defenses and the field trenches, driving the Belgians before them. By October 7th the Krupp shells were falling about the noble tower of the Antwerp cathedral. The city and the suburbs were breaking out in flames. The end was in sight.

The next day the field army of Belgium, commanded by its still-undaunted king, crossed the Scheldt on pontoons, moved west along the Dutch frontier accompanied by the British contingent, and made good its escape to join the Allied armies, still moving up from the south, although 20,000 Belgians forced across the Dutch frontier were disarmed and interned. Meanwhile, by every ship, train, road, thousands of refugees, fleeing from the shells that were falling in Antwerp, flowed out to Holland, to England, to France. A new migration of a people had begun.

The end came on October 9th, when the city surrendered, the remaining Belgian forces escaping to Holland and there laying down the arms they had wielded so valiantly. Not a city, but a nation, had fallen. For England only less than for Belgium, the fall of Antwerp had been a terrible blow. The "pistol pointed at the heart of England," as Napoleon had described the city, was now in the hands of William II.

With the fall of Antwerp and that of Ostend, which promptly followed on October 15th, British public opinion at last recognized that a new Napoleonic war, with the same issues and many of the same circumstances, was before them. British observers already foretold accurately the launching of German submarines and German zeppelins from Zeebrugge. A new Napoleon had reached the Channel. Once

more it was for the British people to watch the narrow strip of sea as they had a century before. But now it was necessary also to watch the skies for that new engine which had added so much to the terror of war.

VI. THE BATTLE OF THE YSER

In late October there opened between La Bassée and the sea the most deadly campaign the war had yet seen. For the next six weeks, on a front of barely forty miles, some hundreds of thousands of men struggled by day and by night for the possession of a score of villages lying straight across the pathway of the new German advance, between the Lys and the mouth of the Yser. When it had ended, in part through the exhaustion of both combatants, the Germans had gained a few parcels of territory, a few wrecked villages, but in the main the line stood as it had stood in the opening hours of the conflict, despite the fact that the German Emperor had come himself to spur on his brave but beaten soldiers and that the whole German nation had set its heart upon Calais.

The purpose of the German strategy was plain. Antwerp taken, Ostend captured, there was an apparent opportunity to sweep down the coast past Calais and Boulogne; to seize Dunkirk, the last French fortress in the north; to take root on the eastern shore of the Strait of Dover; to bring by canal and river the submarines, already so fatal to British warships; to threaten England with invasion as Napoleon had threatened it; to menace London by zeppelin fleets; by heavy artillery and mines to close the Strait of Dover and leave the port of London as dead as that of Hamburg. Underlying all these magnificent details, too, was the dominant determination to regain the offensive, to take up again the road to France.

Not less rapid was the concentration of the Allies. Coming north across the French frontier, French regular troops, British forces withdrawn from the Aisne in early October, Sikhs, Ghurkas, all the Indian contingent now to have their baptism of fire, Senegalese and Moroccan riflemen, Turcos and Légionnaires—finally the retreating remnant of the Belgians reënforced by French and British divisions—gathered around the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres, on the shores of the

North Sea at Nieuport, and behind the Yser River and the canal that joined it to the Lys, to meet the storm. And once more the post of honour and danger fell to Foch, under whose supreme command the Britons and the Belgians, as well as the French, fought.

A more admirable country for defense than the Yser front it is difficult to imagine. Eastward from the dunes stretched an intricate maze of river, canal, and ditch—much of the land subject to inundation once the sluices were open; all of it certain to become a swamp when the first storms of winter began. On this front a dozen large and small villages and hundreds of little stone farmhouses offered cover. Trenches dug to-day might be flooded to-morrow; artillery dragged within range over level fields one day might be submerged the next.

Such was the country between the Yser and the sea. Here and about Ypres for more than a month there continued, with slight interruption, one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of war, fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted at Tours. Asia, Africa, America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.

The first blow fell along the seacoast south of Ostend, fell upon the remnant of Belgian forces, led by their intrepid king standing behind the Yser River at Nieuport, where it enters the sea. Here for days the Belgians maintained an unequal combat. At the critical moment a British fleet took station beyond the dunes and with its heavy artillery beat down the German advance after a slaughter which was terrible.

Halted here, the Germans moved inland and came on again about Dixmude, halfway between Ypres and Nieuport. Here once more they made progress until the Belgians in their despair opened the sluices and the water flowed over fertile fields carrying ruin with it, turning the whole country into a lake, drowning the invaders in numbers, creating an obstacle impassable for the present.

Eastward from Dixmude—which presently, after the most desperate of struggles and after changing hands many times, remained with the Germans (who were halted in its ruin by the ever-memorable resistance

THE SLAVS IN THE WORLD WAR



PART OF THE CRACK CAVALRY CORPS FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE CZAR'S OWN HUSSARS

PICTURES OF RUSSIAN AND SERBIAN SOLDIERS



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

Copyright by Under GENERAL RENNENKAMPF



Copyright by the American Press Association GENERAL RUSSKY

GENERAL BRUSILOFF

FOUR RUSSIAN GENERALS

The Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Czar, is a real soldier and an able soldier. Though a Romanoff his political tendency is toward liberalism. The Czar was probably jealous of him, and after his abdication a plot was launched to offer Grand Duke Nicholas the crown.

General Rennenkampf. After winning Tannenberg from one Russian army under Samsonoff, Hindenburg pursued a second, that of Rennenkampf, from the very gates of Königsberg across his frontier. Later, two German corps under Von Francois were surrounded and Petrograd claimed a victory. But it failed to materialize. The trapped Germans by exertions which the Russians frankly conceded to have been "incredible" found their way out, thanks to the tardiness of Rennenkampf, who went at once into retirement after this fiasco.

Russky and Brusiloff commanded two of the five armies which took part in the great Russian offensive in August and September, 1914. They operated in Galicia, while Rennenkampf and Samsonoff invaded East Prussia.



BATTERY OF RUSSIAN HOWITZERS ON THE POLISH FRONT

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RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

The Russian muzhik makes a good soldier. To begin with there is an inexhaustible supply of him. He has great endurance, is patient, good-natured, and obedient, but lacks initiative. On the whole he has given a good account of himself in the war. He would have done better had he been equipped and supplied as efficiently as the soldiers of the other races. Moreover, there is good reason for the suspicion that he has sometimes been led to his undoing by traitorous pro-German generals.



THE FORMER CZAR'S BODYGUARD OF PICKED COSSACKS RIDING TO THE DEFENCE OF WARSAW



RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS

When Russians and Austrians are pitted against each other as man to man in a fair encounter, this is apt to be the result. The Austrians march to the rear as prisoners. The Austrians have more spirit and dash, but they lack the stolid strength and steadfastness of the Russian peasants. Moreover, the Russians are racially a unit; while the men of the steppes.



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SERBIA IN THE WAR

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The raw material of which Serbian soldiers are made.

The finished product.

Gallant little Serbia was finally overcome by the overwhelming strength of her adversaries. But the world will not soon forget the splendid succession of victories which preceded her days of disaster. In the First Balkan War she defeated the Turks at Kumanovo, at Monastir, and at Adrianople; in the Second Balkan War she shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility at Bregalnitza; in the opening month of the World War when the fortune of the Allies was most desperate it was the victory of the Serb at Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne. In the early days of December Belgrad fell, but once again the Serbians rallied. Belgrad was retaken; by December 15, 1914, Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being, saved until the third—and fatal

Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

SERBIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH NEAR THE AUSTRIAN BORDER

of the famous Fusiliers Marins, the "Golden Lads" of Brittany)—the attack was directed at Ypres. Here the British stood. Here the Kaiser's wish was gratified and the troops of England met the gallant Bavarians; but they did not succumb. At points the line bent back. Real gains were made by the Germans, but the line held. Day and night the slaughter went on. Trenches, hills, farmhouses were taken and retaken. Villages and towns were transformed into heaps of ashes.

To add to the horror autumn began, and sleet and rain, finally snow, fell, transforming the whole country into a swamp. In the inextricable tangle of roads, buildings, and ruined towns, the bodies of men lay unburied for days. The streams and ditches were choked with the human wreckage. All semblance of strategy vanished.

Tactical considerations were subordinated to the simple, single purpose of an advance by the mere weight of numbers. It became not a struggle based on the application of modern theories, but a death-grapple between thousands and hundreds of thousands of men, transformed by suffering, by deprivation, by the misery of the autumn storms, to mere animals, clad in clothes reduced to rags or undiscoverable beneath the outward layers of mud.

Again and again more losses, frightful attrition, seemed to bring the German effort to a standstill. Yet always in a few hours or days new thousands returned to the charge. Always, too, they came forward fearlessly, a song upon their lips. Regiments of youths took the place of the older men of the first line, but the boys were not less brave than the men, the recruits than the veterans.

VII. CHECKMATE

Such were the battles of Flanders, the Battle of the Yser, won by the Belgians and the French, the Battle of Ypres won by the British and the French. Never was a race more closely run. Never was victory nearer to the Germans than in the early days of November. The jerry-built dyke that Joffre had stretched across the last open gap on his front barely held. On November 15th, when the last effort of the Prussian Guard failed, the British Expeditionary Army had become

almost a memory and its losses had passed anything in British history. At Ypres fifty thousand British were killed, wounded, or captured—a third of the whole Expeditionary Army. On the same field the French lost seventy thousand and the Belgians twenty thousand. As for the German loss, it certainly passed a quarter of a million.


Memorable, hereafter, will be the fact that as the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had almost been silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. Come to France at the moment of the crisis, come to cheer his well-loved Indian troops now fighting bravely on the western line, Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory, which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it. Worth repeating, too, is the legend, credited to De Souza, that having studied the maps, having examined the plans and preparations of the French general, who held supreme command over British and French troops alike, Lord Roberts said to staff officers of Foch: "You have a great general."

At Ypres the British troops did all that was expected of them, and more could not be expected of any troops. "Wipers" of the English "Tommy" deserves a place beside Waterloo and Blenheim in British military history. Yet here, as elsewhere, it was the British soldier who shone, for the generalship was French and the victory was won through the genius of that general who had delivered the decisive thrust at the Marne. And for Foch the supreme test came in the midnight hours of a day in which his son and his son-in-law had died on the field of honour.

But however close the race, the decision was absolute. The whole German conception of a swift, terrible, decisive thrust at France had ended in the bloody shambles of the Yser and Ypres. Not a French army had been destroyed, not a French army had been captured. The great battle that was to come six weeks after the declaration of war had come; it had been a French victory, not a Waterloo or a Sedan, but a victory compelling a general German retreat dislocating their whole strategic conception. After that retreat it had never been possible to

regain the offensive and renew the bid for a decision. Each separate offensive effort from St. Mihiel to Nieuport had been beaten down almost where it had started.

Save for Russian defeat at Tannenberg, the defeat at the Marne



DEADLOCK IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER 15, 1914

November 15th sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. Behind her trench lines Germany held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger part of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France was in no position to take the initiative, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of a considerable offensive

might have necessitated a retreat to the Rhine. Hindenburg's victory had given Germany two more months in the west. She had used them up and now the eastern situation had become critical. Russian pressure in East Prussia had recalled German corps from France even before

the Marne. Now, Russian victories in Galicia, the disasters that had overtaken Austria and seemed to forecast her collapse, the crisis in Hindenburg's campaign in Poland, all cried out for attention.

November 15th, then, sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. In that time Germany had overrun Belgium, had occupied more than 8,000 square miles of France and devastated much more; she had approached Paris, on September 5th its suburbs were visible to her armies, but she had been compelled to recoil, and thenceforth until the end in Flanders her strategy had conformed to Joffre's and her purposes had all wrecked in conflict with his will.

Behind her trench lines Germany now held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger share of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France, after her terrific struggle, was in no shape to take the offensive, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of considerable offensive. Germany's prevision in the matter of heavy artillery and machine guns gave her armies a real and long-enduring advantage in trench war.

But the other side of the picture was unmistakable. Germany had staked all on a quick decision; she had become involved in a long war. She had planned to dispose of her enemies in detail, destroying first French military establishments and then Russian; she had failed to destroy France, and Russian armies were now pounding down to the Carpathians. Despite her manifest gains and brilliant preliminary victories, she had, then, lost the first round of the war. She had lost it at the Marne and all her desperate struggles from the Marne to the Yser had availed her nothing. Now at last she must go east and deal with Russia; new horizons and new victories beckoned; but while she turned her face east, Britain and France, behind the dyke they had erected in the west, began to gather up their strength for a renewal of their offensive in a future which was far more distant than they could dream.

With the close of the fighting about Ypres the western battle falls to the level of a deadlock, which endured until the Battle of the Somme in July, 1916, with no material change in the battle fronts.

CHAPTER NINE THE EASTERN FIELD

I RUSSIAN AND GERMAN PURPOSES

With the failure of the German effort at Ypres, the western field loses its importance for more than a year and a quarter. It is not until the colossal bid for Verdun in February, 1916, that the events on the French and Belgian front take on that importance which they had in the opening days of the war. It is, of course, true that long before the battles of Flanders in October and November the eastern field had been the scene of many terrific engagements, and of campaigns whose relation to those in the west is not patent, yet, for the purpose of narration, it is simpler to deal first with the western operations right through the Battle of the Marne until the decision there had been made absolute in Flanders, and then examine in detail the eastern operations from the morning of hostilities.

These operations were seen only confusedly and understood but little in the early days of conflict. There is lacking still and will remain wanting for many years, perhaps, that complete detail which we already possess in the case of the French operations in the west. But it is possible to perceive, upon the least scientific study, that from the opening days of the eastern struggle until the German victory at the Dunajec transformed the whole eastern situation, two very clear and well-defined plans were working out.

In the last days of August, acting in strict conformity with a prearranged plan made by the French and Russian General Staffs, two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, where one found disaster at Tannenberg and the other was compelled to fall back to the frontier and assume a defensive posture. Despite subsequent ventures, leading directly to a second disaster, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the East Prussian field was thenceforth of secondary interest and importance.

On the other hand, concomitant with the Russian defeat at Tannenberg was the first of the two great Russian victories about Lemberg, which exercised a permanent influence upon the eastern campaign down to the Battle of the Dunajec. In these battles about Lemberg the military establishment of Austria was temporarily wrecked and Russian strategy henceforth was concentrated upon the effort to make absolute the consequences of the early victories, to enforce the decision of Lemberg, and put Austria out of the war.

This purpose led to the steady pressure upon Austria on the Galician front, to the advance to the San, to the suburbs of Cracow, and finally, when further progress in this direction was proven impossible, to the gigantic campaign in the Carpathians, which aimed at passing the crests of this range and pouring down into the Hungarian Plain. In the course of the effort many battles, most of them Russian victories, were fought, and the great fortress of Przemysl, with a huge garrison, was captured. The disaster at the Dunajec occurred while the fighting in the Carpathians was still going in the Russian favour, but it is nevertheless true that Russia had failed to achieve her main purpose, when she was forced to give it over.

By contrast with the Russian campaign and purpose, the German efforts in the east were directed at preventing Russia from crushing Austria. These efforts were not originally or mainly confined to supporting Austria in Galicia; rather the Germans undertook, by a campaign of their own, to compel Russia to turn her attention away from Austria and give the Austrians time, under German direction, to get on their feet again. In addition, the German plan had the local object to take Warsaw, seize the west bank of the Vistula River, one of the most serious military obstacles in Europe, and thus insure their own eastern front.

When they began their operations in Poland in October, at the moment they were also attacking Antwerp and preparing for their final effort to break the decision of the Marne, the Germans had only small

effectives, and their advance to the outskirts of Warsaw suggests Early's dash for Washington in 1864, designed primarily to shake Grant's grip on Petersburg and Richmond. Even if they did not get Warsaw, which was a gamble, the Germans expected, justly, to compel the Russians to send troops from Galicia and thus give Austria respite. In this they were entirely successful.

The second drive, begun in November and leading promptly to the terrible Battle of Lodz, was a more serious undertaking. This time the Germans not only expected to relieve the pressure on the Austrians but also to get Warsaw. Temporarily they helped the Austrians, but they failed wholly in the attempt to get Warsaw, and the Austrians were soon in danger again.

November saw, in the west, the final surrender of the German purpose to abolish the decision of the Marne. This was given over, not because it was proven hopeless—in fact, the Germans were almost at the point of victory when they stopped at Ypres—but because it was no longer safe to attempt to deal with their eastern front with the slender effectives which they had there. Up to this moment the Russian campaign had not materially affected the western. It had drawn two Austrian corps out of Alsace at the perilous moment of the Marne, but it had not compelled the Germans to withdraw troops from the western front. On the contrary, they had sent at least six new corps to Belgium for the Ypres and Yser battles.

Had the Russians won at Tannenberg their pressure would have begun to affect the Germans in the west before the Battle of the Marne. When the Russians failed, the Germans were able to go right ahead with their western campaign until November. But at this point the Battle of Lemberg began to have consequences, which the Battle of Tannenberg would have had, had it been a Russian victory. With her western campaign unwon, Germany had to go east in November. So far, the Franco-Russian strategy had prevailed over the German, but the result had been reached so tardily that German armies in the west had been able to dig in on French and Belgian soil from the Vosges to the sea.

After Lodz, Germany turns east and gives her main attention to the Russian front. When she began in November, it is clear that her High Command expected to take Warsaw and beat down the Russian danger before spring, using several corps borrowed from the western front, which had now fallen to the level of trench war. Her High Command obviously had expected to return to the west in the spring and try again to abolish that Marne decision, always weighing upon Germany, because if this decision were to stand, time would be allowed Britain to arm, equip, and munition her millions.

Once Germany did turn east she began a tremendous effort. In December, in January, and in February there are terrific attacks on the whole Polish front facing Warsaw and one great attempt to get to Warsaw and behind Warsaw from East Prussia. But all these fail. The February failure establishes the fact that Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west and new Russian victories in Galicia make it clear that the Germans' effort to relieve Austria by her campaign for Warsaw has failed.

Sometime in February at the latest, Germany discovers that it will not be possible to shake Russia off in time to go back west and renew her effort to get France, still her main foe, out of the war in the spring and summer of 1915. Instead, it is clear that Austria must be kept in the war by a major effort directed against Russia. It is then become essential, since Russia must be attacked, that the blow shall be sufficiently heavy to put Russia out of the war altogether and leave German hands free to deal with France, reinforced by Britain, before Britain has reached the point in her preparation where she will be strong enough to lend France the necessary aid.

Here is the genesis of the great German campaign of the summer of 1916, which begins in Galicia and ends far in Russian territory. With this campaign we are not concerned now. But what it is necessary to recognize is that Russia succeeded in defending Warsaw and holding back Germany, while beating in upon Austria, just long enough to prevent Germany from returning to the western field in 1915. In doing this she gave France and Britain fifteen months to prepare. The ser-

vice was invaluable. In performing it, Russia invited that German attack which brought her to the edge of ruin. But she, also, escaped.

Here, then, is the whole story of the eastern campaign in the period which we are now to examine. In this time Russia is crowding more and more steadily in upon stricken Austria, pushing her back from Lemberg, from the San; coming close up to Cracow and then, checked here, turning toward the Carpathians and struggling up and in places over summits. And in the same time Germany is attempting, with everdiminishing success, to compel Russia to let up on Austria by attacking Russia in Poland. German pressure is great enough to rob Russia's blow of just that weight which would have made it completely decisive, but it fails to divert Russian attention sufficiently. So at last we come to the decision to spend the summer in the east and direct the main blow in the spring and summer against the eastern enemy.

While all this is happening in the eastern field, Great Britain and France are making every effort to get their military forces into shape to take the pressure off their Russian ally in the spring. But the task is far too great and too long for the British. More than a year is to pass after the Battle of the Dunajec before Britain can be armed or munitioned; France, after the sacrifices of the Marne, is not strong enough, alone, to break the German lines in the west. The failure of all the French and British efforts from Alsace to Flanders supplies the German High Command with proof that their campaign against Russia can be pushed in the spring without danger to their western front. It is the failure of Allied efforts in the west straight through the winter, that makes the Russian burden so great, and it is the failure in the spring that precipitates the catastrophe of the Dunajec.

II. TURKEY'S ENTRANCE

The whole course of the eastern operations was affected and Russian disaster finally achieved through the intervention of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers. In the days when Antwerp had fallen and Warsaw seemed on the point of yielding to Hindenburg, the Turk suddenly put his sword at the service of the two Kaisers. Conceivably this

Turkish decision could not have been prevented either by Allied diplomacy or Allied naval action, but the event is the first in a long series of reverses for Allied statesmanship and High Command in the Near East, which changed the whole course of the war in its second year.

The military effect of Turkey's decision was not measured by the new front it opened on the Russian Caucasus or the British lines at Suez. Turkish military operations were neither fortunate nor influential, aside from the defence of Gallipoli. But when Turkey entered the war, Russia was automatically cut off from the outer world for many months by winter on the north and by Turkish forts at the Bosporus. The result was that her munitionment was gravely affected. Before spring she had exhausted all her stocks of ammunition, and when the German blow came in April she was almost without heavy shells. This was the prime cause of all the subsequent reverses. This was Turkey's real service to her allies and her terrible revenge upon her hereditary enemy.

The political causes of Turkey's entrance are not hard to fathom. With the rapprochement of Russia and Britain, the latter resigned, in fact if not by formal engagement, her long-standing rôle of the defender of the Turk. It was well understood in Stamboul, as elsewhere, that the Persian bargain between Russia and Sir Edward Grey had an implied consent to eventual Russian possession at the Straits. Under the stress of circumstances, because British title to the Suez Canal had been made absolute by the French withdrawal from Egyptian ambitions—a part of the 1904 bargain—Constantinople lost its old value for the British, England resigned her position as the first friend of the Sultan, and the Kaiser instantly and eagerly replaced his rival at the Golden Horn.

When the Balkan States attacked Turkey, Germany and Austria hoped for their defeat. Britain and her Russian and French friends hoped for their victory, and Russia and France contributed materially to training and munitioning the armies that won at Lule Burgas, Kumanovo, and Yenidze-Vardar. It was, too, by virtue of an understanding with France, Russia, and Great Britain, that Italy attacked Turkey and took Tripoli.

No Turkish statesman could mistake the fact that France and Britain had abandoned the policy which produced the Crimean War and the abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano. No Turkish statesman could misunderstand the evidence that proved that Russia would never again have to resign Czarigrad at British behest. So far as London, Paris, and for that matter Rome, were concerned, Russia was free to take Constantinople. Therefore a victory of Russia and her allies in the war that had now broken out meant a Russian attack upon Turkey, with the consent of Russia's allies.

Turkey could have no illusion as to German ambitions. An Osmanli Empire administered by Prussian officials was as hateful to the Turk as a lost Constantinople, but this peril, if patent, was not immediate; he could hope that the outcome of the war would leave the enemies of Germany strong enough to prevent this, even though they were defeated. He could hope that the turn of events might save him as it had saved him for so many decades. But the Russian danger was immediate, unmistakable, carried with it a death sentence for him.

Actually the Turkish decision was procured by the intervention of two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, which were caught in the western Mediterranean at the moment of the declaration of war and fled via Palermo to the Dardanelles, escaping the whole French and British fleets. Had British and French warships followed them up the Straits, sunk them under the very eyes of the Turkish Government, the course of events might have been altered and the worst of Allied disasters avoided. But Allied purpose had not yet reached this point; Allied admirals lacked the courage of Nelson in the case of Copenhagen.

With the safe arrival of these ships, Turkey was lost to the enemies of Germany. Aided by their presence, Enver Pasha was able to throw his government into the hands of the Germans. More than this, these same ships, at last issuing forth from the Bosporus and attacking Russian ports and shipping, provoked that Russian declaration of war which placed Turkey definitely on the side of the Central Powers. Count d'Erlon's blundering march and countermarch in the Waterloo

campaign was only one degree more disastrous to his Emperor than was this failure of British naval officers to the Allied cause—French ships were then engaged in covering the transport of French troops from Morocco and Algeria to France—to the whole Allied cause in the spring and summer of 1915.

CHAPTER TEN THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

I RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Russian mobilization, for which the preliminary orders were given as early as July 25th, was conditioned upon circumstances of Russia's western frontier. Here Poland projects, like a fist against a pillow, to use a familiar figure, deep into the block of Teutonic territories. Thus Russian armies operating about Warsaw or to the west of Warsaw would be fatally exposed to German or Austrian attacks coming south out of East Prussia or north out of Galicia, which touches the longitude of Brest-Litovsk, more than a hundred miles east of Warsaw.

This situation Russia was in the process of remedying when the war broke out. North of Warsaw from the Vistula, at the point where the Bug enters it, to the Niemen, the Russians had stretched a line of forts, beginning at Novogeorgievsk and ending at Kovno on the Niemen. This was the famous Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier, but it derived its main strength not from fortifications but from the swamps and from the rivers that give it the name it bears. Westward, Warsaw had once been guarded by forts, but these had been demolished and Russian armies had planned, when the scheme of fortifications was complete, to stand before Warsaw, on the Blonie line, a system of field fortifications suggesting the Chatalja lines. Thence southward the Vistula supplied an admirable defensive position being in itself a serious military obstacle, a broad deep river with high wooded banks.

But Russian preparation had only begun, and south of the Vistula, from Ivangorod to the Volhynian province, there was a gap, between Lublin and Cholm, through which Austrian armies could advance upon Brest-Litovsk, operating far in the rear of Warsaw and behind the line of the Vistula. Until this gap had been closed, all positions to the west-

ward were gravely imperilled. And it is worth noting that the German advance to Warsaw, when it came, was successful because of this gap.


In this posture Russia was compelled to mobilize behind the Bug instead of the Vistula, using the Niemen and the three fortresses of the Volhynian triangle, Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, to guard her flanks. Only covering troops were left in Warsaw, and it was not until the strength of German numbers going west and the weakness of the army left in the east were disclosed, that Russia began her forward movement in Poland, the first positive evidence of which was the army pushed north out of Warsaw to the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg.

It seems now unquestioned that Russian mobilization, slow as it was because of the vastness of Russian area and the paucity of Russian railroads, took both the Germans and the Austrians by surprise and later led them to make angry charges about Russian preparations before the Serbian crisis. But this is a debate for the future. What is clear is that, by the middle of August, Russian armies were beginning to move. This movement was in two distinct areas. Two armies, one from the Niemen and one from the Vistula at Warsaw, pushed into East Prussia, met with considerable success in the third and fourth weeks of August, and were then brought to a dead halt by the disaster at Tannenberg, which destroyed one of the armies and eventually forced the retirement of the other.

The second group of armies was the more considerable and did not number less than a million, at least twice the strength of the other two armies combined. This group was divided into three armies commanded by Ivanoff, Russky, and Brusiloff, names that were to become famous in the history of the war. Ivanoff's army was based upon Brest-Litovsk and by the middle of August was moving south covering Lublin and the gap that opened toward Brest-Litovsk. His mission was to hold any Austrian invasion south of Lublin, but the main thrust was to be made by the other armies.

Russky's army came west along the Kiev-Lemberg railroad, having Kiev as its base, and advanced directly upon Lemberg, crossing the Galician frontier about Brody in the fourth week of August. Brusiloff

brought his army up along the Odessa-Lemberg railroad, taking the field only when it became clear that Roumania intended to remain neutral. The original mission of this army was to protect Odessa and southwestern Russia from Roumanian attack, if Roumania remained faithful to her alliance with Austria and Germany. The release of this army actually made the victory of Lemberg possible and in this way Roumania



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON ALL FRONTS, SEPT. IST, 1914

I-Rennenkampf
II-Samsonoff

IV-Russky

served her old allies an evil turn quite comparable with that served them by Italy, when her proclamation of neutrality released French troops to fight at the Marne. Brusiloff crossed the frontier near Tarnopol, also east of Lemberg, and advanced toward this city, his flank along the Dniester. His junction with Russky was completed before the battle began and his part in the first engagement was decisive.

II. AUSTRIA'S PLANS


It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France. At the very outset it is plain that the High Command of the Dual Alliance fatally underestimated the speed and the force of the Russian blow. Thus Germany borrowed two of the best Austrian corps for her western drive and was putting them into operation in Alsace when Austrian disaster came. In addition, three or four more corps had been sent south to deal with Serbia. This latter army was far too small to fight an offensive campaign with the well-equipped and well-trained veterans of King Peter and suffered immediate and terrible disaster at the Jedar, while Russia was still just beginning to get across the frontier into Galicia, a full week before Tannenberg, and about the time of Charleroi.

It may be doubted whether Austria actually put in the field against Russia many more than 600,000 troops at the outset. In any event, she was outnumbered by at least two to one. She further invited disaster by dividing her armies. One (Auffenberg's) she stationed across Galicia from north to south, east of and covering Lemberg; its right or southern flank rested on Halicz on the Dniester, its northern flank was behind the Bug, and its centre behind the Zlota Lipa, on high ground. This position was excellent and it had been protected by well-constructed field works, but it was far too extended for the number of troops Austria had available.


The second Austrian army (Dankl's), leaving railhead at the San, moved straight north into the Lublin gap, aiming at Brest-Litovsk and having for its ultimate purpose to compel the Russians to evacuate War-

MAN-SAVING:

THE WORK OF THE RED CROSS AND ITS ALLIES



A RED CROSS STEAMER, LADEN WITH NURSES, LEAVING NEW YORK HARBOUR FOR THE THEATRE OF WAR



THE RED CROSS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

An aid station in the trenches (upper left) where the wounded first receive a doctor's care and are prepared for the journey back to the dressing station. A wounded soldier in the trenches (upper right), bandaged and ready to be sent to the aid station. The trip back to the field hospital, first by bearers (lower left) then by horse ambulance (lower right)



AN AMBULANCE ON RAILS

One method of transporting the wounded on the French front from field hospital to evacuation hospital.

Each of these little cars has room for four stretchers which are hung on springs.



A FIELD HOSPITAL

At field hospitals like these the seriously wounded are cared for until they can be sent to the base hospitals.



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THE PART OF PRIESTS AND NUNS

The priests administered the last rites to the dying, and succoured the wounded after the French stand at the Meuse.

Little Belgian children were being taught the alphabet in the schoolroom shown in the lower picture a short time before it became a hospital for wounded Germans.



MME. CARREL FLUSHING A WOUND

The new process of wound-flushing in operation. Mme. Carrel says "no man has yet died from his wounds in our hospital; indeed, the only one we have lost at all died from pneumonia."



THE CARREL HOSPITAL

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

An operation at the Carrel Hospital at Compiègne, France. Dr. Carrel's new method of irrigating wounds is very successful. Patients are turned out perfectly cured, many of whom without the use of the new system would be lifelong cripples.







SERBIAN RED CROSS NURSE AT WORK IN A HOSPITAL AT BELGRAD



Copyright by the International News Service

STRETCHER-BEARERS AT WORK AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE They show more interest in the photographer and less solicitude for their burden than do the turbaned bystanders.



LOADING A GERMAN RED CROSS TRAIN





Copyright by the International News Service

RED CROSS NURSES AS STRETCHER-BEARERS



Copyright by the International News Service

COMPETENT NURSING HAS PUT THIS LITTLE MAN UPON HIS FEET AGAIN
At the moment he appears to be actually enjoying the war.

saw and all of Poland. This was an exceedingly ambitious thrust, it was entirely beyond the capacity of the army and the generals that first undertook it, but it did actually succeed less than a year later, and its success demonstrated the weakness of the Russian position and the wisdom of the original Russian strategic conception, which called for an evacuation of all the territory west of the Bug.

It will be noted that neither the Russians nor the Austro-Germans, in the opening days, undertook any operations in that part of Poland west of Warsaw. The Germans lacked the numbers for any such operation; the Russians were stopped by the concentration of Austrian armies opposite Lublin, which had a deadly menace for any army west of Warsaw. It is only after the German thrust at Warsaw, made possible by Tannenberg, had been undertaken and failed, that Russia ventures into this area, resigning the Galician field for the moment, and then she comes within a hairsbreadth of a crushing defeat at Lodz and makes no further effort in this field, standing stolidly on the defensive.

The opening of the last week in August, then, sees these two major efforts on foot. Russia is advancing with her two armies along the Kiev and on the Odessa railroads and standing firm with her Third Army about Lublin; Austria is holding one army before Lemberg and sending the other north into Volhynia and actually approaching Lublin, its presence already signalled by Austrian reports of victories about Krasnik. We may calculate that the Austrian armies are outnumbered about two to one and that as the armies before Lemberg begin the battle, the Austrians have learned that the Serbians have just won a sweeping victory at the Jedar and that Austrian invasion of Serbia has been abandoned.

Meantime, to complete the eastern picture, one Russian army is approaching Königsberg, having won a battle at Gumbinnen, and a second is approaching Allenstein in East Prussia, while Hindenburg is already preparing his amazing counterthrust. In the west Namur has fallen, the French have been beaten at Morhange and Charleroi, and all the Allied armies are beginning the great retreat which Berlin and Vienna interpret to be the collapse of French military power.

III. LEMBERG


The First Battle of Lemberg lasted not less than eight days. In its earlier stages it began along the Zlota Lipa, but the Austrians presently retired to their main front behind the Gnila Lipa, their southern flank still at Halicz and their centre about Krasne, on the Brody-Lemberg railroad, where it is joined by the Tarnopol-Odessa railroad there left behind the Bug. All this ground was again to be fought over by Brusiloff's great offensive in June, 1916.

The fact that the Austrian resistance finally collapsed has somewhat misled the world as to the nature of the struggle. It was exceedingly severe and for many days the Russians, despite heavy losses, were able to make no progress. Finally Brusiloff broke through to the south toward the Dniester and about Halicz, which he took. This success imperilled the whole Austrian line and it retreated through and beyond Lemberg—which fell on the first days of September, just at Tannenberg time—and took its stand behind the chain of Grodek lakes, a few miles west of Lemberg, its left flank reaching and passing Rawaruska.

This time the decisive thrust is made by Russky. His numbers are so much superior to Auffenberg's that he is able to turn his flank, and the Austrian line swings at right angles around Rawaruska and runs east and west; Russky takes Rawaruska, breaks the whole centre of the Austrians and throws the entire force, shaken by its defeats before Lemberg, into an utter rout.

Meantime Ivanoff, having at first retired before Dankl and permitted him to follow deep into Russian territory and become separated from Auffenberg, turns and delivers a heavy blow. Dankl's army is now left in air, its southern flank exposed by the collapse of Auffenberg, and he is compelled to make a disorderly retreat, approximating a flight, back to and across the San, giving up Jaroslav and coming back behind the Wisloka and approaching Cracow. Auffenberg's army retires over the Carpathian passes into Hungary. Before the Austrian flight had at last paused the Russians announced that they had taken 250,000 prisoners, vast numbers of guns, and an enormous store of munitions and material.

In point of fact, Lemberg was one of the complete disasters of military history; it brought the Austrian war establishment to the edge of ruin and disclosed a fundamental weakness, which, despite German effort and temporary success in the summer campaign of 1915, could not be quite cured and was revealed afresh on the same ground in the campaign that opened the summer of 1916. Differences of race, the manifest lack of



THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA—BATTLE OF LEMBERG

A-Russky
B-Brusiloff
C-Ivanoff
D-Auffenberg

E-Dankl

sympathy on the part of Slav contingents with their task of fighting Russians to please their German and Magyar masters, defective training and insufficient preparation, above all inadequate numbers for the task assigned, all these things combined to make Lemberg an Austrian disaster of first magnitude.

The immediate consequences were the loss of all of Galicia to the San, the advance of Russian troops beyond the San as far as the Wisloka, the investing of Przemysl, the passage of the Carpathians by Cossack raid-

ing parties, and the first arrival of the invader in the Hungarian Plain. Austrian troops had to be recalled from Alsace and from Serbia to retrieve the lost situation and the first demand was made upon Germany to come to the aid of her Austrian ally. By the battle Austria lost 20,000 square miles of territory; Lemberg, a city of more than 200,000 people; the great oil district of eastern Galicia. She lost also not less than half of her first-line troops, counting the Jedar casualties, and, in addition, material of war which could only slowly be replaced.

Austrian defeat at Lemberg coincided with German repulse and retreat at the Marne. But for the unhappy disaster at Tannenberg, the second week in September would have seen all the armies of the Central Powers in retreat or rout. Had Tannenberg not released Hindenburg's army, it would have been from the western armies that Germany would have had to draw corps to repair the Galician situation. She was not now compelled to do this, but the consequences of Lemberg were ultimately to put a term to western operations for a year and a half.

The decision at Lemberg did not endure so long as did that of the Marne; the Germans abolished it at the Dunajec in April. But while the decision stood, it continued to hamper and embarrass German effort. Russia was temporarily compelled to withdraw from the region west of the San, by the first German drive at Warsaw; after Lodz, she was still before Cracow, and it required a new effort in Poland to compel her to abandon her thrust for Cracow. Then she turned to the Carpathians, and the immediate demand of Hungary compelled Germany to send troops to guard Hungarian passes.

In the end Germany had to give over the attack upon Warsaw through Poland and turn her main attention to Galicia. When she did this she reversed the decision of Lemberg and promptly turned the Russians out of Galicia, but this was only in the last days of April, and the Russian victory had begun in the last days of August. Lemberg is, then, the second great Allied victory of the war, ranking immediately after the Marne. It gave the world its first evidence of the new character of Russian armies, demonstrated that the evils of the Japanese War had been remedied, and that Russian generalship was as good as German or

French. Disasters due to the failure of ammunition somewhat marred this new reputation, but in 1916, when munitions had been supplied, Russian armies began to win new victories of an impressive character.

It is fair to say that Lemberg and the Marne together demonstrated that Germany had terribly underestimated her Continental foes. Two years were to pass before she was to reform her estimate as to British troops. But by the middle of September she and her Austrian ally had fought three great battles, as she had planned, which should have decided the issue of the war, but two had been lost, and the third had only saved Germany from ruin and had not crushed France or Russia.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

WARSAW

CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST BID


About October 1st the Russians had passed the San in Galicia and were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain. In the west the Siege of Antwerp was approaching its promptly decisive stage, and the German campaign to abolish the decision of the Marne by a final offensive through Flanders was taking final shape.

It was now necessary to aid the Austrians, but it was not possible to withdraw troops from the west, unless Germany was willing to accept a deadlock from Switzerland to the North Sea, and she was far from ready to do this. There remained the possibility of using the larger portion of the army of Hindenburg, which had won Tannenberg and pursued the second Russian army in East Prussia—that of Rennenkampf—from the very gates of Königsberg across the frontier. Gathering up the mass of this army and leaving the balance to retreat slowly before the Russians, the German General Staff might transport it rapidly, by those admirable strategic railroads which follow the frontier in a semicircle from East Prussia to Cracow; put it in at Lodz, which had fallen into German hands early in the war; call upon Austrian troops, returning from Serbia or from Alsace, and make a sudden drive at Warsaw.

If the drive achieved the maximum of success, Warsaw would be captured, together with Ivangorod to the south, the objective of the Austrian fraction of Hindenburg's army; Germany would, at a single thrust, win the west bank of the Vistula, an enormously strong military position. Behind this line she could hope to stand inexpugnably and

devote her efforts to preparing to renew the conflict in the west in the spring.

But if this maximum was not realized, there was a minimum that was assured, Russia had no troops of material consequence between Lodz and Warsaw: most of her military strength was now in Galicia



RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA, ABOUT OCTOBER 1, 1914

The Russians were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain

pressing against the Austrians and moving toward Cracow. Unquestionably the first sign of a German thrust for Warsaw would compel the Russians to give over their Galician operations, draw out many corps and send them to save Warsaw, and thus dislocate their whole Galician concentration. When this began the Austrians could, undertake a new offensive in Galicia, designed to crush the weakened Russian armies, and the danger to Cracow, as well as the menace to Hungary through the Carpathians, would be abolished.

This was the main purpose of the offensive toward Warsaw. Austria must be helped. The help she required could still be furnished without any draft upon the western lines, but such help would not be sufficient to win a decisive battle, if Russia made a prompt concentration. It could only get Warsaw if speed enabled the Germans to seize that strong position before Russian numbers could be brought up. It was a serious bid for Warsaw, but it was a bid begun with the full recognition that it had at best no more than half a chance of success.


In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with precisely the same purpose in view. It was possible that Early might get Washington. If he did, the success would be of enormous political and moral value; but even if he failed he was likely to compel Grant, hanging doggedly to his footing before Petersburg, to weaken his front to relieve Washington, and this would give Lee a respite. It might lead Grant to abandon his whole effort to get Richmond, from his position south of the James. Early failed, as did Hindenburg, because troops from the other front arrived in time. But unlike Lee's thrust, that of Hindenburg succeeded in dislocating the other enemy concentration, that in Galicia.

There was further, a political purpose in the German thrust. The attitude of the Poles toward the conflicting nations was obscure. It was possible and reasonable for the Germans to hope that the Poles, if a German invasion carried Warsaw, might turn from their Russian allegiance and become the allies of the invader, as they had in the Napoleonic time when they furnished the great Emperor with at least one marshal and some of his best and bravest troops. This German hope was not realized, partly because the failure to get Warsaw necessitated a retreat, in which Poland was laid in ashes by contending armies, but it was an important consideration in the German mind and it was a possibility recognized fully by the Russians.

II. AT THE GATES OF WARSAW

Under these circumstances and about October 1st, Hindenburg began his advance in two columns—one following the railroad east from Kalisz

to Warsaw; the other, mainly composed of Austrians, moving northeast along the railroad from Cracow to Ivangorod. Combined, these armies did not number six army corps, possibly there were but five; certainly their total strength was less than that of Kluck's army in the Marne campaign. These armies had something like a hundred miles to go; they had, when the advance began, practically no Russian



HINDENBURG'S FIRST CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW, OCT. 20, 1914

The German thrust for Warsaw diverted the Russians from their operations in Galicia. This was its main purpose. In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with a precisely similar object in view

troops before them, and they had reasonably good roads to follow. They began with the full expectation of taking Warsaw within the fortnight, and the news of the fall of Antwerp overtook them on the road and gave them new enthusiasm.

With little or no fighting, moving with almost incredible rapidity, these two armies advanced until, on October 14th, one army stood on the

outskirts of Warsaw, in the suburb of Prushkow, seven miles from the centre of the city, while the other had cleared the west bank of the Vistula before Ivangorod. At this moment German shells fell within the Polish capital, German aeroplanes bombed the city, there was a general exodus of the population, and the world believed that Warsaw was to share the fate of Antwerp. So sure did German victory now seem to the Turk that, under German pressure, Enver Pasha chose this moment to put his country into the conflict.

But Russian concentration was just prompt enough. While the Germans were in the suburbs of Warsaw, Siberian regiments pushed through the town and began to defend the outskirts. They were the advanced guards of eight corps, which came to Ivangorod and to Warsaw in the next few days. For a whole week there was sharp fighting before Warsaw, where Hindenburg stood checked but not convinced. But presently the Russian reinforcements crossed the Vistula about Ivangorod and north of Warsaw and came in on both flanks of the Hindenburg forces. October 21st Hindenburg broke off the engagement. He had never fought to the limit; he had stood before Warsaw iong after the possibility of taking the town had passed, to preserve the threat as long as possible. His Austrian allies before Ivangorod had suffered severely; he had gotten off far more lightly.

Beginning October 21st, the first thrust at Warsaw transforms itself into a swift and orderly retreat, such as Frederick the Great taught Europe to expect from his Prussians, and in trim columns Hindenburg moved back to the frontier. As he retreated, the fact was disclosed that he had constructed fieldworks along his route, foreseeing retreat, and these gave his rearguards admirable protection. In this retreat he destroyed roads, railroads, bridges, actually abolishing most of the means of communication in Poland.

Meanwhile, in Galicia, the effect of the Warsaw drive had been exactly what had been hoped. The Russians had come out of the Carpathians and retired behind the San. The Austrians had rallied and taken the offensive, reaching and in spots passing the river. Przemysl had been relieved; there was a moment when the reconquest of Galicia

seemed to be within Austrian possibilities. But this moment passed. As the Germans retired from Warsaw the Russians in Galicia retook the offensive. This time, passing the San, they again—and as it turned out, finally—invested Przemysl and approached Cracow at the precise moment when the armies which had saved Warsaw and Ivangorod were coming southwest, and that of Ivangorod threatened Cracow from the north as the Galician army now threatened it from the east.


Thus the real benefit of Hindenburg's thrust was shortlived. By the time he had fallen back to the German and Austrian frontiers, his retreat was mainly toward the southwest, the Russian menace in Galicia had become even more serious than it had been when he started. He had but postponed the danger for a moment and he had now to deal with it in an aggravated form.

III. LODZ

We have now come to the moment when the western and eastern campaigns merge. Hindenburg is now compelled to make a second effort to relieve the Austrians in Galicia and save Cracow. He has still only very restricted numbers. The Germans are making their last desperate effort in Flanders; they have failed against the Belgians and French from Nieuport to Dixmude; they are attacking the British about Ypres, and the British are holding on doggedly while the French are striving to reinforce them. Unless the Germans can now break through in the west in a brief time, they will have to abandon the western effort and turn their attention eastward. The Russian pressure—which, in Allied plans, made before the war, should have become effective in the last days of August—is about to count in the last days of November.

For his second effort Hindenburg takes advantage again of the strategic railroads which run in a circle about the Russian frontier. In his drive at Warsaw he had used these railroads to move troops from East Prussia to Silesia. When he had failed at Warsaw he had retired southwest upon Cracow and Breslau, destroying Russian railroads as he retired. The Russian troops had followed him through Lodz and even


to the Silesian boundary. But, owing to the configuration of the territory, they were now farther from Warsaw than German troops at Thorn would be, and they had behind them only the ruined roads and railroads, which Hindenburg had wrecked.



HINDENBURG'S SECOND DRIVE FOR WARSAW

Hindenburg left only Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz, moved north to the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers, and there sent in several corps under Mackensen

Accordingly Hindenburg left only the Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz and moved his mass right along the frontier north to Thorn and the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers and there sent in several corps under Mackensen, soon to earn world fame. These troops moved rapidly



THE BATTLE OF LODZ, DURING HINDENBURG'S SECOND CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW

Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians, and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners

across the flank and rear of the Russians to the southeast, turned their flank and presently interposed between them and Warsaw, much as Kluck sought to interpose between the Anglo-French forces and Paris in the September campaign in the west.

Here, then, in the last days of November, while the Battle of Ypres is just ending, is the promise of a second Tannenberg, the capture of a large Russian army, and the ultimate fall of Warsaw. The position of

the Russian army is desperate, it would seem, because its northern flank is turned by the Germans, while it is assailed in front by more Germans, and the Austrians have advanced north from Cracow, threatening its southern flank. But the Russians escaped, showing again the same qualities which shone, even in disaster, in the Manchurian campaign.

At the moment when Russky, who commanded at Lodz, seemed lost, the Germans on his northern flank are involved by a thrust out from Warsaw and south from the Vistula made by troops brought down from East Prussia and out of the fortress garrisons. Two German corps are surrounded and Petrograd, long silent in the midst of disaster, suddenly claims a huge success. This does not happen. General von François, the German commander whose corps are trapped, manages to fight his way out, by exertions which the Russians frankly concede to have been "unbelievable." The Germans are helped by failures of Rennenkampf, who once more, as in the Tannenberg times, discloses tardiness and now goes into retirement.

But already the situation has compelled the Germans to borrow aid from the west. The end of the western campaign has come and the decision of the Marne stands. Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting the war in the east had yet seen. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners; the Russians claim material captures, but the actual effect of all the fighting has been, in the immediate area of conflict, to reproduce western conditions of deadlock, and the Polish front rapidly tends to descend into the same state of trench warfare that has obtained on the Aisne since the middle of September.

IV. THE THIRD BID FOR WARSAW

When in October the Russians began their advance from Warsaw, following Hindenburg toward Cracow, it seems clear that they temporarily renounced the Galician field as the main theatre of operations and put forth their full strength in Poland. After Lodz they again reverted to their old idea. Lodz demonstrated clearly that it would be impos-

sible to move west out of Poland. It was, in fact, as the Germans said in their official announcements at the time, a permanent check to Russian offensive toward Silesia and Posen.

On the other hand, while the first Hindenburg advance toward Warsaw had checked the Russian operations in Galicia and turned them into a retirement behind the San, the Lodz operation did not affect the Galician field and the Russians still continued to press on toward Cracow, after their Polish army had evacuated Lodz, and retired toward Lowicz and Skierniewice, covering Warsaw. A new effort was required to relieve the Galician situation. This new effort was made in Poland; in it we see, unmistakably, the contribution of troops brought from the west. The necessity for this operation was revealed in the severe defeat suffered by Austrian armies coming up out of the Carpathians and seeking to relieve Przemysl and redeem western Galicia.

Accordingly Hindenburg resumed his pressure in Poland; from the Lower Vistula south before Lodz he began a terrific frontal attack upon the Russians, employing the numbers he had now borrowed from the west. Under this pressure the Russians retired slowly, giving over Lowicz and Skierniewice and retiring upon Warsaw. They finally took their stand on the eastern banks of the Bzura and Rawka, little rivers which together stretch straight across the front of Warsaw from the Lower Vistula for many miles south. Below this system the Russians fortified the banks of the Pilitza and then of the Nida, which enters the Upper Vistula north of Tarnow.

The position was largely accidental. The Russians had intended to defend Warsaw from the Blonie lines, much nearer the city; the Bzura is more than twenty miles west of the Polish capital. But little by little they discovered that their lines held; they found that they had been driven into a defensible position, and they hung on. At the same time they drew back from before Cracow, north of the Vistula, standing behind the Nida, south of it behind the Dunajec. They had now entered the lines they were to hold from December until May between the Lower Vistula and the Carpathians, and until August before Warsaw.


The German attacks upon the Bzura-Rawka lines recalled the similar efforts in Flanders, at the Yser and before Ypres. German losses were exceedingly heavy; German gains were inconsiderable, a trench here, a farmhouse there. Meantime the weather had come to the rescue of Russia. An early and severe winter had destroyed Napoleon. The winter of 1914-1915 was one of the mildest in Polish history and the roads were turned into swamps. The superior mobility of the Germans was abolished as a factor and they were unable to use their heavy artillery because of the difficulties of transport. These conditions had materially affected the Lodz operation; they had an almost decisive influence now.

By January 1st the attempt to get Warsaw by frontal attack has failed. It will be resumed in January and February, combined with a thrust south from East Prussia, via Mlawa and along the railroad up which the Russians had marched to diaster in the Tannenberg time. But it will fail again, and this failure will be absolute. Meantime, the Russians will abandon their momentary plan to move west from Poland toward Breslau and through Galicia to Cracow. They will more and more direct their energies toward forcing the passes of the Carpathians and reaching the Hungarian Plain.

Well into February the Germans will continue their efforts to get Warsaw from the front and from the north. In all of this time they will content themselves with bolstering up Austrian defence in Galicia by more and more considerable reinforcement, and by a gradual taking over, first of High Command and then of the direction of the smaller units. It is not until the February attacks fail, and the Russian line before Warsaw is proven too strong to be broken, that Germany, in her turn, will go to Galicia and make her main effort in the field where, for many months, Russia has been steadily progressing.

January 1st, then, is a date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. From the Baltic to the Carpathians the line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed. There is a slight fluctation in East Prussia; it will be February before the Germans,

FEEDING THE MEN AND THE GUNS



BAKING FOR THE GERMAN ARMY
This "battery" of ovens is capable of turning out 16,000 loaves of bread a day.

PICTURES OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY WORK




RUSSIAN FIELD KITCHENS

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These are field kitchens used by the Russian army. In this case they have been captured by the Germans.



COOKING FOR THE KAISER
His field chef is preparing luncheon near the front.



A TRAIN-LOAD OF "CANNON-FODDER" IN GALICIA

This picture is typical of the Russian military problem. There are men innumerable, but supplies and equipment are inadequate.





TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES

The upper picture shows ammunition and stores for the front at railhead. From here they are sometimes moved forward (as shown in the lower picture) by a light, narrow-gauge railway.




TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES

After leaving the rails supplies go forward by motors as far as roads and other conditions permit; then comes the turn of the pack-horses; and finally man-power is often needed to cover the rest of the distance to the entrance of the communication trench.



FOOD SUPPLIES ON THE HOOF

Some of the beef which helped the Russians to be red-blooded enough to take a quarter of a million Austrian prisoners after the battle of Lemberg.



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RUSSIANS RETREATING FROM GALICIA BEFORE THE GERMANS

These wagons laden with ammunition and supplies, are to be placed on freight cars. Bags of food may be seen at the right and in the background. The bundles of hay have been collected and placed in position by soldiers who intend to use them as cushions when they perch themselves atop of the loads, for the tedious jolting ride toward Warsaw.



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A SERBIAN CONVOY IN RETREAT


This picture shows why supplies sometimes fail to arrive and disgruntled soldiers must lie down to sleep upon empty stomachs.



THE WORK OF THE PIONEERS

The Germans have hastily put together this bridge across the Vistula, only to have it endangered by great chunks of floating ice from upstream. They are breaking these to allow them to pass on under the bridge.

having won the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, can announce that East Prussia is freed from the invaders. But actually the decision has been reached, Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west. Germany must make up her mind to this, and when she makes up her mind it will be too late to hope to resume the great western offensive in the spring.



DEADLOCK IN POLAND, DEC., 1914-MAY, 1915

January 1st is the date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. The line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed

Instead, there must be prepared a new eastern campaign and that campaign will have for its real purpose, not alone taking Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, not merely abolishing the threat of Austria, but destroying the military power of Russia and compelling a separate peace; in a word, adopting against Russia the strategy and purpose which failed against France at the Marne.

V. SERBIA TRIUMPHANT AGAIN

While the German advance from Lodz upon Warsaw was going forward, a fresh Austrian disaster attracted the attention of the world. As far back as the first days of November, Austria, hoping permanent relief from the German operations toward Lodz, had detached troops to dispose of the Serbian nuisance, which, since the victory of the Jedar, had injured Austrian prestige and imperilled Hapsburg power in all the Slav regions, but particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And once more it was reserved for Serbia, prime cause of all the terrible world conflict, to give Europe a great surprise, the fourth in three brief years, and to win a shining and conspicuous triumph.

In 1913, at the outset of the First Balkan War—when Europe preserving the memory of Slivnitza, forecast Serbian defeat, and the invasion of Serbia by the Turks was prophesied by those most hopeful of Bulgarian victory—it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who proved irresistible, invincible, won back Old Serbia at Kumanovo, Macedonia at Monastir, and captured the Turkish Commander at Adrianople.

A few months later, when Austria had precipitated the Second Balkan War to destroy King Peter's nation, it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who again prevailed, and the Battle of Bregalnitza as completely shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility as the reverse of Mars-la-Tour had wrecked that of France. The victims of a breach of faith, attacked by night and without warning, without declaration of war, the Serbs rallied, took the offensive, sent the Bulgars in rout back over the Rhodopians and restored to Serbia the southern half of the empire of the great Dushan.

Finally, in the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period that culminated at the Marne. At the Jedar four Austrian army corps had been routed, Austrian prestige in the Balkans shattered, the first Slav triumph won in that long series which by December was to bring Austria to the lowest ebb in her history since the Hungarian Revolution.

On December 1st Serbia was once more in the presence of grave peril. The October drive of Germany had released several army corps of Austrians in Galicia and Poland, and these came south to complete the work of destroying the troops of King Peter, who had for months defended their frontiers. Before this overwhelming force the Serbs had retreated. All the corner of Serbia between the Save and the Drina was lost. Coming east from Bosnia the Austrian right approached Belgrad, which for four months had defied daily bombardment; the centre



SERBIAN BATTLEFIELDS

I—The Jeaar, August, 1914. In the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne

II—Valievo, December, 1914. One of the most complete of Austrian disasters

reached Valievo, the left penetrated to Uchitza, on the Serbian Morava. Presently Belgrad fell, a birthday present to the aged Francis Joseph, the only conquest of his army in the whole struggle.

In the first week in December the fate of Serbia seemed sealed. A second Belgium, another little state destroyed in the contest between the great, seemed assured. Austrian armies appeared certain to reach Nish, the temporary Serbian capital, to open the Orient Railway to the Bulgarian frontier and persuade Bulgaria, still smarting from her defeat by Serbia, to cast her lot with the two Kaisers and open her territory for the passage of the Turks to the battlelines of western Europe.

In the moment of greatest peril, however, Serbia was saved—partly by her own courage, by her own determination, without which destruction was inescapable; partly by the new advance of the Russians. While the Austrian troops were still before Belgrad, Cossacks once more crossed the Carpathians, swept down into the Hungarian Plain; panic reached the very gates of Budapest, and three army corps were hurriedly recalled from Serbia to defend Hungary. Once more at the critical moment the Austro-German Alliance had to surrender triumph in one field because of deadly peril in another.

No sooner had the three corps been withdrawn than the Serbs again took the offensive. Old King Peter, now stricken in years and infirmities, but retaining something of the fire that earned him his cross of the Legion of Honour as a soldier of France in 1870, rode in front of his troops, mounted on a white charger, and harangued them as their chiefs of remote centuries were accustomed to do. Then followed one of the most complete of Austrian disasters. In a few days the whole force had fled across the frontiers, leaving thousands of prisoners, many cannon, and much material, behind them. Belgrad was retaken; by December 15th Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being; saved until the third—and fatal—attack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later.

CHAPTER TWELVE

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS

I NEW YEAR, 1915

The New Year—which was to witness the most brilliant military triumphs of Modern Germany, triumphs rivalling the Napoleonic cycle—opened dismally enough for Berlin. Five months of war and a million casualties had sufficed to complete the destruction of all the initial plans and hopes of Germany. The supreme hope, that of a short war, had gone glimmering and Lord Kitchener's forecast of a three-year war had begun to find converts even in Germany. And the prospect of a long war raised new problems, of which the military, if it was not the most pressing, was by no means the least.

In point of fact, new political considerations were now becoming apparent. There was the question of Austria, a question at once political and military; there was the problem of Italy, destined to become more and more grave as the months passed until the spring should see the House of Savoy again in the field against the House of Hapsburg. There was, too, the similar and only less serious problem of Roumania, which was not to find so speedy a solution as that of Italy, but was destined to prove even more dangerous to German safety. There was the additional necessity to care for Turkish defence, a necessity which would grow with the months and become pressing in the spring, when the Allied fleets knocked at the door of the Dardanelles and Allied armies took root on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Finally, the problem of sea power was beginning to become acute. A world which too eagerly and too completely accepted the British view as to the effect of the British blockade was not completely mistaken in recognizing thus early that the British fleet would steadily and increasingly hamper the domestic economy of Germany and compel

her to employ one expedient after another to meet the shortage incident to the blockade. Only in food did the reckoning prove radically mistaken and even in this department there was discomfort, without immediate or intolerable privation.

The sense of this closing net, the anger at the nation which thus struck the whole German people while it remained removed from the weight of German arms, was to drive the German Government, the naval school of Tirpitz, into a submarine campaign that would involve neutrals, and in the case of the greatest of all neutrals, the United States, produce a situation which after many clashes would at last add the United States to the nations at war with Germany.

The paralysis of the German merchant marine; the closing of the seas to the German flag while British, French, and even Belgian ships still sailed the ocean and brought to French and British ports the munitions and supplies essential to preserve them, while their own factories were still unready and their own industrial system not yet readjusted; the resources of ships and sailors, which permitted the transport of armies; the arrival of colonial troops from Australia, Canada, India, which permitted the nations to redress the balance which was with Germany at the outset, thanks to her superior preparation; these were things that exercised an ever-growing influence upon German thought and German action.

Nor could there be any mistaking the resentment in the whole Fatherland, as it was recognized that, so far as the world was concerned, Germany had become a besieged city, and German explanations and German statements, save for the few fugitive messages sent through the air, were condemned to satisfy German readers alone; while the world, the neutral world to which Germany desired to appeal, found its evidence and drew its conclusions from anti-German sources alone.

II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Looking first at the military problem, it was plain on January 1, 1915, that German prospects, without being desperate, were dark. It was true that men, the world over, too promptly began to compare the

posture of Germany in 1915 with that of Napoleon in 1813. The outside world neither understood the enormous accession of faith and confidence the restricted victories of the opening phase had brought to Germans, and the unparalleled magnitude of German effort which was to come, nor could they realize, as the Germans did, how futile were many of the hopes in Allied quarters of the prompt arrival of Kitchener's millions and the limitless flow of Russian masses.

Yet, despite the exaggerations, the fundamental conception of the non-Teutonic world was correct. Germany had failed at the Marne and in her subsequent efforts to reverse the decision of the Marne. Her armies now stood on the defensive in the west and there was no promise that the initiative could be reclaimed. Two months of terrible slaughter before Warsaw had proven as sterile as the murder done in the battles of Flanders. Warsaw stood as Calais and Boulogne stood.

Looking southward to Austria the picture was dismal in the extreme. The defeat of Lemberg had shaken the whole fabric of Hapsburg military life. After Lemberg the efforts of German commanders to rally and reorganize Austrian armies had saved the armies, but it had failed to make them victorious. Temporary Russian retirements in Galicia had again and again been followed by Russian victories, and in the last days of the year a second Serb triumph had revealed the permanent disorder of Austrian forces. The Russian armies were again pressing up and over the Carpathians, and from Budapest came insistent demands that Germany should guard the Magyar marshes against the Slav danger.

Reckoning on the basis of country occupied, it was true that Germany was now fighting in foreign lands, for the most part. The East Prussian invasions had been repulsed, but not until grave injuries had been done to Junker estates. Not less than 8,000 square miles of industrial France, holding in peace times 2,000,000 people, was occupied, as was the bulk of Belgium and some 15,000 square miles of Russian soil. But, to balance this, France clung to a corner of Alsace, Russia to a paring of East Prussia, and Austria had lost in Galicia and Bukowina nearly 35,000 square miles of territory including the oil-fields of Galicia.

If anything else were needed to incline the balance toward the Allied

side, it could be found in the isolation and inevitable extinction of German colonial power. Togo and the Kamerun were both lost, Kiaou-Chau and the islands of the Pacific were gone. The doom of German Southwest Africa had been sealed by the failure of the Boer rebellion, and a Boer General, Louis Botha, was gathering up the troops which would presently conquer it. German East Africa still endured, but not even a German could believe that it would permanently escape the fate of the other colonies.

On the military side Germany had now once more to bend her energies to restore Austria. She had to reckon on the eventual demand of the Turk for guns, and men to man them. The chance of a resumption of the offensive in the west in the spring was already fading, but the failure meant more time for France and Britain, aided by the workshops of America, to restore the balance in numbers and preparation. The story of how Germany met the military problems is one of the most magnificent in military and industrial history. Unfortunately for her, the political problems were beyond her capacity—beyond all human capacity, probably—and, as it turned out, her military successes could only in part postpone the political perils that were now revealed.


III. ITALY

Of all the political problems, that of Italy was the most dangerous. Count Nigra had once said that Italy and Austria, in the nature of things, could only be allies or open enemies. The Triple Alliance had been denounced by Italy in the opening days of the war. With the denunciation of the fact of the Treaty, although the letter endured for some months thereafter, Italian hopes turned again to the Irredenta, and the Italian people, far more promptly than the Crown or the politicians, began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest, of the islands of the Adriatic and the lost Venetian province of Dalmatia, still adorned by some of the most splendid monuments of Ancient Rome.

Such an agitation could have but one consequence unless Austria were prepared to resign Triest and the Trentino, and Austria was not prepared for any such sacrifice. Under the influence of Germany she

tardily, very tardily, consented to certain cessions, but they were too slight to satisfy Italian demand. Bismarck, in refusing to allow his ally of 1866 to acquire Trent, had sown the seeds of later disaster, and almost from the morning of the war it was clear that Italy would eventually enter the alliance against Germany.

Turkish participation merely increased Italian agitation for war,



ITALIA IRREDENTA

As soon as the Triple Alliance was denounced, Italian hopes turned to the Irredenta, and the Italian people began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest

because the alliance of the Turk with the Central Powers, besides reopening the Tripolitan question, assured the latter of supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, where Italy had great ambitions, all of which ran counter to those of Berlin and Vienna but found ready hearing and small opposition in Allied capitals. It was a desirable thing for Italy that Germany and Austria should be beaten. It would be a fatal thing for many Italian hopes if they won.

Nor was it less essential that Italy should contribute to the defeat of

the Central Powers, if she was to share in the results. There were in Greece and Serbia eager aspirants for the eastern shores of the Adriatic and the islands and shores of Asia Minor. The noise of Allied fleets before the Dardanelles forts presently awoke echoes in Rome that German diplomacy could not silence. The hereditary antipathy to the Austrian and the longing for Triest mounted with the weeks until they reached a point in popular emotion where Prince Bülow grimly conceded that "the street" had won; and Italy, despite the fears of her Sovereign and the opposition of Giolitti, her most influential politician, was plunged into the world strife.

We shall see that the decision came too late to prevent the German victory of the Dunajec, which transformed the whole face of the eastern war for a year. We shall see that Italian hesitations, taken with Allied blunders in the Balkans, combined to clear the way for the great drive through Serbia to Constantinople. But also, at a still more distant time, we shall see Italy sending her troops to Saloniki, as she had sent them to Valona, before she entered the war. We shall see her, at a critical moment, extending her declaration of war to include Germany.

But in January, 1915, the Italian danger was only apparent, it was not yet imminent, and Berlin could believe for many months that Italy would remain neutral. To this end she exerted all her efforts, and it was with an eye to the moral effect in Rome that she prepared the greatest of her victories, the Dunajec, which, unhappily for her, came just too late to check Italy's course, although it did avail to restrict the influence of Italy in the war for nearly a year. Fatally, however, the prospect of a long war was beginning to weigh upon Berlin, for if a swift victory such as those of 1866 and 1870 might have left the neutrals still reconciled to their rôles, a long war held out attractions to their racial and national hopes which could not be mistaken.

IV. ROUMANIA

Not less real than the Italian was the Roumanian danger. Within Austrian and Hungarian frontiers there lived more than 3,250,000 people of Roumanian tongue and race. They were a majority in the great

Hungarian province of Transylvania; the largest group amongst the many races in numbers in Temesvar; a considerable element in Bukowina. All these provinces touched the Roumanian frontier. In every Roumanian heart there had been for many years a desire to achieve the re-union of Roumania, as that of Italy had been achieved in the previous century. Could the Austrian provinces be won, Roumania would become a compact state of nearly 100,000 square miles, as large as the mainland of Italy; if not a Great Power, second only to Spain among the lesser nations of Europe.

Such hopes had seemed impossible of realization until the Second Balkan War first revealed the weakness of Austrian policy and the crumbling of the Hapsburg edifice. Until that time Roumania had, perforce, consented to remain a minor member of the firm of the Triple Alliance, and, as Italy had been drawn to Berlin by the quarrel with France over Tunis, Roumania had been influenced in the same sense by the gross injustice and ingratitude of Russia after the Turkish War. In that conflict Roumanian troops had saved the Russian army at Plevna, but Russia had robbed Roumania of her portion of Bessarabia and flung her a morsel of the Bulgarian Dobrudja as an insufficient recompense.

Ruled by a Hohenzollern, who in the opening days of the World War sought to cast the lot of his country with the head of his House, Roumania had marched with Berlin, Vienna, and Rome—held not a little by the presence of Italy in the partnership, which enlisted the Roumanian tradition of Latin origin—from the era of the Congress of Berlin to the outbreak of the Balkan wars. But when Austria, eager to crush Serbia, had given her support to the creation of a Bulgaria even greater than that which had been erected by the Treaty of San Stefano and abolished by the Congress of Berlin, Roumanian allegiance faltered.

Bulgaria was the rival of Roumania in the Balkans and had openly declared her purpose to reclaim the Dobrudja. Bulgarian plans looked forward to achieving a hegemony in the Balkans comparable to that which Prussia had achieved in Modern Germany. To all such plans Roumania was necessarily hostile, because they both threatened her integrity and menaced her influence. When Austria sacrificed Bukhar-

est for Sofia, Bukharest openly altered her policy; accepted Russian warrant for attacking Bulgaria; and, by her attack in 1913, completely demolished the whole structure of Austrian statecraft. Moreover, the Roumanian soldiers who invaded Bulgaria openly announced that they were taking this route to Transylvania and Bukowina.

Once the breach had been made, the consequences were inevitable. Roumania followed Italy in declaring her neutrality when the war came, despite the desire of the King, whose subsequent death soon removed a Teutonic ally not less potent than Constantine of Greece. When Italian policy began to drift toward the Allies, Roumania tacitly followed. More and more Roumanians looked over the Hungarian boundaries to where, beyond the Transylvanian Alps, millions of their race brothers suffered something approaching intellectual and moral slavery under the Magyar yoke.

When the first Russian victories brought the Slav to the Roumanian boundaries of Bukowina and even across the Carpathians into the Hungarian Plain, Roumanian patriots and politicians listened eagerly to Russian promises, based upon Roumanian participation. Only Russian disaster could abolish or postpone such participation. Had Russian diplomacy been a little less stiff or Roumanian demands a little less grandiose, Roumania might have followed Italy at once. As it was, the Dunajec postponed what it could not prevent. At Bukharest, as at Rome, German diplomacy was to perform miracles, but the ultimate failure was already assured, short of German victory in the war, when 1915 began.

V. AUSTRIA

The military side of the Austrian problem was plain. But the political aspects were not less patent to Berlin. Half of the Austrian population was Slav. In the opening battles Czech, Croat, Serb, and even Polish regiments fought with something less than half-hearted zeal. The Italians from Triest and the Trentino, the Roumanians from Transylvania and Temesvar, easily succumbed to the assault of enemies a degree less hateful to them than the races whose yoke they bore. The vast Russian captures after Lemberg, the Serbian disasters, the later

Galician defeats, were all due in some part to the failure of the subject races of Austria and Hungary.

Yet it was of prime importance to prevent this disintegration from spreading, because every evidence of crumbling was but a new incentive to Roumanian and Italian appetite, and every Austrian disaster had an echo in Bukharest and in Rome which no one could mistake. It was not alone that the crumbling of Austria weakened the Central Alliance directly, but it was also that each new crack, each fissure, in the Austrian unity was a new invitation to other nations to enlist and add their numbers and resources to the enemies of Germany.

Napoleon faced the same problem in 1813, when he lingered in eastern Germany, because he realized that a retreat behind the Rhine would mean that his German allies would, either from desire or necessity, enter the ranks of his foes; as they did, when, at last, after the disaster at Leipzig, he was compelled to retire behind the old frontiers. More than all else this political situation forced itself to German attention in the shaping of the campaigns of 1915. It compelled the abandonment of the west, quite as much as any military consideration. It compelled Germany to allow to Britain the time to begin to get her masses in the field, and it held Germany in the east until February, 1916.

More and more it became clear that, while Germany continued to win victories, she could count on the neutrality of Roumania and the annoying rather than dangerous hostilities of Italy. But only in victory was there safety. On the military side, the Austrian armies would take on new efficiency when a German general and German artillery had won the Dunajec, and the great Russian retreat from the Carpathians to the Beresina began. But once the Russian counter-offensive came, Austrian armies would crumble in a new disaster comparable to that of Lemberg and having more immediately unfavourable consequences.

More and more Austria became a burden, a deadweight upon German military and civil policy. Less and less useful became Austrian military assistance, and greater and greater became the share of Germany in the work of the Alliance. But in addition to this was the posi-

tive peril that grew out of the long-standing enmities Austrian policy had engendered or out of the weaknesses inherent in the heterogeneous nature of Hapsburg populations, weaknesses that at one time contributed to the breakdown of the Austrian army and to the growth of the number of nations at war with Germany.

All this is clearer now than at the moment—yet little was hidden from German eyes—when the Kaiser's Ministers, with the opening of the new year, took up the problems of a long war and were compelled to estimate the assets and liabilities of their new undertaking. These influenced the military situation; they compelled strategy to bow before considerations of state; they forced the Germans to make their main effort in the east; and, even at this early date, they made clear the consequences of immediate or eventual failure either in the east or the west. From the task of destroying France, Germany was now definitely recalled to devote her best skill to the salvage of Austria.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ON THE EAST FRONT TO THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

I IN THE CAUCASUS

The first days of January saw a considerable Turkish disaster on the Russian frontier in the Caucasus. Into this difficult region, where campaigning was made the more difficult by the severity of the winter, the Turks had, in obedience to German dictation, sent several of their best corps. The ostensible purpose was to recover the famous fortress of Kars, lost after a gallant defence in the last Russian war. But, in fact, Kars had small value for the Turks. The real purpose of their effort was to compel the Russians to divert troops to this front from the Austrian frontier and thus take off some of the pressure upon their hard-pressed German ally.

For the Turk there were much more pressing services to be performed near at hand. His entrance into the war had cost him the last, shadowy title to his ancient Egyptian estate, and the friendly Khedive had lost his throne. Britain had proclaimed a protectorate and placed an Anglophile ruler on the Khedivial throne, thus completing the work of making good her position in Egypt, recognized by France in the famous and fatal agreement of 1904. To Suez and to Cairo and to the lost African provinces, Tunis and Tripoli, opportunity seemed to beckon the Osmanli along the road that his Arab predecessors of the Caliphate had marched.

That such a venture might have succeeded seemed and seems possible. Britain still lacked the men to defend Egypt; the native troops were at least cold to their Christian masters, if they were not disloyal. Time had not been allowed for the fortification of the shores of the Suez Canal, which, less than a year after, were to face and master a Turkish attack. Could Suez have been reached, and the canal blocked,

the injury to Britain would have been great, although by no means as considerable as German military writers announced a year later, when the road from Berlin to Byzantium had been opened and Germany found a Teutonic purpose to be served by Osmanli effort at Suez.

German control of Turkish military policy was, however, complete, and while the proclamation of the Holy War was still stirring the imagination of the world, even if it fell flat in Islam, beyond the immediate territories of the Turk; while the world was looking for revolts in India and Egypt, in Tripoli and Tunis; while it was expecting Turkish attack at Suez, several Turkish corps were making the difficult advance from Erzerum toward Kars, and the Russian troops, heavily outnumbered, were falling back into the Caucasian marshes, south and east of Batum and Trebizond.

In this difficult country, suffering from insufficient equipment and from the rigours of a terrible winter, the Turks, after brief preliminary successes, met complete disaster. Of three corps, one, with its Turkish and German officers, was captured. Two more, striving to cover the retreat, were heavily beaten, losing flags, guns, and prisoners. Not less than 100,000 Turkish troops were thus eliminated from the battleline, and German prestige suffered its first heavy blow in Constantinople, a blow from which it did not recover until the successful defence of the city a few months later.

From this moment and for more than a year the Caucasus front loses its importance. The subsequent changes in position were not considerable. The Russians did not bring many troops east from the Galician front; the German purpose was not served by the Turkish effort. But when, in the next winter, the Russians were ready to move in this Armenian district, the fall, first of Erzerum and then of Trebizond, to the sword of the Grand Duke Nicholas, gave the world the first hint of the renaissance of Russian military strength, so shaken at the Dunajec and after.

II. LAYING THE ROUMANIAN PERIL

In December and early January Austrian disaster had for the second time led the world to believe that a collapse of the Dual Empire might presently change the whole face of the conflict. While Russian armies again passed the central and eastern Carpathian passes, other forces swept Bukowina and approached Transylvania. The occupation of the Crownland was a fair invitation to Roumania to join the conflict on the Russian side and receive Bukowina as a bribe and Transylvania as a reward for participation.

For Germany the problem was promptly set to protect Hungary, grown impatient through disaster and anxious because of impending attack from Serbia, from Galicia and Bukowina, and because of the possibility of Roumanian hostility. The resignation of Count Berchtold and the selection of Baron Burian were evidences that, within the empire, Hungarian apprehensions were recognized. The visit of Count Tisza to the Kaiser was a sign that Germany had been warned.

This warning Germany received with all possible attention and acted upon with amazing promptness. Thus in January, while the Russian occupation of Transylvania was being discussed, German troops were brought south and concentrated in lower Hungary. Their purpose, it was duly announced from Vienna and Berlin, was a new invasion of victorious but stricken Serbia. Yet a few weeks later these troops appeared in Transylvania, and moved east, parallel to the Roumanian frontier, as a warning to the Hohenzollern king of this state that, to take Transylvania, he must fight the head of the House of Hohenzollern.

Under the pressure of these troops, Russian armies in Bukowina speedily began to give ground. Like the Shenandoah Valley in our Civil War, Bukowina was becoming a thoroughfare of invasion and a pathway of destruction. Step by step they were driven from before the Borgo and Kirilibaba passes; they were cleared out of the foothills of the Carpathians, and by the middle of February their retreat had halted at the Sereth River, a few miles south and west of Czernowitz and the Russian frontier; more than two thirds of Bukowina had been reconquered, and the Germans had interposed a wall of troops between the Czar and his prospective Roumanian ally.

At the same time there came from Budapest new rumours of Russian disaster, of the suicide of a Russian commander, and the capture of the

General Staff of the defeated army. These rumours were duly denied, but there remained the solid fact that Bukowina had been reconquered; the invitation to Roumania to participate in the war had been abruptly cancelled by German arms, and from Bukharest there came no more reports of the intervention of the Latin state without delay. On the contrary, there were credible reports of the release of vast stores of grain previously purchased by Germany and Austria, temporarily held up by the Roumanian Government, but now permitted to go north. A military campaign waged for obvious political ends had succeeded.

Nor did the quieting of Roumania end the success of German policy. A German loan to Bulgaria again stimulated rumour that Ferdinand and his Bulgarian subjects were contemplating an entrance into the war on the German side, were planning to retake Macedonia, to strike at Serbia and Greece, and, by cutting the Orient Railway, shut off the Slav state from Saloniki and foreign supplies, and, by invading the Valley of the Morava, open a road between Berlin and Constantinople and thus unite the Central European nations. This rumour, however idle at the moment, supplied an interesting forecast of what was to come, and gave Allied diplomacy a warning which it stupidly failed to take.

Finally, from Albania came a fresh incursion into Serbia along the marches of the Drina, directed at Prisrend and the territory still populated by Albanians but ceded to Servia and Montenegro by the Treaty of London. Here was new work for the Serbian army, calculated to keep it occupied, south of the Danube and away from Bosnia, until Germany had dealt with Russian activity in the southeast.

Such, briefly summarized, were the purpose and achievement of German arms in Bukowina. Thus promptly and completely had the Kaiser answered the appeal for help made a few weeks before; thus had he justified the affection and esteem in which he had long been held by the Hungarians, and temporarily silenced the whispers of discontent in Budapest.

III. THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES


To answer the Austro-German thrust through Bukowina and over the Carpathians, the Russians chose to strike at East Prussia. Strategically such a move was advantageous because it meant moving troops a far shorter distance away from Warsaw, which remained the centre of military operations in the whole eastern front. Practically, could East Prussia be overrun, the whole Russian front would be straightened; a great province, a source of food supply to Germany, would be conquered; and, ultimately, the German position between the Bzura and the Nida in Russian Poland would be exposed to attack in the flank and rear.

Thus, while the main Russian and German armies faced each other west of Warsaw on the lines they had taken when Hindenburg's great offensive against the Polish capital had been halted in December, new armies were directed against the German positions north of the Vistula and south of the Niemen, on a front from Tilsit to Johannisberg, while another force moved down the north bank of the Vistula toward Thorn.

Again, as in the case of Tannenberg, the geographical circumstances explain the military operations. Inside the eastern frontier of East Prussia some fifty miles there extends from north to south, between Insterburg and Johannisberg, that intricate tangle of water known as the Masurian Lakes, out of which flows the Angerapp River, which joins the Inster at Insterburg to make the Pregel, a stream that enters the sea at Königsberg. West of this region Samsonoff had suffered his great disaster in September at Tannenberg. To this obstacle the Russians had returned in October after defeating a German invasion of Suwalki Province at the Battle of Augustovo.

For three months Russian and German forces had faced each other in this region with little or no change of position. Now the Russians undertook to turn the Germans out of their strong position behind the Masurian Lakes by attacking from the north and south; that is, by coming in on the flanks. At the outset this move met with apparent success. Coming west on the solid ground between the Niemen and the Angerapp rivers, the Russians approached Tilsit, took Pilkallen, began to talk again of a siege of Königsberg. At the same time, to the south of the Masurian region, between the East Prussian frontier and the Vistula, they made headway toward Thorn.

In the first week in February, however, Hindenburg countered with terrific force. The first sign was a renewal of the German offensive south of the Vistula and along the Bzura-Rawka front. On this line the Germans began a series of desperate assaults, which were announced as a new drive at Warsaw. Petrograd proclaimed the slaughter in these



THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians.

Line A-B shows the Russian front before the battle. The arrows show the lines of the Russian retreat

fights the greatest in the whole war, and there were circumstantial reports that the Kaiser himself had been shocked by the sacrifice of life in a forlorn undertaking.

By the second week in this month, however, the truth became apparent. The German attacks had been mere screening movements to cover the withdrawal of troops from this front to East Prussia, and

very soon Petrograd began to concede defeat and retreat in East Prussia, while Berlin announced a second Tannenberg and the capture of 40,000 Russians. In any event, it was clear that by the use of automobiles, by again employing the strategic railways along the East Prussian frontier, the Germans had rushed overwhelming forces into East Prussia, beaten the Russian flanking force between the Niemen and the Angerapp and completely redeemed East Prussia, save for a little corner about Lyck.

By February 15th German troops were advancing eastward all along the front from the Vistula to the Niemen, were across the Russian frontier in many places, and were still driving the Russians back toward their fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Bielostok, and Ostrolenka; that is, behind the Niemen and the Narew. Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians, and from the Roumanian frontier to the Baltic German troops, with the support of their Austro-Hungarian allies, were advancing. Their success in East Prussia was to tempt them to one more bid for Warsaw, from the north, but this failed, like the others. The road to Warsaw ran neither through East Prussia nor northern Poland.

IV. PRZEMYSL

The disaster of the Masurian Lakes, which divided the attention of the world with the Allied naval operations just beginning before the Dardanelles, was counterbalanced in the following month by the Russian capture of Przemysl on March 22d. Invested for a moment in September, relieved when Hindenburg made his first drive for Warsaw, and promptly surrounded again when the Russians resumed the road to Cracow before the Battle of Lodz, Przemysl had been shut in ever since. Its surrender was one of the most spectacular incidents in the war and it did much, temporarily, to destroy the effect of recent Russian reverses and checks. Since Bazaine had laid down his arms in Metz four decades before, Europe had seen no such capitulation, and Russian estimates placed the number of captives at 130,000.

Before his surrender, the Austrian commander, General Kusmanek,

had destroyed all the forts, blown up the bridges, turned the rifles and cannon into useless junk. But this diminished the material rather than the moral effect of the victory. Actually the last considerable fortress of Galicia, east of the Dunajec and north of the Carpathians, had now fallen. As for the numbers of prisoners, they astonished the whole world and explained a surrender which took the Russians by surprise. Like Metz, Przemysl had fallen to hunger, and, like the Lorraine fortress, it had fallen because it was provisioned to hold a garrison, not a host.

The siege itself had been marked by no considerable military effort. The Russians had merely invested the place and sat down before it. A few brief attacks had demonstrated that it was beyond the resources of their artillery train. Now and again there had been sorties; a desperate effort by Hungarian troops just preceded the surrender. Several attempts on the part of the Germans and Austrians to relieve it had come close to success, but ultimately failed. Time and hunger did the rest.

In the closing days of the siege, cats and dogs had sold for prices recalling the Paris market in 1871. There seems to have been much mismanagement of resources, and the defence shed little lustre on Austrian arms. The last sortie of the Hungarians seemed to the Russians useless sacrifice, for it was promptly and completely checked.

With the fall of Przemysl the Galician campaign entered its final stage. The troops released by the surrender joined the armies that had long been battling in the Carpathians, advancing when opposed only by Austrians, retreating when German reinforcements came up. Each attack after retreat found the passes more strongly fortified, found the task more terrible. Still Russia stuck to it, and with the fall of Przemysl the world looked for the arrival of spring and the Russians together in the Hungarian Plain.

In this it was mistaken. Carpathian hopes, like the expectations aroused by the Allied fleet before the Dardanelles, were soon to be destroyed, and one failure after another was to meet Allied armies and fleets in the whole eastern field. Yet it is worth recalling that the moment when Przemysl fell was the most fortunate moment, from the Allied point of view, since the struggle had opened. Austrian collapse, German

surrender, these were the things that the press of the world outside German and Austrian territories talked of at the very moment when Germany had gotten well forward in the preparation of that tremendous thrust at the Dunajec, which was to usher in a full year of Teutonic victories.

Przemysl is a high-water mark; dead low water in Allied prospects comes something more than a year later, with the disaster and surrender of the British at Kut-el-Amara. It remains, now, briefly to examine the final phases of the great Carpathian battle in which the Russian flood was finally checked, the Russian armies were exhausted and shaken by their terrible efforts and losses, and the failure of Russian munitions brought disaster comparable in modern military history only with that of Napoleon in the Moscow campaign.


V. THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS

There had been fighting in the Carpathians as early as September, after Lemberg, when the Cossacks crossed the range. There had been new and more serious fighting in October and November, when the Russians came west again and approached Cracow. But it was not until the new year that the Russians definitely abandoned the attack to the west and set their faces toward the south and strove to cross the Carpathians into Hungary. Their attempts to the south on the edge of Roumania, designed to influence Roumanian policy, had met a swift check at German hands, and Bukowina had been cleared of Slavs in January and February. Similar German operations, made in response to Hungarian appeals, had closed the passes immediately to the north of Bukowina, through which the shortest rail line to Lemberg goes.

By March, when the Battle of the Carpathians takes its final form, the Russian effort is concentrated upon the Dukla and Lupkow passes while the Austrians and Germans are now on the north side of the Carpathians from this point south to the frontiers of Roumania.

The passes by which the Russians were now seeking to reach Hungary are the lowest in the range. The Dukla is but 1,500 feet at the crest and opens easily into the headwaters of the affluents of the Hun-

garian Theiss. In this pass, as in several of the others, there had been terrific fighting all through the winter and the casualties had been exceedingly heavy. White uniforms had been adopted to deceive the outposts, every device had been employed to aid the assailant and the defender, alike. And slowly but steadily the Russians had progressed in the Dukla until they were actually at the edge of the Hungarian Plain. But in the other passes the stiffening of German reinforcements had permanently checked the Slav.



THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN, SEPT, 1914-MAY, 1915
Russia's Carpathian Army literally beat itself to pieces against the barrier that faced it

The opening weeks of April saw the crisis. A stupendous Russian effort gained still more ground at a frightful cost. The world believed that Russia was forcing her way through the passes, when, by the third week in April, Ivanoff's army came to a practical but not an absolute standstill. The cost had been beyond the resources of Russia in men, in guns, above all in ammunition. To the south, Austrian troops, with

German contingents, were actually breaking out in the foothills of the Carpathians on the Galician side, threatening the flank of the Russians in the Dukla and the Lupkow.

Actually the Battle of the Carpathians was over, although it had two more weeks to run. Germany had succeeded at last in erecting a bulwark against Russian floods in Galicia, as she had promptly broken the force of Russian invasion twice in East Prussia. By the third week in April there is something approaching a deadlock along the whole eastern front from the Baltic to the Roumanian frontier. There is, as yet, no sure sign of the Russian halt, but it had come.

Looking backward we may now perceive that Russia had for all the months since November, since the opening of the Battle of Lodz, been bearing an ever-increasing burden of German effort. Her mission to deal with the Austrians had been triumphantly discharged by the victory of Lemberg and its immediate consequences. All German efforts to abolish this Lemberg decision by Polish and East Prussian drives upon Warsaw had failed. Only when Germany had sent her troops into Galicia and Bukowina had Russian advance slowed down. Przemysl, in late March, had been an authentic sign of Russian strength; the attack upon the Carpathian passes had been a final proof of Russian devotion and determination. But Russia had now reached the point where she must have aid, and effective aid, from her western allies. If they were ready to begin, if Anglo-French efforts in Flanders and France recalled German troops from Galicia and Poland, Russia was still capable of useful service.

But if this help did not come, Russia could no longer bear the burden she had been bearing through the months of furious fighting that separated Lemberg and Tannenberg from Przemysl and the Carpathians.

The best of Russia's officers and of her first-line soldiers had found their graves on the fields of victory and defeat in East Prussia, Poland, and Galicia. The Carpathian Army had literally beaten itself to pieces against the barriers that faced it. Russian military achievement had surpassed her own and her enemies' expectation, but no Russian warning, although there had been many, had sufficed to moderate the hopes

and expectations of the western allies of the Slav. They were soon to be undeceived.

It remains, now, to look westward and examine rapidly the progress of events from the German defeat at Ypres to the moment when Russian effort was checked at the summit of the Carpathians and Russia began to lack the strength to continue the work begun at Lemberg and carried forward, to the very great advantage of her western allies, up to the arrival of spring. It is well to remember, too, that at this moment Russia had at last realized, through the failure of the Allied fleets in the Dardanelles, that she was to receive no immediate aid in munitionment or supplies, of which she stood in desperate need, from her western allies.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915

I THE PROBLEM

When the German attack in Flanders ceased and the Germans began to transport some fraction of their main force eastward to relieve Hindenburg in his Lodz venture, to aid him in his later attacks upon Warsaw and finally to prop up the crumbling Austrian armies, they left a field upon which they had missed victory by the narrowest margin. Napoleon was never nearer to winning Waterloo than were the Germans to achieving a complete success about Ypres. Had Russian pressure been one whit less severe, had Austrian collapse been one degree less imminent, it is difficult to believe that the Germans would have missed arriving at Calais and crushing in the whole western flanks of the Allies.

When the German flood at last subsided it left behind it a victorious but well-nigh-annihilated foe in Flanders. To meet the storm the Allies had flung into the gap the most heterogeneous mass of men that Europe had known since the Mohammedan invasion. Asia and Africa, Australia and Canada, were represented by white, by black, and by yellow troops who fought beside the French, the Belgians, and the British. Sailor lads from Brittany marched shoulder to shoulder with the Senegalese; troops from British India held ground within sight of Arabs and Berbers from Algeria and Morocco. Languages, customs, religions of four continents and a score of races were represented in this strange horde.

Actually the Allies had striven, as men strive when there is a break in the dyke, to stop the rapidly growing gap by every conceivable and available resource. Never in military history was there such a jerry-built wall as stretched across the pathway of German floods, wavered and faltered under German attack, and just held at the final moment, when, with the eastern crisis becoming ever more insistent, the

Germans, under the eyes of their emperor, called upon the famous Prussian Guard to deliver the final blow.

And when the wave at last was spent, there stretched from Switzer-land to the sea that long line of trenches which henceforth for more than two years was to be the western front. Such an ending to a Franco-German campaign had been foreseen neither in Berlin nor in Paris. That such a condition would endure, not for months but for years, was a thing wholly hidden from German and French High Command in November, 1914.

For the Germans there was the firm belief that a few months of winter campaigning would dispose of the Russians, permit the capture of Warsaw, and that spring would see the return to the west of the troops borrowed from the west for the winter months.

As for the Allies, their forces already began to talk of that happy hour when Kitchener's "Million" would arrive, by Easter at the latest, and the long German lines would be broken, the whole of France delivered, and the decision of the Marne enforced along the Rhine. No one yet foresaw the magnitude of German resources or effort; no one yet foresaw that the heavy artillery, prepared to win field battles and reduce fortresses; the machine guns, which only in the German army had been provided by thousands to obtain victory in the decisive battle in the open field, would give Germany an advantage in trench warfare enabling her to hold her lines, not for weeks or months, but beyond the date of the second anniversary of the war, with wholly insignificant changes.

Actually, the German problem had been posed in the east; it was the problem of disposing of Russia by spring and returning to the west to reopen the Marne verdict in the summer and win the war in the first year. The problem of the Allies was to reorganize their shaken armies, to raise the British forces that could supply the necessary superiority of numbers in the west, and to provide that heavy artillery and ammunition which were utterly lacking and without which the attack, in the new conditions of war, was a mere murder. All this it was imperatively necessary that the Allies should accomplish before Russia was beaten down by the whole weight of German attack—before the victory

of Lemberg, which had given the Russians the initiative and the advantage in the east, should have lost its influence.

We have seen that the Germans failed in the east. All their mighty efforts were insufficient to abolish the consequences of the initial Austrian collapse and the early Russian triumphs in time to resume the western campaign in the spring. Not less absolute was the Allied failure in the west. For another year, after the critical spring, Kitchener's million, as an offensive force, was to be a myth. The task set for Britain was beyond the capacity of any nation, untrained to wars of the national sort and lacking the resources in trained men which conscription alone supplies.

Without Britain, France could not free her soil. Almost a million French had been killed, wounded, or captured in the first four months of the war. The industrial districts of France had been seized and were held. France could and did address herself to the task of organizing her national life within a brief time. But such organization was for long beyond the capacity of British Government or people. Months after the need for heavy explosives had been disclosed, the faults of the British military system—its inability to learn—combined to keep the munition works at the task of turning out useless shrapnel.

From political, military, and industrial aspects, the story of the British department of Allied effort, deduction of course being made for the Navy, remains the story of failure, of inability to perceive the character and magnitude of the war, of failure to understand the new horizons, the new conditions, to grasp the fundamental fact that the war could only be won when Britain conscripted her youth and set her maturity to the organized task of munitionment. Under the strain of the first really considerable war in British history, the whole fabric of British Imperial life broke down.

On the military side the British failure was complete in all but defensive operations. The world knew little of the original campaign of Field-Marshal Sir John French. The legend that he had saved the French before the Battle of the Marne and contributed the decisive thrust in this engagement served to deceive and delude the British

themselves. Not even Neuve Chapelle opened their eyes and it required the dismal slaughter at Loos in September, 1915, to demonstrate the need of a new commander-in-chief and of a new system.

Field-Marshal Sir John French's services to his country and to the Allied cause at the Aisne and at Ypres were incontestably great. On the latter field the British army—the old army—died, holding a line whose collapse would have brought ruin to the Allied defence in the west. Not a little of the failure of the British commander must, in fact, be charged to Lord Kitchener. We shall not know until history has cleared the ground how far the commander in the field was blocked, handicapped, finally exhausted by an administration of the War Department, which in such instances as that of heavy explosives starved the army in France because it misunderstood the conditions of the new warfare. Yet in the light of such evidence as exists, the recall of the Field-Marshal seems to have been inevitable and the responsibility for failure in the field in some part his own.

As for the British army, more was asked it than could fairly be asked of any army in the first year of the war. And what it did was a larger portion of the impossible than was then conceivable. It fought with rifles against machine guns—with shrapnel against high explosives; it manufactured its bombs out of jam tins and matched them against the products of prepared machinery. It was often defeated but never conquered; and never—save between Mons and the Marne—greatly disorganized.

In the nature of things this British army was for nearly two years a "forlorn hope"; it could not be compared on the military side with the highly organized German armies or with the French conscript armies; yet, without its contribution, the war would have been irrevocably lost in the first year; and after the first year, its mounting strength and growing efficiency were recognized even by the foe.

During the first two years of the war, this British army never had an equal chance, most of its offensives were sheer sacrifices, made gallantly and willingly, but foredoomed to defeat because equipment was lacking and training was still to be acquired. Political blunders, such as Antwerp and Gallipoli, added further burdens and led to further disastrous consequences. Many of the blunders were censurable and indefensible; many were the inevitable concomitants of national unpreparedness. Yet the critic who recognizes necessarily the failure, from the military point of view, feels his words unfair, in the presence of the spirit and the devotion of the men who held the line from the first Ypres battle to the coming of the new armies or died unhesitatingly in the opening days of the Somme, a sacrifice to the tuition of a nation which had to learn modern warfare in the most expensive of all schools.

With the weapons they had; with the officers that were available—officers as destitute of training as their men; under the burden of the most powerful attack military history records, both in numbers and in mechanical appliances, the British army hung on; and if the original "contemptible little army" died on the line, its presence there prevented an immediate disaster to the Allied cause and its tenacity insured the coming of the other British armies which were to know victory and regain the offensive.

The close of the period we are now to review was to reveal the fact that the Allies in the west were still unready. A moment was to come when, coincident with the fatal thrust that Mackensen was to deliver against Radko Dimitrieff at the Dunajec, German attacks in Flanders were to disclose the fact that Russia could not be relieved by pressure exerted on Germany's western front and must go from retreat to retreat until the coming of winter found her terribly beaten armies at the Beresina and Dwina.

The military operations in this period are of practically no value, compared to that attaching to the struggles in the east, because they resulted in no tactical or strategic advantage to either side—did, in fact, no more than contribute to revealing the fact that Russia could expect no help in the west, at the precise moment when the temporary success of Russia had compelled Germany to turn all her attention for the summer campaign toward Warsaw and not toward Calais.

II. JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING"

To the operations in the west in the period we are now to examine, and, indeed, for many months thereafter, there was applied the picturesque term of "nibbling." Actually, these operations were local offensives, undertaken in all but one of the more considerable instances by the French, and they were designed to keep as many German troops as possible occupied, to prevent the transfer to the east of any large number of army corps, to strain German resources in men and munition by a double pressure on the eastern and western fronts. Beside these purposes local objectives were insignificant.

The world misunderstood these operations completely. It saw in each activity from Switzerland to the North Sea the evidences of a grandiose attempt to reach the Rhine or the lower Meuse. It did not understand the weakness of the Allies, the difficulties of the British, the inadequate resources of the French—in men as a result of their terrible losses, and in munitions because of German occupation of so much of the industrial portion of France. From November to May the whole outside world waited for the new Allied "drive" in the west, were waiting for it when the German thrust at Ypres crushed in half of the whole salient and won a local success more considerable than any the Allies had achieved in all the months preceding.

The first of these "nibbles" was in some respects the most considerable and successful. In December French forces appeared along the western slopes of the Vosges and beyond the summits in that corner of Alsace to which the French had clung after they had abandoned Mühlhausen in August. They flowed down the valley of the Thur and reoccupied Thann; they approached the village of Cernay, which is the key to Mühlhausen, and, after long and desperate fighting, took the mountain of Hartmannsweilerkopf, from which they could look down into Mühlhausen a scant ten miles away.

But despite local successes in the villages of Steinbach and Anspach, despite a slight advance along the plain toward Altkirch, the larger purpose could not be realized. The French were unable to break the German line at the point where it left the plain and approached the Vosges. Mühlhausen could not be taken, nor were any of the later efforts more successful. Some little territory was won north of the Thur, some more Alsatian villages were "redeemed," upward of 350 square miles of Alsace was reunited to France, but although each new general who came to the Vosges eagerly undertook, with the limited resources allowed him, to break through to Mühlhausen, the failure was absolute.

Checked in Alsace, the French turned to Champagne and endeavoured to push up the slopes of the hills north of Soissons and beyond the Aisne, where Kluck had held the British in September. Again there was a preliminary success in early January, the gain of several miles. But as promptly came a German counter-thrust and this time the French lost, not alone what they had gained, but the ground turned over to them by the British when Field-Marshal French had gone north in October. Only on the southern bank of the river were the French able to hold. Germany claimed a crushing victory and talked rather obscurely of Gravelotte; the French explained that the floods in the river behind them had made their position indefensible. Neither statement is worth considering. The Germans never tried to advance farther; the French were unable to progress on this front until April, 1917. The local operation promptly lost all importance.

In February the French undertook a still more ambitious operation in Champagne, on the ground which was to see the great and desperate attack in the following September. Over a narrow front and for the possession of insignificant ridges commanding a railroad line vital to German communications, the French and Germans fought for weeks. The battleline rested on the east upon the Argonne and from the western flank the cathedral of Rheims was visible. After casualties not much under 200,000 for the French and German combined—and the French loss was much the heavier—there ensued a new deadlock. The French had gained rather less than a quarter of a mile on a front less than a dozen. But there was never much promise that they would actually penetrate the German lines, and any original hope was promptly extinguished when German reserves arrived.

While this last attack was going forward the British undertook their first, and for the present period their last, offensive, attacking in the district south of Lille. This effort is worth examining in more detail because it disclosed the extent of the weakness of British organization and was the first of that series of failures, extending through Gallipoli and Loos, to Kut-el-Amara, which revealed how little British military training had kept pace with that of continental nations in later years, and how long was to be the task of organizing new British armies.

But in dismissing these early French operations it is well to recall that each of them was designed primarily to aid the Russians and to divert German attention from Galicia and from Poland; the Alsatian attack coincided with the great drive of Hindenburg to the Bzura-Rawka line; the Champagne attack with the opening of the Battle of the Carpathians; and the Soissons fight which just preceded it with the demand of the Hungarians for German aid to repulse the Russian menace in Bukowina and the growing Roumanian threat, due to Russian victories in the Crownland.

In this synchrony of operations east and west it is possible to see what the French were striving to do, not on their own frontier primarily but in the wide field of the continental strife. Nor can one doubt that, while their efforts were not fully successful in this larger field nor of any real consequence locally, they did materially reduce the pressure upon their Slav ally and postpone the day when Germany was able to regain the offensive in the east.

III. NEUVE CHAPELLE

On March 10th at Neuve Chapelle, a few miles southwest of the great city of Lille and just north of the strong German post of La Bassée, which had seen desperate fighting in October and November, the British launched a great attack upon a four-mile front. The immediate objective of the attack was the Aubers ridge, which in military comment is described as the key to the city of Lille itself.

This attack was preceded by the first of those avalanches of artillery bombardment to become familiar thereafter and to be described at once by the Germans, who gave it the enduring name of drum-fire. Under this storm of fire, delivered from 300 guns concentrated in a narrow area, the German first-line trenches disintegrated, even the second line was shaken, and the British infantry made its first advance with little or no serious opposition, finding the ground strewn with German dead, and capturing scores of men overcome by the noise and shock of the fire.

But beyond the first-line trenches the British came under machinegun fire from scattered points in which the German second line had not been destroyed. They also suffered severely as a result of the miscalculation of their own guns, but the fatal circumstance was the failure of reserves to arrive.

There was a moment when it seemed as if the road to Lille was open. But the British could not seize the moment, and it passed forever. After two days the Germans were able to repulse all attacks with terrific slaughter. The British had gained a mile on a front of four; the ruins of the village of Neuve Chapelle were in their hands, but the larger success had been lost. British Command had failed to synchronize men with guns, to prepare reserves to follow the first waves of attack. What was to happen at Loos and Gallipoli on a far larger scale had now occurred at Neuve Chapelle.

In this battle, which filled the bulletins at the time but is now hardly more than a forgotten skirmish, the British first tasted the cup of bitterness which the Germans had drunk to the dregs in the Battle of Ypres. Under German artillery and machine-gun fire, the British losses surpassed that of the British contingents who fought with Wellington at Waterloo. The "butcher's bill" had been 13,000 casualties; the gains, a mile of territory, 2,000 German prisoners, and the privilege of burying 3,000 Germans fallen to British guns.

In Allied strategy this blow in Artois had been delivered in strict conjunction with the French offensive far off in Champagne and at the moment when the arrival of German reserves on the latter field disclosed the fact that Germany was weakening her line before the British. In September a similar double thrust was to be undertaken in Champagne and Artois, which would cost the French 120,000 casualties and the

British 60,000. Looking back to it, after the mighty struggles of the later months, Neuve Chapelle seems insignificant. Yet it was the first time that a considerable use was made of massed fire. It forecast exactly the tactics Mackensen was to employ in his great victory in Galicia not many weeks later, and it did come within sight of a considerable triumph that might have restored Lille to France.

In the first blush London celebrated Neuve Chapelle as the "battle bigger than Waterloo"; but the later disclosures changed the whole tone of British comment, and England presently realized that a meaningless local gain had been achieved at a frightful cost, because British troops had fallen under their own guns and British reserves had wholly failed to arrive at the moment when real victory was within easy grasp. Taken with the scandal over the shell supply—which soon developed and revealed that the British High Command was still sending shrapnel in limited quantities to an army that required heavy explosives in enormous quantities and could not get them at all—Neuve Chapelle was a saddening incident to the British people.

IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

In early April the French undertook an interesting campaign to abolish the St. Mihiel salient, the single breach in the yoke of permanent French fortifications from Verdun to Switzerland, which the Germans had been able to make in September. Coming out from Metz and ascending the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, the Germans had actually crossed the Meuse, taken foot on the west bank, and also captured Fort Camp des Romains, above the town of St. Mihiel on the east bank.

The ground held by the Germans was a narrow spearhead thrust straight through the armour of France. Never had the Germans been able to widen the wound or deepen it after the first thrust, but they remained in possession of a portion of the hills of the Meuse and they cut the railroad from Commercy to Verdun. Now the French, coming north out of Toul and south out of Verdun, endeavoured to break this salient along its sides. Some initial success they had at Les Éparges;

they took several hills and a village or two. But then they were stopped. German heavy artillery in Fort Camp des Romains held them up. The local success did not hide the larger failure. A still more ambitious effort in July, and from the Bois-le-Prêtre, above the west of Pont-à-Mousson, similarly failed. Verdun was left in danger and the extent of the danger was to be disclosed in February, 1916.

Finally we come to the last of the battles in the west in the period under examination, the Second Battle of Ypres, which coincided almost exactly with the date at which the world believed that Kitchener's million were to begin their triumphal advance in the west; and it terminated in a local German success at the moment when Mackensen was to regain for Germany the initiative in the east.

The new blow fell on April 22d. It was delivered by relatively small contingents, and it is plain that the Germans had no expectation of anything but a local triumph, the moral effect of which would far surpass the military. Not only did it come in an hour when the news from the east was to fill the world, but the Allied failure at the Dardanelles had dashed the hopes of all the enemies of Germany and a shining Teutonic triumph held out a promise to hold Italy to neutrality. Again, the Allies were already collecting an army to send to the Dardanelles on the most foolish of all ventures and German pressure was conceivably calculated to withhold troops from the Near East.

The German attack was preceded by the first discharge of "poison gas" of the war. Not since the slaughter in Louvain and the bombardment of Rheims had any event made such a noise in the world as this first use of gas as a weapon of destruction. It added instantly to the horrors of conflict and it was in violation of all the restrictions that humanity and international agreement had placed about the conduct of war. It instantly changed the whole temper of the British, who suffered most severely, mainly in the Canadian contingent; it abolished quarter on the western front for many months, and it brought in its train a savagery and brutality that the wars of the Nineteenth Century did not know.

Even in its immediate purpose, this weapon was unsuccessful. It did not give Germany a shining triumph. It did not open a gap in the

Allied defence, it merely brought to horrible death a few thousands of Allied soldiers, and, before many weeks had passed, the Allies had prepared an apparatus protecting their soldiers and had in their turn adopted this hideous method of killing, which subsequently brought as many thousand Germans to terrible agony and frightful death.

In selecting the Ypres front as the point of attack, the Germans had pitched upon the point best known to the outside world in the whole Allied line from Belfort to Nieuport. Here the Germans had attacked in the autumn and by but a shadowy margin failed to get through. Belligerent and neutral nations, watching for the advance of the Kitchener army, still hardly taking shape, saw, instead, what seemed to be a new German drive for Calais and for several days a real German advance. Nor were the military reasons less weighty in determining the point of attack; Ypres was a salient on which the Germans from higher and encircling ground could pour down a converging fire, cutting all the lines of communication.

The original attack fell to the west of Ypres, at the moment when this beautiful city, with some of the most interesting monuments of Flemish art, was melting into dust and ashes under a terrific cannonade. At the point where the French and British lines touched—the French position held largely by native troops—the Germans launched immense clouds of gas. First amazement and then terror followed. The men who had endured artillery fire and faced death with unfaltering courage for many months broke and fled, a gap opened in the Allied front.

This break exposed the flank of the Canadians. They, too, had suffered from the gas, but less severely than their French neighbours. They did not break or immediately retreat. They extended to cover the exposed flank and hung on. No reserves were available for hours, and in these first hours nearly a third of the Canadian contingent died or were wounded and captured on their lines. Presently the crisis passed. Reinforcements arrived, the Belgians extended their aid to the French, the British brought up troops from the south. Ypres was not lost, the dyke between the Germans and Calais still held.

It is worth recalling, too, that for England, the Canadian contingent bore the brunt as the Australian Anzacs were to win equal glory at Gallipoli. In the history of the British Empire the Second Battle of Ypres may well prove memorable, for Canadian loyalty there gave shining answer to German forecasts of colonial secessions; while in German Southwest Africa, British South Africa was presently to emulate the example of Canada in Flanders and Australia and New Zealand at the Dardanelles.

The Second Battle of Ypres lasted five days; by the third the Germans no longer claimed to be making progress and at points they were presently pressed back, but the whole Ypres salient had to be flattened out. Actually the British gave up more ground than they had surrendered in the First Battle, but solely because of the collapse of the French line to the west, under the poison gas attack. Guns, prisoners, ground, the Germans had taken, but the triumph was local and of no permanent value on the military side.

Yet the lesson of the Second Battle of Ypres was unmistakable, although the world was long in learning it. A swift, heavy blow had disclosed the fact that the Allies were unready. Their previous offensives had disclosed the same weakness. Now it was clear that only by heroic efforts could they check a German attack. They could not break the German lines, they could only with difficulty hold their own. The whole British front had been affected by the attack and new dispositions had to be made.

Before she went east, Germany had undertaken one attack to demonstrate that she need fear no real danger from the Anglo-French quarter. She had established the fact. Not until September would her western lines be threatened and not until July, 1916, would the British be ready to take an effective share in the western offensive operations. The legend of "Kitchener's Million" disappeared in thin air, the hope of the speedy deliverance of France vanished, the first authentic sign of German recovery was now perceived by the world which was to have a second and greater proof in a few hours.

In the major problem, to reorganize, to get forward in time to take the pressure off Russia, France and Britain had failed at the moment when the Russian strength was becoming inadequate for the task on the Russian front.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN CONCLUSION

While the echoes of the guns about Ypres were filling the world, the Austro-German army of Mackensen attacked and almost destroyed the Russian army, commanded by Radko Dimitrieff—the victor of Lule Burgas—which stood behind the Dunajec River, in western Galicia. The immediate consequence of this disaster was the dislocation of the whole Russian front; the eventual result, the retreat from the Carpathians and the Vistula to the Dwina and the Beresina.

These great events do not concern the present narrative, they belong, as I see it, to the second phase of the war, the attack upon Russia. With the Battle of the Dunajec ends that first phase, comprehended in the attack upon France and the consequences of this attack. These consequences, since the attack failed, were the deadlock in the west and the loss to Germany of the initiative in the east and west. To obtain the necessary numbers to deal the colossal blow that should destroy France, Germany had weakened her eastern front and relied upon Austria to hold up Russia. Still relying upon Austria mainly, after the Marne, Germany had elected to endeavour to reopen the decision of the Marne in all the weeks from September to the middle of November.

Compelled at last to go east, while the Battle of Flanders was still unwon and the decision of the Marne stood, Germany had then to labour under the disadvantages which had resulted from the successes won by Russia over Austria and the position gained in Galicia. Not until the Dunajec did Germany finally restore the balance, not until the Dunajec did she escape from the consequences of the Marne campaign, consequences which affected the eastern quite as much as the western field.

Had the Allies been prepared to take the offensive in the west,

when Germany at last turned eastward in November, they would have won the war. Had they been able in the spring, when the German attack at the Dunajec began, to make a similar attack in the west, German disaster would have been immediate. The failure in the autumn enabled Germany to erect those colossal dykes against the Allies in the west which extended from the North Sea to Switzerland. Failure in the spring condemned Russia to bear that terrible burden which almost brought irreparable disaster and real German victory.

In the spring of 1915 it was plain that the advantage belonged to the alliance which could strike the first heavy blow, but the superficial circumstances alike favoured the Allies and seemed to indicate that they would be able to retain the initiative which they had won at the Marne and bring Germany to swift and complete defeat. All this was impossible because Great Britain had been unable to transform herself into a military nation and to do in months what her Allies and enemies had achieved only by long years of patient and universal training. As for France, she lacked the numbers, now, to risk alone the supreme effort, for if it failed, German victory in the west, while Britain was still unprepared, was inevitable.

In this situation there was allowed to Germany a new opportunity, and as it turned out, another year, in which to win the war. If she could dispose of Russia and return to the west before Britain had at last organized her millions and her industries, she might hope for the complete victory that had escaped her in the Marne conflict. But if she failed in the east, if she were compelled to come west with the Russian task incomplete, as she had been compelled to go east while France still stood, then German failure in the second phase would be as patent as it was now in the first.

Only victory in the east, followed by triumph in the west, could permanently abolish the decision of the Marne. Unless it was abolished the time was bound to come when Germany would have to face fresh millions coming from Britain and find herself outnumbered and deprived of all the advantages that superior preparation and organization had given her at the start. This is what did happen, but not until the sum-

mer of 1916. And as it did happen the decision of the Marne stood, and stands, the one great event in the whole World War from August, 1914, to September, 1916.

All that the science, knowledge, skill, genius of two races could mobilize met at the Marne in a struggle in which the fate of one race, at least, was in the balance, and if France fought for life, Germany fought for a world power that could hardly have escaped her had she prevailed. But she did not prevail; everything she hoped to attain escaped her on this field. Afterward she still had numbers, the fruits of her years of preparation remained in her hands, but the moment had escaped her and did not return. Had Napoleon won at Waterloo, his old domination of Europe would not have been regained, but had Germany won at the Marne, William II would have attained an eminence that Napoleon never reached in his most fortunate hour.

At the Marne, France willed to live; in the gravest hour in the history of their race, French commanders and French soldiers alike displayed not merely the courage that was traditional and was equalled by German devotion, but those qualities which have often given France the supremacy in Europe and have never failed to save her when her condition seemed desperate. And by her will to live, France saved Britain, Russia, Europe, from a German domination, which in the German mind was to renew the glories of the Roman Empire.

A second sacrifice and a second agony were to be demanded of the French people at Verdun, but the stakes of that terrible contest were incomparably smaller, and the greatest possible fruit of German victory on the Meuse would have been provinces and indemnities. Nor was there ever a grave danger of this harvest. At the Marne, Germany fought for a World; at Verdun, for a War; and while she fought at Verdun, her statesmen talked of a victorious peace, which if it still indicated great ambitions, no longer disclosed Napoleonic aspirations.

With all its mighty events, with all its noble and splendid pages, the history of the first two years of the great conflict is the history of the Battle of the Marne. We have seen in these chapters how Germany strove to abolish that decision; we shall see in those which describe the

attack upon Russia how she continued to strive to abolish it in tremendous struggles from the Straits of Dover to the Golden Horn, from the Meuse to the Beresina; but after splendid successes, we shall see the continuing failure. Like Marathon, the Marne was a mortal wound; but, unlike Marathon, it did not kill at once.

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volumes.

EDITOR

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THE NEW SCIENCE OF WAR

By AN AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERT

MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

The mobilization of a country for war means the putting into effect of all measures necessary to pass from a quiet, peaceful community to a military state in which the strong hand of military power, as exemplified in the chief executive of the State, reaches out to all parts of the whole national fabric the men, the animals, the industries, the soil itself and all its products. It means the assembling of the military companies, regiments, brigades, divisions, and army corps which form the actual fighting units that enter into the campaign. It means the gathering together of the State's human resources, in and even out of the country, so as to supply them with food, weapons, clothing, transportation, and medicines. It means the supplying of the navies, the building of new ships, the closing of harbours with mines and submarine nets. the patrolling and defence of all frontiers, and measures for the protection of all bridges, railroads, and highways. In other words, it means the putting into actual effect of the million and one things which are necessary to defend the country in case of an attack from an enemy. Every thinking person in the United States must realize something of what this means when he recalls the early months of 1917, when war with Germany at last seemed imminent.

Mobilization does not in itself imply the transportation of all the men and material which are assembled in various places to engage in the war. This is termed concentration: that is, after all the military organizations are assembled and equipped at their home stations, near where the men that compose them reside, they are moved to the frontiers, and wherever they are needed, by rail or ship. Where a nation is bounded by strong antagonists who are thoroughly prepared and ready to take the offensive, the full power of that nation is put into motion at the earliest possible moment in order to prevent complete disaster. In countries of this kind all the departments of the State, when the mobilization is ordered, have been already thoroughly organized and all work together for the complete military efficiency of the country. They have all been trained, long ahead of time, to know exactly what this means. Each military unit, each factory, and all supplies have been assigned their exact places in time of peace, and every man knows what to do when the summons is issued. All the civil functions—courts, police, municipal, State and national

authority—are directed in accordance with the wishes of the military head of the nation, and no project is gone into, either political, commercial, or financial, which will not benefit the military situation and help out the armies and navies that are attempting to gain mastery over the enemy. The whole idea of the mobilization and after this of the concentration of the troops against the enemy is to make all persons in the country work as a team, from the factory workers and the farmers at home to the commander-in-chief handling the armies in the field.

France offers one of the best examples of a well-organized country. This was amply demonstrated in the first part of the present World War. Even the minutest details of French mobilization had been carefully arranged years ahead of time. The army of France consists of three classes.

First let us speak of what is known as the active army—that is, the first line, which contained the younger men who were expected to stand the brunt of the heaviest fighting. This is the part of the army which is kept constantly under arms in time of peace and through which every man in the country, physically able for service, passes to gain his military education; for France, as is the case with all countries in Europe, requires all its citizens to be ready to serve in the army in time of peace so as to prepare them for war.

The next class is called the reserve, and is composed of men just older than those in the active army. Most of these are from twenty-seven to thirty-five years of age, the superior limit being thirty-seven years. They are men with families, with responsible positions in civil life, and of course at their age are more settled in their habits and occupations, and consequently are not so active as the younger men who compose the first line. These men still are able to endure great hardship and even to engage in campaigns, but they are not expected to stand exposure and hard marching to the same extent as the younger men of the active army.

The third class, known as the territorial army, is composed of men over thirty-seven years of age. Many of these are now serving in the field army, as all differences as to classes of troops have now been abolished. The territorials ordinarily are not supposed to serve in a campaign but are used for the protection of railroads, bridges, important factories, works, and stores in the interior of the country near where they reside. They are especially useful for this purpose because they know most of the residents in their part of the country and all of those who are engaged or will be engaged in the military preparations necessary in their especial localities, because these are rehearsed so often in time of peace. In France the same persons who rehearse them in time of peace execute them in time of war.

Mobilization of the active army in France meant merely filling up the ranks to war strength with the men who had left during the previous two years. The active armies in all European countries in time of peace have from one half

to two thirds of their full strength on duty with the colours as compared with their full strength in time of war, so that when the reserves of the active army are called upon, each knows his place in the ranks. Each man, when he leaves the active army in France, at the conclusion of his two or three years of service or course of instruction, is given a little book, in the back of which is pasted a leaf of instructions. This tells him in the minutest detail where he should report in case of mobilization, what railways he should take from his home to get to his regiment or battery, on which day of mobilization he should report, and even the hour of the day on which he should join the colours. Nor were these instructions handed to him in a perfunctory manner; pains were taken to see that he knew and thoroughly realized what they meant so that there could be no doubt of his intelligent action when the call came.

Mobilization of the whole country in France required about sixteen days. This meant putting all parts of the army—active, reserve, and territorial—on a thorough war footing, and organizing all the industries so that they would be in condition to supply the sinews of war. Of course, long before this time had expired, hundreds of trains were speeding to the front, loaded with troops, while other regiments were being formed behind them to fill up the empty cars on their return from carrying up the first contingents.

The general mobilization in France was announced on the afternoon of August 1, 1914, throughout the whole Republic. Before this, although some few military movements had taken place, the people generally had heard only vague rumours of such a procedure. As is usually the case in an ordinary peaceful community, most persons had succeeded in dismissing these disturbing thoughts from their minds, so that when the actual summons came, it burst like a bombshell among this industrious people.

The announcement of the great event was made in various ways in the different localities, in accordance with the custom prevailing in the particular place. In some towns, church bells were tolled; in many, drummers paraded the streets; and in others, trumpets called the people together for the announcement. Usually the police read the notice to the people at the street corners, or, if in the country, at the meeting places, cross roads, or churches. Notices were conspicuously posted at all points of vantage. They were sent out by the civil functionaries particularly charged with this duty. These had been keeping the blanks for years, all ready for the eventful day, and all that they had to do was to fill in the date and send messengers to the various points in their precincts which already had been selected. For some days before the actual notice was posted, word had been quietly passed around, to each one subject to call, to have ready certain articles which he was expected to furnish for himself. This was particularly the case with shoes. As the French troops have always been famous for their marching, the importance of having good shoes for a campaign is probably more highly appreciated in that country than in any other. Little groups of men had been coming and going at the cobblers' shops for days, while the cobblers worked night and day to finish up their customers' shoes. All preferred, when they first went out, to wear shoes that had been worn a little and walked in, instead of brand-new ones that might hurt their feet for several days and render them incapable of marching. The cobblers themselves soon joined their respective organizations and made ready to repair the shoes of their comrades in much the same way as a black-smith reshoes the horses in a cavalry regiment.

When the actual mobilization was announced, the men in the first line were required to join their organizations by noon of the next day. Imagine a man in the country, in the interior of France, a farmer or labourer, a banker or a merchant, when he first heard the notice of mobilization on August 1st. The first thing he did, of course, was to look in his precious little book to be sure of his instructions, and to see the hour and the minute on which his train would leave for the headquarters of his regiment. If his book had been lost he reported to the nearest local functionary, who directed him how to proceed, and in addition gave him a printed card with all necessary instructions. The local officials also took charge of all the wives, children, and domestic animals that had to be left behind by the departing soldiers. Arrangements were made at once for their care and subsistence while the soldiers were away. Each district is always prepared to supply everything necessary to families that are unable to earn their own living when the master of the house departs.

On leaving his home, the man, now transformed from his ordinary character into that of a soldier, took with him his two pairs of precious marching shoes, one slightly used and one brand new. He took socks, underwear, tobacco, toilet articles, and the clothes he had on. Everything else needed for his military equipment he would find at the barracks of his company. Upon arrival at the railway station he found all the conductors, engineers, switchmen, firemen, in fact all employees of the railroad, incorporated in the military service. All these had passed automatically under military jurisdiction, put on a uniform, and become part of the army. The town through which he walked on his way to the railway station was now under the strictest police control. Everything was quiet. The strong arm of the law of war and military power could be felt to pervade everything.

The French soldier seldom becomes riotously drunk—as do Americans, Englishmen, and Irishmen—because he seldom drinks whisky or other hard liquor—with one exception. He likes absinthe; but the sale of this intoxicant was prohibited at the first call of mobilization. At the railroad station a large area was fenced in for the exclusive use of soldiers, and lights were provided so that the whole space could be illuminated at night to facilitate the entrainment of the troops. In different corners of this area around the station the men belonging to the various regiments in that particular part of the

country were assembled into little groups, so that those assigned to each regiment could proceed together and not become mixed with other contingents when the cars approached for their accommodation. Here our soldier met many of his old comrades who had served with him during his period with the active army, and the actuality of impending events was brought forcibly to his mind. All thoughts of home and family now were set aside and their place was taken by reflections as to what would happen and what could be done to overcome the obstacles ahead. Within a few minutes the group of men to which he had attached himself passed out to the railway siding where the cars were in readiness. These were ordinary baggage cars, transformed into rough passenger carriages by having benches put into them. Thousands of cars were equipped in this manner as if by magic, because the benches had been ready for years, stored in convenient localities from which they made their appearance at once when mobilization was ordered. The cars in France are small. Each one held only thirty-two men sitting back to back in the centre. while the rest of the space was taken up by their luggage. After a trip of an hour-during which of course the discussion centred upon where their regiment might be going, where the first battles would take place, and whether everything would move as planned—they arrived at the town which was the headquarters of the regiment. Many trains were encountered on the way, all moving north and filled with men, horses, artillery, and supplies; and a few cars already emptied were met, passing back to the south for their second load.

On alighting from the train our soldier marched with his comrades to the barracks of his regiment. Here he quickly found his company which, within the hour, had procured uniforms, arms, knapsacks, and other equipment from the regimental storehouse. This was all new material which had been kept in good condition and added to from day to day in the expectation of just such an event as this. The size of the garments was suitable for each person and the material the best that could be had. Each day for years the minutiæ of the arrangements necessary to equip the soldiers had been attended to, and all of these matters had been gone over time and time again before the mobilization. until every detail was considered to be as nearly perfect as it was possible to make it. They had never been tried out in actual war, however, and there were many who had misgivings as to their efficiency. But the mobilization worked out with the utmost perfection. Not a hitch occurred. By the afternoon of the second day the active army was on a thorough war footing at its home stations, and our soldier was completely equipped from head to foot with the uniform and arms of the Republic. The regiments were all ready to entrain and move to the frontier where concentration would take place. It is true that the soldiers still had the red trousers and blue coats worn by the troops for many generations. There were some who contended that the bright colours

were too conspicuous for modern war; that they would form an excellent target to an enemy thousands of yards away. But this feeling was drowned by the sentiment that clung to the old uniform which had seen the troops of the Republic victorious on hundreds of battlefields. Clad in these colours, Napoleon's victorious legions had conquered the world. The most glorious pages of French history were brightened by the old uniform. What would the soldiers think of themselves if their glory was quenched by the dirt-gray uniforms which their principal antagonists, the Germans, had adopted as their campaign equipment? It is hard for people outside of France to understand how strong was the sentiment attaching to these colours. It cost them dear in lives, in the early part of the war, before they consented to change to an inconspicuous garb.

These splendid troops embarked by regiments on their waiting cars, and as each station was passed the number of trains constantly increased. For the army corps to which each regiment belonged was being gathered together. Finally the total number of trains moving forward for this single army corps exceeded one hundred. These carried all the artillery, all the infantry, cavalry, ammunition, and wagons necessary for a body of upward of 45,000 men. In fact, during the first few days of August, there were more than 100,000 cars moving through France, and not a hitch occurred anywhere. When the army corps in its railway trains arrived at its destination and the unloading began, each detail had been worked out as to where the organizations which they bore should go. Platforms had been erected to facilitate the unloading of wagons and animals. It takes even longer to unload trains than to load them; but the operation had been performed many times in manœuvres and was well understood.

There was great fear that the Germans might be enabled to break through the frontier troops by mobilizing and concentrating more rapidly. Then they could get into the interior of France, blow up bridges and other strategic points on the railways, and thus seriously hinder an orderly concentration. The frontier troops, however, stood their ground in excellent fashion and all trains moving to the front averaged eighteen miles an hour. When the French realized that all the active army corps had arrived at their appointed places in such excellent order, a great feeling of confidence pervaded the country. Not only did the army corps arrive promptly, but the great field armies, which consisted of from five to six army corps, or about 250,000 men, were organized without delay. This again added confidence to the whole French army.

It is difficult to realize the amount of preparation necessary to accomplish so orderly a mobilization, and—although each man thought that such an act would cause new, strange, and undreamed-of feelings and occurrences—when the actuality presented itself everything seemed perfectly natural and simple because it had been rehearsed and thought about so many times before. In France each man was made to think, from the time that he was a raw

recruit, that the fate of his country might hang on his action in an emergency. And when the hour came he proceeded to do his duty in a quiet, intelligent manner.

Not only France, but all other countries in Europe, South America, and even Asia are now arranged in a military way so that they can mobilize in an extremely short space of time. All of them use about the same system. They require each man, when he comes of age, either to undergo military training or to hold himself in readiness for such duty. The country is divided into various districts for military purposes and from each one of these districts a certain army unit is raised in time of peace. When war comes each district has its particular functions to perform and no additional orders are necessary in the emergency. The districts in Europe are organized on a basis of what are called army corps. Army corps are little armies in themselves. That is, they have all branches of the military service in them—artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, air troops, and supply trains. When on a war footing, they have altogether about 50,000 men in their ranks and as auxiliaries. These are the organizations which enter the campaigns and do the actual fighting, several of them being grouped together into the great aggregations now alone known, technically, as armies.

Now it is these units, these army corps, that are mobilized and filled up to get into the field when war begins. They are called tactical units, because tactics is that part of the military art which pertains to action on the field of battle. When these troops leave home, other military organizations take their These are constantly being filled up with recruits to supply the vacancies left by drafts into the active army, which make good the losses that take place in the field. In fact, in the present war, some of the organizations in the German army had to be completely replenished two or three times in the first few months. That is, a battalion which started out with a thousand men had to be supplied with three thousand men during the first months to keep its strength to one thousand at all times. This does not mean that all of the men were killed, but that this number had to be supplied to take the place of sick and wounded, and those who had dropped out from exposure, fatigue, and other causes. Of course many joined and rejoined two or three times. One can easily realize the great perfection that a system must have in order to keep up with these tremendous demands.

The army-corps districts each contain a certain number of able-bodied young men capable of bearing arms. For instance, an army-corps district may have 400,000 able-bodied young men in it between the ages of eighteen and thirty-seven years. In time of peace this district contains one army corps of 50,000 men. It will be seen, then, that these 50,000 men may be replenished eight times in case of necessity, and therefore if the equipment, uniforms, and supplies are on hand, and if the men have previously been trained, additional

army corps can be organized very easily. Now the Germans had about 400,000 able-bodied young men in each of their army-corps districts, and at the beginning of the war they had ready sufficient equipment for turning out, in-

stead of one army corps from each district, four army corps.

Each year recruits were called to the colours and served their allotted time of two or three years according to whether they were with the infantry, cavalry, or artillery. After this they were turned into the reserve. In Germany only about 55 per cent, of the total number of young men available each year were called on for military service, because, among other things, the expense of their maintenance was very great and because they were needed in industrial pursuits. Every one, however, was listed, and many of those who did not pass regularly through the ranks of the army received a certain amount of military training which fitted them for certain work. Every man, be it understood, knew his appointed place when mobilization was ordered. When the call came, therefore, instead of only twenty-five army corps taking the field, which is the number of army-corps districts Germany had, each army corps formed three more in its district, and one hundred army corps were put into the field within a very short time after the war began. This was the surprise that Germany sprung on the Allies. It required 200,000 men for the field organizations out of approximately 400,000 in each army-corps district, and left behind a reserve of 100 per cent. There was, therefore, a total of about ten million able-bodied young men who could be used for active military service. About half of these had been thoroughly trained before the war began and the other half were immediately placed in training. Each year a certain number of youths become of military age in each country and the various nations figure out their campaigns so as to make their annual contingents, as they are called, supply the annual losses. If the annual contingents of youths are not sufficient to cover the losses due to the war, the nation constantly grows weaker, and of course if the losses are great enough will eventually lose in the struggle. mainly through shortage of men. If, however, the campaigns are so conducted that the losses will not exceed materially the annual contingent a nation will never run short of men. Sometimes the nation is able to control this and sometimes it is not. Everything depends upon the expertness with which it handles its troops and upon the pressure which is brought to bear by the enemy.

In the army-corps districts, the boundaries of which are prescribed as definitely as the boundaries of states are established in the United States, every horse and mule is listed and assigned to its place in the military service, be it with the active army, with the depot organizations, or held in reserve for an emergency. All motor transportation suitable for military service receives a small subsidy in time of peace, or is developed in some other way with a view to its use in time of war. The drivers of all motor trucks stay with them when they go into service. They know exactly where to go when mobilization is

ordered. All arms and clothing factories, all producers of foods are assigned their place in the general system. Each army-corps district has its commander, both in peace and in war, designated beforehand. If the active corps have gone to war, the command of the district is left usually to an old general who has commanded troops in this same district when young and in active service. Some of the old generals now serving in Europe in this home service are more than seventy years of age, but they are still bright, alert, and ready to administer their commands.

The army-corps districts are grouped together, for purposes of control and administration, into larger ones called army districts, which correspond to the plan for grouping the army corps for duty in the field. These army districts in turn are handled directly by the supreme military commander of the State, who is always nominally the King, Emperor, or President of the country. Actually they are handled by the Army General Staff.

All military organizations and systems are made as simple as possible because, under the great strain of a rapid mobilization, particularly while such enormous numbers of human beings are moving about from place to place, mistakes are apt to occur which may result in the most serious consequences. The more complicated a system is, the more likely it is that a mistake will be mad. And so the greatest simplicity is required throughout. Ordinarily, not more than five different units or duties are prescribed for any one person to handle, because, if more than this number are to be watched by any one individual, some will probably be forgotten, with consequent injury to the rest. Therefore efficient military organization, from the top down, allows to each commander not more than five things to watch or administer. For instance, the general headquarters of any one group of armies will have five armies to watch; each army commander will have five army corps to watch; each armycorps commander has to watch his two divisions of infantry, his artillery, his cavalry, and his special troops; and so on, down. Sometimes this number must be varied according to the circumstances, but it is the average which all attempt to maintain, with the object of keeping the machinery as simple as possible.

All countries use the same general system of mobilization. The greatest precautions are taken to insure the means of transportation, such as railroads, especially junctions. In a well-organized nation, each man on the day appointed knows and goes to his place, and the country by one step transforms itself from a peaceful industrial community into an active military body ready to strike, and strike hard. This is the operation of mobilization, and although tremendously difficult to carry out smoothly, it is only the beginning of war. Think of what it means when the details of a great mobilization have not been worked out in advance—when it is necessary to do these things after war is declared or when war is imminent!

On account of its great expense, its interruption of the ordinary pursuits of

the people, and its very great influence on industry, mobilization is a serious matter, never ordered unless war is practically a certainty.

Even after mobilization is carried out efficiently—that is, when all the stores and men and organizations have been assembled at their home stations—there remains the complicated and difficult process of transporting large military units to the actual place where they are going to fight. This is done by railroads, steamships, or marching, as the case may be. In the United States the distances are so great that if the map of Europe were applied to this country the distance travelled by New York troops to the Mexican border at El Paso would be almost as great as from Petrograd, Russia, to Genoa, Italy, and the distance from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coast is much greater.

Where speed is an important military consideration against an active enemy, transportation is a difficult and complicated process. Railroad schedules have to be made out for each organization and railroad cars have to be distributed so that movements shall not interfere with each other. When it is realized that an army corps of 50,000 men requires from 100 to 125 thirty-car railway trains for its transportation, it may be appreciated how great is the task of military concentration particularly as thirty or more army corps may need to be concentrated at one time on a single front, as was actually done in some countries in Europe. One wrecked culvert, bridge, or tunnel on a main line might completely negative the plans for a whole campaign and bring about defeat.

It is difficult for a person not conversant with military methods to realize how carefully the railway lines of Europe were guarded in August, 1914. Thousands of soldier-laden trains were moving in every country. The safety of these countries depended upon the safe and punctual arrival of the trains at their appointed destinations. Ordinarily the armies of the European countries can be completely mobilized in four or five days. Their concentration by railroads on the frontiers requires from ten days to two weeks more. whole process, therefore, of turning out the troops and actually putting them in the field requires from two to three weeks. All this time the full military power of the State is developing, and great precautions are taken to guard it from interference. For this reason fortifications and garrisons are maintained at important points near the border so as to protect the troops while they are being carried from their home stations to the frontier. These frontier troops are maintained at war strength, or nearly so, during peace; very much as the regular army is in the United States. They are ready to defend themselves at an hour's notice, and are expected to hold back their opponents for a time, long enough to allow their own armies to assemble and concentrate behind them for the campaign.

On the French and German borders when the war broke out these frontier troops, or covering troops as they are called, met the attacks of each other

wherever it was possible and held each other in play while their armies made ready behind them. Arrangements of this kind are made everywhere, according to locality, both on land and sea. The great masses of troops are assembled in accordance with the plan that has been decided upon for the campaign: that is, whether the armies immediately after concentration shall move into the enemy's country or whether they shall assume the defensive and let him attack first.

Where circumstances permit, countries at war always prefer to attack first and carry on an offensive campaign; for offensive war is what wins. In accordance with what is known of an enemy's dispositions, troops are assembled along the frontiers and concentrated into the larger armies for the actual strokes. As they arrive they are unloaded and marched forward to their respective positions. All the roads over which they are to advance by marching have been selected previously. As each army corps detrains, it forms and begins its march to the front. The campaign then begins in dead earnest. Casualties occur which cause a stream of wounded and incapacitated persons to start flowing from the front to the rear. Not only persons, but horses, motor vehicles, and all sorts of supplies which have been hurt or damaged in the campaign are moved to the rear for medical assistance or repairs. The places of these have to be taken by fresh personnel and material sent up from the home country, so that behind a well-organized army to-day a constant stream of personnel and equipment flows to the rear while another stream of fresh personnel and equipment flows forward by a different channel.

The degree of efficiency of all these plans and arrangements depends primarily on how accurately conditions have been studied and arranged for beforehand in time of peace. Of course the first-line troops of the active armies go into the field before all others, and as soon as these have been marched into the campaign the second-line troops, or those a little older, follow them up. The second-line troops man the frontiers and occupy the fortresses which are maintained as rallying places for the armies in case they are defeated. Forts are placed at vital points such as where a network of great roads comes together, at important crossings of rivers, opposite great passes in mountains, or as bars to easy lines of approach by the enemy. The great entrenched camps are capable of holding several army corps. Their defensive works are made up of embankments, trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, and other obstacles that will help to hold an enemy off for a sufficient length of time to allow the armies to reform behind them and, where reformed, quickly to take the offensive from them. Sometimes the second-line troops are actually put into the field with the first-line armies. This is now the case both in France and Germany, so that the duty of looking after the permanent forts and all the communications within these countries is left to still older men. In fact, in the interior, men up to sixty years of age can be utilized to advantage.

Properly trained officers are very difficult to supply after war has begun, or in fact at any time. Casualties among officers in the present war have been very heavy because, at the beginning, each nation attempted to carry out its purpose in the shortest time possible, and all officers were ordered to expose themselves without reserve. The greatest exertions are now being made to fill their places. In Germany, selected men who have good educations are taken from the different military organizations in the field and sent to military schools, where they receive additional training for several months, to fit them to become officers. They are then sent back to their regiments. In this way the officer material is provided for, although of course these men are not so good officers as those trained before the war. The training received in actual war, however, counts for a great deal. Other countries also have an efficient system for keeping up the supply of officers. England actually maintains schools for officers on the Continent, right behind her armies that are engaged in combat. This brings the practical realities of warfare very close to those who are being instructed.

Each war has the effect of developing many instruments, devices, and supplies which have never been known before, for necessity is the mother of invention. For instance, during the Napoleonic wars, sugar was extracted from beets, as none could be imported during the blockade. During the present war, benzol has been extracted from coal by the Germans, for use instead of gasolene in motor vehicles. It was an incident of warfare. Troops in this war have been able to go from one place to another more quickly than at any time before, because of the unprecedented use of motor vehicles and other mechanical transportation. Electrical means of communication have been so perfected that vastly greater numbers of men can be handled than ever before, while air craft have brought about means of reconnaissance which were unheard of and even undreamed of in former campaigns.

An accurate timing of military movements of all sorts is one of the very important things in war, and the nation has a great advantage that can foresee just what its enemy will do and just what time it will take him to do it. In estimates of time the elements of distance and numbers are very clearly defined factors, to each of which must be assigned a value and a relative efficiency; that is, whether the enemy is organized so as to be better in battle or on the march than one's own troops. Mere numbers in themselves mean very little. What numbers are able to do depends entirely on their efficiency. For instance, a great mob, although it may have a clearly defined purpose, we may say, of destroying a building or of lynching a person confined in a jail, is easily handled by a well-organized group of men perhaps only one twentieth as strong in numbers. In fact, numbers in themselves are dangerous, because a very numerous army is apt to lack cohesion; and, defeated, is not able to escape nearly so easily as a small force under the same circumstances. In war the attacker al-

ways covers the maximum space in as short a time as possible so as to catch his adversary before he is entirely ready to begin. He attempts to gain control of important points in the enemy's country. Such a point, for instance, is New York. An attacker would at once attempt to gain the city of New York, which is the greatest port and railway centre of the East. The defender, on the other hand, strives to maintain unimpaired the means of resistance afforded by his country, and covers the distance as quickly as possible in order to stop the enemy from accomplishing his object.

During mobilization, every detail which will gain time or delay an enemy is of the utmost consequence. This element of time is considered so important by belligerents that they go to any lengths to destroy the enemy's communications, his railroads, tunnels, ships, and roadways. Usually spies are stationed in a prospective enemy's country with this object in view. The mobilization plans of a country going to war must contemplate not only that its troops will be victorious in the field, but also that they may be defeated and that resistance may have to be kept up for a long time, even for a period of years, before it is successful. The longer a country is able to maintain itself and offer resistance, the greater is the hope of ultimately wearing out the enemy and of obtaining assistance from some exterior source.

To-day difficulties in the way of rapid mobilization are perhaps greater than ever before in history, on account of the masses of men to be moved and the intricate and complicated means of moving them. These great masses of men are almost entirely dependent on railroads for their food, ammunition, and stores. With the smaller armies of ancient days, food could be obtained in the immediate vicinity, from the country itself, but these days are long since passed. The huge armies of to-day cannot be provisioned from so small a territory. War to-day must contemplate not only immediate destruction of the hostile army, but more than ever before the cutting off of its means of communication so that the enemy cannot obtain necessary food and munitions.

Mobilization, therefore, signifies preparation in the most efficient manner possible, by every means known to a country for furthering its military objects. It is not enough merely to defeat an enemy. Each defeat must be a link in the chain of his destruction. If a victory uses up the attacker more than it does his enemy, it might under certain circumstances be more costly ultimately than a defeat. The necessity should be apparent, therefore, to all military nations that they must have well-thought-out, consistent programmes, to be followed in case of war. This has always been a difficult matter for States given over to party governments. Such States are ordinarily run by discussion and ruled by speech, with the result that the governments are conducted not necessarily by the greatest administrators but more often by the most fluent talkers. "For he who thinks aright but cannot communicate his thoughts in a telling speech is just as insignificant in a democracy as if he could not think at all." Great men

of action are seldom good orators and good orators are seldom great men of action. Consequently, to carry out a good military mobilization, a nation should be taught to have great confidence in its military leaders and to rely on their judgment, initiative, and ability. This confidence should be continually fostered by educational preparation in time of peace.

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TWO GREAT FRENCHMEN AND THE WORLD WAR

By STÉPHANE LAUZANNE, Editor of the Paris Matin

1.—M. DELCASSÉ

In the month of July, 1898, M. Théophile Delcassé, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, took possession of the Minister's suite of offices, and installed himself in the famous room at the Quai d'Orsay. His first act was to change the position of the historic table which had once belonged to Vergennes. On this table the Treaty of Versailles between England and France is said to have been signed. It used to stand in the centre of the Minister's room, a little in shadow. M. Delcassé had it placed near the window, full in the light. Talking with an intimate friend on this same day he declared frankly:

"There is much to be done. But first of all we shall adjust all the points of difficulty which exist to-day in the relations between France and England."

The friend supposed him to be joking. These difficulties were many; the problems included Egypt, Siam, the Soudan, Newfoundland, Morocco. One need be dowered with a stout heart to undertake to settle all these.

M. Delcassé did have a stout heart, and, what is even better, perseverance. In 1899 a preliminary agreement was signed establishing the French and English spheres of influence in the Soudan and on the white Nile. But this was only a minor affair. The crucial difficulty was Egypt itself, which France had formerly, and which England then, claimed. How was this to be settled? M. Delcassé considered that the best arrangement would be the one which, once for all, should settle all colonial differences between the two countries. To England, Egypt, that is to say Eastern Africa; to France, Morocco contiguous to Algeria, that is to say Western Africa. All the rest was only what might be called "the trimmings" to make the portion of each equal and complete.

In 1902 his aims were accomplished. A general agreement was signed, and according to the prediction made when he entered upon his duties at the Quai d'Orsay, "all the points of difficulty were adjusted." France and England could shake hands.

M. Delcassé, turning then toward Italy, signed with her some months later an almost identical agreement. He mapped out the spheres of influence of each of the two countries as he had done with England, obtaining from Italy a pledge of non-interference in all matters save those concerning Tripoli.

Moreover, Italy—although continuing her alliance with Germany and Austria—engaged never to become in any way an instrument of aggression in their hands against France. Italy and France were once more sisters and friends, as in the past.

There remained Germany.

M. Delcassé was blamed that he had not turned to Germany as to England and Italy—that he had not treated her as he had the neighbours to the west and south of France. This reproach was entirely undeserved. To begin with, he had only one subject to discuss with Germany—Alsace-Lorraine. But that was the very subject which Germany always refused to discuss. Then, every time M. Delcassé tried to confer with Germany he encountered as an interlocutor one who dodged and dissembled, one who refused to speak clearly and frankly.

The following anecdote in this connection is eminently characteristic:

In 1899, when England was in the midst of the Boer War, the German Foreign Office all at once found an occasion to remark to M. Delcassé that "it was a great pity that France and Germany never sought to come together for a chat."

"The two countries," Germany went on to say, "had every reason for coming to an understanding. United, they would be able to do great things

and would be practically masters of the world."

Somewhat surprised at this unlooked-for proffer of friendship, M. Delcassé thought that he had better consult the President of the Republic (then M. Loubet), the President of the Council of Ministers (then M. Waldeck-Rousseau), and his other colleagues. The Council was inclined to suspect either a trap, or an intrigue directed against England. Nevertheless, there was no reason for refusing to discuss matters. It is the custom of France, when addressed, to make a suitable reply.

So M. Delcassé replied to Germany: "You speak of 'getting together!' What do you mean? You say there is good reason why we should understand one another. What is this reason?" These were pointblank questions, at once frank and loyal. But—neither the following day nor the day after that, nor ever, has France received any answer. Germany has never once mentioned this advance. She seems unaware of having made it. But to-day, when one studies Germany's diplomatic methods, it is easy to perceive what she had in mind; she was trying to tempt France into vague, mysterious negotiations with no definite object. Then she would go to England with the tale that "France is conspiring with us against you." In a word, her object had been to start a quarrel between France and England.

But, it has been said, M. Delcassé might have talked with Germany upon his own initiative about another subject—Morocco. To this he has always replied that there was no more reason for consulting Germany about Morocco, than for consulting the United States or Austria. Germany had no special interest in Morocco. The Mediterranean Powers were the ones interested there

and there were good reasons for consulting them. But Germany is not a Mediterranean Power, and on several occasions Prince Bismarck himself declared that Germany had no intention of meddling in the Mediterranean question.

Be this as it may, Germany perceived that M. Delcassé was her enemy and

determined to get rid of him. In 1904 she managed to do so.

Having recourse to the habit of unmannerly bluster which had many times served her ends, Germany announced in April, 1904, that she would not recognize the French Agreement of Morocco, because there had been no international conference on the subject. The Kaiser embarked for Tangier where he made a noisy speech, and France was startled by the spectre of war. In 1904 she was neither in a moral nor material sense ready for war. She believed in international peace, in the friendship of nations, and in compulsory arbitration. Her arsenals were empty. Moreover, a good many Frenchmen refused to believe that this was a premeditated scheme on the part of Germany to bully and to threaten France. In short, the majority thought it necessary to yield. France yielded. M. Delcassé tendered his resignation and left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he had been in office for seven years.

To-day, in mentally reviewing this period, one asks which service of M. Delcassé was the greater; that he had, by dint of the magnificent work of seven years, made friends with England and Italy; or that, in the moment of his swift descent from power, he had unveiled the brutal designs of Germany before

the whole of Europe.

"Germany," he once said to me, "understands and respects only one thing —force. Those who speak of coaxing Germany or of making concessions to her, stupidly deceive themselves. If you are so unlucky as to allow Germany to get hold of even one finger, she will seize your whole hand, then your arm, then your shoulder. Your whole body soon will be in her clutches. There is no need to provoke Germany; but when one is face to face with her and sure of one's position, one must be bold and resolute. No weakness!"

And he added:

"Those who have sacrificed me to German bluster have thought that this would settle everything. What a mistake! Germany demands not merely a sacrifice of our pride. She calls for territory and money. She intends to rule and to dominate the world, and is resolved that her interests shall be served before the rights of others are considered."

It is remarkable, recalling to-day these phrases of more than thirteen years ago, to see how exact was the estimate of the man who formulated them, how clear was his vision of the cataclysm about to be let loose upon the world.

France was soon to see who was right and who was wrong. Incident swiftly succeeded incident, at Morocco and elsewhere; the deserters of Casablanca, Agadir, the descent of German dirigibles on French territory.

M. Delcassé, meanwhile, in dignified retirement, set himself to work. He devoted his attention to the navy, wishing to see France take her place among the great naval powers. In 1911 he returned to office as Minister of Marine and remained in that position for two years, labouring incessantly for the replenishment of arsenals, the letting of armour contracts, and the building of the fleet which was destined, when the time came, to join England's navy in the task of assuring to the Allies their supremacy upon the sea.

In 1914, when war was declared, all turned to M. Delcassé. He had fore-seen the war. Now that it had come, if France found herself not isolated, but with strong allies, she owed this state of affairs to him. Therefore, when the French Ministry of National Defence was formed on the 2d of September, 1914, M. Delcassé once more took charge of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and after an absence of ten years, reëntered the office on the Quai d'Orsay where he had signed agreements with England and Russia, and where he had laid the foundations of the alliance which to-day unites all the nations of the Entente.

On resuming his duties at the Foreign Office, his very first act was a masterstroke. During the forty-eight hours following his return to power, he negotiated the famous Agreement of London. It runs thus:

The undersigned, duly designated by their respective Governments, make the following declaration: The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war. The three Governments agree that when the time comes to discuss terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers shall state the conditions of peace without a preliminary agreement with each of the other Allies.

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON
BENCKENDORFF (COMTE DE)

Edward Grey.

To this document is added the following line:

"This Declaration will be published to-day."
(Signed) Delcassé

September 4, 1916.

This is the Constitution of the Allies—the solemn pact which unites them. It is the wall against which all German attempts to weaken or destroy the alliance have thus far spent themselves in vain. If M. Delcassé had accomplished nothing else during his second Ministry, he would still have herein rendered once again a service of incalculable value to his country.

It is still too early to judge his work during the first year of the war. There was one incontestable triumph—Italy's entry on the side of the Allies, on the 23d of May, 1915. There was one unavoidable misfortune—Bulgaria's entry

on the side of Germany.

The policy which M. Delcassé followed in the Balkans was very simple, yet one must recognize a certain grandeur in his conception. This policy consisted in lining up the whole group of Balkan States against Germany. To do this it became necessary to appease the irritated Bulgarians and to ask certain sacrifices of the Greeks, the Serbians, and the Roumanians. This was the task which M. Delcassé set himself. He received encouragement from England and above all from Russia, who took it upon herself to guarantee the loyalty of Bulgaria. He had few illusions as to the value and importance which attached to the cooperation of Greece, and to him the great essential seemed to be to reconcile the Serbs and Bulgars, and to revamp a Balkan alliance against the Central Powers. He was mistaken and he failed; but the long train of mistakes which the Balkans have inspired during the last two years largely extenuates the gravity of his error. It is safe to say that any European statesman who should suppose it possible to unite peaceably the four or five races who dwell in the Balkan Peninsula would have made the same mistake. Any European statesman who places much confidence in any Balkan State whatsoever, and who is simple enough to judge this race by the same standards as other European races, would be fooled the same way. There is no people in the world to whom one can more fittingly apply the American expression: "Champagne taste, beer income." Each kingdom in the Balkans has at its disposal resources comparable with those of Switzerland or Colombia; each one, if we are to believe what they tell us, should about equal Austria or Brazil in area and should possess dominion over all the Near East.

Be this as it may, in November, 1915, M. Delcassé quitted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the second time, and once more went into retirement.

Those who care to be just must recognize that he was the one who constructed the bulwark which civilization maintains to-day against the Central Powers. He it was who first perceived the German peril and laboured to raise a breastwork against it; he it was who bound together the group, then scattered, that form the Allies of to-day; he it was who laboured, after having reconciled his country with England, to reconcile England with Russia. And we owe it to him that the 4th of September, 1914, did but cement the union of the Allied Powers, and turned the adversaries of Germany into a block of granite so hard that she has not thus far been able to chisel off a single particle.

Because of this the name of Delcassé will always remain linked with the history of the Triple Alliance and the history of the Allied Powers in this war.

2.—MARÉCHAL JOFFRE

Already a great deal has been written concerning Maréchal Joffre. But much remains to be said before the whole story is told. This is the present writer's excuse for the following sketch.

Joffre deserves the credit of having been probably the only one to foresee the kind of war in which the world is now engaged—a slow-moving war along vast fronts, wherein patience is more serviceable than valour and enthusiasm accomplishes less than painstaking calculation.

Even now I seem to hear Joffre saying:

"Henceforth it will not be commanders-in-chief who win battles, but colonels and even simple captains. . . . The conflict will extend along a front of four or five hundred kilometres, and on so huge a field, the will of a single man cannot take hold. No finite mind can contrive and play tricks upon a checker board so vast. . . . The general will have played his part when he has assembled in the chosen region all the armies which are needed there. It is the colonels and captains who must take the stage as soon as the first shots are fired. They are the ones by whom the issue of the engagement must be decided. The victorious troops will be those who can hang on the longest, who have the best wind, the strongest grip, the most unfaltering faith in their ultimate success."

He spoke these words to me in August, 1912, a few days before going off to direct the grand manœuvres of the French army in Touraine. The Matin recorded his words at that time. But I should never have forgotten them in any case. I can still recall how he looked in the dim-lit room of the Higher Council of War at the Invalides; I can still recall the man with the clear blue eyes; I seem still to hear his voice, deliberate and almost soft in tone. Never did eyes see the future more clearly; never did voice utter prophecy more startlingly realized.

A calmer man could not be found in all of our seething, tumultuous France. Self-possession is Joffre's dominant characteristic, and probably it was to this self-possession of his that France owed her safety in the month of September, 1914.

In those days the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief were over-whelming. If there was little confusion in our souls during those days, we nevertheless suffered keenly. Instead of the expected victory in Alsace came ruinous invasion—the mighty onrush of the German horde advancing on Paris by forced marches. The Government could only call upon the Commander-in-Chief to "Hang on and fight." On the shoulders of Joffre rested the burden of France's fate. Strong though they were, he was forced to stoop; but his soul never yielded. The composure which he owed to his well-regulated manner of life created about him an atmosphere of peace, of quiet confidence.

M. Millerand has related that when he was appointed Minister of War, on September 2, 1914, his first thought was to seek out General Joffre. He found him in a little house at Romilly on the banks of the Marne—self-possessed, quiet, calm, as though the military tragedy then being enacted was but an everyday manœuvre.

General Joffre told the Minister of his plans, speaking with the utmost simplicity and clearness; and M. Millerand says that when he came out of the little house at Romilly, he went on his way reassured and tranquil—greatly impressed by so much sang-froid. Self-mastery is in truth the first step toward the conquest of fate. At the solemn hour of the Marne Joffre was master of himself, even as a Roman emperor in the hour of his triumph seemed master of the world.

France is proud of having produced the greatest soldiers of history, but never before has she been able to boast of a soldier so simple. Listen to this order issued on the evening of the 12th of September, 1914, when the victory of the Marne was assured:

"The battle which has been in progress for five days has ended in victory. Our vigorous recovery of the offensive has won this success. One and all, officers and men, you have responded nobly to my call. Your country owes you much."

When one considers that the victory of the Marne is probably the greatest in history, it follows that the hero of the Marne is the greatest victor in history. Is it not then remarkable that this man should announce his success in terms so measured, so unpretending, so restrained?

It makes one think of Fabius, whom the Roman legionaries used to call "Cunctator" ("The Delayer"); but Joffre is a greater and better man than was Fabius. He not only possesses the modest simplicity of the greatest Roman generals, but all the good qualities of the French also are his; the infinite capacity for taking pains, the ever-present good sense, the ingrained thrift which made him so extremely careful in his expenditure of blood and soldiers. He has, too, all the sparkle of the French esprit and all the Frenchman's good humour.

One day a Paris crowd recognized him as he left the Foreign Office, where he had been taking part in a great Council of War. He and his automobile were surrounded. He was loudly cheered, and as he placed his foot on the step, an anxious voice shouted: "When will the war end?"

General Joffre smilingly looked the crowd over and then turned to his chauffeur:

"You have heard, Martin? When will the war end?"

The whole crowd laughed good-humouredly and cheered him louder than ever. This mischievously jocular answer was Joffre, pure and simple.

His soldiers both loved and respected him, and bestowed upon him the homely sobriquet of "Grand-papa. He was also called "Our Joffre" because they felt that he belonged to them and was one of them; because he was all that they wished him to be. But it must not be thought that Joffre won the army's affection by overlooking and tolerating peccadilloes. Always hard upon himself, he showed that he could be equally hard on others. Discipline never

boasted a more inflexible guardian. He had no pity for incapable and unlucky generals, and, in less than a year, sixty-four such went into retirement or were relieved of their commands. Neither would he tolerate misdemeanours on the part of officers or the rank and file. When he learned that, on the battlefield of the Marne, the soldiers were occasionally picking up the pointed helmets of the Prussian dead or other arms and equipment of the enemy, to send as souvenirs and trophies to their families, he formally forbade such practices by an order couched in very severe terms. This order was ever after obeyed, and one could see the soldiers pass without a glance the pointed German helmets which strewed the roads and ditches. Compare this strictness with the easy-going tolerance which permitted German officers to carry off linen and crockery found in occupied houses, and to send them home to Germany in bales and packing-cases!

Moreover, the soldiers knew that their "Grand-papa" was trying in every possible way to save their lives. It was General Joffre himself who in the early days of the war gave the order for discarding the too-visible red trousers and for the substitution of greenish blue ones. He it was who decreed that the officers' red caps, which served so well as targets for German sharpshooters, must be covered; that all decorations, metal buttons, and everything that could serve as something to aim at, must be done away with.

"He will end," said the *poilus*, laughing, "by making each one of us wrap himself in an individual cloud which will make us completely invisible."

What remains to be said? That he formulated orders and rendered decisions which were models of clarity, brevity, and eloquence? . . . The well-known order of the day on the eve of the Battle of the Marne is an excellent example. It began with the famous sentence: "Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come: let each man die in his place, rather than fall back." This order will always hold a glorious place in the annals of France. It is truly a pity that the public at large, the foreign nations, cannot be familiar with the four or five hundred orders of the day which he composed during the period when he was Commander-in-Chief of the French army. Their prime characteristic is that, as one reads them, one wishes constantly to shout out "Of course! He is right!" They were indeed so full of common sense that no one cared to discuss them. It was obviously useless.

On the 24th of December, 1916, the Government of the French Republic, while granting him a well-earned rest, bestowed upon General Joffre the highest possible military honour—one which had been in abeyance for forty-five years. He was appointed Marshal of France. But this recompense is nothing beside the place which the Victor of the Marne will forever hold in the hearts of the French people. There is actually not a cottage throughout all France

which does not contain in some room a portrait of Joffre, not a city is so poor in patriotism that it does not boast a statue of Joffre in one of its public squares. For many centuries there will be no child who does not learn to spell the name of Joffre. For countless generations, he will remain the revered "Grandpapa" who saved the whole French family in its hour of peril.

TIT

REPORTS OF EYE-WITNESSES AND PERSONAL ADVENTURES

1.—THE GERMAN ENTRY INTO BELGIUM

By ARNO DOSCH-FLEUROT

The day before the German troops entered Brussels, the day they occupied Louvain, on August 19th, three other American correspondents and I went to Louvain from Brussels in a taxicab. Without realizing it, and without being stopped by outposts, we drove directly between the retreating Belgians and the advancing Germans. We were trapped in Louvain, and when the Germans learned of our presence they held us there three days on parole. This gave us time to know and love that charming old university city. Less than a week later two of us returned and saw it burn

In those days in Brussels every day had a character of its own, and this was Wednesday, the day after the Queen and the Court had hurried in the night to Antwerp. The streets, which had been full of people the day before, were nearly deserted. The few pedestrians hurried along silently. Even the civic guards, with their high-domed hats and their cockades, no longer patrolled the streets. Only the Belgian flags hanging from every house front showed that the city was not half empty.

The four in our party, Mr. John T. McCutcheon, Mr. Will Irwin, Mr. Irvin S. Cobb, and I had been trying for two days to get permission to leave the city so we could see some of the fighting between the Germans and the Belgians, and this morning we were on edge with anticipation. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, had been intervening in our behalf, and we also had, besides our passports, impressive documents issued by Mr. Ethelbert Watts, the Consul-General, explaining that we were American citizens. With these we went to the Gendarmerie, a massive old citadel of a building, to secure "laissex passers."

Entering the old Gendarmerie through a small door in a great wooden gate, we passed under a low, deep arch and came upon half a dozen unshaved guards sitting before a long, plain table in the courtyard. Their uniforms gave no evidence of rank, but the manner in which they summoned us before them left no doubt as to their authority. As we stood explaining our need I noticed the courtyard was filled with military wagons, heaps of grains and provisions, and about fifty horses being harnessed before they had finished their morning oats.

From an upper window some one was throwing out bags of grain, which were being hurriedly loaded into wagons.

We were told that no "laissez passers" were being issued. "But you might try to see what you can do with these," suggested one of the guards,

pointing to our passports.

Two days in Brussels had taught us to take every opportunity at once. So we left in a hurry, but, as only one of us spoke French and that poorly, we decided to stop at the American Legation to get some one to explain to our French taxicab driver what it was that we wanted him to do.

As we turned the corner of the Rue de Trèves we saw the American flag flying before the Legation. This was the first intimation we had that the city was threatened with invasion. But even then we did not expect anything

more than a cavalry raid, nor did the people of Brussels.

Our taxicab driver was instructed to take us as far as he could go, and it came near being only half a dozen blocks. There we were stopped by a double row of derailed street cars across the avenue. These were obviously calculated to break the formation of the expected Uhlan raid and were so placed as to make a direct charge impossible. The work had been done by a company of middle-aged citizens in blue smocks drawn in at the belt line by their sword belts. Their costume was that of the revolution of 1830, which made of Belgium an independent kingdom.

These staunch citizens were for not letting us pass at first, but one of them said of the taxicab driver, "Let him get his fare," and that seemed to be a better argument than our passports. So our taxicab was permitted to describe a letter S passing through the barricade and we went on out of the avenue. We now met a good many of these smocked burghers, binding the trees along the avenues into masses of barbed wire, and upsetting carts in the cross lanes. Then, for the next mile or two, we passed many people strolling or reading in the parkways, even nurses with baby carriages. But after we passed the civic guards at the barricades on the edge of the Forest of Soignies we had the road to ourselves as far out as the village of Tervueren, where King Leopold's Congo Museum stands.

We were now well out of the city and still going. There was not even a sentry for two or three miles before we came to the village of Tervueren. There half a dozen people were sitting in front of a café, and they stared dumbly after us as we took the Louvain road. That, too, was empty so far as we could see, except for a Belgian soldier mounted on a bicycle, whom we soon overtook and invited into the taxicab. We hoped to learn the password from him.

About halfway to Louvain, at a point from which you can see a corner of the field of Waterloo, we came upon a dozen refugees with packs on their backs. They stopped only long enough to tell us they were from Tirlemont, the next important town beyond Louvain. "Uhlans!" they cried, as they hurried on

toward Brussels. In their tone was the same terror heard in the voice of set-

tlers on the American frontier when they cried "Indians!"

Within the next half mile the road became blocked with refugees. They were of all kinds and ages, peasants with their household goods in ox-carts, townspeople in carriages, men on horseback, women afoot. I counted eleven small children and one very old woman in a cart. A dignified old peasant grandmother sat in a wagon, on a chair that looked as if it might have been lifted from the chimney corner. There were two red-cheeked girls, with their skirts tucked up, carrying a trunk. They had carried that trunk at least eight miles already.

Those who were wearing leather shoes were mostly footsore. Some carried their shoes in their hands. But those in wooden shoes clicked steadily on. Occasionally, when a spasm of cannonading began beyond Louvain, the whole line started forward at a faster pace. Little children holding to the hands of their parents were shaken into a dog-trot. Oxen were prodded into an ungainly lope. Those with light burdens pressed past those with heavy. But none that I saw deserted his burden. The nearer we drew to Louvain and the louder the cannonading, the more hurried and silent were the refugees. Those who looked at us at all hardly seemed to see us. Only a few stopped and stared after us. They seemed trying to figure out what manner of madmen we were.

In the midst of the refugees we came upon a Belgian soldier still carrying his gun. "Where are the English? Where are the French?" he called out to us, and as we stopped to answer his question, the refugees that dammed up behind repeated the question. "Are the English close?" they asked appealingly. We replied that we did not know but assured them the road to Brussels was open and safe.

We now began to meet soldiers in groups of twos and threes, and from each group came the same questions, "Where are the English? Where are the

French?"

We soon came to understand the eagerness of the question. The Belgians had been holding the German advance for nearly three weeks. Liége had fallen four days previously and they had fought every inch of the road as they retreated. Each day they had been expecting to receive the support of the English and the French, and, now that their capital was threatened, they could not believe that their allies were not right behind them.

As a matter of fact the German army first encountered the French army at Namur, twenty-five miles southeast of Brussels, and it was not until two days after the occupation of Brussels that the German advance column which went direct from Brussels to Mons had its first skirmish with the English at Bray:

a small town near the French frontier.

At Laefdael, a village four miles from Louvain, we came upon ten thousand

Belgians drawn up in a valley to the north of the road where the Germans advancing from the south could not see them. The right flank of the Belgians lay right along the road, and we could see what the Belgian army was made of. They were a dusty and foot-sore lot, most of them exhausted and asleep on the grass, but those who were awake smiled and waved their hands at us. Of the hundreds of faces I saw in that brave little army there was not one which showed defeat. And, despite their careless attitude, they were in good military order. Scattered among them were the rapid-fire guns drawn by dogs, which had done such astonishingly good work on the retreat from Louvain. To me those patient Belgian dogs, lying on their sides panting in the sun, gave the whole scene a peculiarly pathetic look. It all seemed so small and amateurish against the advancing German army with its half million men and its complete equipment. But, three days later when we came back that way, the wrecked town of Laefdael and the graves on the south side of the road showed that the Belgians and their dog-drawn mitrailleuses gave a good account of themselves that afternoon before they retreated.

A mile from the ramparts of Louvain we were stopped by two English motion-picture men in an automobile, who said it was dangerous to go farther. As we stood talking with them I saw a soldier lift his head in the beet-field beside the road. I looked closer then and saw that the field was full of Belgian soldiers behind every hay-cock and every bush. But the cannonading was still vigorous on the far side of Louvain and we considered it still safe to go a little closer. We also knew that Louvain had been the headquarters of the Belgian army and we thought it was yet. But that morning at ten o'clock

King Albert had moved his headquarters to Malines.

Our taxicab driver was frightened by what the motion-picture men told us, and refused to go farther. He did not want to risk his car, he said. So we told him to wait for us there and the four of us set off afoot for Louvain. The road was now crowded with refugees, but we were too intent on pushing forward to the fighting line to pay much attention to them. To the questions "Where are the English? Where are the French?" we merely shook our heads. We could not trust ourselves to answer. We knew now in its fullness what that question meant to them. It was not until we passed the old ramparts, made into a boulevard, that we found our way free of refugees. They had not come through Louvain, but had passed around it on the rampart. The streets, however, were full of people. The quarter from which we entered was the oldest and the poorest, and the narrow streets were at points blocked, but people moved aside courteously to give us passageway. There was no sign of fleeing and that was what gave us courage to go on. We thought these people were in the street merely listening to the cannonading.

We stopped a priest to inquire our way and he turned back fifty yards to take us to a cloister, where, he said, there was a priest who could speak English.

As we entered the low, cool arch so common to Belgian houses we could see the priests at the bottom of their garden among the pear trees and the wall fruit. Among ourselves, we commented that here at least the ravages of war would not be felt. A week later that cloister was a ruin.

The priests came forward to meet us and refused to hear a word of apology until we had rested and drunk a glass of light red wine. To them, we found, the war was in another world, even though the cannonading was now quite loud. After a few minutes we pressed on toward the Grand Place, where we still expected to find the Belgian headquarters. There were now twice as many people in the streets as before. Even the girls and young women, usually kept under cover in Belgium, were standing in the roadway, though when the rest of the people greeted us with their usual courtesy, like convent-bred girls they lowered their eyes. Most of the people took us for English and wished us well. When we said we were Americans, "Vive les Américains" always floated down the road behind us.

We had not gone far down the twisting Rue de Bruxelles, watching for the Gothic façades of the wonderful Hotel de Ville, when an automobile swung in from the north and raced through the street back toward Brussels. The occupants, whom we took to be Brussels newspapermen, cried something after us, but all we could hear was the one word, "danger."

They had hardly gone before eight or ten Belgian soldiers, the first we had seen in the town, came hurrying through an alley from the south and dashed across the Rue de Bruxelles. As they passed there was a stir, but, as soon as they were out of sight, all faces were again turned down the street. No one

would have guessed they had just passed.

Twenty paces past the alley a single horseman rode around the corner into the Rue de Bruxelles from a side street. He wore a badly fitting dust-gray uniform and carried a long steel spear. Close behind him came another gray-uniformed man on a bicycle, a carbine slung over the handle-bars. For ten seconds I stood in the middle of the street and stared at them before I realized that they were German soldiers. Then I remembered the Belgians in the alley and stepped into the nearest doorway out of range. There was no shooting, however. The Germans rode unmolested into the next street, scanning the four of us curiously as they passed.

All at once we realized that it was time we tried to get back to our taxicab. The townspeople, also understanding our need to get away, most of them taking us for English, gave us the road. But before we reached the rampart we could see the gray backs and the shining bayonets of an infantry column turning into the Brussels road from the boulevard. Ahead of them were a few straggling refugees from Tirlemont.

Behind the infantry came a company of lancers, one riding ahead, his automatic pistol in his hand, his eyes scanning the houses and the faces. watch-

ing for the first false move. The others rode stolidly on. Next came a bicycle company, then more infantry and cavalry, at the head of each company one man with his pistol drawn. The ranks were thinned in some companies and there were many empty saddles. These were the men who had just forced the retreat of the Belgians, and immediately behind them came their rapid-fire guns and large pieces of artillery. The horses that drew them came trotting along the boulevard, and it was not more than half an hour before we could hear them at Laefdael.

I thought I would never forget the least detail of that first advance on Brussels, but I remember two minor things best. I noticed a lancer staring at my coat and I put up my hand to find that I was still wearing the colours of the Allies—the Belgian, French, English, and Russian. The lancer, however, merely smiled at my discomfiture. As soon as he was gone I removed those colours. A little later the first of the Uhlans appeared. They were recognized at once by the flat tops to their helmets and some one near me hissed. In a moment the muzzle of an automatic travelled across our faces with painful slowness. I could feel the crowd sway and the breath of relief when the Uhlan rode on. For some reason, which I was unable to determine after two weeks in Belgium, the Uhlans had acquired the reputation of butchers. They were, in fact, no more brutal than the rest of the German army. All were bound by inflexible rules. When they were cruel it was because their orders were cruel. If they were barbarous it was because war is barbarous.

The hardest thing to describe about the entry of the Germans into Louvain is the hush that fell over the city. Except for the click of German heels, the clatter of German horses, and the rumble of German artillery you could have heard a sigh twenty feet away anywhere in Louvain. With the whole city at this nervous tension a German military aeroplane of the Taube type swept low overhead, and every face in the city stared at the black imperial crosses on the underside of the great planes, symbols of the German invasion.

As if it were the imperial fancy to give another sign of its power, at this moment the silence was broken by a high, clear flute sound from around the bend in the Rue de Bruxelles, and a large, gray German war automobile raced through the street. Over it, reaching from the ground in the front of the hood to the back of the tonneau, were two long, sharp, scythe-like knives bent convexly. These were merely wirecutters, so the automobile could charge through barbed wire, but they gave the car a sinister air. A general staff officer, evidently bound forward to direct the attack on Laefdael, sat alone in the tonneau, and the only man in the automobile with a rifle was the herald beside the driver, a curious brass instrument to his lips, its four horns announcing shrilly to the countryside that here was a man worth killing. It was a piece of imperial audacity, and Louvain admired that.

We had been led to believe that the Germans were only making a recon-

naissance in force and that before the afternoon was over we would be able to swing to the north and regain the Belgian lines. But the German troops kept coming along the rampart all afternoon, and when the provision trains and cook stoves appeared we began to realize that this was an invasion. Other war automobiles also passed, and late in the afternoon there was a large detachment of infantry. Night was coming on and it occurred to us that we were in a slightly precarious position. We might be taken for spies. For that matter we had been taking the precaution to mingle with the crowd, and the townspeople had helped to shield us from scrutiny. Now it became necessary to report our presence to the police.

When we reached the Grand Place there were half a dozen military automobiles drawn up before the Hotel de Ville, the beauty of which was partly hidden by scaffolding set up for supports. The Rue de la Station, the widest in the city, was also crowded with these automobiles, filled with officers of the distinctively Prussian type. Down a narrow street came another line, similar to that which had passed on the ramparts, and it also took the street which led to Brussels. By six o'clock we had seen about thirty thousand men pass in the direction of Brussels, all with their baggage trains and cooking apparatus. It had also filtered through the town that Louvain had become staff headquarters, and that at three in the afternoon the German general had taken possession of the hotel which King Albert had left at ten in the morning.

We made an attempt to get an interpreter by applying at the School of Languages which faced the Grand Place, but the interpreter did not come until later, and meanwhile we stood among the Louvain people watching the spectacle. While we were intent on the never-ending line of troops coming down the narrow street, a whole infantry division came marching down the Rue de la Station, in parade order, singing "Every Little Movement Has a Meaning All Its Own." This carried far down the line until a regiment broke it with "In the Night." It was plain to see that these troops were fresh and goodhumoured. They had had a little skirmish that morning at Diest, just enough to lift their spirits, but had not had the real fighting seen by those who passsed along the ramparts.

Not to be outdone, and at the same time feeling the seriousness of war a little more, a company, which had been at Liége and Tirlemont, coming down the side street, began to sing "Die Wacht am Rhein." The line from Diest in the next lull changed to the patriotic also and sang the inspiring "Deutschland über Alles." After that we heard hardly anything else but that, and late in the evening they were still marching to it.

By this time Louvain was full of soldiers, but our interpreter had found us. The ease with which he picked us out of the crowd showed how conspicuous we were. Every few minutes we were stopped with the gruff

question, "English?" In consequence it took us some time to make our way to the Place de la Station to the hotel our interpreter had picked for us.

There were half a dozen staff officers in the next hotel and we decided to tell them our troubles. They listened politely for a moment and then they broke out laughing. "Going to war in a taxicab," they laughed, "this is a joke." We were glad they took it that way. What we had heard of the German army had led us to expect quite different treatment. We were told, however, that we had done the wise thing in reporting ourselves.

By this time the town had begun to feel that the invasion of the Germans was not attended by all the atrocities they were supposed to be guilty of. German soldiers had entered the food stores and were buying like any other customers. In fact, Louvain had a rush of business such as it had not had for years. I think Louvain went to bed that night feeling as we did, that, whatever the German invasion might portend, the army was made up of pretty good fellows.

In the morning M. Sabbe, the interpreter, called for us and took us to the barber's, where the German officers waited their turn like the rest of us, and then to breakfast at the best restaurant in Louvain. Its proprietor had drawn its iron blinds and taken down its sign, and, with all their detailed knowledge of the invaded country, the Germans had not discovered it. There our breakfast was cooked by the woman who owned the restaurant, a slight little Flemish woman with the gentle smile and even the parted hair of a Mona Lisa. The usual spiritual quality of her face was also heightened no doubt by the fact that she was soon to have a child.

It was well into the morning before our complacency was disturbed. Two ignorant little men, who looked as if they might be a peasant's stable hands, were led briskly up the street by a squad of soldiers to the staff headquarters. Ten minutes later a large closed van which looked like a city patrol wagon passed down the street and turned to the left upon reaching the station. It was followed by a number of people wearing Red Cross badges. In five more minutes it was followed by a squad of soldiers and in ten minutes more by the Red Cross attendants bearing stiff, undersized bodies wrapped in blankets. This was the first military execution in Louvain. The undersized men had been found guilty of shooting at the soldiers.

Meanwhile we had been ordered to keep to our hotel, our eating place, and the main streets. We were promised that Mr. Whitlock would be informed of our whereabouts, but we were not to return to Brussels. We had learned too much about the movement of the troops.

That second day in Louvain, Thursday, was full of activity. A half-dozen aeroplanes made their headquarters to the right of the station, and to the left was the place of execution. Meanwhile the troops passed constantly in three columns, those from Diest still singing the four favourites of the day before,

occasionally varying with the Austrian national air. Early in the day it struck me that the troops were all blond. They were, in fact, all from points north and east of Berlin, and, though I watched idly while no less than forty thousand passed, I counted only thirteen men who were not decided blonds. I also doubt if there were a dozen whose hair was not clipped close to the scalp.

By noon the relation between the soldiers and the townspeople had become a little strained. About this time there were half a dozen shots on a side street and, after a while, a German officer who had been shot through the leg was carried by on a litter. Behind was the dead body of a Belgian. Evidently the German officer was the better shot. As the day wore on military executions down to the left of the railroad station became more frequent. There were perhaps fifteen. At the staff headquarters of the German army we were told there had been a good deal of sniping from houses, mostly in the outskirts and in small adjoining villages, and the punishment for this was death.

During the day announcements were posted throughout the town, signed by the burgomaster, calling upon the citizens to surrender all their arms at once. A little later he made another announcement ordering all doors and windows to be closed by eight in the evening. In this announcement he said he was speaking in behalf of the military authorities. That night I think all Louvain went to bed with an uncomfortable feeling of impending danger.

But the next morning the town was quiet. The troops were still coming through steadily in three streams. We began to realize that this was the main invading army headed for Paris. On many of the wagons in fact was scrawled, "Direkt nach Paris." That day will live in my memory chiefly on account of the rumble of wagons. The main provision train—with food for 350,000 men for a month—went through Louvain all day long and until far into the night.

Early that morning, however, it was announced that the burgomaster and two other prominent citizens had been held as hostages. The notice was signed by the military commander and stated that the least indication of hostility to the German troops would place all three hostages in a "very dangerous position." We were told at the staff headquarters that this measure had been taken because it seemed impossible otherwise to prevent sniping. I doubt, however, whether that announcement troubled Louvain as much as the one that followed in the afternoon. All houses facing on the Rue de Bruxelles and the Rue de la Station—the route the troops were taking—were placed under special restrictions. All windows were to be closed at eight o'clock in the evening, the curtains drawn, and lights so placed that the shadow of any one approaching the window would be thrown upon the curtain. These lights were to be left burning all night. At the same time the street doors were to be left unlocked.

This order was made to discourage sniping, but it was terrifying to the

women of Louvain. Half a dozen whose acquaintance we had made did not go to bed.

As the word had gone forth that all persons found in a house from which one shot had been fired were being shot, we had taken the precaution during the day to secure the front rooms in our hotel to prevent complications. So we had to pay for our security by sleeping in closed rooms with kerosene lamps. I stood it until three in the morning, then I put out my light and opened the windows.

On the morning of the third day we were told we could return to Brussels, and we found it took an hour or so to say good-bye to the kindly people we had come to know. We left our Mona Lisa hostess with the greatest regret. Besides being the best cook in Louvain, she was a sweet and gentle woman. I remember she made us laugh by trying to tell us in English about the predicament of the mayor. She said he had a "crisis of the nerves." Undoubtedly he had, when any one of 45,000 people could cost him his life.

Then there were our friends the priests, our guide and counsel M. Sabbe, and the tobacco dealer, who had the best brands of Havana cigars and who behind his store had built a little grotto with a fountain which was the delight of his wife and three growing daughters. There were, besides, the pleasant-spoken woman who sold us fresh linen and the buxom pastry cook from whom we got delicious little cakes right out of the oven. Our speaking acquaintance included most of the people who lived on the main streets and they all wished us a safe journey. Those who knew us best expressed the hope that we would return to Louvain in a happier time.

That time did not seem very near, however, after reading the latest notice that was being posted as we left. It was explicit and complete. It said in plain language that every citizen found with a weapon in his possession or in his house would be immediately shot. Every person in a house from which a shot was fired would be shot. And every house from which a shot was fired would be burned.

Four days later I returned to Brussels from the French frontier, to which I had followed the German troops in their march into France, and was met with the news that Louvain was being burned. There were a dozen stories current as to why it was being burned, but none of them was susceptible of proof. I tried to get at the facts, as I realized that the burning of Louvain would go down in history, but I doubt whether it will ever be known just what happened in Louvain immediately before the city was ordered to be destroyed. The details, however, are not really important. Ill-feeling had been growing from the second day. The German troops had become bad-tempered when their comrades were shot by snipers, and the people of the town had in turn grown restive under the rule of the mailed fist. There had been an exchange of shots, perhaps even a conspiracy, and the German troops took the full measure of reprisal.

On the way out of Belgium the next day I passed through Louvain in company with other newspaper correspondents who were trying to get out by way of Holland. We were told that a troop train returning to Germany with wounded and with English prisoners would leave the Gare du Nord in Brussels at eight o'clock in the morning. It finally left about four in the afternoon. In the station we heard the usual tales about Louvain and there was considerable excitement about it among the soldiers. The officers treated it coolly as a reprisal of war, but the excitement brought on by destruction showed in their men. At different times during the day five soldiers told me in a whisper that Brussels would be next, and there was no doubt from their tone they hoped it would be. There was even reason to fear it. For, as we reëntered the station on the way back from a hurried luncheon in the hotel, two rapid-fire guns were being drawn up before the Gare du Nord so that they commanded the two principal streets of Brussels.

The train ran very slowly and did not reach Louvain until nearly evening. Some of the near-by towns were also afire, and at all the stations there were many soldiers. But it was not until we came in sight of Louvain that we realized the extent of the destruction. Some of us had not been able to credit it until we saw with our own eyes. I was prepared to find one or two of the more troublesome quarters destroyed, but the first thing that caught my eye was the roofless church of St. Pierre. Across the Grand Place the Hotel de Ville still stood, but everything in between, a distance of half a mile, and everything for a mile beyond, to the farthest rampart, was burnt. All the handsomest houses in the northern end of the city were bare brick and stone walls. There were a few buildings along the ramparts to the east still standing, but these, too, were burning when our train went on two hours later.

My first inclination, as the train pulled in, was to go through the ruined town, but the train had hardly come to a stop before a soldier, drunk both from excitement and drink, shoved his head into the window and cried with an expressive gesture, "Three cities razed! Three! There will be more!"

He had hardly gone before another shoved in his head and cried "English" in a menacing tone. We called back "Americans," but he did not understand. "Americans from the United States," I said in German. "We are not enemies." "All who cannot speak German well are enemies," he replied, fumbling at his belt. It looked for a second as if we were in for a struggle, but another more intelligent soldier pushed him aside with the explanation, "He's drunk."

I realized by this time it would be extremely dangerous to go down the streets of Louvain in the twilight with my poor command of German. Moreover, the final act of the destruction of Louvain was being staged right in front of us. While it was being played, during a period of more than an hour, the third soldier, who had not been drinking but was much excited, remained

at the window talking to us. As the station was crowded with other excited soldiers we did our best to keep him there.

Meanwhile I could see directly out of the entrance upon the Place de la Station and down the Rue de la Station as far as the wrecked church of St. Pierre. Every house along that stately street was burnt. The homes of all our kindly acquaintances were gone. We had been told that the people had all been warned to leave, but I wondered what had become of the little Flemish woman of the restaurant with childbirth approaching, and the many lone women whose husbands and brothers were in the Belgian army.

About a hundred English prisoners were led across the Place de la Station and, after they had been placed in cars, a long line of citizens of Louvain were brought around in a circle under guard. I could not make out at first what the purpose of this was as my view was temporarily cut off by a cow that was led to the main entrance of the station. But presently a bayonet was run into the neck of the cow, and, as it fell, I could see a group of about fifteen men, in civilian clothes, closely guarded. The long line of Louvain citizens was being led around them.

It was difficult to make out what was going on. I asked the soldier at our window and he said carelessly, "Oh, those are the civilians who returned to-day to shoot us after we had burned half the town. We are going to shoot some of them."

The outer line of civilians kept marching in a circle until they had all passed close to the men in the centre. Then the line opened and the inner group passed out to the right. A group of soldiers followed.

After an interval of only a minute or two, hardly time for absolution, we could hear the rifles of the firing squad. Evidently the careless soldier knew what he was talking about.

"Hear that," he said, as the rifles cracked. "What did I tell you?"

Immediately some one climbed on a gun carriage among the group of citizens standing motionless before the station entrance. I could not hear a word he said, but his expressive gestures showed he was exhorting his fellow townsmen to accept their fate and yield to their conquerors.

While he talked, the butcher in the foreground skinned the cow with professional coolness, and began carving the carcass. It was nearly dark by this time and a number of soldiers came with candles and stood around the animal, the blood of which had spread over the station platform.

2.—MÜCKE OF THE "EMDEN"* By LEWIS R. FREEMAN

The films, as films, were most excellent, but their motive was so obvious that the rather representative and not especially "hyphenated" New York audience, which had plainly come for entertainment, not propaganda, was becoming increasingly restive under the cumulative effect of the "kulturine" cap-

sules which were being slipped in with the pictures.

Beaming German soldiers helped tottering old Belgian refugees over débris and mud puddles, or swung obligingly out of line to round up a Polish peasant girl's cows. In "a captured city in the West" a helmeted Uhlan shared his loaf of black bread with a hollow-eyed street urchin, and the film snapped sharply off when a comrade in the background started to hustle some weary stragglers on their way. "Russian Prisoners are Allowed to Rest on Their Way to the Concentration Camps" was the caption preceding the picture of a bayonet-ringed group of Cossacks sitting by the roadside; and "The Drawn Features of the Kaiser Show How Terribly He Feels the Suffering Imposed by the War" introduced another film, in which the War Lord, in the uniform of the Death's Head Hussars, strode gloomily down the line of a drawn-up regiment.

"Too much 'Gott mit Uns' and 'Deutschland über Alles' for mine," snorted a man in front of me, reaching down for his hat. "Why don't they show us Liége and Louvain and round out the picture?"

Then, suddenly and with characteristic kinematic carelessness of sequence, the scene changed, and with it the atmosphere of the theatre. A quay by the waterside was being shown, with an eager, expectant crowd waiting for something that was about to happen. That sunlight, those fez-crowned heads, that stretch of dancing water with domes and minarets etched against the skyline above the opposite shore—I had missed the screenful of words that told what was coming, but I knew in an instant that I was standing on the water-front at Constantinople and looking across the Bosporus to Scutari and Asia.

It was the breathless interest of the waiting crowd that surged out over the darkened footlights and pervaded the theatre. It was all so real, so unaffected, so "unkultured," that one knew instinctively that the thing, unlike so much that had gone before, was not being done for effect—to fan the flame of Teutonic pride or "educate" the neutral. And so the spirit of the picture entered the audience, and we who, a moment before, half amazed, half disgusted,

^{*}From the Atlantic Monthly, June 1, 1916.

were shifting impatiently in our seats and glancing at our watches, now leaned forward in eager anticipation. We had become one with the expectant crowd by the quay-side.

Presently the object for which they—we—were waiting, a gaunt destroyer stripped for action, slipped into view, and, steering a wavering course across the swift current of the intercontinental strait, came nosing in beside the quay. Now, standing at attention amidships, at the head of the gangway, an erect white-clad figure was discernible; and even before the blurred features quivered to life in the sharpening focus, we were adding our cheers to those of the gesticulating Orientals on the quay.

The man in front of me—the one who had been on the point of stamping out a minute before—was applauding with hands and feet, and I, clapping vigorously myself but without knowing just why, was on the point of leaning forward to ask him what it was all about, when the stout German lady overflowing the chair on my right suddenly gave vent to an explosive "Ach, Mücke! Mücke!" and, allowing her lorgnette to fall to the floor, began smiting her own plump palms together.

So it was Mücke we were welcoming? No wonder the theatre was in an uproar; no wonder it seemed quite the natural thing that my own brogans should be joining in the tumult of applause, and that those hearty "Bravas" should be coming from the throats of the dark-faced chaps on my left who were so unmistakably Italian. "Surely Mücke is entitled to a hand from everybody." "Don't let him go with that perfunctory sword salute!" "Call him back!" "We want Mücke!" No one spoke these words, so far as I heard, but they express the spirit of the crowd exactly. It was no shadow swashbuckler we were applauding, but—so complete the illusion—a very real hero of flesh and blood; and for a moment one was just a little indignant that he would not stop and make a speech.

On flickered the film; on rolled the narrow black-and-white strip of Turkish panorama. Now young Ulysses marched off the quay at the head of his squad of bluejackets; now they tramped in a procession—with Turkish cavalry and Turkish boy scouts—down a flag-bedecked boulevard; now they approached a *shamiana* under which a group of officers was waiting; and now (one knew instinctively that this was the climax of more than the little march up from the quay) Mücke halted before a man in the uniform of an admiral of the German navy, clicked his heels together, touched the hilt of his sword to his forehead, and stood at attention.

Just so—a hundred times on this warship or that—had I seen a middy or an ensign report for duty to the officer of the day; and that, in fact, was just what Mücke was doing. That he happened to have zigzagged over eight or ten thousand miles of sea and land, braving storm and blockade, desert tribes and fever, didn't make the least difference in the way the thing was done.

The *Emden* was a shell-shattered hulk on the rocks of Cocos Island, and a few of her officers and men who had slipped through the meshes of the British net had hurried back to their nearest superior to report for duty. That was all.

Again the film changed, and in an instant the massive bulk of Von Hindenburg appeared on the stone steps of a captured Polish palace. Bull-necked, square-headed, heavy-jowled, the incarnation of brutal, relentless force and efficiency—of Prussianism—he stood and glowered down upon us till one stirred restlessly in his seat and glanced uneasily at his neighbour. The applause—Mücke's applause—died away, and only the click-clack of the picture-projector was audible where tumultuous acclaim had rung a few moments before. The stout German lady sighed heavily and sank back into her seat. "If we only had more of the Mückes and not so many of the Hindenburgs," I heard her say to a companion as I edged past them to the aisle, "perhaps this war would not have made so many people hate the Germans."

The sentiments were not quite parallel, but the words recalled those of a young British subaltern whom, a fortnight previously, I had shouldered in the crowd around a shot-pierced searchlight and a rusty naval gun—relics saved from the *Emden*—on exhibition in London's Horse Guards Parade.

"Now those two were real gentlemen," he said, with enthusiasm, after we had conversed for a few minutes about the *Emden*. "If only the German army had the instincts of Müller and Mücke this bally war would be something like a fair sporting proposition instead of such a beastly bore."

II

The official account of the stirring and picturesque adventures of the *Emden* is hardly likely to be given to the world until the gates of Captain Müller's comfortable English prison swing open for him at the end of the war; but in the interviews, a lecture or two, and a booklet by Lieutenant Mücke all the salient features have been covered, and it is from translations of these that we will endeavour to follow the fortunes of the doughty young Teuton whose courage, resource, and devotion to duty have won scarcely less admiration in the countries of his enemies than in the Fatherland.

Within a day or two after the outbreak of the war the *Emden*, in pursuance of the commerce-destroying plan which the German Admiralty had worked out to its least details many years before, slipped away from Tsingtau and headed for the South Pacific to join the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Nüremberg*. It was a later order which turned her off to the Indian Ocean to find both her glory and her grave.

"In Tsingtau," wrote Mücke, "we had suppled ourselves with all the things we could think of. The first officer takes the place of the housewife in many ways, and has to look out for all details concerning equipment and provisions." But soap, it appears, had been overlooked, so that the men of the

Emden were shortly in a position where they had to consider washing an occupation de luxe. However, the first ship sunk, on September II, carried enough soap, "in the great impulse of cleanliness of the English," to last the Germans for a year. This was the Lovatt, a British transport, which had promptly hoisted the Union Jack, under the impression that the Emden was an "English boat." "The silly face of its captain, which he made after we had hoised our flag and ordered him to stay with us, I would regret not to have seen," observes Mücke; and adds that "for the numerous stables for horses on this boat we had no appreciation, and a half hour later we had submitted the question to the sharks."

Business was brisk for the *Emden* during the next few days, and there was one occasion on which she had five or six steamers (Mücke has forgotten the exact number) hove to and ready to sink at one place. "This happened so," writes Mücke: "a steamer came along and was stopped. Ten men and an officer went over to it. These got the ship ready to sink and saw that the passengers were all removed. While we were still occupied with this boat, appeared the top of another mast on the horizon. We did not need to hurry at all; the ships seemed to come by themselves to us. When one came near enough, the *Emden* made it a friendly signal, which tempted it on to join the other boats. And by the time this one was prepared for sinking, another mast-top would appear."

Mücke's account of the manner of sinking a prize is exceedingly graphic, with all its Teutonic exactness. "It is a queer feeling for a seaman to see a ship sinking, and we who were used to helping each ship in need were always touched by it. The destroying was usually done in this way: We went down to the engine-room and removed the covers of pipes leading outside. In rushed the water in jets as high as a man. The watertight door of the boiler room was then opened, to allow that compartment to be flooded. If there was cause for haste, other holes were opened by explosives. For a time the ship would rock back and forth as if it did not know exactly how to behave. Always deeper and deeper it sank, until the upper deck touched the water. Then it acted like a body taking its last breath. The bow went down first, the masts struck the water, and the screws were raised in the air. The funnels blew out the last smoke and coal-dust; for an instant the ship stood on end, and then shot down to the depths like a heavy stone. After half a minute greetings from the depths would begin to arrive. Long pieces of wood came up vertically, like an arrow, jumping several yards in the air. In the end the place where the ship sank was marked by a large oil-spot and a few smashed boats, beams, life-preservers, and the like. Then it was time for the Emden to make for the next mast-top."

In the Berliner Tageblatt's account of the adventures of the Emden Mücke's strictures against some of the captains of the captured steamers are so strong,

and of such a nature, as to incline a person acquainted with the bluff British merchant-marine skipper seriously to doubt their credibility; but there is a circumstantiality in the remarks attributed to the captain of the Kabinga

which gives them all of the ear-marks of truth.

"On the Kabinga," Mücke is quoted as saying, "the captain had his wife and youngster with him. He was inclined at first to be disagreeable, but afterward he grew confidential, like all captains, called us 'Old chap,' gave the lieutenant a nice new oilskin, and, as we finally let the Kabinga go, wrote us a letter of thanks. They all gave us three cheers as they steamed away. 'Come to Calcutta some time!' was the last thing the captain said, 'and catch the pilots so that those [unprintable seaman's epithet] fellows will feel something of the war, too.'"

Any one who knows anything of the feeling cherished by the British India skipper for the lordly Hoogly River pilot—the most highly paid and the most autocratic of all the pilots of the seven seas—will also know that this is just

the sort of thing one of the former would say on such an occasion.

At the end of ten days practically every steamer in the northern Indian Ocean was either at the bottom of the sea or held in port by its apprehensive owners, so, in lieu of other game, the audacious *Emden* took a tilt at the oiltanks of Madras. Sure in his knowledge of the antique guns which defended the historic Indian port, Müller steamed in, with all lights out, to within 3,000 metres of the shore. "The harbour light burned peacefully," writes Mücke, "and made navigation easy. Our targets, the red-and-white-striped oil-tanks, could be plainly discerned. A few shells, a quick flash of blue-yellow flame, and the tanks were vomiting red jets from the shot-holes. Then a great black cloud of smoke arose, and, according to the proverb, 'Variety is the spice of life,' we had this time sent a few millions up into the air instead of down into the depths. From Madras a few shots were discharged at us, but without any aim, and the fire of the burning oil-tanks lighted us for ninety miles on our way."

The Tyweric, sunk but two hours after it had left Colombo, gave the Emden late news of the world through the evening papers of the Cingalese capital. The German cruiser appeared to be the principal topic of local news, and her officers learned, among other things, that their ship had been sunk at two widely separated points, and was being hotly pursued at another. Mücke waxes both facetious and ironic in his account of the sinking of an English sugar steamer very close to the coast of Ceylon:

"The captain, because of the fact that he was captured almost under a British searchlight, was in such bad humour that he resisted us. The sad result of his patriotism was that he was not even allowed to bring so much as an extra handkerchief away with him. Within five minutes his steamer was cleared and its crew aboard our Lümpensämmler. [The latter term, which

may be roughly translated as 'rag-collector' or 'rascal-collector,' was the facetious name given by the Germans to one of the prizes which they always kept in attendance upon the Emden to carry the prisoners from sunk steamers.] The captain and the engineer had the honour of spending their voyage on the Emden in separate cells, and ten minutes later the sugar steamer sweetened the supper of the sharks. This captain, as we learned later from the papers, told some nice 'robber-stories' about the Emden, and said she was a dirty, scratched, and damaged old boat. Had I only known that so high a visitor was to come to us, my pride as first officer would certainly have prompted me to have the deck scrubbed and painted. This noble soul also said that our crew looked starved and depressed; but surely this was not fair to the supply of English steamers we had enjoyed."

Ten or a dozen more steamers were sunk by the *Emden* during the next three weeks, and then she slipped away from the sea-lanes that she had terrorized, to rest and refit. This took her to Diego Garcia, an isolated rock in the South Ocean where two or three lonely Britons were holding an almost uncharted outpost of Empire by running a plantation. Here occurred a most delicious little episode. "As we dropped anchor," writes Mücke, "there came an Englishman, his arms loaded with presents for us, and his eyes wet with tears of welcome. He had not yet heard of the war, as the island received its mail only once every half year by schooner. He asked us to fix his motor-boat, which was out of commission. This we did gladly. Then, without telling him anything of the terrible condition the world was in at present, we bade him good-bye and sailed away. His mail was due in fourteen days, and then, perhaps, he may have learned to whom he brought his presents."

Shipping was spread thin along the trade routes when the *Emden* returned again to the attack, and two or three steamers sunk in the vicinity of Miniko were the sum of her bag for a week's cruising. This monotonous life began to pall upon the men of the raider, and, as Mücke naïvely put it, they "felt the stirring of desire to make the acquaintance of real warships. We knew through the papers," he writes, "that sixteen English, French, and Japanese men-of-war were using up their coal in a vain search for us, and, obligingly, we decided to visit them in their own harbour."

The Penang raid was the crowning achievement of the Emden's career, and, as it proved, the final one. It was a fitting "swan-song." Penang, a British Crown Colony, like Singapore, Hongkong, and one or two other ports of the Far East, is located on a small island, with its harbour formed by the narrow strait which separates the island from the mainland. For a mile or two this strait is no wider than the Hudson at Grant's Tomb, and at its narrowest place, crowning a little point which reaches out toward the palm-fringed foreshore of the Malay Peninsula, is a picturesque old stone fort which dates back to the days when the Portuguese held the Spice Islands and fought the

British and the Dutch for the mastery of the Orient. Old bronze guns peeped from its crumbling ports, and did brave service as hobby-horses when the ayahs from the officers' quarters brought out the babies for their afternoon promenade. If any modern guns had been mounted about the harbour, it may be taken for granted that the *Emden* was fully informed both as to their power and location.

The raider's only chance of a successful raid upon a harbour in which it was more than likely to encounter superior force was to creep in unobserved, strike suddenly, and withdraw in the confusion of the surprise. By this time the profile of the *Emden* was up in the chartroom of every warship and merchantman plying the Eastern seas. The resourceful Teutons, knowing this, hit upon the expedient of altering that profile. A fourth smoke-stack of painted canvas had been ready for weeks against just such an emergency, and when set up in line with the three real ones made the raider appear, in anything but the broad light of day, an almost exact counterpart of a well-known type of British armoured cruiser which was being extensively employed in the pursuit of the *Emden*.

With all lights out, the disguised German warship crept in toward the narrow strait which forms the harbour of Penang. The arrival was timed to the minute to meet the first forerunning streaks of dawn. Complete darkness would have made it impossible to navigate in the restricted seaway, while daylight would have meant discovery. The half-light of the breaking day suited the raider's purpose to a nicety. At first only fisher-boats were seen; then a mass of merchant shipping unfolded, and, finally, looming darkly at only a couple of hundred metres distance, the silhouette of the Russian cruiser Schemtschuk took shape against the brightening east.

"On board the Russian everybody was busy sleeping," observes Mücke. "We fired a torpedo at its stern. It was lifted by the detonation half a metre, and then began to sink slowly. Following the torpedo, we directed a hail of fire at the fore-deck, where the crew was sleeping. Soon this part of the ship looked like a sieve, and we could see through the holes the fires that were raging inside. Meanwhile, we sailed by the sinking ship and turned ready to run. Now we were being shot at from three sides—from the Schemtschuk and from two other directions which we could not exactly determine. We heard the whistling of the shells and saw the spots where they plunged into the water."

A second torpedo finished the Russian cruiser, and the *Emden* turned to meet its new foes. Now the French destroyer, *D'Iberville*, was descried; now a cruiser was reported coming in, and now a torpedo boat. The supposed cruiser turned out to be a merchantman, but the torpedo boat, the French *Mousquet*, was a real menace in the narrow channel. Disdaining the obsolete *D'Iberville*, the *Emden* steamed to meet the oncoming *Mousquet*, which was

disposed of in three broadsides. Picking up thirty-three survivors from the water, the unscathed raider slipped out of the harbour and made for the open sea from which it had come but a short half hour before. The night mists were lifting now, but there was left afloat in Penang no ship swift enough to pursue the audacious marauder.

III

Twelve days later, on the ninth of November, the Emden landed a force under Lieutenant Mücke to destroy the wireless station at Keeling—sometimes called Cocos—Island. The little British colony received the heavily armed enemy philosophically, and just before Mücke began putting the radio apparatus out of commission the operator congratulated him upon having been awarded the Iron Cross. "How do you know I have the Iron Cross?" asked the surprised German. "I have just caught the message," was the answer. It was the last one received at Keeling for some time.

Scarcely was the work of destroying the station completed, when Mücke heard the *Emden's* siren signalling him to return at once. Rushing his men into the launch, he started for his ship, only to see the *Emden's* anchor wound frantically in and the cruiser steam away at top speed. At first he thought that it was going to meet a collier, but just before the cruiser disappeared its *Gefechtsflagge*—the battle-pennant—was broken out, and columns of water flung high in the air told that guns of equal or greater power than the *Emden's* own were feeling for their range. The raider was nearing the end of its fartrailed tether.

Crushing down his chagrin at being thus helplessly marooned while his ship and captain were fighting for their lives, Mücke returned to the shore, hoisted the German flag, mounted his four machine-guns and declared the island under martial law. Not until a trench had been dug and preparations made to resist a landing from the enemy warship did he find time to climb to a house-top and endeavour to follow the distant sea-duel.

His account of the fight between the *Emden* and *Sydney* is incomplete, disjointed, inaccurate, and not especially fair, and I am not setting it down here. The raider put up a game fight against a swifter and more heavily armed adversary. It was foredoomed from the moment the speedy Australian cruiser picked up its smoke-trail, and its finish was not the least glorious moment of an unparalleled career.

Lieutenant Mücke was destined to receive two shocks on this eventful ninth of November, both from the English. The first was the sinking of the Emden, which, though staggering, was quite comprehensible. The second shock—but let Mücke tell the story himself. "The battle over, I went back to the people on the island. Their behaviour was characteristic. While we had all kinds of things to do to put the strand in a proper state of defence, and the battle was

but a few minutes over, one of them came to me and exclaimed, 'Do you play tennis? We always play about this time of day.' Then one of them told me that they were really very glad that their cables to Australia were out of commission, as it would save them many hours of extra work every day." Mücke's contempt struggles with his surprise, but the incident leaves one fairly safe in assuming of the English and German minds, that, as Kipling says of East and West, "never the twain shall meet."

When Mücke and his party landed at Keeling they passed a small schooner anchored in the bay, which he marked for sinking when time permitted on the ground that she was "enemy shipping." Luckily for him that opportunity did not offer, for if the Ayesha had been sent to the bottom, it is certain that the Germans would never have left the island alive except as British prisoners. Fearing the return of the Sydney, Mücke made up his mind to take his little band and run for one of the Dutch islands of Malaysia. The English outdid themselves in speeding their guests on the way; Mr. Ross, the genial owner of the ship and the island, bade them good-bye with the comforting words: "The bottom of the little schooner is rotten, but I wish you a pleasant voyage."

To deceive the English, Mücke steered westerly, as though heading for East Africa, until out of sight of Keeling, and then put about and slanted up for Padang, a Dutch settlement in Sumatra. The Ayesha, which was of about a hundred tons and had formerly carried copra from Keeling to Batavia, proved a first-class sea-going boat. Her gear was in atrocious shape, however, and it was "touch-and-go" all the way to the Dutch Indies. The water in three of her four tanks turned out to be "rotten" and quite unfit to drink, and only a timely tropical shower saved the party from severe suffering from thirst. Storms alternated with calms during the latter portion of the voyage, and on a number of occasions the men were out in boats trying to tow the schooner a few miles nearer its goal.

Sighting Sumatra on the 27th of November, Mücke sailed the Ayesha into the three-mile zone, hoisted the German war-flag, and demanded of the captain of a Dutch destroyer which had been following him that he be allowed a warship's rights of twenty-four hours in Padang to provision and refit. After much parleying, the Dutch finally allowed the Ayesha to drop anchor in Padang, but that was about the extent of their concessions. "The principal person in Padang," observed Mücke, "was the harbour master, a Belgian born, and naturally we could not expect from him any great amiability. The Ayesha did not seem good enough for him, and he acted as if he was in a coal-cellar until I gave him to understand that he was on a warship of His Majesty, the Kaiser."

As Mücke's men had landed at Keeling in their oldest uniforms, they were in rags by this time, and their leader confesses to an "insane desire to make again the acquaintance of the tooth-brush and soap." But the Dutch allowed

them only water, provisons, and some tackle and sails, and the Ayesha was headed back to the open sea in not much better plight than when she arrived. "My men were literally in their 'paradise suits," says Mücke, "and I had only one sock, a pair of shoes, and the remains of a shirt." The crews of the several German ships interned in the harbour sped the Ayesha with cheers and "Die Wacht am Rhein," and two German reservists followed in a rowboat and boarded her beyond the three-mile limit.

The Ayesha had missed a Japanese warship by only a few hours on the day of her arrival at Padang, and her luck still held good after her departure. For the next three weeks she made herself as inconspicuous as possible, meanwhile making such headway as the fluky weather permitted toward one of those long-predetermined "sea trysting-places," remote from the regular trade lanes, where the German commerce destroyers were expected to repair for coal and refitting. Finally, on December 14, the Choising, a 1700-ton China coaster belonging to the North German Lloyd, hove in sight. "Great was our joy now," wrote Mücke. "I had all my men come on deck and line up for review. The fellows hadn't a rag on. Thus, in Nature's garb, we gave three rousing cheers for the German flag on the Choising. The men on the Choising told us afterward, 'We couldn't make out what that meant, those stark-naked fellows all cheering!"

After two days' delay on account of a storm, the men of the *Emden* were transferred to the *Choising*, and the brave little *Ayesha*, whose log showed 1,700 miles of sailing since she had left Keeling, was sent to the bottom.

"She wasn't at all rotten and unseaworthy, as they had told me," wrote Mücke, "but nice and white and dry inside. I had grown fond of the ship, on which I could practise my old sailing manœuvres. . . . That was the saddest day of the month. We gave her three cheers, and my next yacht at Kiel will be named the Ayesha."

IV

On the Choising Mücke came upon the story of a journey round the world by a man called Meyer, in which the statement was made that the Hedjaz or Pilgrim's Railway (which really runs from Damascus only to Medina), was completed to Hodeidah, on the Red Sea. As this appeared to offer the only possible chance of ultimately reaching Germany again, the young officer, who had temporarily assumed command of the Choising, resolved to run for the Arabian coast. The narrow Strait of Perim, "swarming full of Englishmen," was passed on the night of January 7. The next night, nosing in toward a string of lights which, it was thought, might mark the pier of Hodeidah, the Choising almost rammed a French armoured cruiser lying at anchor, but managed to back away without awakening suspicion. The next night Mücke and his men, in four boats, effected a safe landing, and, after the usual parleys

with a suspicious gathering of Arabs, made their way safely along to the sunscorched streets of old Hodeidah. Here the Turkish soldiers saluted them as allies and friends, and assured them that, though the railway was still hundreds of miles to the north, it should not be difficult for them to make their way to it by caravan. Hearing this, Mücke, as soon as it was dark, sent up a red star rocket, the signal agreed upon to let the captain of the *Choising* know that he was safely started on his way home and that the way was clear ahead. As a matter of fact, his troubles were just beginning.

It was Mücke's original plan to make his way northward by the interior route, not only because it was more salubrious than that along the coast, but because it took him beyond the reach of interference by the British blockaders. His party, however, appears never to have penetrated far beyond Sana, in the highlands of Temen. He is quite silent in all his published interviews and lectures regarding what occurred during the two months following his departure from Hodeidah, the only explanation advanced being that "the time spent in the highlands of Sana passed in lengthy inquiries and discussions that finally resulted in our foregoing the journey by land through Arabia for religious reasons." Doubtless, this is as much as he would be permitted to reveal of the condition prevailing in a region which always has been, and probably is still, in revolt against the Turks. All the party, many of whom were suffering from fever, benefited greatly by the sojourn in the high, dry valley in the Yeman Mountains.

Returning to Hodeidah early in March, no alternative was left for Mücke but to work his way up the coast in boats to the better-controlled region in the vicinity of Jeddah and Mecca, an undertaking which, what with the hostile Arabs ashore and the British patrol off-coast, placed him almost literally between "the devil and the deep sea." The party divided and set sail in two tsambuks, native craft of about fifty feet length and twelve feet beam. Mücke purposely set a Saturday evening for running through the British blockade line because, he writes, "I knew the English liked their week-end rest so well." Whether or not the blockade was suspended at this time he does not state. but, at any rate, both tsambuks slipped safely through. After that, by keeping in the shallow coastal waters, the danger from warships was minimized, but the immunity was dearly bought. By keeping an incessant watch for three days, the boats managed to avoid the reefs among which they navigated. Then the larger craft, in endeavouring to thread a passage already safely negotiated by its lighter mate, struck a sharp rock, filled and sank. Twenty-eight men, among whom were four typhoid convalescents and Mücke himself, were thrown into the shark-infested water. An Arab fishing-boat stood by, but, observing the sun helmet of one of the Germans, its crew became suspicious and refused to take any chances in saving the Giaours. At last the other tsambuk hove in sight, and ultimately managed to pick up the men in the water by using its tender, a sort of dinghy in which only two could be taken at a time. The rescue work was not completed until far into the night, and one of the typhoid patients suffered so severely from the shock and his long immersion that he died a few days later. The next day two machine guns and most of the rifles were brought up by Arab divers, but none of the recovered weapons proved entirely dependable afterward. The worst loss, however, was the medicine, especially the quinine, for the want of which there was much suffering later.

The remaining tsambuk somehow managed to flounder on to Konfida, where another boat was secured to take the place of the one that had foundered. Four more days of creeping up the coast took the party to Lith, where definite word that three English ships were blockading Jeddah forced the amphibious men of the Emden back upon land again. The region of hostile Arabs was not yet passed, but Mücke did not hesitate between the near certainty of an English prison and the risk of a fight with Bedouins. Hastily gathering a caravan of a hundred camels the Germans set out overland for Jeddah, the nearest point where Turkish authority was fully established.

At first the Arabs contented themselves with circling in the distance out of rifle range; then, their audacity increasing with their numbers, they made an attack on the night of April first. Firing began from all sides in the darkness, but the Germans, hastily improvising rough defences from their camels and baggage, held their ground till davlight, then rushed out and routed the enemy with bayonet charges.

"They fled, but returned again," writes Mücke, "this time from all sides. Several of the gendarmes who had been given us as escorts were wounded; the machine-gun operator, Rademacher, fell, killed by a shot through his heart; another was wounded; Lieutenant Schmidt, in the rear guard, was mortally hurt. He had received a bullet in his chest and abdomen."

All day there was intermittent sniping, and in the intervals of firing the Germans worked hard on their fortifications—a circular barricade, fifty yards in diameter, of live camels, saddles, and rice- and coffee-sacks filled with sand. Using hands, bayonets, and tin plates, they scooped out a trench inside of this, and back of it built a shelter for the sick and wounded. In this strange fortress the precious water-supply—two jars and ten kerosene-cans—was buried in the sand.

The following morning, under a flag of truce, the Arabs made an offer to allow the Germans to go free on the delivery of all their arms, water, provisions, and twenty-two thousand Turkish pounds. Mücke responded that the money question did not interest him in the least, as he had not a single piastre; and as for arms, it was not the custom for Germans to give them up as long as there was any one to fight with them. Then the shooting began anew, and continued throughout the day. During the night Lieutenant Schmidt died

from his wound, and his grave was carefully smoothed over to obliterate it and thus protect his body from defilement by the Mohammedans should the camp have to be abandoned.

By the third day both munitions and water began to run short. The Arab zaptiehs, or gendarmes, with the party relieved the water situation somewhat by cutting the throats of the wounded camels and drinking the noisome yellow liquid from their "reserve" stomachs. The Germans, unable to swallow this nauseous substitute, kept up as best they could on the three small cups of water a day that was served to them. The fact that they dared not wear their sun helmets for fear of offering better marks for the Bedouins made the suffering from heat intense, and sunstroke prostration was added to the other troubles. The guns became so hot that the barrels seared the flesh of the hands that touched them, while the air grew black with a plague of flies drawn by the decomposing bodies of the camels.

When night fell, the Germans dragged the carcasses of the animals which had been killed during the day as far as possible from the fortifications, but even then the odour was unbearable. It was good hunting for the hyenas. They came in droves with the darkness, their horrible laughter resounding through the desert silence. One could see them creeping like black shadows round the dead camels and hear them snarling. One of them, coming too near the redoubt, was shot by Mücke himself who thought one of the Arabs was trying to creep up on them.

When another emissary from the attacking band approached again to discuss terms of surrender, the situation appeared so desperate that Mücke asked for a parley with the Sheikh himself, intending to finish that worthy with his revolver, and then lead his men out to die fighting. The Arab leader, scenting trouble, declined to show himself; but the Germans, not to be balked, commenced preparations for a sally which, if successful, was to be extended to an attempt to cut through to Jeddah. Before the first of them had climbed the parapet, however, a commotion in the enemy's ranks was noticed, and presently the Arabs began to disperse in all directions. The cause of this became evident a few minutes later, when two camel-riders, waving white banners, topped a sand-dune to the north, and the Germans soon learned that a relief force dispatched by the Emir of Mecca was drawing near.

Under this strong escort the men of the Emden reached Jeddah the following day, only to learn that the Turks were powerless to protect the caravan route to the terminus of the Hedjaz Railway at Medina, and that they must either remain where they were indefinitely, or else take to the sea and brave the British blockade again. As usual, Mücke decided in favour of the alternative that promised to carry him most quickly homeward, irrespective of risk; and after a day or two of rest in the historic old ports he put his men on a couple of tsambuks and commenced another game of hide-and-seek with the British

patrol. Gunboats of the enemy were sighted every day, but by keeping the Europeans out of sight the *tsambuks* were given so much the appearance of harmless Arab fisher-craft that they were not molested.

Not until nineteen days had passed, during which they skirted several hundred miles of reef-armoured coast-line, did they reach a region where Turkish authority was sufficiently established to allow the overland journey to the Hedjaz Railway to be attempted. The tsambuks were abandoned at El Wesh, where Suleiman Pasha provided a strong escort for the five-day caravan journey to El Ula, where a special train from Damascus awaited the long-expected men of the Emden.

The arrival at El Ula marks the end of the epic adventures of the little band of adventurers; the rest of their journey was a triumphal progress through Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor, culminating in the magnificent moment which stirred us to acclamations even on the "movie" screen. Then we saw only the bowed head, the lowered sword-point, the moving of the lips of the young "triumphator." This is what he said:

"Beg to report most obediently, Herr Admiral, landing corps of the *Emden*, forty-four men, four officers, one surgeon."

TV

HOW BRITAIN DID THE JOB

By IAN HAY (CAPTAIN BEITH), Author of "The First Hundred Thousand"

When, in August, 1914, the war burst upon Europe, it found Great Britain just about as unprepared for war as a country could well be. Assisted by our national habit of taking the benevolent intentions of our neighbours for granted, we had yielded to the assurances of those politicians who held that the best way to keep out of war is to remain unprepared for war. The result was that when the little British regular army—the so-called Expeditionary Force -hurled its contemptible little self across the Channel to the discomfiture of the divine dispositions of the Kaiser, it went alone—nerved to the grimmer determination by Lord Kitchener's explicit assurance that it need expect no reinforcements for at least six months, for the very simple and most convincing reason that there were no reinforcements to send. That little force was probably the best equipped, the best led, and the finest body of troops ever put into the field by Great Britain. They fought the greatest rear-guard action in history, and they fought it, week after week, without once breaking their formation or losing their morale. But—they fought it alone. Their own country could not help them.

However, to be just, the moment the clear call came, there was never any difficulty whatever about getting more men. They enlisted in swarms. The difficulty was, on the spur of the moment, to organize machinery that would handle them—feed them, house them, equip them, and get them into fighting trim. Men stood in the street for days, in a long and most pathetic queue, waiting to enlist; and as most of them had thrown up their jobs in order to do so, they were almost starving before they were taken in. The ordinary recruiting offices, snowed under, delegated a great deal of their work, perforce, to amateur organizations, such as local political clubs. These proceeded to enroll recruits with a zeal which rather lost sight of the fact that the humblest recruit possesses a personality and a stomach of his own. When a man joins the British army, he first of all fills up and signs what is called an attestation paper, and takes the oath. He is then dispatched, with his paper, to the headquarters of his regiment, where he hands over the paper and is duly enrolled. At least, that is what happens in normal times. In the fall of 1914, at any hour of a given day or night, some fifty or a hundred surprisingly cheerful individuals were apt to arrive at regimental headquarters, and announce,

usually in chorus, to the overdriven officers in charge, that they had "come for tae jine the Airmy." They were asked for their attestation papers. These were not always forthcoming. Sometimes they had been treated like the now historic "scrap of paper"; but more often the society which had enrolled the man had held his paper back, with a view to mailing it forward in a bunch with others at some more convenient season. The trouble was that until these papers were forthcoming the men could not be regarded as soldiers, and no public money could be expended upon them. They might neither be fed, nor clothed, nor (officially) housed. This threw a heavy private burden upon the officers, whose slender resources were strained to the uttermost to provide for this officially non-existent multitude. However, ultimately the papers arrived, and all concerned embarked upon the task of finding an owner for each paper. Owing to the paucity of Scottish tribal names, a Scottish battalion was particularly difficult to index; and the task of sorting out the innumerable Campbells and Camerons and Wilsons and Thomsons-not to mention the riotous hordes of "Macs"—was a soul-destroying business. Day after day, night after night, the sifting process went on, with infinite labour and dis-So much for the voluntary system, and the shunning of "milicomfort. tarism."

In due course the new battalions were evolved out of chaos, and departed into space to undergo their training. They possessed no uniforms—nothing beyond the civilian clothes they stood up in. Practically no man owned a greatcoat. If he did, he promptly sold it, to save the trouble of carrying it, for Tommy is the most improvident creature in the world.

We had all types. There were miners by the hundred—the finest soldiers in the world for trench fighting, because they handle pick and shovel by instinct, and they appear to prefer residence below ground to residence upon the surface—shipbuilders, farmers, carpenters, shepherds, and members of other and rarer trades. One platoon, for instance, contained a waiter from a restaurant, who was accustomed to parade every morning in the ranks, bright and early, in all the glories of evening dress. The outstanding feature of "K I," as we called ourselves, was its ability to produce on demand an expert to cope with any possible emergency. If an escape of gas was discovered in the orderly room—literal, not figurative—a plumber was instantly forthcoming to cope with the matter. In fact, it was hardly safe for an officer to pose to his platoon as an expert upon any subject at all, for fear some lifelong expert should uplift his voice in the rear rank and refute his doctrines. And it may be added that in "K I" no considerations of military etiquette ever prevented him from doing so! I still cherish the recollection of a certain junior officer who devoted twenty minutes to explaining the points of the compass and the elements of map-reading to a man who afterward explained that he was by profession a land-surveyor!

Such was the material we had to handle. It was an army of all the talents except soldiering. No one who saw Aldershot during the first months of the war will ever forget it. Men wandered about in droves, dressed like nothing on earth. The spirit of discipline was hardly born. Rules and regulations were regarded either as antiquated relics of the age of peace, or else as a form of industrial tyranny. The officer was regarded as a rapacious employer, while the sergeant—or foreman, as he was usually called—was looked upon as a hired bully. If a man felt disinclined to go upon parade, he simply did not go; and he felt both surprised and pained if, on returning from a trifling absence of three days, prepared to forget and forgive upon a monetary basis—say the loss of three days' pay—he found himself under arrest as a deserter. But we can judge these men by no standard but their own. They had joined the army, to a man, at the outbreak of war, in the sure and certain expectation of being forthwith provided with rifle and bayonet, and of being despatched at once to the Front-wherever and whatever that might be-to kill Germans. One cannot blame them for feeling a little disappointed on finding that the path of glory was approached by a stony thoroughfare eight months long, hedged about with unexpected restrictions on the subject of obedience and sobriety. They had to acquire the instincts of a soldier after they had settled down to another way of life. No wonder they found things difficult. Yet, less than a year later, at the opening assault of the great and bloody Battle of Loos, those same men went forward, many of them to certain death, as steadily as the most seasoned veterans.

Such was the Spirit of the British armies, old and new. And it is that spirit which has saved us as a nation, and done most, at terrible personal sacrifice, to redeem us from the evils of unpreparedness.

THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF GALICIA*

By STANLEY WASHBURN

Had Russia been fighting Austria alone in this war, the whole world would have been ringing for the last two months with the account of vast operations, magnificent strategy, and battles which in size and extent have never before been known in the world's history. But with the coming of the war here, there broke also the great cloud all over Europe, and the details and scope of this remarkable campaign have, as it seems to me, been completely overshadowed by the nearer and better-understood operations in the country of Western Europe, which is much more intimately known to Englishmen and to Americans. While England and the United States were hanging with bated breath on the invasion of Belgium and the subsequent movements in France, the situation in Galicia received scant attention, and barring occasional reports of the capture of towns, the names of which were hardly familiar to us, very little news came from this zone.

It seems, therefore, appropriate to sketch briefly and simply what has been done down here by Russia and how she has done it. With the mere statement that the operations against Austria involved the movement of more than a million of Russian troops against about a million of Austrians and Hungarians, it will be understood that the scale of the campaign was enormous.

At the commencement of the war the invasion began from three different directions, and the Russian troops were formed into three great groups, each composing many army corps, the total aggregating twenty. These movements started from three bases. Brusiloff from the extreme east, with his base on Odessa, crossed the boundary formed by the river Zbrucz (local spelling), with his central corps on the line of the railroad at Wotocczyska, and commenced his march on Lwow (Lemberg), which is the strategic centre of central Galicia. Simultaneously Russky's army started with its innumerable army corps and auxiliary troops, having Kiev for its base. These divisions crossed the frontier with their centre on the line of railroad running from Radziwitow through Brody and Krasne to Lemberg.

The last great group of army corps, commanded by Ewerts, had its base on Brest-Litowsk, and moved south via Lublin to drive out the opposing Austrians in their front, and take the whole in the flank. This, in a very broad and gen-

^{*}Reprinted from "Field Notes from the Russian Front" by the kind permission of the author.

eral way, was the movement planned and the general scheme of strategy, which, it may be said, was carried out to the letter. The greatest weakness of Russia at the start of the hostilities was in her lack of strategic lines of railroad. If one takes a map of Galicia, it will be observed that the Austrian Government has numerous lines which run to the frontier of Russia and then stop. This enabled the Austrians to mass troops almost instantly. The Russians, on the other hand, had few such lines, and the result was that the initial operations were much more difficult than they would otherwise have been. Time, in war, is the chief factor of the whole enterprise. Had Russia had more railheads at the frontier, she would no doubt have swept Eastern Galicia before the Austrians could have concentrated in any great force, But the lack of such facilities enabled the enemy to prepare defences hurriedly at many points, and to contest the Russian advance at every step. The opinion in England and in the United States also seems to have been that the Austrian troops were inferior, and that Russian advances were due largely to the weakness of her enemy. Those who have travelled over the field of operations, and read in the page of abandoned battlefields the tale of stubborn resistance, must change their views about the Austrians, and at the same time admit the remarkable impetuosity and courage of the Russian troops, who, against enormous obstacles, tore their way through a clever and ferocious resistance. The army of Brusiloff was the most distant from the strategic centre aimed at (Lemberg), and hence had the farthest to go, and perhaps in the early days the hardest fighting. The Austrians, with their superior railway facilities, were able to prepare a preliminary line of resistance to this army, along the bluffs and high ground between the forks of the stream known on local maps as Zlota Lipa, and here they made their first stand, a battle which in any other war would have taken columns to describe, but which in this struggle falls into the class of a mere skirmish.

From this point the Austrians fell back on a second line of defence, and one which was, in fact, an extremely strong one. This was the hills and ridges east of the river called Gnila Lipa. By the time this position was reached by the Russians, Brusiloff's left was in touch with Russky's right that had crossed the boundary around Radziwitow. The position now defended by the Austrians extended from the town of Halicz on the Dniester River, which was the Russian southern flank, in a practically unbroken line through the north of Krasne. The battle which was engaged over this extended line lasted for periods, in different parts of the position, of eight to ten days in the south, to nearly two weeks on the Krasne position itself.

The Austrian line was a very strong one and was defended with an intelligence and vigour which for days on end promised to thwart utterly the Russian efforts to break through. Trenches by the mile, with bombproofs, barbed-wire entanglements, and all other devices of modern field fortifications had been

erected to block the advance of the invading troops. Modern field guns, machine guns, and field howitzers were all turned against the Russians, and their losses were undoubtedly very heavy. Some of the details of the general line were contested for eight and nine days, being now taken by one side and now by the other, with each assault and counter-assault leaving the piled-up heaps of the dead and wounded in its wake. All this time Ewerts's numerous army corps were slowly pressing down from their base on Brest Litowsk, driving back heavy forces of the Austrians. But these columns were not determining factors in the first big fight before Lemberg. It was the collapse of the Austrian defence toward the south of the line that broke down the first big Austrian stand on their main line of defences. Heavy masses of them fled via Halicz, blowing up a fine steel bridge in their retreat. But the Russians, in spite of their days of incessant marching and heavy fighting, were not to be denied, and, throwing a pontoon bridge over the river, followed up their victory.

This movement threatened to envelop the whole Austrian right, and rendered the defence still going on around Krasne no longer tenable. Orders were therefore hurriedly given for the abandonment of that hard-fought field. It must be understood, however, in justice to the Austrians, that, even after thirteen days of resisting the Russians, their line in this part of the field was not broken, nor even severely shaken; and their retirement was due to the strategical exigencies created by Brusiloff's enveloping movement on the south. The Austrians then evacuated their base at Lwow (Lemberg), and without offering any further resistance in the city, retired to their newly created and even stronger position extending through Grodek and north to Rawa Ruska. Here, for the first time, all the Russian armies were in touch, as all the Austrians were also. Ewerts and his numerous corps had forced back his antagonists to the line between Rawa Ruska and Bitgorai. This then presented an enormous front, with all the armies of both sides in touch with each other, and all engaged practically at the same time. It is difficult to form more than the merest approximate estimate of numbers engaged, but it is safe to put the total on both sides as above 2,500,000.

This battle, the details of which are so little known, was without doubt the hardest fought struggle, and on the most gigantic scale that the war had seen up to the time when it took place. Ewerts on the north would not be denied his advance, and his repeated assaults on the Austrians resulted in bending in their left day by day until their linewas bent into a right angle, with Rawa Ruska on the northeastern corner. Here for eight days a battle raged which the annals of history certainly cannot up to this time duplicate, for the ferocity and bitterness of attack, and the stubbornness and courage of the defence. The Austrians, let it be said, were in an extremely strong position round this quaint little town, and were prepared to defend themselves to the last ditch, which in

fact they did to the letter. At the extreme corner of the defence, which I suppose one might call the strategic centre of the whole battle—if one place in so huge an amphitheatre can be picked out—they fought for six days with an endurance which was almost incredible.

Here there are no less than eight lines of defence in little more than a mile. Each of these was held to the last minute, and some of them changed hands several times before the Russians came finally over them. Each trench tells its own story of defence. Piles and piles of empty cartridges, accourrements, and knick-knacks are heaped in every ditch. Right across the field between their positions is written their hurried change of line, with new graves and hundreds of haversacks scattered in between. Then comes another trench with the same signs of patient endurance under shot and shell. The last and strongest position of all before the final collapse is a place to make the blood curdle. By this time the Russians had brought up their heavy field howitzers, and when they finally got the range, they literally destroyed the whole position. One can walk for hundreds of vards stepping from one shell hole into another, each five feet deep and perhaps ten feet across. One can pick up the dirt of the trenches and sift the shrapnel balls out in handfuls. And yet even here the Austrians hung on for a time, as the mute evidence of the field too clearly tells. In every direction from each shell hole are strewn the fragments of blue cloth of the Austrian uniform, torn into shreds and ribbons by the force of the explosive; and all about the field still are bits of arms, a leg in a boot, or some other ghastly token of soldiers, true to discipline, hanging on to a position that was alive with bursting shells.

Beyond this line was the artillery position of the Austrians, and here again we find heaps upon heaps of brass shrapnel shells, with shattered wheels and splinters of caissons in every direction. This last stand finally caved in, and the next field, dotted with dead horses, shows where the remnant of the Austrian artillery took its way. The Austrians never had a chance to make a stand in the town itself, and with its loss came the dissolution of the whole defence along the entire line of battle, and what was really an overhwelming disaster to the cause of the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian army here split in two. While it is an advantage for victorious armies to have separate bases. it is anything but desirable for an army in defeat, for naturally each fragment falls back on its own line of communications. This is what actually happened here at this time. The Hungarian corps on the Austrian right retired through the Carpathian passes, while the Austrians fell back in confusion on Cracow. with the Russians taking Yaroslav on their heels. This, then, was the first great phase of the invasion of Galicia. The Russians at the conclusion of this part of the campaign held Galicia up to the river San and Yaroslav, and had swept everything in this zone before them with the exception of the fortified position of Przemysl, which, as I write, still forms a strong position in the present Austrian line. So much for the purely military aspect. Let us now turn to the methods of the Russians and the manner of their behaviour while in a conquered country.

The Russians, after six weeks of campaigning, were left in absolute control of the whole of Galicia, up to a line running from the Carpathians on the south, through Przemysl and along the River San to the important town of Yaroslav. If one goes back over this campaign and studies the movements from the start of the war, one cannot but be enormously impressed with the remarkable achievement accomplished by the Russian army in a comparatively short campaign. Starting from widely separated bases, with meagre railway facilities, they manœuvred three giant armies, each composed of many corps and all working in general union, and achieved, without one effective setback, a series of victories of enormous magnitude. They did this in the face of an enemy whom history will show to have been by no means weak. The theory that Austria was a web of factions that would dissolve at the first impact, and the belief that her troops would not fight, have been absolutely disproved; and it serves to magnify the achievements of the soldiers of the Czar, when we accord to the Austro-Hungarian army the credit which is due to its courageous defence and the stubborn resistance put up at every favourable opportunity.

My opinion is that no troops could have made a braver resistance than was offered in many instances by the defeated army. I walked over one position which the Austrians held for a day in a stubble field with no defences whatever save the few-inches-deep pits that each man had dug for himself. For a mile the pathetic evidence of their determination to stick was visible on every hand. An unbroken line of accourrements and fragments of shells marks the position where they held on absolutely without any shelter. Right in the centre of this hideous zone was a crossing of the roads, and there stands to-day a mossgrown old cross which for a century perhaps has received the reverence of the passing peasant. All through this terrible day the carved figure of the Christ upon the cross looked down upon the dying and wounded. The top of the wooden upright was shattered with a bit of shell, while one arm of the figure of Christ was carried away by a shrapnel fragment. Could anything be more incongruous than this pathetic figure of Him, who came to spread peace and good will among men, looking down to-day on a field sown with mangled corpses? At the very foot of the cross is a newly made grave and a rude wooden sign nailed upon the monument itself: "Here lie the bodies of 121 Austrian warriors and four Russian warriors of the -th regiment."

After the terrible fighting that had gone on for weeks, there followed a period of recuperation and refilling of the wastage of both armies. The Russians engaged the front of Przemysl and took the town of Sambor, and rested for a little. In the meantime the Austrians, encouraged by their German allies, were making frantic efforts to pull themselves together. The fragments of

the army that had escaped through the passes of the Carpathians were taken by rail to Cracow, while the army that went that way was reinforced and stiffened, and the whole reorganized and whipped into shape for further operations. The view that the heart of the Austrian army had been destroyed was now contradicted, for shortly after the 10th of October, 1914, it again showed signs of life. We hear that its left in Cracow joins the German right, and that many German army corps are united with it there. Rumour among us also says that the German Staff is in command of all Austrian operations. In any case, the second phase of the Galician war is now in full blast.

The Austrians began this by a terrific attack on Sambor, which was held by the Russians. Their impetus was so great that for several days it seemed possible that the Russians might be dislodged permanently from their hardwon position on their left flank. Indeed at Lemberg, where the guns could plainly be heard, there were constant rumours of Austrian victories. But their offensive ultimately failed, and the tide of battle gradually ebbed from round Sambor, and the interest shifted to a point which is between Sambor and Przemysl. Here the Austrians concentrated a number of army corps, less than four, and made a heroic effort to break the Russian line, with the idea of taking Lemberg, which was a practicable scheme, entirely dependent on the success of their attack. For a day or so their efforts seemed to be showing results, and a number of the hospitals in Lemberg were ordered to be in readiness for an instant removal. But this also failed, and also the Sambor movement, with a dreadful loss to the Austrians in dead and wounded, besides more than 5,000 prisoners taken by the Russians.

While this action was at its height, the combined Austrians and Germans delivered a stroke against Yaroslav, which the Russians had been holding since the days following the retirement of the Austrians from their Gródek-Rawa Ruska line. The details of this battle are not known to us, and indeed. the action is still under way as I am writing these lines. From what we gather. however, the Germans, after occupying Yaroslav, were driven out by the Russians in a terrible counter-attack, and since then have made no headway whatsoever. In a word, the movements of the Austro-German united armies in this last effort to wrest Galicia from the Russians seem now to have been absolutely futile. For three days we were travelling just in the rear of the Russian line, and during all that time the cannonading was terrible and without intermission. We are too near the operations, both from the point of view of distance and time, to get any real perspective of the general situation; but at the time of writing it seems safe to venture the statement that the Dual Alliance have shot their bolt on this frontier, and that hereafter there will be no serious opportunity for them to regain the territory which they lost in Galicia.

The fortress of Przemysl still holds out and may very well do so until the end

of hostilities. It is strongly defended, and will take a lot of battering before its capture can be effected.

What I have written of the military situation in Galicia is, I believe, approximately a correct outline of the general movements. It is almost impossible to get more than a very general idea of how things have actually happened, except in a very hazy way. The fighting has extended over such an enormous area, the numbers engaged have been so large, and units of command have been so numerous, that nothing like an accurate account can be given until the reports of the various commanders on both sides are to hand and can be digested.

The general fact remains, however, that Russia has in two months handled an army of more than a million men with no serious setbacks, and is to-day occupying the richest and best portion of the fertile province of Galicia.

Written October, 1914.

VI

HOW THE NAVY SAVED ENGLAND*

By WINSTON CHURCHILL

(Former First Lord of the British Admiralty)

London, July 22.—What kind of foe is this "Great Amphibian" which, for the first time in history, Germany has drawn out against her? Many valiant enemies has the Prussian army fought in the last 300 years, on the whole with a balance of good fortune, but here is something new altogether.

Never before have the force and science of Central Europe come into armed conflict with the western island. Far back along the fading paths of history crusading armies moved across the salt water to the fray. The chivalry of Crecy, and the archers of Agincourt who disembarked upon the coast of France; the sea rovers who affronted the power of Philip II on the Spanish Main, and the soldiers who withstood him in the Low Countries; the armies of William III and the Duke of Marlborough, humbling the glory of Louis XIV; the far-ranging ships and stubborn infantry that sustained a great king in one century and warred down a great emperor in the next—all had one birthplace, all were manifestations of one peculiar form of power.

GERMAN RAGE AGAINST ENGLAND

Now at last Prussia—the embodiment of all that land energy could give—must join in unrelenting conflict with the Great Amphibian. It is no small proof of the shrewdness of the Prussian military instinct that they realized at once where the peril lay, and even while the German armies rolled forward to the terrific assault on the French frontier, or drew up to withstand at heavy odds the hosts of the Czar, their hate and rage were concentrated upon the unorganized, black-coated, commerce-absorbed, politics-loving state which could scarcely at the outset put 150,000 men in the field.

Berlin mobs insulting with vulgar fury the departing British Ambassador expressed the same well-founded apprehension as the discerning pen and venomous verse of Lissauer. Let us always labour to deserve these sincere and spontaneous tributes.

The Great Amphibian is a female beast; not clever, but very tough; short-sighted, but very patient; slow and clumsy, but very strong and fierce—strong as her homes in the broad seas. You cannot voyage upon them without see-

^{*}From the Tribune. Copyright, 1916-The Tribune Ass'n.

ing her dorsal fins cutting the blue water, and all over the world she has deposited her young. She moves at all times freely about broad and narrow waters, and, when minded, bars their passage to all others.

THE GREAT AMPHIBIAN

If need be she can crawl or even dart ashore first a scaly arm, with sharp claws; then, if time and circumstances warrant, a head, with gleaming teeth, and shoulders that grow broader and broader. Then she can draw out convolution after convolution of muscular body, till one cannot tell where the end of her may be found. Or she can return again to the deep, to strike anew, now here, now there—and no one can guess where the next attack will fall. While she fights her strength waxes. She is invigorated, not exhausted, by effort, and her ancient craft in war is gradually revived in her as the struggle deepens. Only she eats too much, wastes too much, and costs a lot to keep. Withal the Great Amphibian is faithful unto death. She is very hard to get at—in fact, since she first learned to swim, no one has ever caught her.

The true characteristic of all British strategy lies in the use of this amphibious power. Not on the sea alone, but on land and sea together—not the fleet alone, but the army in hand with the fleet. In this lies everything. In this already once in this war decisive victory has perhaps resided.

BRITISH MOBILIZATION

On the afternoon of July 26, 1914, orders were issued to prevent ships of the First Fleet from dispersing, as would otherwise have been done at daylight on the 27th, and to recall such as had started. At midnight the ships of the Second Fleet were ordered to remain at their home ports, in close proximity to the balance of their crews. On the 27th all the naval aircraft were moved to vulnerable points on the east coast, the Second Fleet completed an informal "stand by," telegrams were sent to admirals abroad, and far away at the China station the battleship *Triumph* began to clear for action.

During the 27th and 28th the protecting flotillas along the east coast were raised to their full strength. On the night of the 29th the whole of the First Fleet, with auxiliary cruiser squadrons and flotillas, passed the Strait of Dover and gained their war station in northern waters. On the same day an official "warning telegram" of approaching danger was issued. On the 30th the "precautionary period" began. Naval harbours were cleared and modified examination service was instituted. On the 31st the immediate reserve was mobilized and various reserve cruiser squadrons came into being.

NAVY MADE READY

On August 1st, shortly before midnight, a general mobilization of the navy was ordered and the Third Fleet began to come to a war basis. This step was

approved by the Cabinet on Sunday, the 2d, and made regular by royal proclamation next day. All reservists, however, had responded to the Admiralty summons, and on August 3d, when the ultimatum was sent requiring Germany to evacuate Belgium, the whole process by which the naval power of Great Britain is placed in readiness for war was completed in all respects.

At a great war council held on the afternoon of August 4th, attended by the principal naval and military personages as well as Cabinet ministers directly concerned with the Admiralty, it was agreed to despatch immediately the whole regular army—not four, but six divisions, if necessary—to the Continent and to undertake their transportation and the security of the island in their absence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the Royal

Navy.

Once more now, in the march of the centuries, Old England was to stand forth in battle against the mightiest thrones and dominations. Once more, in defence of the liberties of Europe and the common right, must she enter upon a voyage of great toil and hazard, across waters uncharted, toward coasts unknown, guided only by stars. Once more "the far-off line of storm-beaten ships" was to stand between a Continental tyrant and the domination of the world.

It was II o'clock at night—I2 by German time—when Berlin's answer to the British ultimatum was expected. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders was gathered a small group of admirals and captains and a cluster of clerks, pencil in hand, waiting.

Along the Mall, from the direction of Buckingham Palace, the sound of an immense concourse singing "God Save the King" floated in, and on this deep wave broke the chimes of Big Ben. As the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room. The war telegram which means "Commence hostilities" was flashed to ships and establishments under the white ensign all over the world.

Aye, commence hostilities at once against Germany; urge them; persevere in them; concentrate upon them; repent not of them; pursue them to the very end.

Certainly Great Britain's entry into the war was workmanlike. Confronted by the greatest military power in the world and by a navy second only to her own, she acted with instant decision. Her great fleet disappeared into the mists at one end of the island, her small army hurried out of the country at the other.

'ARMY PLAYS BIG PART

By these extraordinary strokes she might well have appeared to the uninitiated eye to divest herself of her defences, to lay herself open to the greatest perils. Long stretches of her eastern coast, guarded only by unostentatious

flotillas and comparatively untrained territorials, seemed almost to invite attack. Yet both these acts had been carefully conceived in time of peace, and both were in harmony with the highest strategic truth.

The "contemptible little army" reached the western battlefield in time to play what well might be judged a decisive part in the first and most critical of all trials of strength. The "Grand Fleet"—for this name, so honoured by our ancestors, was to be revived on the outbreak of war—from its northern throne has ruled the seas ever since with a completeness of control which even Trafalgar had not secured.

It may well be that history furnishes no more remarkable example of determined adhesion by civil government to sound principles of war as embodied in carefully considered plans without regard to obvious risks and objections. Had all our action been on this level, how many months of danger, how many lives, and what treasure might not have been saved.

BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA

From the first hour of war it was evident that command of the sea and all that followed from it rested with Britain. Everywhere German merchant ships scurried to port. Everywhere their cruisers hid themselves. Everywhere their commerce raiders were blocked in neutral or enemy harbours.

But at any moment England's naval strength might be challenged—and if at any moment, then surely the earliest moment was most probable—and even pending battles, the seas were full of dangers about which no experience existed as a guide or measure. At any moment—and if at any moment, then surely while it might delay the departure of an expeditionary force—a raid or descent might be attempted upon our coasts. Nevertheless, the army must go to France, and at once. Submarines? Still it must go. The French African army also must cross seas not yet cleared. Never mind—the bulk would get there.

And then, from all over the world, the Great Amphibian must draw her children, her resources, and her food. Ten thousand keels were carrying on trade and transportation, sailing boldly over every sea, hundreds homeward bound and hundreds outward bound each day, on I per cent. war insurance.

THE MENACE TO BRITAIN

The Australian and Canadian armies, the Indian divisions for France, the territorial divisions for India, regular divisions, spread garrisons about the world and a dozen minor enterprises claimed transport and armed convoy. For the enemy's cruisers were still at large and hidden.

Reinforcements and supplies for the army in France flowed in in an everwidening stream, in spite of the enemy submarine, growing more daring and more skilful every day. Then, as the Allied armies recoiled on Paris, land com-

munications by Havre were threatened.

"Shift the base to St. Nazaire." It was shifted accordingly. "Get ready to shift further south still." It was got ready accordingly. "Better news—victory on the Marne—the tide has turned—shift it back to Havre." Again it was shifted accordingly.

Meanwhile there was not a moment's interruption to the men and supplies pouring out or the wounded pouring back. And all the time Britain must pen the second greatest naval power in its fortified harbours, guard the island from all attack, or be ready to fight the supreme battle of all history at four hours' notice. She must keep on being ready for years.

ENGLAND THE WORLD'S ARMOURER

The Great Amphibian, going ashore, must transform a large part of her body. Armies of millions must be raised—one, two, three, four millions, or more. She never thought of that before. And, of course, it will take some time, but they will want arms and equipment. She never thought of that before, either—not even at the time she thought of armies.

Never mind. Let us become the world's armourer and arsenal. Transform industries, call out men, call in women. Pity to have overlooked it before. Half a year has been lost—or was it a year—or was it more? But her faithful servants on the sea still execute punctiliously the tasks confided to them. Mistakes can be put right, delays can be retrieved, needless suffering can be avoided, loss can be endured. All sacrifices, even those that seem to have been in vain, can be made fruitful.

Slowly but surely the whole force of the nation and empire and all its dependencies will be organized for war by land and sea; not one scrap will be wilfully neglected. The effort ultimately will reach the potential maximum, both in volume and in quality—unless the war for any reason comes sooner to an end.

VII

THE EYES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

HOW AIRCRAFT INFLUENCED THE WAR AND HOW WAR IN-FLUENCED AIRCRAFT

By WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT AND CARL DIENSTBACH

In the Tripolitan War waged by Italy against Turkey in 1911 a few imaginative theorists—so they were called—induced the Italian authorities to send to the front three or four French exhibition machines with which the army had been provided. It was proved at once that scouting could be done more effectively on wings than on horseback. But the Tripolitan campaign was aëronautically one-sided. The Turks had neither airships nor flying machines and no artillery designed for the especial purpose of bringing down airscouts. There could be no fighting in the air. The war proved only the value of the flying scout. It did nothing to develop the airplane or the airship.

The Balkan War that followed was hardly more illuminating. To be sure, airplanes were sent up to reconnoitre, but they were manned by hired foreign flyers—mercenaries with itching palms but no patriotic fervour. There were no combats in the air simply because the flyers avoided each other almost as politely as if they thought it ungentlemanly to trespass on an opponent's zone. It seemed as if a doubt once expressed by H. G. Wells in one of his well-reasoned, imaginative novels, the doubt if the courage of the Twenty-second Century was equal to the test of fighting in the air, was ignominiously confirmed

early in the Twentieth.

Hence, Europe entered the great war that began in 1914, realizing that the airplane and the dirigible airship would play a vital part in turning the tide of battle but quite ignorant of the terrible demands that would be made on machines and men in the air. Of all military arms the aëronautic was the least developed because it was the least understood. In the brief space of two frightful years it became necessary not only to evolve an effective system of air tactics but also to invent new types of machines. Even the art of flying had to be learned anew. The air lessons that strategists thought that they had learned from the Tripolitan and Balkan wars were simply thrown overboard.

THE AIRPLANE STRENGTH OF THE GREAT POWERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

Of all the great European powers, France was the first to appreciate correctly the possible military worth of aircraft. Germany long experimented

with dirigibles. She lost three precious years before she caught up with France. And yet Germany was aëronautically better prepared than any other European power when the first shot was fired. She had some five hundred airplanes against the French eight hundred; but her five hundred were superior in type. Least prepared were Russia and England. Their indifference proved costly during the first year.

We can only guess at the airplane strength of Great Britain in 1914. On paper she had two hundred machines. It is doubtful if there were a hundred in actual commission—so few in fact that they could play no very important part in stemming that overwhelming tide of field-gray Germans that swept through Belgium and France. But for all that the British machines were

good, better in fact than those of the French for military scouting.

It was characteristic of Germany that she alone entered the war with a standardized airplane. Her monoplane Taube, or "Dove," of which we heard so much in the early months and her Albatross, Aga, and other biplanes were by far the best military machines in Europe—best because they had given the most uniformly satisfactory account of themselves in long-distance flights. All these machines were standardized tractors; that is, their propellers were mounted in front. To relieve the pilot as much as possible of the nervous and muscular strain of maintaining his balance, the Taube and the Albatross were made automatically stable by shaping the wings like those of a dove and by giving them the contour of a broad arrow-head. They were strong, as strength was conceived in 1914. And they were wonderfully dependable. There were some faster flying machines in the British and French armies, but on the whole, the Taubes and Albatrosses anticipated better than any other type the qualities that the bloody experiences of the war have taught soldiers to demand of wings and motors.

Although the French had the most airplanes at the outbreak of the war it was a very heterogeneous collection. There was nothing comparable with the standardized German equipment—nothing but a motley array of civilian and sporting machines, some very fast and some very slow, some staunch and some daringly flimsy. In the end, this very lack of uniformity aided the French in the process of elimination and invention that preceded the development of final types on all sides. It was much harder for the Germans to scrap their Taubes and Albatrosses simply because they had been standardized.

THE DOVES OF WAR

With their standardized equipment of Taubes, or Doves, the Germans boldly took the initiative in the air from the very first day of the war. It was the Taubes that ushered in the invasion of Belgium, the Taubes that scrutinized the territory before the army that rolled over northern and eastern France, the Taubes that encouraged the Germans to take chances that might

have proved fatal had there been no guiding intelligence in the air. They flew far, far behind the French lines. They soared over Paris long before the German army was pounding at its gates. They were the harbingers of victory in driving the Russians out of East Prussia.

This superiority of the Germans in the early stages was in part due to training. The airplane had been first used by the French in those annual manœuvres in which every European army engaged before the war. Apparently the Germans alone had learned the necessity of long-distance military flights. At all events, there were few long French flights at the outbreak of hostilities—few attempts to fly far into the enemy's country, few attempts to beat off the German Taubes. On the whole, the French undertook only timid short journeys over the German lines. There were even complaints on the German side that French machines were seen so infrequently. It is clear that the bird of battle had as yet neither beak nor talons. It was a mere fledgling. A few rifle and pistol shots were exchanged; but there was no air fighting in any real sense. Whenever a German machine made a menacing feint that suggested a duel the opposing French machine generally retired hastily. Nor were any efforts made to direct artillery fire on either side at first. There was merely reconnoitring, with all the advantage on the German side that followed from the use of the best machines and the best trained scouts.

SURPRISE ATTACKS WERE IMPOSSIBLE

Inexpert as the reconnoitring was on all sides but the German in the early months, it is nevertheless significant that there was no battle that even remotely resembled a surprise attack. The eyes in the air saw everything. Von Hindenburg's operations in Eastern Prussia were sometimes surprisingly sudden. If they constitute an exception it must be attributed to the poor airplane equipment of the Russians—a feeble imitation of the French on a very much reduced scale.

Even in the capture of Antwerp the Taubes proved their worth. The Belgians and British had cunningly masked a few batteries. All the ranges were known to a foot. As the Germans advanced they were met by a deadly artillery fire. Whence did it come? The forts of the first line had long since been reduced to ruins by the Krupp 16-inch howitzers, by 12-inch Skoda mortars, and by 8-inch siege guns. The forts of the second line were too far back to deliver so destructive a fire. The shells evidently came from an ingeniously concealed battery which had to be destroyed before the troops could advance to the Nèthe. Airplanes were sent up with strict orders to note the location of every enemy battery. The batteries were silenced.

That the German avalanche was finally checked at the Marne is due entirely to the flying machine, unskilfully handled though it was by the French.

If the Germans alone had been provided with airplanes or if the French had been as poorly provided with machines as were the Russians, the Battle of the Marne would have resulted in a German victory and in the capture of Paris. The Germans had pushed on too fast and too far. They had overreached themselves. It was glaringly apparent to the French air scouts that the too-hasty German advance could not be adequately supported. Knowing what they did of the precarious German situation, the French stood their ground and at last stemmed the devastating tide.

On the other hand, the Germans, too, profited by the airplane. Without it they would have suffered a crushing defeat at the Marne. Circling high up in the air, a German airman whose name is unfortunately not mentioned in the official reports, saw the movement undertaken by the enemy to turn the German flank. The order was given to draw in the lines—to retreat, in other words. So the airplane at the Marne saved the day both for the French and

the Germans.

The Battle of the Marne was followed by long weary months of trench warfare. Both French and Germans buried themselves in the ground. This stagnation was in large measure due to the airman. It was impossible to carry out any important strategic movement without detection. There was ample opportunity now to experiment with new types of aircraft and to evolve an efficient system of air tactics.

THE FRENCH BEGIN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRPLANE

The French were probably the first to realize that a military airplane could be highly serviceable in more than one way. It might be good for scouting, for fire control, or for fighting. Because the aëronautic matériel of the Allies was so varied, so unstandardized, they were soon able to select the most efficient types. They proved to be the high-powered racer of Morane, and the fast small biplanes of Sopwith and of Bristol. The Morane racers became models for new squadrons. They had proved to be good for scouting because they were fast and because the wings, elevated as they were above the pilot, did not obstruct the view of the terrain below. The Taubes, which, like the French Blériots, were monoplanes with wings that impeded observation, were retained for a time by the Germans, but merely because of their staunchness and great radius of action.

In the first air fights that ensued, pistols and rifles were the weapons adopted, now as aërially antiquated as the bow and arrow or the blunderbuss. In spite of their far-sightedness, in spite of their thoroughness, the Germans had not mounted machine guns on their airplanes. The imaginative French had made a few experiments of that kind; but the load-carrying biplanes on which the guns were mounted were much too slow. To the British belongs the credit of having begun real air-fighting—the most daring of all fighting. That

was because their staunch, fast biplanes were best adapted of all flying machines to mount machine guns. The British succeeded in driving the German air-scouts back over their own lines as soon as they appeared. The French soon emulated their allies and became equally proficient.

All subsequent changes in airplane design were dictated by the necessity of engaging in air-duels. The racing machine again served as the prototype of The French and the English seem to have made that the fighting machine. discovery first. They began by strengthening the racer so that it could carry So they were the first to appear in the air, much to the conmachine guns. sternation of the Germans, with craft that for the time being were invulnerable because of their manœuvring and climbing powers. The Germans had nothing that approximated the racer. Wedded as they were to a standard, they hesitated to make a radical change. At last, however, they discarded their big monoplane Taubes in favour of their equally standardized Albatross biplanes. which, however, gave the pilot an unobstructed view. They first resorted to a very curious expedient—the building of a gigantic machine with two bodies and two motors and propellers and car in the middle. "Fritz" the British promptly called this monstrosity when it appeared. It was so powerfully engined that it proved to be speedier than the French and British scouts; it carried two machine guns so that it might overwhelm resistance by a hail of bullets. But "Fritz" could neither climb nor manœuvre as well as the fighting machines of the Allies. For that reason he was but a passing phase in the evolution of the airplane-destroyer. The huge Sikorskys of Russia—machines with bodies as big as Pullman cars and almost as comfortable—were even less serviceable.

THE GERMAN FOKKERS

The Germans saw that there was nothing for it but to imitate the Allies. They returned to the monoplane—not to the discarded Taube, but to the untried Fokker. Like the French fighting machines, the Fokker was made small and given extraordinarily powerful engines. It could dart about with wasplike agility. Seated within its beautifully modelled body was a single picked man, who had not only to manipulate the controls but also to work a machine gun. The mounting of that gun was marvellously ingenious. It was fixed in position so that it could fire its six hundred shots a minute only straight ahead between the blades of a propeller spinning at the rate of twelve hundred revolutions a minute. Why did it not tear away the propeller? Because engine and gun were geared together, so that the engine pulled the Only thus was it possible to time the firing of the gun with such absolutely mathematical accuracy that a blade was never struck. The French machine guns were similarly mounted and similarly fired. It is impossible to fix the credit for the invention; French and Germans had worked it out independently before the war.

It is evident that in handling such a gun the entire machine must be swung, just as a lancer must wheel his horse in order to lunge with his weapon. There is a reason for this. The fighting Fokkers and Moranes have a speed of well over a hundred miles an hour. When one rushes past the other in that jockeying for position that accompanies a duel in the air, each pilot must reckon with his own speed and that of his opponent—a total of two hundred miles an hour. The difficulty of making a hit at close range—and hits must be so made—may be conceived if a marksman seated at the window of an express train were asked to hit a certain passenger in another train rushing past in the opposite direction. Only by firing head-on at a foe directly in front of him can the fighter hope to score. That great fundamental fact was not learned until air-fighting in high-speed machines began in earnest. It dictated the peculiar mounting of the machine gun and its mechanical operation by the engine. After this lesson was learned and the Moranes and Fokkers had been designed in the light of this knowledge, there were no further marked improvements in fighting machines, except that racing monoplanes were supplanted by racing biplanes in accordance with scientific teaching of to-day.

Over and over again has it been said that this is a war of mechanism and that the old romance of fighting is gone. Men are moved down or blasted out of existence not by visible foes but by invisible engineers miles distant. Even in rushing a trench there is but scant opportunity for a furious hand-to-hand struggle. The few bewildered shell-shocked creatures that still cower alive beneath a shelter after a bombardment that has lasted for days, are too dazed to struggle. But in the air, it is otherwise. Only in the epics of Homer are deeds recorded that can be fittingly compared with the feats of the airfighter. In the battles of the Iliad, the personal prowess of a god-like hero wins the day; the fate of an army depends on the courage, strength, and skill of an Agamemnon, Ajax or Achilles. So it is in a modern air battle. The romance of old has not only been revived but intensified a hundred fold. Compared with German and British airmen circling around each other like falcons. but flying higher than any falcon, swooping down upon each other with breathless suddenness, braving simultaneously the perils of the invisible atmospheric mäelstroms and billows and the bursting shrapnel of anti-aircraft artillery, squirting death from a machine gun during a few favourable seconds. how feeble and insignificant seem the rock-hurling, sword-wielding deeds of Homeric heroes!

These warriors of the air are picked men. Upon their personal skill and courage hangs the fate of whole divisions. Consider the battle of the Somme, for example. The French and English had driven the German scouts and fighters from the sky. Command of the air gave them command of the terrain, and so they forced the Germans back yard by yard by means of the most terrific air-controlled artillery fire that either side had endured since the be-

ginning of the war. Boelke, the aërial Achilles of Germany, the most dashing air-fighter that the war has produced, was in his tent—but not sulking. He had been ordered home by the Emperor himself to rest, to impart his skill to other officers, and to superintend the building of new machines. It was felt that only Boelke could regain the mastery of the air. He was summoned back to the Somme with his squadron. He was killed accidentally in a collision with a too-eager follower. But his unmatched prowess saved the Germans from further losses. In a sense, he alone checked the advance of the Allies.

Air-fighting ended the long-distance reconnaissance flights that had preceded the Battle of the Marne. Only long bombing raids were henceforth undertaken—raids in which it was possible to avoid the more dangerous positions of the enemy, to fly swiftly over his lines, to reach the comparatively unprotected country beyond and to drop bombs on the airship sheds of Friedrichshafen and Düsseldorf and the chemical works of Ludwigshafen. Two months before the war it was taken as a matter of course that half the numerous machines entered in an overland endurance contest should come to grief before reaching their destination. In these long bombing expeditions two dozen machines sometimes took part; the missing were brought down by cannon or attacking machines and not by defective parts. Can more telling testimony be offered of the wonderful improvement that has been made in airplane design?

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE FROM THE AIR

With the beginning of trench warfare, the French and German air-scout was assigned to the dangerous task of controlling artillery fire. It is self-evident that he would not be permitted to wireless back the hits and misses of the great guns behind his own lines undisturbed. The enemy sent swift air-fighters after him. To cope with their fast machines, his airplane had to be redesigned. It was not fast enough; it was a poor climber. The Germans promptly built scouting biplanes for fire-control which had the Fokker's characteristic insect-like manœuvring ability. That was not easily done. A Fokker need not stay aloft hours at a time; it need not carry a heavy load of fuel. But a scouting machine which stays up perhaps half a day must be a weight-carrier. The Germans effected a compromise by making the machine as small as they could without limiting its weight-carrying capacity too much. At last they arrived at a really serviceable military type remarkable for its speed, its manœuvring ability and climbing power.

The small modern scouting machine thus evolved by the Germans needs carrying power for its equipment alone. It has wireless instruments both for sending and receiving messages, half a dozen bombs, bomb-aiming apparatus, a stereoscopic camera, and two machine guns—one fixed in position and handled by the pilot as in the Fokker machine, the other mounted on a turn-

table and handled by the observer who swings with it. A scouting machine is expected to make a running fight to the rear, but if it is cut off it must fight bow-on like a Fokker.

It has become a hackneyed phrase that the men who fire the great guns never see the target. Hackneyed as it is, it needs reiteration. It would take a man three hours to walk to the spot where the projectile fired by a twelve-inch Skoda gun buries itself in the ground. Batteries are so ingeniously concealed that opposing gun-crews must content themselves with knowing the general direction of the target. The airplane had to be reinvented not only because it had to attack scouts but because it had to aid the gunners. By 1910 the modern long-bore gun and the howitzer had outstripped the methods of laying it on the target devised by optical-instrument makers and mathematicians. To make the most of the gun, better fire-control was an essential. If the airplane and dirigible had not been invented years ago, they would assuredly have been invented during the progress of the war.

Napoleon's picturesquely blasphemous estimate of the fortunes of battle is still valid. But it needs an addition. Heaven is not only on the side of the heaviest artillery but also on the side of the most efficient fire-controlling airmen. It is true that telephones and telegraphs in the advance trenches are employed to communicate the effect of each shot. But while the telephone and telegraph operators in the trenches may see the sandbags opposite, the crux of the enemy's defence is never revealed to them—the crux represented by the batteries far, far behind the enemy's front. Before the eyes of the man in the air, the whole battleground is spread out. He now has at his command wireless telegraph instruments. As a shot falls he can flash back the word "too short" or "too long." Anything that the eye in the air can see can be destroyed. The airman must be regarded as the miraculous extension of a general's eyes and mind. It lies within his power to annihilate a battery mightier than that of any super-dreadnought.

The tactics of the Somme developed with better handling of the airplane. As the efficiency of fire-control and scouting was increased, artillery became more deadly. Technical improvement in the airplane was mirrored in the tactics adopted by the opposing general staffs. Hence, the decisive importance of artillery in the war must be in a large measure ascribed to the airplane.

The technique of scouting and fire-control bears little resemblance to what it was before the war. Photographs have taken the place of the eye. Automatic airplane cameras had been invented before the war, but no one suspected that they would be used in anything but long scouting expeditions. In the engagements that took place in the region of Arras in April, 1917, no fewer than seventeen hundred photographs were made in a day of the German lines by dozens of flying machines. On both sides along the western front scouting has become as photographic as modern astronomy. The

camera is built into the machine at a spot where the lens can see everything. Stereoscopic pictures are taken and studied in a stereoscope. Indefinite markings on charts of fortifications, trenches, and batteries give place to exact records marvellously rich in detail. Counterfeits (sham batteries and trenches) are easily detected, because counterfeits lack depth.

LEARNING TO FLY ANEW

The art of flying has changed fully as much as the flying machine itself—not in its principles but in the demands made on the pilot. Generals have become ruthless. Before the war, machines were adapted to the pilot; after the Marne, the pilot had to adapt himself to the machine. The astonishing somersaults and tail-first dives of Pégoud and his imitators are now part of the repertoire of every military flyer. They have been elevated to the dignity of tactical evolutions. No matter what the conditions may be, no matter how daring in design an untried machine may be, the flyer must rise into the air. He is literally flung into the atmosphere and made to soar without ante-bellum regard for his neck. Military exigencies are more important than lives.

But the enormously increased speed of the new machines is not without its compensation. Ten years ago the man in an airplane was in the unstable position of a tight-rope walker without a pole. Wilbur Wright testified that out of the sixty seconds in a minute a pilot was busily engaged in working his controls for fifty-nine in the unceasing effort to maintain his balance. Orville Wright now comments that a pilot may neglect his balance for a time, even in gusty weather, and still be certain of recovering his equilibrium when necessary. That is an advance so wonderful that only an airman can appreciate it at its full worth—an advance made chiefly by a nice proportioning of surfaces and distribution of weights as a result of laboratory research.

ZEPPELINS AND OTHER DIRIGIBLES

What of the dirigibles in the war? Very little has been heard of them with the exception of the Zeppelins. On paper the Allies were more than a match for the Germans in the number of dirigibles that could be launched. But when the test came, when the outbreak of hostilities taxed all resources to the uttermost, the Germans again proved that they had the upper hand. There is an important meteorological reason for this. The prevailing winds are from the west. Raids in dirigibles are always made against the wind, if possible, so that damaged vessels may drift back to safety. The meteorological advantage was with the Germans as a result.

Only the Zeppelin has earned laurels comparable with those of the airplane. German army officers had objected to the Zeppelin's unwieldiness. They wanted something that could be inflated on the battlefield and that could be transported in two army wagons, and so they advocated the Parseval and

Gross-Basenach collapsible vessels. They soon saw the light. It is significant that both England and Russia were permitted to buy Parsevals in Germany. Austria alone was initiated into Zeppelin mysteries; at least she had announced her intention of adding Zeppelins to her airfleet about a year before the outbreak of the war.

Although the Zeppelin proved itself vastly superior to all other dirigibles

its design was no more final than that of the military airplane.

War has made speed so imperative that the Zeppelins have been shorn of all wind-resisting appendages. The car lies close to the hull now; the rudders are simpler than they were; the propellers are no longer mounted on brackets at the side of the hull, but directly on the cars. The smallest modern Zeppelin built before the war was the *Viktoria Luise*, a craft 485 feet long. Her type has disappeared as the Taube airplane disappeared. It was too small and too slow.

Still slower and still smaller were the dirigibles of the Allies. They could not fly as high as the smallest Zeppelin; they were too dependent on favourable weather. That applies with equal force to the German non-rigid Parsevals and the semi-rigid Gross-Basenachs, and explains why they, too, have been heard of only infrequently. They must have been brought down rather too easily if we may judge from the way a Parseval succumbed to Russian artillery fire near Riga in the autumn of 1915.

HOW THE ZEPPELINS PATROL THE NORTH SEA

Except by the English Government itself, the Zeppelin has been generally underestimated, probably because of the indignation aroused by its attacks on English towns. It is even referred to in the press of both sides of the Atlantic as an egregious failure. Count von Zeppelin is popularly supposed to have died of disappointment. One has only to read the speeches made in Parliament in March, 1916, by Churchill, Balfour, Joynson-Hicks and Lord Montagu of Beaulieu to learn how keenly the British authorities regret that England did not build a fleet of Zeppelins ten years ago, how much simpler England's problem would be if the North Sea could be watched by a few giant rigid dirigibles rather than by a large squadron of war vessels, and how effectually the Zeppelins keep the German High Sea Fleet informed of the activities of British battle cruisers and dreadnoughts.

The truth is that the Zeppelin's influence on naval tactics is comparable with the airplane's influence on land tactics. Britannia unquestionably rules the waves of the North Sea; but the Zeppelin also unquestionably rules its atmosphere. England has not been able to cope with the Zeppelin naval scout. Over the waters of the North Sea the Zeppelins are safe. There are no hidden fortifications with powerful anti-aircraft artillery. A warship armed with the necessary guns can be descried afar and avoided. Sea-

planes have proved powerless to thwart the Zeppelin. The largest have not the necessary radius of action. A Zeppelin's movements may be extended for days. Even over the restricted waters of northern Europe a seaplane can stay aloft for only a few hours. The Zeppelin is an independent fighting and scouting craft like any cruiser. A seaplane must be accompanied by a mother ship. It cannot rise from the open sea, unless the water happens to be fairly smooth and the weather favourable. From a ship only a machine smaller than a seaplane can be launched. The hoisting of a seaplane on board of its mother ship is fraught with danger of attack. The operation takes time; the mother ship must come to a full stop; the whole target is excellent. In battle, seaplanes must be left at the mercy of the waves after the fuel supply is exhausted.

A seaplane that rises after two fleets are engaged, like the solitary British machine that appeared in the sky during the Skagerrack battle, can hardly render effective service. A Zeppelin which is on duty all the time, if need be, must be reckoned with; it enables a commander to begin the action when he—not the enemy—decides. In a single day a Zeppelin can sweep the whole North Sea without risk to itself. A mother ship with seaplanes would consume several days in the same employment. And what happens when the plane discovers the enemy? It is discovered itself; the presence of a defence-less, near-by mother ship is advertised. If the enemy should have a squadron of fast destroyers, the mother ship must inevitably be captured, which performance seals the fate of the seaplane.

That the Zeppelin is more than a match for the seaplane is admirably demonstrated by the engagement that took place near Terschelling, off the Dutch coast on July 5, 1915. Several mother ships were engaged in hoisting a fleet of seaplanes overboard, when a Zeppelin squadron espied the operation. It came down like an avalanche, dropped bombs on the mother ships and opened fire. The ships steamed away at once. Lieutenant Bird, the pilot of the single plane that had been launched, decided that salvation lay in flight. He rose and fled over Holland, inland. A Zeppelin had wirelessed the news of his escape back to a German base. Airplanes pursued him and pressed him so hotly that he was forced to descend in Holland where he and his machine were interned.

THE ZEPPELINS IN THE NORTH SEA BATTLES

The two battles fought by the Germans and English in the North Sea will go down in history not only because super-dreadnoughts and battle cruisers were under fire for the first time but also because of the part that the Zeppelins played.

Both Admiral Beatty and Admiral Jellicoe have freely conceded the naval value of the Zeppelins in the official reports of the two great battles fought in

the North Sea. There can be no question that the German High Sea Fleet came out into the open only after the Zeppelins had carefully determined the location and strength of the British Grand and Battle-Cruiser Fleets. Thanks to the Zeppelins, the German Admiral knew exactly when the British Grand Fleet might be expected to arrive on the scene of the Skagerrack battle. He retired in the nick of time. The amazingly swift destruction of three fine British battle-cruisers during that historic engagement seems to presuppose a knowledge of contemplated manœuvres that could only have been gained from a height at which everything is revealed. So, too, the shelling of English coast towns by German warships must have been preceded by a careful Zeppelin survey of the Channel and North Sea to discover whether or not the vessels to which the bombardment was entrusted might venture forth.

THE ZEPPELIN AS A BOMB-DROPPER

On land the Zeppelins have been employed like airplanes; in other words, for scouting and bomb-dropping. Airplanes did not at first engage in nocturnal scouting. The Zeppelins, on the other hand, hovered over the enemy night after night from the beginning. Hence, they gave the Germans an enormous advantage at the outset, all the more so because anti-aircraft artillery was still ineffective. They dropped bombs on the fortress of Namur in 1914 and materially assisted in reducing that stronghold.

Like the scouts in airplanes, the commanders of Zeppelins had much to learn. Even in the most realistically planned peace manœuvres, dirigibles are not fired upon with real shells. Only war can teach a man how low he may dare to navigate. Because they lacked experience, the Zeppelin commanders risked the enemy's fire too carelessly. Crude as the first anti-aircraft artillery was, several Zeppelins were destroyed even in the beginning.

The problem of arming the Zeppelin against airplanes has not been satisfactorily solved. It carries one or two machine guns on top of its huge envelope and several within its cars. Although a Zeppelin is a wonderfully steady platform, guns can hardly be expected to fire with great precision when shaken by near-by engines. The guns on top of the huge envelope, admirably located as they are, are not affected by vibration, but they lack shelter and cannot be served comfortably. Perhaps the Zeppelin that was destroyed over London by Lieutenant Robinson, an intrepid boy in a British airplane, met its awful fate because its guns were unfortunately mounted. That a vessel larger than most ocean steamers should not have been able to beat off an airplane speaks strongly in favour of that supposition.

How the Zeppelins are used over land is well illustrated by the attack made on the night of August 11-12, 1915, on Bielostok, an important military railway junction. The craft flew at a height of only 8,000 feet without being hit once by the Russian artillery. When Bielostok was reached, the vessel

rose to 10,000 feet. Far below, the city and the railway station could be distinctly seen, brightly illuminated. Thirty bombs were dropped, one after another. Explosions of ammunition followed, so terrific that they were felt in the Zeppelin itself. The junction was wiped out.

As a bomb-dropper, the Zeppelin is more successful than the airplane. Its sighting instruments are not only more elaborate and accurate, but manipulated in ease and comfort. When it is considered that in dropping a bomb an error of an inch may be multiplied into a hundred yards at the ground, the ability of the Zeppelin to sight its target carefully gives it an enormous advantage over the airplane. Moreover, the heavy bombs carried by an airplane must of necessity be few in number; light bombs, however numerous, are easily deflected by the wind. The bombs of a Zeppelin weigh 150 pounds each. A Zeppelin carries a load of sixty such bombs—ten times as many as an airplane; if it does not hit the mark at the first trial, it can make attempt after attempt. Hence, we find Zeppelins assisting the siege guns and howitzers in reducing the fortresses of Belgium.

HITTING THE MARK FROM A HEIGHT OF TWO MILES

It is certain that far more is seen from any aircraft at night than is commonly supposed. Lights may be extinguished or covered; but no amount of darkening ever erases the contour of a terrain viewed from a great height. Water always appears light; massed buildings, forests and parks, darker. On the whole, suppression of details may even assist a bomb-dropper; the general character of a country becomes plainer, the landscape more recognizable. One of the writers vividly remembers the bewildering mass of details visible during a daylight trip in a Zeppelin; landscapes were so confused that it was difficult at first to distinguish one from another.

Although a darkened territory may actually assist the commander of a Zeppelin in determining his whereabouts, he can drop bombs successfully only if he has a very clearly defined mark. The blast furnaces of English industrial districts, unmistakable glowing spots that could not be extinguished if iron was to be smelted continuously, must have been splendid marks for the Zeppelins. There are stories enough to that effect. Anti-aircraft batteries have been silenced, so it is claimed by the Germans, simply by aiming at their flashes. Firing destroyers are said to have been sunk and searchlights extinguished. Much larger, blurred targets, on the other hand, were missed. In spite of countless misses, the Germans claim to have done enormous damage to factories, stores, ships, and railways as well as "deplorable harm to noncombatants."

The question of the ethics of bomb-dropping and of reprisals in kind is at once raised. We are concerned here only with the task of gauging the military value of aircraft. Bomb-dropping for moral effect is probably a failure. It

may be questioned whether the bombs dropped on English towns by the Germans or by the English on German cities were directed at anything but military objects such as are found in any large city. When bombs are dropped on a town, fortified or unfortified, it is always a foregone conclusion that innocent people will be killed. When the Germans violated the principles of international law by torpedoing a hospital ship and the British in April, 1917 retaliated by sending a so-called "punitive expedition" to drop bombs, also in violation of international law, on the little university town of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, a curious situation arose: There were more important, more readily accessible fortified places than Freiburg; but Freiburg was selected because it was unfortified and because the expedition was punitive. Although the killing of non-combatants was the object of the expedition, the bombs were dropped only on the principal buildings; it was expected that non-combatants would be incidentally killed and the object of the expedition thus attained. The larger the city the more likely is it to contain buildings of military importance. Hence, an aërial attack on undefended Munich would have been more justified than an attack on an undefended small university town. But only a Zeppelin could reach Munich with a load of bombs from one of the Allies' aircraft bases.

THE CONVERTIBLE AIRPLANE—A BRILLIANT ENGLISH INVENTION

Germany's effort to blockade the British Isles with submarines drove home to England her need of dirigibles. To detect a submarine's periscope from afar requires a steadier platform than that of a seaplane. England had neither the time nor the experience to build vessels comparable with Zeppelins. She hit upon an entirely new type of craft, the "convertible airplane"—a veritable stroke of genius. Despite its name, the convertible airplane has no supporting wings; like any other dirigible, it depends entirely upon gas to ascend. Until the "convertible" came, it had always been accepted as a matter of course that the cars of dirigibles should be as roomy as the pilot houses of steamships. Some unknown English genius, noting that airplane bodies could be turned out quickly and cheaply, hit upon the brilliant idea of using them as cars for gas envelopes. Thus, the so-called "convertible airplane" was created. They were much slower than the Zeppelins, but their speed of forty-five miles an hour gave them at least a fair measure of that velocity which is all-important in dirigibles. Moreover, their large number made up for what speed they lacked; they could be built very rapidly. At one stroke, almost, England was placed in possession of a craft not so air-worthy, so fast, or so formidable as the far huger Zeppelin, but well adapted for patrol duty in fair weather. These small convertibles and the Zeppelins are the only dirigibles that have met the later exigencies of the war.

For lack of dirigibles comparable with the Zeppelins in radius of action

and bomb-carrying capacity, the Allies have experimented with mammoth airplanes. The ordinary machine is hardly suitable for very long flights. Its quarters are too cramped, its fuel-capacity too small. At the very outbreak of the war, England bought the America, built by Curtiss for a trans-Atlantic flight—a biplane leviathan with cabin accommodation for five. She was engaged in naval scouting before she was destroyed in a storm. Many Americas have since been built for England to compensate as far as possible for her lack of Zeppelins.

Huge two-motored machines also have been built by the Allies for bombing raids. The Germans have built but one such craft. Evidently the Zeppelins meet all bombing requirements.

AIRCRAFT MADE THE WAR MORE SCIENTIFIC

If we were to crystallize the influence of aircraft upon warfare in a single dictum, this is the conclusion at which we would arrive: The use of aircraft has made warfare more than ever an exact science. To fight a battle, a general must have a plan of action, but before he can formulate that plan, he must know something of his enemy's strength and movements. He must have facts. From the days of ancient Greece down to the Twentieth Century, he gathered them bloodily by sending on troops of cavalry or by a reconnaissance in force. Even then, he could make only more or less shrewd guesses. To force an enemy into an untenable position has always been the object of a general. To do that he must have the most precise information. With the introduction of aircraft into war, he was given the means of collecting that information rapidly and abundantly. But, paradoxically enough, it is harder to win a battle now than it was in Napoleon's day, simply because the enemy, too, gathers his information from the air. The obstacles to be overcome have been multiplied enormously. It is singular that the great generals of history have been, for the most part, engineers. The use of aircraft has made it more than ever essential that the strategist should be an engineer—that he should understand not only how to handle men but that he should be a highly trained physicist as well.

VIII

FLYING MACHINES AND THE WAR

*An Interview with ORVILLE WRIGHT: By FRED C. KELLY

"The greatest use of the airplane to date has been as a tremendously big factor of modern warfare. But—— The greatest use of the airplane eventually will be to prevent war.

"Some day there will be neither war nor rumours of war, and the reason

may be flying machines.

"It sounds paradoxical. We are building airplanes to use in time of war, and will continue to use them for war. We think of war and we think of airplanes. Later on, perhaps, we shall think of airplanes in connection with the wisdom of keeping out of war.

"The airplane will prevent war by making it too expensive, too slow, too

difficult, too long drawn out—in brief, by making the cost prohibitive."

The man who makes these statements about the airplane is Orville

Wright, one of the brothers who invented it.

"Did you ever stop to think," inquires Wright, "that there is a very definite reason why the present war in Europe has dragged along nearly three years with neither side gaining much advantage over the other? The reason, as I figure it out, is airplanes. In consequence of the scouting work done by the flying machines, each side knows exactly what the opposing forces are doing.

"There is little chance for one army to take another by surprise. Napoleon won his wars by massing his troops at unexpected places. The airplane has made that impossible. It has equalized information. Each side has such complete knowledge of the other's movements that both sides are obliged to crawl into trenches and fight by means of slow, tedious routine rather than by quick, spectacular dashes.

"My impression is that before the present war started the army experts expected it to be a matter of a few weeks or, at the most, a few months. But it has run into years. Now a nation that may be willing to undertake a war lasting a few months may well hesitate about engaging in one that will occupy years. The daily cost of a great war is of course stupendous. When this cost runs on for years the total is likely to be so great that the side which wins nevertheless loses. War will become prohibitively expensive. And the scouting

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work in flying machines will be the predominating factor, as it seems to me, in bringing this about. I like to think so anyhow."

"What, in your opinion, has the present war demonstrated regarding the relative advantages of airplanes and Zeppelin airships?" the inventor was asked.

"The aeroplane seems to have been of the more practical use," replied Wright. "In the first place, dirigible airships of the Zeppelin type are so expensive to build, costing somewhere around half a million dollars each, that it is distinctly disadvantageous to the nation operating them to have one destroyed. The financial risk every time your Zeppelin is shot at is too great. But what is more important is the fact that the Zeppelin is so large that it furnishes an excellent target unless it sails considerably higher than is comparatively safe for an airplane. And when the Zeppelin is at a safe height it is too far above the ground for your scout to make accurate observations, though, it is true, photography is now of great assistance in this direction. Similarly, when the Zeppelin is used for dropping bombs, it must be too high for the bomb thrower to show much accuracy."

"You think that the use of flying machines for scouting purposes will be of considerably more importance than their use as a means of attack?" was another question.

"That has been decidedly true so far," replied Wright. "About all that has been accomplished by either side from bomb dropping has been to kill a few non-combatants, and that will have no bearing on the result of the war.

"English newspapers have long talked of the danger of Zeppelin attacks or airplane attacks, but it was all for a purpose, because they did not believe the country was sufficiently prepared for war and sought to arouse the people and the War Department to action by means of the airship bogy."

"Has the war use of the airplane been up to the expectations you and your brother formed at the time of its invention?"

"Yes, beyond our expectations. About the first thing we thought of after we found that we could fly was its possibilities for scouting purposes, but we had little idea that the year 1917 would see so many thousands of airplanes in army use.

"Aside from the use of the machines for war purposes the war has given a great boost to aviation generally. It has led more men to learn to fly, and with a higher degree of skill than ever before. It has wakened people to aviation possibilities."

IX

LANGUAGE OF THE BIG GUNS*

By HUDSON MAXIM, Inventor of Smokeless Powder

In the present war, the big guns, both on land and sea, have told their own story, and they have commanded conviction of their usefulness in proportion to the loudness of their voice.

Following the introduction of armour-plate by Ericsson's *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, armourplate was answered by increasing the size of guns and projectiles. Brown prismatic powder was developed to slow the burning and lessen the initial pressure, thereby securing a better maintenance of pressure behind the projectile in its passage along the bore of the gun.

Guns weighing more than a hundred tons were built in England for the use of brown prismatic powder, but it was found that, after firing a few rounds, the guns drooped at the muzzle under the shock of discharge, and lost their

accuracy.

The invention and development of smokeless gunpowder, mainly during the ten years between 1887 and 1897, resulted in radical improvements in

guns of all calibres.

Only about 44 per cent. of the products of combustion of the old black powder and the brown prismatic powder were gaseous. The balance, about 56 per cent., were solid matter, and produced smoke. It will be seen, at a glance, that smokeless powder, whose products of combustion are entirely gaseous, possesses enormous ballistic advantages, quite independent of its smokelessness. Less than half the products of combustion of the old smoke-producing powders being gaseous, much energy was absorbed from the gases, to heat and vaporize the solid products constituting the smoke. Additional heat was consumed by the work of expelling the smoke from the gun.

The products of combustion of smokeless powder are not only practically all gaseous, but also they are much hotter than the products of combustion of the old, smoky, black powder. Owing to this fact, smokeless powder may be

considered about four times as powerful as the old black powder.

When a projectile is thrown from a gun, although it is not heated appreciably, yet heat-energy represented by its velocity is absorbed from the expanding gases of the powder charge. When a 12-inch projectile weighing a thousand pounds is thrown from one of our long naval guns, it has a striking energy, fifty feet from the muzzle, of about 50,000 foot-tons—that is to say, it

^{*}From "Defenceless America."

strikes with a force equal to that of 50,000 tons falling from a height of one foot, or one ton falling from a height of 50,000 feet. As the 12-inch naval gun weighs about 50 tons, the energy absorbed from the gases in the shape of velocity of the projectile is sufficient to lift a thousand 12-inch guns to a height of one foot.

As a projectile weighs half a ton, the force of the blow is about the same as though the projectile were to be dropped from a height of twenty miles, with no deduction for the resistance of the atmosphere.

When the projectile is stopped, a quantity of heat is re-developed exactly equal to that absorbed from the powder gases in giving the projectile its high velocity; and the quantity of heat absorbed from the powder gases in throwing a thousand-pound projectile from our big naval guns is sufficient to melt 750 pounds of cast iron, which is enough to heat the projectile white hot.

Obviously, when the projectile strikes armourplate, either the plate or the projectile must yield, for the reason that the projectile brings to bear upon a 12-inch plate an energy sufficient to fuse a hole right through it, and this is substantially what it does. The hard and toughened steel of the plate is heated and softened by the force of impact, and, although the projectile may be cold after it has passed through, it actually does fuse a hole through the plate, the metal flowing like wax from its path.

The introduction of smokeless cannon-powder was followed by a recession from guns of great weight and calibre, to guns of smaller weight and smaller calibre, the aim being to make up for the greater smashing power of huge projectiles, thrown at a lower velocity, with projectiles of smaller size, thrown at much greater velocity and having a greater power of penetration of armourplate, which was constantly being made thicker and tougher and harder in order to resist the impact of armour-piercing projectiles.

As armour-plate continued to increase in thickness and in powers of resistance, guns of bigger and bigger calibre had to be made, capable of withstanding the enormous pressure necessary to throw projectiles of sufficient size and at sufficiently high velocity to penetrate any armourplate that could be opposed to them.

With every improvement in armourplate, the gun and the projectile have been improved and enlarged, until now no armourplate carried by any ship can withstand the naval guns of largest calibre. In its race with armour-plate, the gun has thus far been the winner.

Thus we see that the sufficiency of armourplate must, other things being equal, inevitably depend upon insufficiency in range and penetrating power of the gun to which it is opposed. An unarmoured vessel, with guns capable of penetrating the armourplate of an opponent having shorter-range guns, needs only to have superior speed in order to choose a position out of range of the armourclad's guns, and, atmospheric conditions being favourable, to destroy it without itself being exposed to any danger whatsoever.

But there are other conditions which prevent the gun, however long its range and however great its power of penetration, from being a complete defence in the absence of armoured protection. These conditions are—the limit of vision due to the rotundity of the earth, even in clear weather; the limitation of vision, at much nearer distances, in thick or hazy weather; and, of course, the greatly increased difficulty of hitting at extreme ranges. Also, it is necessary to be able to observe, from the fighting-tops, where trial shots strike, in order to get the correct range, and lay the guns exactly upon the target.

In the recent North Sea fight, firing began at more than 17,000 yards, or about ten miles; 12-inch and 13-inch shells from the British ships struck the Bluecher before more than the upper works of the Bluecher could be seen from the decks of the British ships. Only by the fire-control officers, a hundred feet above the decks, could her whole hull be seen. When the first huge shells came plunging down out of the sky upon the Bluecher, her gunners could not see the ships from which they came.

To-day, the long-range, high-power naval gun, charged with smokeless powder, and throwing a projectile made of tempered steel inconceivably tough and hard, and charged with high explosive, is the most powerful dynamic instrument ever produced by man. A 12-inch naval gun throws a projectile weighing half a ton, at a velocity nearly three times the speed of sound. A charge of 375 pounds of smokeless powder, strong as dynamite, is employed for the projectile's propulsion.

Believing that the advantages of projectiles of great size, carrying a very large bursting charge, could be better illustrated by a gun of extraordinary calibre, I designed a cannon having a calibre of twenty-four inches, but having a weight of only 43 tons, the weight and length of the gun being the same as the British 12-inch 43-ton gun. This gun was designed to throw a semi-armour-piercing projectile weighing 1,700 pounds, and carrying an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds, the total weight of the projectile being 2,700 pounds. While the projectile was not designed to pierce heavy armour, it was capable of penetrating the decks and sides of light-armoured cruisers and deep into earth or concrete for the destruction of forts. It was a veritable aërial torpedo. By means of the special form of multi-perforated smokeless powder designed for this gun, the huge projectile could be thrown to a distance of nine miles with the gun at maximum elevation, and still with a comparatively low chamber pressure.

The projectile was provided with a safety delay-action detonating fuse, designed to explode it after having penetrated the object struck, thereby securing the maximum destructive effects.

It is reported that the Germans have made a huge howitzer weighing 45

tons, having a calibre of $23\frac{1}{2}$ inches, which also is capable of throwing a projectile weighing more than a ton to a distance of nine miles.

If Uncle Sam would listen with an understanding mind to the language of the big guns now speaking on land and sea, he would immediately build a large number of huge howitzers. He would build a large number of good roads, capable of standing the tread of these howitzers. He would build as well a goodly number of battle-cruisers, as big and as fast as any afloat in foreign seas, and armed with guns ranging as far as the guns of any foreign power.



PART III APPENDIX

THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE
By FRANK H. SIMONDS



APPENDIX

THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE By FRANK H. SIMONDS

In the third week of August, 1914, a French army crossed the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and entered the Promised Land, toward which all Frenchmen had looked in hope and sadness for forty-four years. The long-forgotten communiqués of that early period of the war reported success after success, until at last it was announced that the victorious French army had reached Saarburg and Morhange, and were astride the Strassburg-Metz railroad. And then Berlin took up the cry, and France and the world learned of a great German victory and of the defeat and rout of the invading army. Even Paris conceded that the retreat had begun and the "army of liberation" was crowding back beyond the frontier and far within French territory.

Then the curtain of the censorship fell and the world turned to the westward to watch the terrible battle for Paris. In the agony and glory of the Marne the struggle along the Moselle was forgotten; the Battle of Nancy, of Lorraine, was fought and won in the darkness, and when the safety of Paris was assured the world looked toward the Aisne, and then toward Flanders. So it came about that one of the greatest battles of the whole war, one of the most important of the French victories, the success that made the Marne possible, the rally and stand of the French armies about Nancy, escaped the fame it earned. Only in legend, in the romance of the Kaiser with his cavalry

waiting on the hills to enter the Lorraine capital, did the battle live.

When I went to France one of the hopes I had cherished was that I might be permitted to visit this battlefield, to see the ground on which a great battle had been fought, that was still unknown country, in the main, for those who have written on the war. The Lorraine field was the field on which France and Germany had planned for a generation to fight. Had the Germans respected the neutrality of Belgium, it is by Nancy, by the gap between the Vosges and the hills of the Meuse, that they must have broken into France. The Marne was a battlefield which was reached by chance and fought over by hazard, but every foot of the Lorraine country had been studied for the fight long years in advance. Here war followed the natural course, followed the plans of the general staff prepared years in advance. Indeed I had treasured over years a plan of the Battle of Nancy, contained in a French book written long ago, which might serve as the basis for a history of what happened, as it was written as a prophecy of what was to come.

When the Great General Staff was pleased to grant my request to see the battlefield of Nancy I was advised to travel by train to that town accompanied by an officer from the General Staff, and informed that I should there meet an officer of the garrison, who would conduct me to all points of interest and explain in detail the various phases of the conflict. Thus it fell out, and I have to thank Commandant Leroux for the courtesy and consideration which made this excursion successful.

In peace time one goes from Paris to Nancy in five hours, and the distance is about that from New York to Boston, by Springfield. In war all is different, and the time almost doubled. Yet there are compensations. Think of the New York-Boston trip as bringing you beyond New Haven to the exact rear of battle, of battle but fifteen miles away, with the guns booming in the distance and the airplanes and balloons in full view. Think also of this same trip, which from Hartford to Worcester follows the line of a battle not yet two years old, a battle that has left its traces in ruined villages, in shattered houses. On either side of the railroad track the graves descend to meet the embankments; you can mark the advance and the retreat by the crosses which fill the fields. The gardens that touch the railroad and extend to the rear of houses in the little towns are filled with graves. Each enclosure has been fought for at the point of the bayonet, and every garden wall recalls the Château of Hougoumont, at Waterloo.

All this was two years ago, but there is to-day, also. East of Bar-le-Duc the main line is cut by German shell fire now. From Fort Camp des Romains above St. Mihiel German guns sweep the railroad near Commercy, and one has to turn south by a long detour, as if one went to Boston by Fitchburg, travel south through the country of Jeanne d'Arc and return by Toul, whose forts look out upon the invaded land. Thus one comes to Nancy by night, and only by night, for twenty miles beyond there are Germans and a German cannon, which not so long ago sent a shell into the town and removed a whole city block beside the railroad station. It is the sight of this ruin as you enter the town which reminds you that you are at the front, but there are other reminders.

As we ate our dinner in the café, facing the beautiful Place Stanislas, we were disturbed by a strange and curious drumming sound. Going out into the square, we saw an airplane, or rather its lights, red and green, like those of a ship. It was the first of several, the night patrol, rising slowly and steadily and then sweeping off in a wide curve toward the enemy's line. They were the sentries of the air which were to guard us while we slept, for men do sentry-go in the air as well as on the earth about the capital of Lorraine. Then the searchlights on the hills began to play, sweeping the horizon toward that same mysterious region where beyond the darkness there is war.

The next morning I woke with the sense of Fourth of July. Bang! Bang!

Bang! Such a barking of cannon crackers I had never heard. Still drowsy, I pushed open the French windows and looked down on the square. There I beheld a hundred or more men, women, and children, their eyes fixed on something in the air above and behind the hotel. Still the incessant barking of guns with the occasional boom of something more impressive. With difficulty I grasped the fact. I was in the midst of a Taube raid. Somewhere over my head, invisible to me because of the wall of my hotel, a German airplane was flying, and all the anti-aircraft guns were shooting at it. Was it carrying bombs? Should I presently see or feel the destruction following the descent of these?

But the Taube turned away, the guns fired less and less frequently, the people in the streets drifted away, the children to school, the men to work, the women to wait. It was just a detail in their lives, as familiar as the incoming steamer to the commuters on the North River ferryboat. Some portion of war has been the day's history of Nancy for nearly two years now. The children do not carry gas masks to school with them as they do at Pont-à-Mousson, a dozen miles to the north, but women and children have been killed by German shells, by bombs brought by Zeppelins and by airplanes. There is always excitement of sorts in the district of Nancy.

After a breakfast broken by the return of the airplanes we had seen departing the night before for the patrol, we entered our cars and set out for the front, for the near front, for the lines a few miles behind the present trenches, where Nancy was saved but two years ago. Our route lay north along the valley of the Meurthe, a smiling broad valley, marching north and south and meeting in a few miles that of the Moselle coming east. It was easy to believe that one was riding through the valley of the Susquehanna, with spring and peace in the air. Toward the east a wall of hills shut out the view. This was the shoulder of the Grand-Couronne, the wall against which German violence burst and broke in September, 1914.

Presently we came to a long stretch of road walled in on the river side by brown canvas, exactly the sort of thing that is used at foot-ball games to shut out the non-paying public. But it had another purpose here. We were within the vision of the Germans, across the river, on the heights behind the forest, which outlined itself at the skyline; there were the Kaiser's troops and that forest was the Bois-le-Prêtre, the familiar incident in so many communiques since the war began. Thanks to the canvas, it was possible for the French to move troops along this road without inviting German shells. Yet it was impossible to derive any large feeling of security from a canvas wall, which alone interposed between you and German heavy artillery.

We passed through several villages and each was crowded with troops; cavalry, infantry, all the branches represented; it was still early and the soldiers were just beginning their day's work; war is so completely a business here-

Transport wagons marched along the roads, companies of soldiers filed by. Interspersed with the soldiers were civilians, the women and children, for none of the villages are evacuated. Not even the occasional boom of a gun far off could give to this thing the character of real war. It recalled the days of my soldiering in the militia camp at Framingham in Massachusetts. It was simply impossible to believe that it was real. Even the faces of the soldiers were smiling. There was no such sense of terribleness, of strain and weariness as I later found about Verdun. The Lorraine front is now inactive, tranquil; it has been quiet so long that men have forgotten all the carnage and horror of the earlier time.

We turned out of the valley and climbed abruptly up the hillside. In a moment we came into the centre of a tiny village and looked into a row of houses, whose roofs had been swept off by shell fire. Here and there a whole house was gone; next door the house was undisturbed and the women and children looked out of the doors. The village was St. Geneviève, and we were at what had been the extreme front of the French in August, and against this hill burst the flood of German invasion. Leaving the car we walked out of the village, and at the end of the street a sign warned the wayfarer not to enter the fields, for which we were bound: "War—do not trespass." This was the burden of the warning.

Once beyond this sign we came out suddenly upon an open plateau, upon trenches. Northward the slope descended to a valley at our feet. It was cut and seamed by trenches, and beyond the trenches stood the posts that carried the barbed-wire entanglements. Here and there, amidst the trenches, there were graves. I went down to the barbed-wire entanglements and examined them curiously. They at least were real. Once thousands of men had come up out of the little woods a quarter of a mile below; they had come on in that famous massed attack, they had come on in the face of machine gun and "seventy-fives." They had just reached the wires, which marked high water. In the woods below, the Bois-de-Facq, in the fields by the river, 4,000 Germans had been buried.

Looking out from the trenches the whole country unfolded. Northward the little village of Atton slept under the steep slope of Côte-de-Mousson, a round pinnacle crowned with an ancient château. From the hill the German artillery had swept the ground where I stood. Below the hill to the west was Pont-à-Mousson, the city of 150 bombardments, which the Germans took when they came south, and lost later. Above it was the Bois-le-Prêtre, in which guns were now booming occasionally. Far to the north was another hill, just visible, and its slope toward us was cut and seamed with yellow slashes: Those were the French trenches, then of the second or third line; beyond there was still another hill, it was slightly blurred in the haze, but it was not over five miles away, and it was occupied by the Germans. From the slope above

me on a clear day it is possible to see Metz, so near are French and German lines to the old frontier.

Straight across the river to the west of us was another wood, with a glorious name, the Forest of the Advance Guard. It swept to the south of us. In that wood the Germans had also planted their guns on the day of battle. They had swept the trenches where I stood from three sides. Plainly it had been a warm corner. But the French had held on. Their commander had received a verbal order to retreat. He insisted that it should be put in writing, and this took time. The order came. It had to be obeyed, but he obeyed slowly. Reluctantly the men left the trenches they had held so long. They slipped southward along the road by which we had come. But suddenly their rear guards discovered that the Germans were also retreating. So the French came back and the line of St. Geneviève was held, the northern door to Nancy was not forced.

Looking down again it was not difficult to reconstitute that German assault, made at night. The thing was so simple the civilian could grasp it. A road ran through the valley and along it the Germans had formed; the slope they had to advance up was gentle, far more gradual than that of San Juan. They had been picked troops selected for a forlorn hope, and they had come back four times. The next morning the whole forest had been filled with dead and dying. Not less than a division—20,000 men—had made the terrible venture. Now there was a strange sense of emptiness in the country; war had come and gone, left its graves, its trenches, its barbed-wire entanglements; but these were all disappearing already. On this beautiful spring morning it was impossible to feel the reality of what happened here, what was happening now, in some measure, five miles or more to the north. Nature is certainly the greatest of all pacifists; she will not permit the signs of war to endure nor the mind to believe that war itself has existed and exists.

From St. Geneviève we went to the Grand Mont d'Amance, the most famous point in all the Lorraine front, the southeast corner of the Grand-Couronne, as St. Geneviève is the northern. Here, from a hill some 1,300 feet high, one looks eastward into the Promised Land of France—into German Lorraine. In the early days of August the great French invasion, resting one flank upon this hill, the other upon the distant Vosges, had stepped over the frontier. One could trace its route to the distant hills among which it had found disaster. In these hills the Germans had hidden their heavy guns, and the French, coming under their fire without warning, unsupported by heavy artillery, which was lacking to them, had broken. Then the German invasion had rolled back. You could follow the route. In the foreground the little Seille River could be discerned; it marked the old frontier. Across this had come the defeated troops. They had swarmed down the low, bare hills; they had crossed and vanished in the woods just at my feet; these woods were the

Forest of Champenoux. Into this forest the Germans had followed by the thousand, they were astride the main road to Nancy, which rolled white and straight at my feet. But in the woods the French rallied. For days there was fought in this stretch of trees one of the most terrible of battles.

As I stood on the Grand Mont I faced almost due east. In front of me and to the south extended the forest. Exactly at my feet the forest reached up the hill and there was a little cluster of buildings about a fountain. All was in ruins, and here, exactly here, was the high-water mark of the German advance. They had occupied the ruins for a few moments and then had been driven out. Elsewhere they had never emerged from the woods; they had approached the western shore, but the French had met them with machine guns and "seventy-fives." The brown woods at my feet were nothing but a vast cemetery; thousands of French and German soldiers slept there.

In their turn the Germans had gone back. Now, in the same woods, a French battery was shelling the Germans on the other side of the Seille. Under the glass I studied the little villages unfolding as on a map; they were all destroyed, but it was impossible to recognize this. Some were French, some German; you could follow the line, but there were no trenches; behind them French shells were bursting occasionally and black smoke rose just above the ground. Thousands of men faced each other less than four miles from where I stood, but all that there was to be detected were the shell bursts; otherwise one saw a pleasant country, rolling hills, mostly without woods, bare in the spring which had not yet come to turn them green. In the foreground ran that arbitrary line Bismarck had drawn between Frenchmen forty-six years before—the frontier—but of natural separation there was none. He had cut off a part of France, that was all, and one looked upon what had been and was still a bleeding wound.

I asked the French commandant about the various descriptions made by those who have written about the war. They have described the German attack as mounting the slope of the Grand Mont where we stood. He took me to the edge and pointed down. It was a cliff almost as steep as the Palisades. "C'est une blague," he smiled. "Just a story." The Germans had not charged here, but in the forest below, where the Nancy road passed through and enters the valley of the Amezeule. They had not tried to carry but to turn the Grand Mont. More than 200,000 men had fought for days in the valley below. I asked him about the legend of the Kaiser sitting on a hill, waiting in white uniform with his famous escort, waiting until the road was clear for his triumphal entrance into the capital of Lorraine. He laughed. I might choose my hill; if the Emperor had done this thing the hill was "over there," but had he? They are hard on legends at the front, and the tales that delight Paris die easily on the frontiers of war.

But since I had asked so much about the fighting my commandant promised

to take me in the afternoon to the point where the struggle had been fiercest, still farther to the south, where all the hills break down and there is a natural gateway from Germany into France, the beginning of the famous Charmes Gap, through which the German road to Paris from the east ran, and still runs. Leaving Nancy behind us, and ascending the Meurthe Valley on the eastern bank, turning out of it before Saint Nicholas du Port, we came presently to the most completely war-swept fields that I have ever seen. On a perfectly level plain the little town of Haraucourt stands in sombre ruins. Its houses are nothing but ashes and rubble. Go out of the village toward the east and you enter fields pockmarked by shell fire. For several miles you can walk from shell hole to shell hole. The whole country is a patchwork of these shell holes. At every few rods a new line of old trenches approaches the road and wanders away again. Barbed-wire entanglements run up and down the gently sloping hillsides.

Presently we came out upon a perfectly level field. It was simply torn by shell fire. Old half-filled trenches wandered aimlessly about, and beyond, under a gentle slope, the little village of Corbessaux stood in ruins. The com-

mandant called my attention to a bit of woods in front.

"The Germans had their machine guns there," said he. "We didn't know it, and a French brigade charged across this field. It started at 8:15, and at 8:30 it had lost more than 3,000 out of 6,000. Then the Germans came out of the woods in their turn, and our artillery, back at Haraucourt, caught them and they lost 3,500 men in a quarter of an hour." Along the roadside were innumerable graves. We looked at one. It was marked: "Here 196 French." Twenty feet distant was another; it was marked: "Here 196 Germans." In the field where we stood I was told some 10,000 men are buried. They were buried hurriedly, and even now, when it rains, arms and legs are exposed.

Two years had passed, almost two years, since this field had been fought for. The Germans had taken it. They had approached Haraucourt, but had not passed it. This was the centre and the most vital point in the Lorraine battle. What Foch's troops had done about La Fère Champenoise, those of Castelnau had done here. The German wave had been broken, but at what cost? And now, after so many months, the desolation of war remained. But yet it was not to endure. Beside the very graves an old peasant was ploughing, guiding his plough and his horses carefully among the tombs. Four miles away more trenches faced each other and the battle went on audibly, but behind this line, in this very field where so many had died, life was beginning.

Later we drove south, passing within the lines the Germans had held in their great advance; we travelled through Lunéville, which they had taken and left unharmed, save as shell fire had wrecked an eastern suburb. We visited Gerbéviller, where in an excess of rage the Germans had burned every structure in the town. I have never seen such a headquarters of desolation. Every-

thing that had a shape, that had a semblance of beauty or of use, lies in complete ruin, detached houses, a château, the blocks in the village, all in ashes. Save for Sermaize, Gerbéviller is the most completely wrecked town in France.

You enter the village over a little bridge across the tiny Mortagne. Here some French soldiers made a stand and held off the German advance for some hours. There was no other battle at Gerbéviller, but for this defence the town died. Never was death so complete. Incendiary material was placed in every house, and all that thoroughness could do to make the destruction complete was done. Gerbéviller is dead, a few women and children live amidst its ashes, there is a wooden barrack by the bridge with a post-office and the inevitable postcards, but only on postcards, picture postcards, does the town live. It will be a place of pilgrimage when peace comes.

From Gerbéviller we went by Bayon to the Plateau of Saffais, the ridge between the Meurthe and the Moselle, where the defeated army of Castelnau made its last and successful stand. The French line came south from St. Geneviève, where we had been in the morning, through the Grand Mont, across the plain by Haraucourt and Corbessaux, then crossed the Meurthe by Dombasle and stood on the heights from Rosières south. Having taken Lunèville, the Germans attempted to cross the Meurthe coming out of the Forest of Vitrimont.

Standing on the Plateau of Saffais and facing east, the whole country unfolded again, as it did at the Grand Mont. The face of the plateau is seamed with trenches. They follow the slopes, and the village of Saffais stands out like a promontory. On this ridge the French had massed three hundred cannon. Their army had come back in ruins, and to steady it they had been compelled to draw troops from Alsace. Mühlhausen was sacrificed to save Nancy. Behind these crests on which we stood, a beaten army, almost routed, had in three days found itself and returned to the charge.

In the shadow of the dusk I looked across the Meurthe into the brown mass of the Forest of Vitrimont. Through this had come the victorious Germans. They had debouched from the wood; they had approached the river, hidden under the slope, but, swept by the hell of this artillery storm, they had broken. But few had lived to pass the river, none had mounted the slopes. There were almost no graves along these trenches. Afterward the Germans had in turn yielded to pressure from the south and gone back. Before the Battle of the Marne began the German wave of invasion had been stopped here in the last days of August. A second terrific drive, coincident with the Marne, had likewise failed. Then the Germans had gone back to the frontier. The old boundary line of Bismarck is now in many instances an actual line of fire, and nowhere on this front are the Germans more than three or four miles within French territory.

If you should look at the map of the wholly imaginary Battle of Nancy,

lrawn by Colonel Boucher to illustrate his book, published before 1910, a book describing the problem of the defence of the eastern frontier, you will ind the lines on which the French stood at Saffais indicated exactly. Colonel Boucher had not dreamed this battle, but for a generation the French General Staff had planned it. Here they had expected to meet the German thrust. When the Germans decided to go by Belgium they had in turn taken the offenive, but, having failed, they had fought their long-planned battle.

Out of all the region of war, of war to-day and war yesterday, one goes pack to Nancy, to its busy streets, its crowds of people returning from their day's work. War is less than fifteen miles away, but Nancy is as calm as London is nervous. Its bakers still make macaroons; even Taube raids do not excuse the children from punctual attendance at school. Nancy is calm with the calmness of all France, but with just a touch of something more than calmness, which forty-six years of living by an open frontier brings. Twenty-one months ago it was the gauge of battle, and half a million men fought for it; a new German drive may approach it at any time. Out toward the old frontier there is still a German gun, hidden in the Forest of Bézange, which has turned one block to ashes and may fire again at any hour. Zeppelins have come and gone, leaving dead women and children behind them, but Nancy goes on with to-day.

And to-morrow? In the hearts of all the people of this beautiful city there is a single and a simple faith. Nancy turns her face toward the ancient frontier, she looks hopefully out upon the shell-swept Grand-Couronne and beyond to the Promised Land. And the people say to you if you ask them about war and about peace, as one of them said to me: "Peace will come, but not until we have our ancient frontier, not until we have Metz and Strasbourg. We have waited a long time, is it not so?"

END OF VOLUME ONE





